State of Louisiana v. Carnelius Holmes

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,398-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CARNELIUS HOLMES Appellant

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Appealed from the
Forty-Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 21-CR-31373

Honorable Nicholas E. Gasper, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Christopher A. Aberle

CHARLES BLAYLOCK ADAMS Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

LEA R. HALL, JR.
RHYS E. BURGESS
NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Carnelius Holmes stole two firearms from two different vehicles, was

arrested, and eventually pled guilty to two counts of simple burglary. At his

plea hearing, the trial court advised him of the rights that he would be giving

up by pleading guilty, including his right “to testify on your own behalf if

you so choose.” After entering his guilty plea, he never showed up for his

scheduled sentencing hearing and remained at large for almost three years,

until he was arrested for a different crime. When he was brought back

before the court for sentencing on the simple burglary charges, the trial

court, noting the nature of his crime included the theft of firearms and his

unlawful freedom for the prior three years, sentenced him to the maximum

sentence of 12 years of hard labor on each count of simple burglary. The

trial court generously ran each count concurrently and suspended four years

of the sentence, effectively crafting an 8-year sentence for Holmes. The

defendant appealed, now arguing that (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly

and intelligently given because he was not specifically advised of his right to

remain silent, and (2) his sentence is excessive. As Holmes elected to plead

guilty, there was no trial, and he did not testify. For the reasons set forth in

more detail below, we affirm both his convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Carnelius Holmes (“Holmes”) was charged1 with two counts of

simple burglary, in violation of La. R.S. 14:62, for stealing firearms out of

two vehicles.2 Holmes pled guilty, and the trial court ordered a pre

1
February 2, 2021
2
December 27, 2020

sentence investigation (“PSI”). 3 Prior to his guilty plea, Holmes was

advised by the trial court that he had the right to a jury trial, the right to

confront witnesses against him, and the “right to testify on your own behalf

if you so choose.” The trial court confirmed with Holmes’ defense counsel

that counsel had explained all of Holmes’ rights prior to his guilty plea.

Holmes pled guilty and a sentencing hearing was set.4

Holmes did not appear for his sentencing hearing, and the trial court

issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Holmes remained at large for three

years, until he was arrested on other charges. When Holmes appeared

before the court after his arrest, the trial court, after reviewing the PSI,

sentenced Holmes to 12 years at hard labor on each count of simple

burglary, with four years suspended on each count, with the sentences to run

concurrently. 5 Holmes made a motion to reconsider the sentences based on

his lack of criminal history, and the trial court denied the motion. This

appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Holmes asserts two assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes
of all of his Boykin rights.

Second Assignment of Error: Mr. Homles’ maximum sentences-12
years of imprisonment on his 2 convictions-were excessive.

DISCUSSION

First Assignment of Error: The trial court failed to advise Mr. Holmes
of all of his Boykin rights.

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August 23, 2021
4
November 15, 2021
5
October 14, 2024
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In the first assignment of error, Holmes contends that his conviction

should be vacated because his guilty plea was not freely, intelligently, and

voluntarily made in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.

Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Specifically, Holmes argues that the trial

court failed to properly inform him of his right to remain silent and that a

jury could not use that silence against him.

Review of the record reveals that the trial court did not specifically

inform the defendant that he had a right to remain silent at the time of his

guilty plea, which, no doubt, is preferrable. However, the record includes

the following exchange:

The Court: Okay. You understand that, when you’re charged
with committing a crime, you’re entitled to certain rights?
Those include the right to maintain your plea of not guilty and
have a trial in front of a judge or jury, where the State would
have to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At that
trial, you’d have the right to assistance of an attorney, a right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to subpoena
witnesses to testify on your behalf, and the right to testify on
your own behalf if you so choose. If you’re found guilty after
a trial, you’d have the right to appeal that conviction. You
understand, by pleading guilty, you’re giving up those rights?

The Defendant: Yes, sir.

(emphasis added). The record further reflects that the trial court asked

Holmes’ attorney if he had a chance to speak with him and advise him of all

of his rights, and Holmes’ trial attorney affirmed that they had spoken of his

rights and that Holmes knew that he was giving up those rights by pleading

guilty. The following exchange is reflected in the record:

The Court: Okay. And, Mr. Eades, you’ve had a chance to speak
with Mr. Holmes and advise him of all of his rights, and you believe
he understands what he’s doing today?

Mr. Eades: Yes, Your Honor.

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We find that the trial court sufficiently advised Holmes of his

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. As this Court has noted

previously in State v Billups, 50,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d

1124, quoting State v. Hunt, 573 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991):

In order to effectively waive the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, a defendant who pleads guilty must be
advised of his right to remain silent at trial. A defendant does
not have to be advised that he has a right to ‘stand mute and
refuse to enter a plea of any nature at the Boykin examination.’

See also State v. Honeycutt, 41,601 (La. App. 2 Cir. 02/28/07), 953 So. 2d

914. The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that decisions regarding pleas

should be “decided from the totality of the circumstances whether the plea

has been free and voluntary and made with an intelligent understanding of

the consequence. No express requirement that a specific articulation of

specific constitutional rights are sacramental.” State v. Smith, 375 So. 2d

1328 (La. 1979).

Here, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that the trial court

adequately advised Holmes of his Boykin rights and that Holmes knowingly

and intelligently waived these rights when he pled guilty. The record

reflects that Holmes was represented by counsel when he pled guilty and

throughout these proceedings. The colloquy as a whole reflects a sufficient

inquiry by the trial court and response from Holmes regarding his

fundamental rights. Holmes’ counsel also confirmed reviewing with

Holmes each of his rights and confirmed for the court that Holmes was

aware of his rights and was entering a guilty plea with full knowledge of

what he was doing. This assignment of error is without merit.

Second Assignment of Error: Mr. Homles’ maximum sentences-12
years of imprisonment on his 2 convictions-were excessive.

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In his second assignment of error, Holmes contends that his maximum

sentences on his two convictions were excessive. He argues that he is a 30-

year-old, first felony offender and that the 12 years of imprisonment are

excessive and serve no purpose.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749; State v. Vanhorn,

52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La.

11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065. First, the record must show that the trial court

took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial

court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Croskey, 53,505

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1151. The important elements which

should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties,

marital status, health, and employment record), prior criminal record,

seriousness of offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones,

398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); Dowles, supra. There is no requirement that

specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Dowles,

supra.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. Dowles, supra. Constitutional review turns upon

whether the sentence is illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
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offense, or shocking to the sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const.

art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense

or nothing more than the purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A

sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in light of the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Baker, 51,933 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-

0858 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18),

257 So. 3d 196.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Dowles, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. Id. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate

court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the

appropriateness of a particular sentence. Id. As a general rule, maximum

sentences are appropriate in cases involving the most serious violation of the

offense and the worst type of offender. State v. Taylor, 41,898 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/4/07), 954 So. 2d 804.

Holmes pled guilty to two counts of simple burglary, which is defined

as the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft, or other

structure, moveable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the intent to

commit a felony or any theft therein. La. R.S. 14:62(A)(1). The maximum

sentence for simple burglary is 12 years with or without hard labor. La. R.S.

14:62. The trial court imposed the maximum 12-year sentence on each

count, to be run concurrently, with four years suspended. While the
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sentencing provisions exposed Holmes to 12 years on each count, for a

potential 24-year sentence (if ordered to be served consecutively), Holmes

actually received the equivalent of a total of an 8-year sentence when

considering the concurrent nature of the sentences and suspension of 4 years

on each.

We find the trial court adequately considered La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1

for sentencing. The trial court considered several factors provided in Article

894.1 on the record, including both aggravating and mitigating factors. The

trial court specifically noted the fact that Holmes had absconded for almost

three years after pleading guilty but prior to his sentencing. Prior to the

imposition of the maximum sentence, the court also noted that these simple

burglary charges included the theft of firearms by Holmes, which the court

stated made the crimes more serious as stolen firearms are generally used in

the commission of further crimes.

The trial court imposed sentences well within the statutory limits, and

kindly allowed those sentences to be served concurrently. Considering the

seriousness of burglaries where firearms were stolen and the fact that

Holmes evaded sentencing for almost three years, the imposition of the

maximum is not a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering.

The trial court acted within its discretion in imposing the concurrent

maximum sentences, with four years suspended and credit for any time

served. These sentences are not excessive, and this assignment of error also

lacks merit. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Carnelious Holmes’ convictions

and sentences.

AFFIRMED.
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