State of Louisiana v. Dashone Gibson

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,411-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

DASHONE GIBSON Defendant-Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 383,463

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLANT PROJECT Counsel for
By: Christopher Albert Aberle Defendant-Appellant

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for
District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee

JASMINE CARLETTE COOPER
ALEXANDRA PORUBSKY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STONE, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

The defendant, Dashone Gibson, was charged by bill of information

with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S.

14:95.1. Following a trial, a unanimous jury found the defendant guilty as

charged. He was sentenced to serve six years at hard labor without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. For the following

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

On June 11, 2021, two officers of the Louisiana State Police

Department, Troopers Richard Lopez and Joseph Jones, were patrolling in a

marked vehicle; they stopped at a red light at the intersection of Linwood

Avenue and 75th Street in Shreveport, Louisiana. The defendant, Dashone

Gibson, pulled up next to the officers in his vehicle. After observing the

defendant operating his cell phone while driving, the officers decided to

conduct a traffic stop.

Trooper Lopez approached the defendant’s vehicle and informed him

he was stopped for suspicion of texting and driving. The defendant denied

texting, but he admitted he had used his cellphone to answer a phone call

using the Facebook application. During the interaction, Trooper Lopez

observed what appeared to be a holstered handgun wedged between the front

seat and the center console. The officer also noticed the defendant appeared

to be nervous and was avoiding eye contact with him.

Based on the presence of the weapon and the defendant’s behavior,

Trooper Lopez conducted a criminal background check and learned the

defendant had a 2017 conviction for simple burglary in DeSoto Parish.

Trooper Lopez advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and asked him if

he was the person convicted of simple burglary in 2017. The defendant

initially admitted to the prior conviction, but he later expressed uncertainty

about the conviction; he only recalled having “to pay a lot of stuff.”

Meanwhile, the defendant gave Trooper Jones consent to search his

vehicle. During the search, the officers discovered the gun located between

the front seat and the center console was, in fact, a BB gun. However, the

officers searched the trunk of the vehicle and discovered a Mossberg 500

shotgun. The defendant admitted to being the owner of the shotgun, stating

that he kept the gun for protection.1

The defendant was placed under arrest and was subsequently charged

by bill of information with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. Following the trial, a unanimous jury found

the defendant guilty as charged of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. The trial court denied the defendant’s motions for new trial and post-

verdict judgment of acquittal. The defendant was sentenced to serve six

years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence, to run concurrently with any other sentence he may be serving.

The defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence was denied.

The defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He argues the

State failed show he was a convicted felon because the State did not prove

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The officers also found 3.5 grams of marijuana in the center console of the
vehicle.

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he was the same person identified as “Dashone Gibson a/k/a Dashoone

Gibson,” who was convicted for simple burglary in 2017 in DeSoto Parish.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731

(La. 1992); State v. Smith, 47,983 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 116 So. 3d 884.

This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not

provide the appellate court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of

the evidence for that of the factfinder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La.

2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17),

245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),

775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S. Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d

62 (2000). The appellate court does not assess credibility or reweigh the

evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

At the time of the commission of the offense, La. R.S. 14:95.1

provided:

It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of *** a
crime of violence as defined in R.S. 14:2(B) which is a felony
or simple burglary *** to possess a firearm or carry a concealed
weapon.

To convict a defendant of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the possession of

a firearm; (2) a previous conviction of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of

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the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) general intent to commit

the offense. State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 272 So. 3d

999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d 61.

The burden is on the State to prove the existence of the prior felony

convictions. In the area of establishing a defendant’s previous conviction

identity, courts have recognized various methods that may be used to carry

this burden of proof, such as testimony of witnesses, expert opinion as to the

fingerprints of the accused when compared with those of the person

previously convicted, photographs contained in a duly authenticated record,

or evidence of identical driver’s license numbers, sex, race, and date of birth.

State v. Westbrook, 392 So.2d 1043 (La. 1980); State v. Green, 51,784 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1105; State v. Jones, 41,429 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d 131, writ denied, 06-2769 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.

2d 394. The mere fact that the defendant on trial and the person previously

convicted have the same name does not constitute sufficient evidence of

identity. State v. Watson, 40,059 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/05), 911 So. 2d 396;

State v. Green, supra.

When the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator,

rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate

any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by

one eyewitness or victim may suffice to support a conviction. State v. Grant,

55,722 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/28/24), 399 So. 3d 716; State v. Hughes, 05-0992

(La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1047. It is the factfinder who weighs the

respective credibility of the witnesses, and this Court will generally not

second-guess those determinations. Id.

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In State v. Grant, supra, the defendant was found guilty of a myriad of

offenses, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The

defendant appealed his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, arguing the State failed to sufficiently prove that he was the same

“Ramon Grant” who committed the predicate offense in Texas. More

specifically, the defendant argued the State failed to introduce into evidence

the defendant’s date of birth, driver’s license, or social security number, or a

photograph of the defendant in the Texas case.

In the instant case, to satisfy its burden of proving the defendant’s

identity as the person convicted of simple burglary in DeSoto Parish in 2017,

the State presented the testimony of Trooper Richard Lopez, who

participated in the traffic stop of the defendant, and Agent Brandon

Thompson, a probation officer who supervised the defendant’s probation for

an unrelated offense.

Trooper Lopez testified as to the events that took place during the

traffic stop. He also testified regarding the process for verifying the

defendant’s identity. He stated as follows:

We have laptops in our – in our units, so we’re able to run their
driver’s license, their name, criminal history, stuff like that and
– and it’ll come up with a picture that we can then compare to
who we’re – the person that we’re talking to.

Trooper Lopez positively identified the defendant as the person he

encountered during the traffic stop and “identified that day as Dashone

Gipson[.]” The video footage from Trooper Lopez’s police-issued body

camera was played during his testimony. The video depicted the officer

asking the defendant whether he had been convicted of simple burglary in

2017, and defendant initially verified that he was.

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Brandon Thompson of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole, testified he was the

defendant’s current probation officer for an unrelated offense. He also

testified that his job is to supervise felony offenders, and his job duties

required him to keep track of offenders who “are under supervision and

when they come off of supervision.” Thompson stated he was familiar with

court documents such as bills of information and court minutes, and he

identified the certified copies of the bill of information and court minutes

from the 2017 guilty plea and sentencing hearings; the documents were

introduced into evidence. Thompson reviewed the court documents from

DeSoto Parish and identified the defendant as the person who was convicted

of simple burglary in DeSoto Parish in 2017.

According to Thompson, the defendant was charged by bill of

information with simple burglary committed on or about March 30, 2017.

Thompson also read from the court minutes from the 2017 offense and noted

the defendant pled guilty to the charge of simple burglary. The minutes also

reflected that the defendant was sentenced to serve three years in the parish

jail with one year suspended and was placed on supervised probation for a

period of three years. Thompson testified he did not supervise the

defendant’s probation for the 2017 simple burglary conviction; however, he

had knowledge of the prior conviction, and he was aware that the defendant

successfully completed his probation for the conviction.

After thoroughly reviewing this record and the related jurisprudence,

we find the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant’s identity as the

person who pled guilty to simple burglary in DeSoto Parish in 2017.

Trooper Lopez conducted a criminal background check and confirmed that
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the defendant had been convicted of simple burglary in DeSoto Parish in

2017. Further, when questioned during the traffic stop, the defendant

initially affirmed his prior conviction, but he quickly attempted to back away

from the admission by stating he only recalled having to “pay a lot of stuff.”

The defendant’s statements to the officers also revealed his knowledge that

he was a convicted felon because he admitted his brother purchased the gun

for him. The jury was able to review the video footage from Trooper

Lopez’s interactions with the defendant and was able to make a

determination based on the evidence presented.

Moreover, although Thompson did not supervise the defendant for the

2017 conviction, he was supervising the defendant’s probation for an

unrelated offense, and he had knowledge of the defendant’s criminal

background. Thompson was able to review the court documents from the

2017 conviction and confirmed the defendant’s identity as the offender in

that case. The jury apparently accepted Thompson’s testimony that he had

verified the defendant’s identity during his period of supervision and that he

was able to confirm the defendant was the same person identified in the

court records from DeSoto Parish.

The jury heard the testimony from the witnesses and reviewed the

footage captured by the officer’s body camera. The jury was free to make a

credibility determination as to the defendant’s identity as a previously

convicted felon. As noted above, great deference is given to a factfinder’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part;

this Court will not reexamine the credibility of a witness or reweigh the

evidence presented.

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Therefore, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we find that the totality of the evidence was sufficient to prove

that the defendant was the same “Dashone Gibson a/k/a Dashoone Gibson,”

who pled guilty to simple burglary in 2017 in DeSoto Parish. Accordingly,

the State met its burden of establishing that the defendant was a convicted

felon, which is a necessary element of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. This assignment lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the defendant’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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