State of Louisiana v. Selma Thomas Mangham

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,408-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

SELMA THOMAS MANGHAM Appellant

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Appealed from the
Thirty-Ninth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Red River, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 141,615

Honorable James H. Boddie, Jr., Ad Hoc, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Christopher A. Aberle

JULIE C. JONES Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

R. BENNETT LANGFORD, III
Assistant District Attorney

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Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This criminal appeal arises from the 39th Judicial District, Parish of

Red River, State of Louisiana, the Honorable James H. Boddie, Jr., Judge,

presiding ad hoc. On August 2, 2024, a unanimous jury convicted the

defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham (“Mangham”), of sexual battery of a

victim under the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(2) and

(C)(2); molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (D)(1); and indecent behavior with a juvenile under

the age of thirteen, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2). The trial court

sentenced Mangham to a total of 30 years on the three convictions without

the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, with credit for

time served. Mangham appeals, urging that his trial counsel failed to request

a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentences, and his

sentence is excessive under the circumstances. For the reasons stated below,

we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 18, 2021, the defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham, was

charged by bill of information (which was amended on July 31, 2024) with

sexual battery upon A.K., D.O.B. 10/27/2011, when the victim is under the

age of thirteen, molestation of a juvenile when the victim is under the age of

thirteen, and indecent behavior with a juvenile under the age of thirteen.

The State alleged that each crime took place between February 17, 2019, and

August 17, 2021. Facebook Messenger screenshots contained in the record

show that Katie Mangham, the mother of the minor children M.S. and S.P,

found out about Mangham touching the young girls and reported the incident

to the Red River Parish Sheriff’s Office. An arrest warrant was signed by a

judge on August 12, 2021, and on August 13, 2021, Mangham was arrested.

Following investigation into the matter and Mangham’s arrest, the State

charged Mangham for the alleged acts he committed against A.K.1 On June

6, 2022, the State filed a notice that it intended to use evidence from other

crimes to prove Mangham’s propensity to engage in sexually assaultive

behavior and his lustful disposition towards children at Mangham’s trial.2

La. C.E. art. 412.2. A jury trial commenced on July 30, 2024.

Detective Darren Keel, an investigator with the Red River Parish

Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was involved in the investigation into the

claims against Mangham. At the time of this investigation, there were two

alleged victims, M.S. and S.P. Following the victims’ interviews at the

Gingerbread House, Mangham was arrested on August 13, 2021. After

Mangham’s arrest and interview with the officers, another victim, K.C.,

came forward. K.C. then participated in an interview at the Gingerbread

House. Thereafter, two more victims came forward, I.K. and A.K., and they

were interviewed at the Gingerbread House as well.

Jordan Hughes, a forensic interviewer at the Gingerbread House,

testified as an expert witness at trial. Ms. Hughes conducted interviews of

the victims involved in this matter. Ms. Hughes testified that A.K. was nine

years old at the time of the interview, and I.K. was ten years old. Although

I.K. initially was not willing to talk, I.K. eventually revealed that she had

been touched by Mangham or “Poppa.” On the same day, Ms. Hughes

1
Notwithstanding allegations against Mangham involving other young girls, the
bill of information indicates that Mangham was charged with instances only relating to
A.K.
2
While Mangham was only charged with instances related to A.K., the State
introduced into evidence the Gingerbread House interviews of M.S., S.P., K.C., and I.K.;
these children also testified at trial.
2

interviewed I.K.’s sister, A.K., who was more receptive to speaking with the

interviewer. Ms. Hughes testified that she also interviewed M.S., S.P., and

K.C.

During her interviews with M.S. and S.P., both children made

disclosures to Ms. Hughes. M.S. indicated that Mangham touched her

private part on top of and under her clothes. Ms. Hughes testified that M.S.

demonstrated the touching. Similarly, S.P. disclosed that Mangham touched

her lower stomach, breast, and private part areas on top of and under her

clothes. Ms. Hughes indicated to the court that during K.C.’s interview, the

child was nervous but ultimately made a disclosure to Ms. Hughes,

indicating that Mangham or “Poppa Tom” tried to take K.C.’s clothes off

more than one time. K.C. also told Ms. Hughes that Mangham touched her

private area by rubbing his finger all through her parts. Ultimately, Ms.

Hughes testified that the statements given by the children were, in her

opinion, consistent.

A.K. testified at trial, and she watched her Gingerbread House

interview in court. She indicated that she remembered the interview, she

told the truth, and she added that she had told her MawMaw that Mangham

had showed her his private parts. However, A.K. stated that MawMaw did

not believe her and told her that she should not say things like that because

Mangham could get in trouble. A.K. testified that she would go to

Mangham’s house three to four times a week, and every time she was there

Mangham would touch her when she was near him or sitting next to him on

his armchair. A.K. stated that the touching began when she was around

seven years old and stopped when she was about nine years old. When A.K.

would ask Mangham to stop, A.K. testified that he would apologize but then
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start again after a little bit. A.K. told the court that Mangham would cover

them with a blanket when the touching occurred. She also relayed an

instance where Mangham removed the blanket and showed A.K. his private

parts while smiling at her.

M.S., A.K. and I.K.’s cousin, also testified at trial, watched her

Gingerbread House interview, and indicated that she remembered the video

and that everything she said during the interview was true. M.S. stated that

she would go to Mangham’s house multiple times a week, and he would

touch her while they were in his armchair with a blanket covering them. She

relayed the instances when Mangham touched her under her clothes, and she

indicated that she was scared when he touched her and that it would hurt.

Similarly, S.P., M.S.’s sister and A.K. and I.K.’s cousin, testified at

trial and communicated that everything she said in her Gingerbread House

interview was true. S.P. indicated that she went to Mangham’s house almost

every weekend, and he would touch her most weekends for about two years.

She testified that the touching would occur when she sat with him in his

chair. S.P. stated that she did not like it at all when Mangham touched her

and that it made her very uncomfortable.

K.C., 15 years old at the time of trial, testified that everything she said

in her Gingerbread House interview was true. K.C. stated that Mangham

threatened her a lot, stating that she would not be coming home for dinner,

and she indicated that Mangham threatened to shoot her with his gun a lot of

times. K.C. testified that she would go to Mangham’s house about twice a

month, and he would try to touch her and pull her pants down during those

visits. This went on for about two years, according to K.C. She stated that

she would be terrified each time.
4

Lastly, I.K. testified at trial and indicated that everything she said in

her Gingerbread House interview and wrote down in the interview was true.

I.K. stated that she and her sister, A.K., would visit Mangham’s house on

weekends and holidays. Almost every time she went to Mangham’s house,

he would touch her while they sat in the armchair together. She testified that

she did not like when Mangham would touch her, but she would continue to

sit with him when he asked because she was worried her parents would get

mad at her for declining Mangham’s offer to sit with him.

Brenda Mangham, Mangham’s wife, testified at trial that she and

Mangham have been married for 53 years and have three children together.

Apart from their three children, Ms. Mangham indicated that she and her

husband have raised 68 children over the years. None of the children,

according to Ms. Mangham, complained that Mangham was inappropriate

towards them. She testified that Mangham was a modest person and

instructed children on numerous occasions to put clothes on if he felt they

were dressed immodestly. Ms. Mangham stated that the grandchildren

would sit on the arms of Mangham’s chair and never on his lap due to the

size of his belly and sensitive spots on his legs. She also denied ever having

a conversation with A.K. about Mangham exposing himself to her.

Following testimony from friends and family of Mangham about his

reputation in the community as an honest person and his treatment of

children, the State and the defense made their closing arguments, and the

trial court gave the jury instructions. Ultimately, on August 2, 2024, the jury

unanimously voted to convict Mangham as charged on all three counts.

Mangham filed a motion for new trial and a motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal on October 7, 2024.
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At the hearing held on October 10, 2024, the trial court denied

Mangham’s motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal.

During the sentencing portion of the hearing, the trial court emphasized that

the legislature deems the crimes for which Mangham was found guilty to be

heinous and egregious offenses and noted that Mangham’s counsel, being

able and capable, had explained the range of sentencing for the crimes. The

trial court stated that Mangham took away the innocence of the young girls

involved in the trial and found all the girls who testified to be credible. It

noted one mitigating factor, which was that Mangham was a first felony

offender.3 The trial court then sentenced Mangham to 25 years at hard labor

to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence on count one, sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen.

For the crime of molestation of a juvenile under the age of thirteen, the trial

court imposed a 25-year-hard labor sentence without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered that

these two sentences be served concurrently “with the exception of five years

of that sentence.” Regarding count three, indecent behavior with juveniles,

the trial court sentenced Mangham to ten years at hard labor, to be served

without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In total,

the trial court stated that Mangham would have a 30-year-sentence with

credit for time served. Mangham filed the instant appeal.

3
There was a PSI in this matter; the transcript reflects the trial court’s instructions
that the PSI be filed into and made a part of the record.

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DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first assignment of error, Mangham claims that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to request a downward departure from the

mandatory minimum sentences due to Mangham’s advanced age and health

problems. Similarly, Mangham maintains that his attorney failed to file a

motion to reconsider the sentences and raise the issue that they are excessive

under the circumstances. Mangham argues that there was no strategic

reason for his trial counsel not to request a downward departure or file a

motion to reconsider sentence. This performance was deficient, according to

Mangham, which resulted in prejudice towards Mangham because this

failure prevented the trial court from reviewing whether Mangham was

“exceptional” and/or whether his circumstances warranted a departure from

the mandatory minimum sentence. Mangham also maintains that he was

prejudiced by his trial attorney’s failure to preserve the issue of

excessiveness for appeal.

In reply, the State articulates that Mangham must first show that his

attorney’s performance was deficient, and second, that this deficiency

prejudiced the outcome of the case. The State maintains that counsel’s

failure to request a downward departure does not equate to deficient

performance. Furthermore, the State contends that there is no reasonable

probability that Mangham’s sentence would have been different had trial

counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence or requested a downward

departure. Even if this Court finds that trial counsel’s decision to not request

a downward deviation amounted to deficient performance, the State urges

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that Mangham still failed to make any showing that such performance

prejudiced the outcome of the case.

The Supreme Court set out the two-prong test for a defendant

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984): that counsel’s

performance was deficient; and the deficiency prejudiced his defense. State

v. Hilliard, 52,652 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 1065, writ

denied, 19-01701 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d 68. Both the Louisiana and

federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to the effective

assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; La. Const. art. I, § 13;

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963);

State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 1333; State v. Bayles,

53,696 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1149. Under the standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel set out in Strickland v. Washington, supra,

adopted by Louisiana’s Supreme Court in State v. Washington, 491 So. 2d

1337 (La. 1986), a reviewing court must reverse a conviction if the

defendant establishes that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and

counsel’s inadequate performance prejudiced the defendant to the extent that

the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict suspect. State v. Ball, 19-01674

(La. 11/24/20), 305 So. 3d 90; State v. Bayles, supra.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are more properly raised in

an application for post-conviction relief in the trial court because this

provides the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing under La. C. Cr. P.

art. 930. State v. McGee, 18-1052 (La. 2/25/19), 264 So. 3d 445; State v.

Ward, 53,969, (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 324 So. 3d 231. When the record
8

is sufficient, however, allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

may be resolved on direct appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Id.

To support his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, Mangham

first claims that his counsel failed to request a downward departure from the

statutory minimum sentence and that a downward departure is warranted due

to his age and health. A defendant may attempt to rebut the presumption

that a mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional, but he must “clearly

and convincingly show that he is exceptional which in this context means

that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is a victim of the

legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the

culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the circumstances

of the case.” State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672, 676,

citing State v. Young, 94-1636, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So.

2d 525, 528 (Plotkin, J., concurring), writ denied, 95-3010 (La. 3/22/96),

669 So. 2d 1223; State v. Parker, 54,947 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 358 So.

3d 220, writ denied, 23-00417 (La. 10/3/23), 370 So. 3d 1073; State v.

Combs, 56,232 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 410 So. 3d 405.

Next, Mangham argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to

file a motion to reconsider sentence. However, the mere failure to file a

motion to reconsider is not, in and of itself, error. A basis for ineffective

assistance of counsel may be found only if a defendant can show a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, his sentence would have

been different. State v. Jackson, 52,606 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So.

3d 1217, writ denied, 19-00699 (La. 10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 560, and writ

denied, 19-00797 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So. 3d 1056.

9

Mangham must establish that his trial counsel’s performance was

deficient, and this deficiency prejudiced his defense. Mangham claims that

his counsel’s failure to request a downward departure from the minimum

sentence was deficient and precluded the trial court from considering

Mangham’s age and health, as well as the legislature’s failure to assign

sentences which contemplate that some elderly people experience dramatic

changes in behavior and are thus less culpable than they would be otherwise.

Mangham claims that this preclusion resulted in prejudice to him, which

continued as his counsel failed to preserve the issues of excessiveness for

appeal by not filing a motion to reconsider Mangham’s sentences. We

disagree.

Mangham’s argument is full of sound and fury, signifying nothing as

it relates to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Despite

Mangham’s claims, nothing in the record supports a finding that trial

counsel’s performance was deficient. Following the jury’s verdict,

Mangham’s attorney filed motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment

of acquittal, arguing on behalf of his client that the evidence presented at

trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mangham committed the

alleged crimes. The trial court at the sentencing hearing even acknowledged

counsel’s performance by stating that Mangham was represented by an

“abled and capable” attorney.

Likewise, the trial court clearly considered Mangham’s age during

sentencing. The court noted that Mangham was a 73-year-old first felony

offender with no prior criminal record. The court said that it found the

evidence to be overwhelming in this case, and opined that the legislature

deemed the crimes to be heinous and egregious offenses due to the penalties
10

associated with each crime. The trial court ultimately ordered the minimum

sentences (25 years) for counts one and two and ordered that the sentences

be served concurrently. The trial court’s decision to order concurrent

minimum sentences for both counts indicates that it considered the totality of

Mangham’s circumstances, including his age. Nothing supports Mangham’s

contention that a request for a downward departure from the statutory

minimum would have changed Mangham’s sentence. Furthermore,

Mangham’s claims that the legislature failed to contemplate elderly people’s

changes in behavior and culpability is unsupported.

Lastly, Mangham is unable to show a reasonable probability that his

sentence would have been different if his trial counsel had filed a motion to

reconsider sentence. Given the trial court’s detailed reasoning at the

sentencing hearing, it is highly unlikely that Mangham’s sentence would

have been different, especially considering he was already ordered to serve

the minimum sentences for counts one and two, and each sentence was

ordered to run concurrently. Ultimately, Mangham has failed to meet the

Strickland standard as he could not establish that his counsel’s performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms, and that his attorney’s inadequate performance

prejudiced the defendant to the extent that the trial was rendered unfair and

the verdict suspect. For these reasons, Mangham’s first assignment of error

is without merit.

Excessive Sentence

In his second assignment of error, Mangham asserts that his sentences

are excessive under the circumstances as they amount to a virtual life

sentence considering his advanced age and health. Alternatively, he urges
11

that, if this Court determines its review of Mangham’s excessive sentence

claim is limited to a bare claim of constitutional excessiveness, this Court

should set his sentences aside and remand this case for resentencing as the

sentences are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and

shocking to the sense of justice due to Mangham’s age and health and the

fact that he is a first felony offender.

On the other hand, the State asserts that Mangham’s sentences for his

three offenses involving a juvenile under the age 13 are not excessive under

the circumstances. Although Mangham argues that his 30-year sentence is a

“virtual” life sentence, the State maintains that any defendant charged with

these offenses faces the possibility of a “virtual” life sentence given that the

maximum sentence is 99 years. The State urges that the legislature clearly

contemplated the possibility of “virtual” life sentences in drafting the

sentencing provisions.

Because we have determined that the failure to file a motion to

reconsider sentence was not considered ineffective assistance on behalf of

Mangham’s trial counsel, our review is limited to the bare claim of

constitutional excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1993);

State v. Passaniti, 49,075 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/14), 144 So. 3d 1220, writ

denied, 14-1612 (La. 3/6/15), 161 So. 3d 14; State v. Smith, 46,343 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/22/11), 71 So. 3d 485, writ denied, 11-1646 (La. 1/13/12), 77

So. 3d 950. Under constitutional review, a sentence can be excessive, even

when it falls within statutory guidelines, if the punishment is so grossly

disproportionate to the severity of the crime that it shocks the sense of

justice and serves no purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering. State

v. Anderson, 55,550 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/24), 383 So. 3d 1081, writ denied,
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24-00779 (La. 10/23/24), 395 So. 3d 249, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1473, 221

L. Ed. 2d 586 (2025); State v. Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1.

The relevant provisions are:

• Whoever commits the crime of sexual battery on a victim
under the age of thirteen years when the offender is
seventeen years of age or older shall be punished by
imprisonment at hard labor for not less than twenty-five
years nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five
years of the sentence imposed shall be served without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.
R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2).

• Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile
when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than twenty-five years
nor more than ninety-nine years. At least twenty-five years
of the sentence imposed shall be served without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S.
14:81.2(D)(1).

• Whoever commits the crime of indecent behavior with
juveniles on a victim under the age of thirteen when the
offender is seventeen years of age or older, shall be punished
by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two nor more
than twenty-five years. At least two years of the sentence
imposed shall be served without benefit of parole, probation,
or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81(H)(2).

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered a 25-year sentence at

hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for

the conviction of sexual battery on a victim under the age of thirteen years

old. For the conviction of molestation of a juvenile, the court stated that

Mangham would be imprisoned for 25 years at hard labor without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The court then stated

that these sentences were to be served “concurrently with the exception of

five years of that sentence.” The court then ordered a ten-year sentence at

hard labor without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for

Mangham’s indecent behavior with a juvenile, and the court stated that the

13

ten-year sentence would be served concurrently. The trial court concluded

the order by stating, “You have a total of 30 years to serve without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.”

While we acknowledge that the verbiage used by the trial court

relating to the 25-year sentencing in count two is unclear, the trial court’s

statement that Mangham was to serve a total of 30 years at hard labor

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence resolves

any uncertainty about Mangham’s sentence. We agree with the trial court’s

assessment that Mangham took away the young victim’s innocence and

inflicted emotional trauma on not only the victim in this case, but the other

young girls who testified at trial. Considering the potential sentencing

exposure as well as the facts and evidence presented at trial, Mangham’s 30-

year sentence is neither grossly disproportionate to the severity of his crimes

nor shocking to our sense of justice. Consequently, Mangham’s second

assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of the

defendant, Selma Thomas Mangham, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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