State of Louisiana v. Jakeno Andrews

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,402-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

JAKENO ANDREWS Appellant

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Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2019-CR-2717

Honorable Bernard Scott Leehy, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

HOLLY CHAMBERS JONES
KALEE MORGAN MOORE
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,
This criminal appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District, Parish of

Ouachita, State of Louisiana, the Honorable B. Scott Leehy, Judge,

presiding. The defendant, Jakeno Andrews (“Andrews”), pled guilty to

manslaughter in connection with the death of the victim, Damien Lee. The

trial court sentenced Andrews to 35 years’ imprisonment at hard labor with

credit for all time served. Andrews appeals his sentence as constitutionally

excessive. For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 14, 2019, officers with the Monroe Police Department

responded to a battery complaint coming from someone at 2812 Calypso

Street in Monroe, Louisiana. When the officers arrived at the scene, they

made contact with Andrews and entered the residence. Almost immediately

upon entry, the officers smelled a strong odor of bleach and observed that

everything had been cleaned. They found the victim, Damian Lee, bleeding

from his head and lying unconscious on the bedroom floor. Andrews

indicated to the officers that Lee had arrived at the home and told Andrews

that he had been attacked. The officers were unable to locate Lee’s pulse

and contacted medical personnel. When emergency responders arrived, they

determined that Lee was deceased.

The officers escorted Andrews outside the residence and placed him in

the back of a patrol unit. Andrews, who was unrestrained, escaped from the

patrol unit and fled the scene. Although the officers chased Andrews, they

were unable to apprehend him. Detective Kris Fulmer, an investigator with

the Monroe Police Department, arrived on the scene and obtained a search

warrant for Andrews’ residence. While conducting a search of the residence,

officers observed that the floors looked like they had just been cleaned and

were still wet in some areas. The kitchen chairs had been stacked on the

table, and there was a mop bucket beside the bathroom door with a cleaning

solution in it. A bleach bottle and a bottle of Fabuloso were beside the mop

bucket. Similarly, a Lysol bottle was on the living room table. The bathtub

was also wet, indicating that it had been used recently. Small drops of blood

spatter were found on the living room walls, the table, T.V. stand, wall

heater, and ceiling. Although there was a significant amount of blood spatter

in the living room, there was very little blood on the floor.

The bedroom in which Lee was found also had only a small amount of

blood in it. The only blood observed by the officers was on or under the

victim’s body. Officers indicated in their reports that Lee’s body had

numerous cuts ranging from his lower legs to his head. Some cuts were

fresh while others appeared to be old, and the fresher wounds appeared to be

small holes which Det. Fulmer suspected might have been inflicted from a

tool like an ice pick. Following the search of the residence, Lee’s body was

released to the Ouachita Parish Coroner’s Office.

The following day, on May 15, 2019, Andrews turned himself in at the

Monroe Police Department. Officers escorted Andrews to an interview

room without restraints, and he voluntarily offered an explanation to the

officers. Andrews was read his Miranda rights, and he indicated his

understanding by signing and initialing a form. He agreed to speak with

Det. Schmitz and Det. Fulmer. In his interview with the detectives, Andrews

explained that, on the date of the incident, Lee had punched him several

times in the face, and Andrews had responded by pushing Lee, which caused

Lee to fall and hit his head. The back of Lee’s head started bleeding, but the
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blood simply ran down his back instead of squirting or spraying. According

to Andrews, Lee assisted him in mopping and cleaning up the blood from the

floor. Andrews also stated that he had mopped the floor prior to the

altercation. Lee then went into the bedroom to lie down, but Andrews

realized that Lee was making funny noises, which prompted Andrews to call

the police. Andrews informed the detectives that he was scared when police

arrived, so he told the officers on the scene that Lee had been beaten up.

Because Andrews was afraid, he escaped from the patrol unit and ran.

Det. Fulmer’s report indicated that, although Andrews complained

that Lee had punched him in the face hard a number of times, Andrews’ face

on the day of the interview had no marks or bruises. When detectives

questioned Andrews about that, he changed his story and said that Lee did

not punch him very hard. Andrews also denied any knowledge of cuts on

Lee’s body. Following Andrews’ exchange with the detectives, he was

arrested and booked for second degree murder.

Dr. Frank Peretti, the forensic pathologist who conducted Lee’s

autopsy, and determined that Lee died from multiple blunt force chest

injuries with multiple sharp force injuries. Dr. Peretti also found that Lee

had several broken bones in his chest, and the numerous cutting wounds on

Lee’s body were in different stages, some fresh, healing, infected, and

healed. It appeared to Dr. Peretti that Lee’s body had been abused over a

long period of time.

On August 16, 2019, a Ouachita Parish grand jury indicted Andrews

on the charge of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.

Initially, Andrews waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty, but he

later filed a “Motion to Modify Plea to Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” on
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February 4, 2020, which the trial court granted. On February 9, 2021,

Andrews filed a “Motion to Appoint a Sanity Commission,” which was

granted by the trial court. The trial court appointed Drs. Charles P. Vosburg

and D. Clay Kelly, Jr. to the commission on November 29, 2021. At a

hearing held on March 10, 2022, the trial court communicated the findings

of the sanity commission, which were that both doctors found that Andrews

was able to relate to his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding, and Andrews has a rational understanding of the proceedings

against him. The trial court also noted that both doctors found that Andrews

met the Bennett criteria for competency to stand trial. The court ultimately

concluded that Andrews was competent to stand trial.

On June 27, 2024, Andrews entered into a plea agreement with the

State wherein he pled guilty to manslaughter; the trial court accepted his

guilty plea. The trial court noted that it found Andrews made a knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights, and he had full

understanding of the nature of the charge against him and the consequences

of his guilty plea. The court then ordered a pre-sentence investigation

(“PSI”). Andrews’ sentencing hearing took place on September 19, 2024.

The trial court began by reciting the facts of the case and noting Andrews’

criminal history. Andrews had one felony conviction, several arrests for

various misdemeanor matters, and one conviction for extortion. The trial

court also noted a letter filed by Andrews and acknowledged that the

defendant has led a difficult life.

In its reasoning, the trial court included that it had weighed the

sentencing guidelines from La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and listed several

aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial court first noted that Andrews’
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conduct during the commission of the offense manifested deliberate cruelty

to Lee, especially considering the numerous stab wounds and the extent of

the victim’s injuries, including collapsed lungs and broken ribs. The trial

court also highlighted that Andrews knew or should have known that the

victim was particularly vulnerable due to a disability. Although Andrews

wrote a lengthy letter, the trial court indicated that Andrews failed to express

any remorse. This lack of remorse was also evident, according to the trial

court, when Andrews attempted to clean up the residence to hide any

culpability he may have had in the victim’s death rather than contacting help

immediately. The trial court also considered Andrews’ flight from the scene.

The trial court addressed the mitigating factors it considered, including that

Andrews has led a difficult life.

The trial court ultimately determined that there was an undue risk that,

under a suspended sentence or probation, Andrews would commit another

crime. It also concluded that Andrews needed correctional treatment that

can be provided most effectively by commitment to an institution and that a

lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of Andrews’ crime. The

court then imposed a sentence of 35 years at hard labor with credit for time

served and advised Andrews that he has two years from the date that the

sentence and conviction become final within which to apply for post-

conviction relief. Andrews filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence”

on October 15, 2024, which was denied by the trial court on October 22,

2024. Andrews has appealed.

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DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Andrews urges that his 35-year hard

labor sentence for manslaughter is unconstitutionally excessive under the

facts of this case. Andrews acknowledges that his sentencing exposure was

substantially reduced by his plea agreement from a mandated sentence of life

imprisonment (second degree murder) to not more than 40 years

(manslaughter). However, he argues that his sentence of 35 years at hard

labor is a near-maximum sentence, which should only be reserved for the

worst of offenders and the worst of offenses. Andrews also suggests that the

trial court and the State may have erroneously believed that he was

responsible for “over 100 cutting wounds” on the victim’s body. Andrews

insinuates that the victim may have engaged in self-injury. Moreover,

Andrews also argues that his mental health issues should have carried more

weight in his sentencing.

In response, the State maintains that the trial court carefully and

thoroughly considered the sentencing factors outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, the PSI, and statements on Andrews’ behalf. The trial court noted

Andrews’ criminal history as a second felony offender and considered his

numerous misdemeanor arrests and/or convictions. The State also points out

that the trial court noted that Andrews knew or should have known that the

victim was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to a

disability. The trial court, according to the State, believed that the victim’s

disabilities played a significant part in the victim’s inability to resist the

brutal and fatal attacks by the defendant. Although Andrews submitted a

lengthy letter to the trial court before sentencing, the letter failed to contain

remorse for killing the victim. More particularly, the trial court was
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concerned that Andrews did not seek medical attention for the victim.

Instead, the State suggests that the evidence showed Andrews was focused

on cleaning the crime scene to hide his culpability. Andrews also fled the

scene instead of waiting to be questioned by officers. In light of these

circumstances, the State urges that the trial court did not abuse its broad

discretion in sentencing Andrews to 35 years at hard labor.

An appellate court uses a two-pronged approach in reviewing a

sentence for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court

used the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Harper, 54,173

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/12/22), 332 So. 3d 799; State v. White, 53,444 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/22/20), 293 So. 3d 1274; State v. Scroggins, 52,323 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/25/19), 280 So. 3d 841. The trial judge is not required to list every

aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects that he

adequately considered the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433 So.

2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Harper, supra; State v. Couch, 53,956 (La. App.

2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 541; State v. White, supra. The important

elements that should be considered are the defendant’s personal history, prior

criminal record, seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of

rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. Harper,

supra; State v. Couch, supra; State v. White, supra.

Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not

adequately describe his conduct or has received a significant reduction in

potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has

great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the

pled offense. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. Harper,

supra; State v. Couch, supra; State v. Minnieweather, 52,124 (La. App. 2 Cir.
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6/27/18), 251 So. 3d 583; State v. Robinson, 49,825 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/20/15), 166 So. 3d 403.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is excessive

by constitutional standards. State v. Scroggins, supra. A sentence violates

La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of

pain and suffering. State v. O’Neal, 55,559 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381

So. 3d 273, writ denied, 24-0424 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 817; State v.

McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156, writ denied,

23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So. 3d 149. For a sentence to be

considered excessive by constitutional standards, a reviewing court must

find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence makes no

reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing

more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Griffin, 14-

1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Efferson, 52,306 (La. App. 2

Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052 (La. 4/15/19), 267 So.

3d 1131.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116; State v. Griffin,

supra. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether

another sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial

court abused its discretion. State v. O’Neal, supra; State v. McKeever, supra.

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La. R.S. 14:31(B) provides that whoever commits manslaughter shall

be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years.

In this case, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. The trial

court’s 35-year sentence is not excessive in light of the facts of the case and

the significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement Andrews

obtained through his plea agreement with the State. The record shows that

the trial court considered the facts of the case as well as Andrews’ criminal

history. The trial court noted Andrews’ one felony conviction and several

arrests for various misdemeanor matters. The trial court honored Andrews’

request to refrain from detailing his extortion conviction, and the trial court

did so by stating that the information was in the PSI report.

In addition to considering the PSI report, the trial court took into

account the defendant’s social history, noting that Andrews’ letter indicated

that he had led a difficult life, and it considered this information as a

mitigating factor. As aggravating circumstances, the trial court stated that

Andrews’ conduct during the commission of the offense manifested

deliberate cruelty to the victim, especially considering that the victim had

been incapacitated to the extent that he could not defend himself and was

subjected to extreme violence. The trial court considered that any chance of

survival the victim may have had was lost during the time Andrews spent

cleaning the scene to hide evidence of his culpability. The court also noted

Andrews’ flight from the scene as an aggravating factor. After considering

the totality of the circumstances, the trial court noted that a jury in this case

would have been faced with strong evidence of second degree murder, but

Andrews received leniency in his plea agreement with the State.

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In its conclusion, the trial court expressed that there is an undue risk

that under a suspended sentence or probation Andrews would commit

another crime, that he needs correctional treatment that can be provided

most effectively by commitment to an institution, and that a lesser sentence

would deprecate the seriousness of his crime. It is without question that the

trial court adequately complied with and considered the sentencing

guidelines, and it did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Andrews to 35

years at hard labor with credit for time served.

Finally, the 35-year sentence imposed is not constitutionally

excessive. Andrews used extreme violence and showed deliberate cruelty to

the victim while committing the offense, with Lee suffering from numerous

stab wounds, collapsed lungs, and several broken ribs. Given Andrews’

potential exposure to a mandatory life sentence and in light of his conduct,

the 35-year sentence at hard labor is not grossly disproportionate to the

severity of the offense, nor does it shock the sense of justice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the conviction and sentence of the

defendant, Jakeno Andrews, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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