State of Louisiana v. Rory Chevalier Pipkin

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,400-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RORY CHEVALIER PIPKIN Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 386,967

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY J. JOHNSON
COURTNEY RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before COX, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

COX, J.

This case arises out of the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish,

Louisiana. Rory Chevalier Pipkin was convicted of third degree rape and

sentenced to 55 years of imprisonment without probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. Pipkin now appeals his sentence. For the following

reasons, we affirm Pipkin’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for

resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

FACTS

Pipkin was indicted on April 28, 2022, for the first degree rape of

A.K. (D.O.B. 2/14/2012) from January 1, 2017, through June 6, 2019. The

following testimonies and evidence were presented at trial:

Xavier Kennon testified that her daughter dated Pipkin for a year and

a half to two years. She stated that they lived in Shreveport before

relocating to Dallas, Texas in 2019. Ms. Kennon testified that Pipkin, her

daughter, and her granddaughter, A.K., lived together, and A.K. would be

left alone with Pipkin. She testified that on June 6, 2019, A.K. told her that

Pipkin would have her try on dresses and touch her inappropriately. Ms.

Kennon stated that A.K. told her Pipkin had her put his penis in her mouth.

A.K. told Ms. Kennon that she could draw a picture to show what happened,

and A.K.’s drawings were submitted as evidence. Ms. Kennon stated that

she called the police, and the police had A.K. examined and taken to the

Gingerbread House.

A.K. testified that at the time of trial, she was 12 years old and in the

sixth grade. She stated that in 2017, she was living with her mom and

Pipkin in Shreveport and then Texas. She stated that when she was living

with her mom, Pipkin would take care of her during the day. A.K. testified

that she remembered being interviewed at the Gingerbread House. A video

of A.K.’s Gingerbread House interview was played for the jury, where A.K.

described the incidents of performing oral sex on Pipkin. A.K. identified the

pictures she drew for her grandmother.

Lacie Hadley, forensic interviewer at the Gingerbread House

Children’s Advocacy Center, was accepted as an expert in forensic

interviewing and the dynamics of child sexual assault. Ms. Hadley testified

that she did not interview A.K. She explained how the Gingerbread House

works, different types of disclosures by children, and research related to the

disclosures of elementary-aged children after sexual encounters.

On cross-examination, Ms. Hadley admitted that she has heard of

false reports and that there is concern in the interview process that the person

being interviewed will be influenced by the expectations of the interviewer.

Ms. Hadley testified regarding general concerns that might arise when

interviewing. She emphasized that the goal of the Gingerbread House is not

to determine if a report is true or false; the goal is to make the child feel

comfortable to talk about “whatever it is that they need or want to talk

about.”

Dr. Jennifer Rodriguez was accepted as an expert in pediatric child

abuse. She testified that she did not examine A.K. but reviewed the report of

A.K.’s examination. Dr. Rodriguez testified that A.K.’s throat, mouth, anal,

and genital exams were within normal limits. She stated that it is common

for children who have been sexually abused to have normal exams because

the mouth and genitals heal quickly.

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Sh’Quilla Kennon, A.K.’s mother, testified for the defense. She

stated that she was not interviewed by law enforcement regarding A.K.’s

disclosure of sexual abuse.

Tori Leathers testified that Ms. Kennon (A.K.’s grandmother) was

overbearing. Tajuana Jackson, Pipkin’s mother, testified that Ms. Kennon

was controlling.

A unanimous jury found Pipkin guilty of the responsive verdict of

third degree rape. Pipkin filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied by the trial

court.

Pipkin was adjudicated as a fourth habitual offender based on the

following prior convictions: aggravated flight from an officer on April 3,

2017 (in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1(C)); possession with intent to

distribute a Schedule 1 CDS on May 1, 2012 (in violation of La R.S.

40:966(A)(1)); and cultivation of marijuana on October 30, 2007 (in

violation of La R.S. 40:966).

At sentencing, the trial court stated the abuse occurred from the time

A.K. was five to seven years old, and had the child not disclosed to her

grandmother, the victimization would have continued for a longer period of

time. The trial court stated, “[T]aking into consideration Article 893, 894,

and the … likelihood of the defendant committing a subsequent crime or

crime of this nature and all the testimony exhibited at trial, the Court will

sentence the defendant to 55 years at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation or suspension of sentence[.]”

Pipkin filed pro se and counseled motions to reconsider sentence. In

the pro se motion, he argued that the trial court erred in not advising him of
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his rights under the habitual offender law and failing to order a PSI. He also

argued that his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. Pipkin’s counsel

argued that the sentence is excessive. The trial court denied the motions to

reconsider and stated, “Petitioner filed this motion within the time

constraints however, the Petitioner was sentenced according to the

applicable law and there is nothing to suggest that such sentence is illegal.

The court is not disposed at this time to upset the imposed sentence.”

Pipkin now appeals his sentence.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Reconsider Sentence

Pipkin argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

reconsider sentence. He asserts that the trial court relied on an incorrect

interpretation of law in stating that sentences cannot be amended once they

are executed. Pipkin states that he filed his motion to reconsider his

sentence within the time delays of La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1, which is an

exception to the general rule that sentences cannot be amended. He asserts

that because the trial court relied on an incorrect interpretation of the law

that sentences cannot be amended, he was deprived of a considered review

of his motion. He asks for a remand to properly consider his motion to

reconsider his sentence.

Each motion to amend or modify a sentence imposed shall be filed,

considered, and decided in compliance with Code of Criminal Procedure

Articles 881 and 881.1. La. C. Cr. P. art. 822. In felony cases, within thirty

days following the imposition of sentence or within such longer period as

the trial court may set at sentence, the state or the defendant may make or

file a motion to reconsider sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(A)(1).
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The trial court stated Pipkin fell under art. 881.1 because his sentence

was at hard labor and recognized that Pipkin filed within 30 days. The trial

court stated, “Petitioner filed this motion within the time constraints

however, the Petitioner was sentenced according to the applicable law and

there is nothing to suggest that such sentence is illegal. The court is not

disposed at this time to upset the imposed sentence.” The trial court did not

state that Pipkin’s sentence could not be amended but that his sentence was

not illegal because he was sentenced according to applicable law. Pipkin

misconstrues the trial court’s ruling. This argument lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

Pipkin argues that his sentence is unconstitutionally harsh and

excessive. He highlights that a PSI was not ordered, and the trial court did

not provide a basis for the sentence imposed. He argues that his sentence

was not particularized to him because no information was provided

regarding his social or employment history, and the trial court only

mentioned this offense and his prior convictions before imposing the

sentence. He asserts that because he was 36 at the time of the sentence, a

55-year sentence is basically a life sentence. Pipkin argues that the

sentencing record does not reflect that he is the worst of the worst or that he

deserves a maximum sentence. He asks this Court to vacate his sentence.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711.

First, the record must show that the trial court took cognizance of the

criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The articulation of the factual
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basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or

mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. The trial court is not required to list

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects

that it adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433

So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Trotter, supra. The important elements

which should be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family

ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record,

seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v.

Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So.

3d 1065. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the

crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it

shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.

2d 166; State v. Vanhorn, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Trotter, supra. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating
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circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. State v. Trotter, supra. Absent specific authority, it is not the

role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing

court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence. State v. Vanhorn,

supra.

Whoever commits the crime of third degree rape shall be imprisoned

at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence,

for not more than 25 years. La. R.S. 14:43.

A defendant adjudicated a habitual offender should be sentenced in

accord with the version of the habitual offender law in effect at the time of

the commission of the charged offense. State v. Belvin, 18-0421 (La. App. 4

Cir. 4/3/19), 363 So. 3d 320. Pipkin’s offense occurred between January 1,

2017, and June 6, 2019. The Habitual Offender Statute, La. R.S. 15:529.1,

was revised multiple times during the range of time that the offense

occurred. La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) remained the same and stated that if

the fourth or subsequent felony is punishable by imprisonment for any term

less than his natural life, then “[t]he person shall be sentenced to

imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term not

less than the longest period of the first conviction but in no event less than

twenty years and not more than his natural life.”

However, from January 1, 2017, through October 31, 2017, La. R.S.

15:529.1(A)(4)(b) stated:

If the fourth felony and two of the prior felonies are felonies
defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B), a sex offense
as defined in R.S. 15:540 et seq. when the victim is under the
age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offense, or as a
violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law
punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more, or of any
other crime punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or
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more, or any combination of such crimes, the person shall be
imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life, without benefit
of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Therefore, if Pipkin were sentenced under the habitual offender statute prior

to November 1, 2017, he would have been subject to a mandatory life

sentence. Effective November 1, 2017, that provision was amended to

remove violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law

punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more and any other crime

punishable by imprisonment for 12 years or more. After November 1, 2017,

Pipkin would have been sentenced under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a), and his

sentencing range would be 25 years to life.

In State v. Roth, 52,359 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1230,

writ denied, 18-2059 (La. 6/17/19), 273 So. 3d 1210, the crime occurred

over a seven-year period, during which the sentencing range was amended.

The trial court could use either version of the statute to sentence Roth

because the crime occurred during the effective period for both versions of

the statute. In Roth, the trial court stated which version of the statute it used

for sentencing. This Court affirmed the use of either sentencing provision.

In State v. Thibodeaux, 12-300 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/24/12), 100 So. 3d

398, the Third Circuit was faced with a similar situation where two habitual

offender sentencing provisions could apply, with one provision being a

mandatory life sentence. The trial court did not specify which provision was

used in sentencing the defendant. The Third Circuit found that it could not

speculate as to what grounds the trial court determined the sentence in this

case, i.e., was he sentenced under the more lenient provision or did the judge

decide to make a downward departure from the mandatory sentence? The

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Thibodeaux court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for

resentencing.

In State v. Simpkins, 44,197 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/09), 12 So. 3d 1021,

writs denied, 09-1229 (La. 2/5/10), 27 So. 3d 296, and 09-1539 (La. 3/5/10),

28 So. 3d 1004, the sentencing range was amended during that period the

crime occurred. The victim in the Simpkins case testified that she was

molested over a two-year period, that defendant raped her six or seven times,

and that the last rape occurred the last time she stayed over at defendant’s

house. The defendant’s wife confirmed that the last time victim stayed over

was before March of 2007, which was six months after the new sentencing

effective date that increased the possible sentence. This Court found that the

harsher sentencing range should have been used based on the time frame

proven at trial, vacated the defendant’s sentence, and remanded for

resentencing.

After resentencing, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the

Simpkins court. State ex rel. Simpkins v. State, 12-1599 (La. 12/14/12), 102

So. 3d 776. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that “the court of appeal

made a factual determination that [the defendant] must have molested the

victim during the five-month window between the effective date of the

amendment and the victim’s 13th birthday.” The State agreed that the new

sentence was “based on facts not found by the jury at trial, but assumed by

the court of appeal[.]” The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the new

sentence and reinstated the original sentence. Id.

As stated above, when the crime occurs over a period of time in which

the sentencing range is amended, either sentencing provision may be used.

The same is true for habitual offender sentencing that is amended during the
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time span of the crime. However, we do not assume which effective date of

the habitual offender law that was used when the trial court is silent. The

jury was not tasked with making a factual determination as to whether the

crime occurred before or after November 1, 2017, the effective date of the

pertinent habitual offender sentencing amendments. Either habitual offender

sentencing provision is appropriate because the crime occurred from 2017

through 2019. However, without knowing which habitual offender

provision was used, we cannot properly analyze Pipkin’s sentence; he could

have a mandatory life sentence or a sentencing range up to life

imprisonment. Therefore, we do not reach the determination of whether

Pipkin’s sentence was excessive. We vacate Pipkin’s sentence and remand

for resentencing for the trial court to specify which habitual offender law

effective date and provision is used during sentencing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Pipkin’s conviction is affirmed. Pipkin’s

sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing with instructions.

AFFIRMED IN PART; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED

WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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