Marina Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Sean Cahill and Melissa Cahill

Judgment rendered August 27, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,423-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

MARINA HOMEOWNERS Plaintiff-Appellee
ASSOCIATION, INC.

versus

SEAN CAHILL AND MELISSA Defendants-Appellants
CAHILL

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 641,978

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

ROWE & MANNING LAW FIRM Counsel for Appellants
By: William C. Rowe, Jr.
Joseph S. Manning
Nicole G. Courville

LUNN IRION LAW FIRM, LLC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Patrick W. Woolbert Marina Homeowners
Association, Inc.

WIENER, WEISS & MADISON, APC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Geoffrey D. Westmoreland Kim French

*****

Before COX, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

COX, J.

This civil appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Caddo

Parish. Plaintiff, Marina Homeowner’s Association, Inc., (“MHA”) filed a

petition seeking declaratory judgment that defendants, Sean and Melissa

Cahill (“the Cahills”), use of their Shreveport home as a short-term rental

was in violation of the covenants of the homeowner’s association. MHA

also sought a permanent injunction against the Cahills, enjoining them from

further violations of the covenants. In turn, the Cahills filed an exception of

no right of action, arguing that the covenants were no longer in effect as they

were subject to a term that expired. The trial court ruled in MHA’s favor,

denying the Cahills’ exception of no right of action.

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

FACTS

In December 2020, the Cahills purchased a home located at 1706

Harbor Drive in Shreveport, Louisiana. The property is located in the

Willow Ridge Subdivision (the “Subdivision”) and is subject to a

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“the Declaration”),

which was filed in the registry of conveyance on September 23,

1982. Article VII of the Declaration, concerning building restrictions and

use, provides:

ARTICLE VII - USE RESTRICTIONS
Section 1. Land Use and Building Type. No Lot shall be used
except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected,
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one
single-family dwelling not to exceed three stories in height
above the ground level of highest elevation on which any
portion of the main building is erected, and a private garage and
such outbuildings as are customarily appurtenant to dwellings,
every building except a greenhouse to correspond in style and
architecture to the dwelling to which it is appurtenant. No
outbuilding shall exceed the swelling to which is appurtenant in

height, number of stories or size. A garage or carport to house
at least one automobile much be provided for each lot.

On February 2, 2023, MHA sought a permanent injunction, claiming that the

Cahills violated Article VII.

Specifically, MHA alleged that on August 29, 2022, the Cahills, who

are Oklahoma residents, applied for a short-term rental property permit

under the name Cahill Dream Properties. The permit was approved on

September 7, 2022, and the Cahills listed the property on short-term rental

websites such as Airbnb and VRBO. MHA notes that it sent the Cahills a

written demand for them to cease operation of their property as a

commercial business, i.e., a short-term rental, lodging quarters, or hotel.

On October 25, 2023, the Cahills filed an exception of no right of

action wherein they asserted that the covenants of the Declaration expired

and were no longer enforceable. Specifically, the Cahills asserted that the

plain language of the Declaration provides a definite term with a specific

start and end date under Article VIII, Section 3, entitled “Amendments,”

which provides:

The covenants and restrictions of this Declaration shall run with
and bind the land, and shall inure to the benefit of and be
enforceable by the Association or the owner of any lot subject
to this Declaration, their respective legal representatives, heirs,
successors and assigns, for a term of twenty (20) years from the
date this Declaration is recorded, after which time said
covenants shall be automatically extended for successive period
of ten (10) years. The covenants and restrictions of this
Declaration may be amended by an instrument signed by not
less then seventy-five percent (75%) of the members of the
Association. Any amendment must be properly recorded.

The Cahills argued that because the Declaration was filed on September 23,

1983, the 20-year term was enforceable until September 23, 2002, and then

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automatically extended for a successive period of 10 years, which ended on

September 23, 2012.

The Cahills maintained that no documents were filed to change the

language of this section, and no amendments were filed to continue the

existence or the enforceability of the covenants in accordance with Section 3

of Article VIII. The Cahills asserted that the drafters intended that an

amendment be filed and recorded to extend the terms of the Declaration, and

because none was filed, the terms of the Declaration were not enforceable at

the time the property was purchased, nor is it enforceable at the time the

permanent injunction was filed.

A hearing on the matter was held on November 28, 2023. Before

testimony was presented, counsel for the Cahills reiterated the argument that

the exception of no right of action should be granted. Counsel argued that

homeowner associations (“HOAs”) are governed by their documents, and

regardless of any errors, should be interpreted against the drafters. Counsel

argued that in this case, the language of the Declaration provides for a term,

which indicates a definitive end, except in the event that an amendment is

filed and recorded to extend or renew the term of the covenants.

Counsel for MHA argued that provisions of the Louisiana

Homeowners Association Act (“LHAA”) regarding building restrictions

supersede La. C. C. Art. 783, which entails that interpretations of contracts

must be construed against the drafter. Specifically, MHA’s counsel argued

that La. R.S. 1141.4 provides that the existence, validity, or extent of a

building restriction affecting any association property shall be liberally

construed to give effect to its purpose and intent. In this case, the language

of the Declaration indicates that the covenants “automatically extended for
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successive period of 10 years.” Counsel maintained that there is an error in

the language so that it’s meant to provide for successive periods of 10

years. Regardless, counsel maintained that the term “successive” indicates

that the covenants were meant to continue term after term. Further, counsel

argued that the language found in the Declaration was standard language

found in most restrictive HOAs whose terms are meant to extend benefits to

its members into perpetuity.

Following arguments from counsel, the following pertinent testimony

was presented:

First, Dianna Martin (“Martin”), a resident of the Willow Ridge

Subdivision and a committee member of the MHA’s architectural control

committee (“ACC”), testified she lives two houses away from the Cahill

residence. Martin stated that in 2022, the ACC noticed that some residents,

including the Cahills, used their properties as short-term rentals. Those

owners were informed that they were in violation of the subdivision’s

covenants. Martin testified that the MHA board held a meeting in which it

was decided that short-term rentals were in violation of the covenants.

On cross-examination, Martin stated that when she purchased her

home, she did so with the understanding that the properties could not be let

out as short-term rentals. After a copy of the Declaration was furnished for

Martin to review, she admitted that she could not find any provision or

governing bylaw that prohibited short-term or long-term rentals. In turning

to a 2023 amendment to the Declaration, Martin explained that the

amendment clarified that leases for less than a six-month period were

prohibited. Martin then clarified that Article VII of the Declaration provides

that “no lot shall be used except for residential purposes.”
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Next, Harold Sater (“Sater”) testified that he was a former resident of

the Willow Ridge Subdivision and had been president of the MHA board

since 2021 before he moved. Sater stated that during his time as president,

he became aware that a few homeowners used their property as short-term

rentals, which the MHA board agreed was in violation of the covenants.

Sater stated that in response, he contacted attorneys for MHA and

spoke with those homeowners identified as using their properties as

rentals. Sater stated that he no longer served as president when the 2023

amendment was passed, but he was aware that it had been discussed and was

well-read on the governing provisions of the Declaration. Sater testified that

while the Declaration did not contain the term “short-term” rental, it

prohibited commercial leases. Sater then admitted that he was not aware of

any rentals that the Cahills may have had.

Jane Anderson (“Anderson”), the current president of the MHA board,

testified that as part of her duties, she helps to uphold the covenants and

maintain the quality of the subdivision. Anderson stated that each resident,

including the Cahills, was provided with a copy of the Declaration when

they purchased their home. Anderson then stated that in 2019, she and other

members of the association were aware that some of the homes in the

subdivision were used as short-term rentals. Anderson stated in response,

those owners were contacted and informed that use of their properties as

commercial businesses violated the terms of the covenants. Anderson stated

that a petition was passed throughout the subdivision to allow owners to

voice their opinion on the matter. Anderson stated that all of the owners

who used their properties as short-term rentals ceased operations voluntarily,

except the Cahills.
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Anderson stated that after several board meetings, it was decided that

rentals were prohibited, and an amendment was passed in 2023 to that

effect. In looking at the 2023 amendment, Anderson testified that five

members of MHA signed the amendment. Anderson then acknowledged

that Article VIII, Section 3 of the Declaration provides that “[t]he covenants

and restrictions of this declaration may be amended by an instrument signed

by not less than 75 percent of the members of the association. Any

amendment must be properly recorded.” Anderson testified that although

the amendment was not filed, it was meant to reflect that at least 75 percent

of homeowners agreed that short-term rentals were in violation of the

covenants.

Next, Kim French (“French”), a former resident and board president,

testified that she was also familiar with the covenants governing the Willow

Ridge Subdivision. French stated that although she no longer serves as

president, she stayed on to assist the board. She testified that in 2019, while

she was president, she became aware that there were homeowners who listed

their homes on short-term rental websites. French stated that, generally, the

covenants provide that homes are to be used for residential purposes, so the

board informed those owners that their rentals were in violation of the

covenants.

Further, French stated that she only contacted the Cahills regarding

their property being used as short-term rental to inform them that guests

could not have open access to common areas that MHA maintained, such as

the pool and marina. French testified that although she was not a board

member during this time, members of the board asked her to communicate

with the Cahills. However, French maintained that she never gave the
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Cahills permission to continue operation of their short-term rental because

she did not have the authority to either allow them to continue operations or

to stop the operations altogether.

Sean Cahill (“Sean”) testified that he purchased his home in the

Willow Ridge Subdivision so he and his family would have a place to stay

when visiting the area. Sean admitted that he rented the property

approximately seven to eight times in 2022 and approximately three times in

2023 but stated that renting was not profitable as he primarily rented to those

in need. Sean explained that he did not have any employees and managed

the property himself. Sean stated that French contacted him about the use of

the property as a short-term rental, but French only relayed that she did not

like short-term rentals, and there was nothing MHA could do about it;

instead, she only requested that he update the listing as it concerned the

marina.

Sean stated that he believed this meant he could continue to use the

property as a short-term rental. He maintained that he was not informed that

he could not use his property as a short-term rental, that no one from the

board contacted him about the property, and that no one informed him that

the board held a meeting to address the issue of short-term rentals. Sean

confirmed that he and his wife purchased property in the Willow Ridge

Subdivision and listed the property on websites such as Airbnb and VRBO

under their LLC, Cahill Dream Properties. He stated that guests would stay

no longer than six nights at the property. In reviewing his short-term rental

permit from the Municipal Planning Commission of the City of Shreveport,

Sean admitted that the permit provided:

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I understand that any homeowners association, townhome
association, or similar association may prohibit short-term
rentals through their bylaws, covenants, codes, and/or
restrictions (or any other agreement governing and limiting the
use of proposed short-term rental). It is my responsibility to
contact any such association, as applicable to determine if
short-term rentals are allowed.

Sean stated that the paperwork was only signed after he spoke with

French about the property being used as a short-term rental. On cross-

examination, Sean admitted he did not regularly attend MHA meetings for

residents but stated he was under the impression that someone would contact

him for important information as previously done.

Finally, Melissa Cahill (“Melissa”), Sean’s wife, reiterated that she

and Sean purchased the home in the Willow Ridge Subdivision so that they

and their family would have a place to stay when they visited the

area. Melissa then reviewed a copy of the Declaration and stated that upon

her viewing, there was nothing that prohibited the use of their property as a

short-term rental. Melissa confirmed that a section of the Declaration

provided:

Any member may delegate in accordance with the rules of the
association his right of enjoyment of the common area and
facilities to the members of his family, his tenants, invitees or
others who lawfully reside on a lot.

She explained that she understood this provision to mean that as an owner,

her family, visitors, and tenants were permitted to use common

facilities. Further, she stated that the term “tenant” meant that as an owner

of a lot, she was permitted to lease her property. Melissa testified that

French contacted her and Sean about the rental, but the conversation only

concerned removing access to the pool and marina for their rental to

continue operation. Melissa stated that French was the only person to

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contact either her or Sean about the rental, and at no time did they receive a

notice that the board would vote on whether short-term rentals were

permissible.

At the close of testimony and closing arguments, the trial court denied

the Cahills’ exception of no right of action and granted MHA’s permanent

injunction. This appeal followed.

ARGUMENT

On appeal, the Cahills raise two assignments of error, arguing that the

trial court erred in: (1) denying their exception of no right of action, finding

that the Declaration of the Willow Ridge subdivision remained in full force

and effect; and (2) granting MHA’s permanent injunction, prohibiting the

Cahills from using their property as a short-term rental.

Specifically, the Cahills argue that they were not in violation of the

Declaration’s applicable building restrictions in using their property as a

short-term rental because the Declaration expired on September 23, 2012,

and was no longer binding or enforceable. The Cahills highlight that Article

VIII, Section 3 provides, in part:

The covenants and restrictions of this Declaration shall run with
and bind the land, and shall inure to the benefit of and be
enforceable by the Association or the owner of any lot subject
to this Declaration, their respective legal representatives, heirs,
successors and assigns, for a term of twenty (20) years from the
date this Declaration is recorded, after which time said
covenants shall be automatically extended for successive period
of ten (10) years. The covenants and restrictions of this
Declaration may be amended by an instrument signed by not
less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the members of the
Association. Any amendment must be properly
recorded.” (Emphasis added).

The Cahills maintain that the drafters’ use of the word “term,” and the

singular, rather than the plural use of the word “period” indicates that the

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drafters intended the Declaration to have a definitive expiration, rather than

exist into perpetuity. Moreover, the Cahills argue that the Declaration was

recorded on September 23, 1982, and in accordance with this provision, was

meant to expire after 30 years, unless an amendment was filed and recorded

to extend the enforceability of the Declaration. In this case, the Cahills have

asserted that no amendment was filed prior to September 23, 2012, to either

amend the language of the provision or extend the terms of the Declaration

beyond the automatic 10-year extension.

Finally, the Cahills address MHA’s assertion that the exclusion of an

‘s’ to the word “period” was simply a clerical error, and the Declaration’s

20-year term is meant to automatically renew for successive periods of 10

years. The Cahills argue that HOA covenants are likened to contracts, and

are subject to the same interpretation and enforcement, i.e., if any ambiguity

exists in a provision, it must be interpreted against the party who furnished

its text. Moreover, when a dispute arises as to the extent or limitation of a

restriction encumbering an immovable, courts should look to the intent of

the encumbering the property as set forth in the instruments embodying the

restrictions, giving due consideration to the entire document.

The Cahills maintain that the drafters’ intent is clear from the use of

the word “term,” indicating a definitive end, and the singular use of the word

“period.” Moreover, the Cahills maintain that Article VIII, Section 3 is

entitled “Amendments,” which further indicates that the drafters intended

that an amendment be filed to extend the terms of the Declaration. They

maintain that any clerical errors or typos, as proposed by MHA, should be

interpreted against MHA.

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DISCUSSION

An action can be brought only by a person who has a real and actual

interest which he asserts. La. C. C. P. art. 681. An exception of no right of

action is a peremptory exception, the function of which is to show that,

based upon the facts alleged and the evidence submitted, a plaintiff has no

legal right or interest in enforcing the matter asserted. Campbell v. Nexion

Health at Claiborne, Inc., 49,150 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/14), 149 So. 3d

436. It asks whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of person to whom

the law grants the cause of action asserted. Id. The objection of no right of

action tests whether this particular plaintiff, as a matter of law, has an

interest in the claim sued on. Id.

The exception does not raise the question of the plaintiff’s ability to

prevail on the merits, nor the question of whether the defendant may have a

valid defense. Garrison v. James Const. Group, LLC, 14-0761 (La. App. 1

Cir. 5/6/15), 174 So. 3d 15, writ denied, 15-1112 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So. 3d

146. The burden of proof of establishing the exception of no right of action

is on the exceptor. Campbell, supra. Exceptions of no right of action

presents a question of law; therefore, an appellate court conducts a de novo

review of the trial court’s action on this exception. Matter of BCL Invs.,

L.L.C., 52,387 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So. 3d 675, writ denied, 19-

0276 (La. 4/22/19), 268 So. 3d 296.

In the present case, the Declaration not only established the Willow

Ridge Subdivision but also subjected homeowners to certain building

restrictions. Building restrictions are charges imposed by the owner of an

immovable in pursuance of a general plan governing construction standards,

specified uses, and improvements. La. C.C. art. 775. Such restrictions are
11

classified as real rights likened to predial servitudes. La. C.C. art.

777. Building restrictions are ordinarily created by developers of land who

intend to subdivide their property into individual lots for specific

purposes. La. C.C. art. 776, Comment (b); McGinty v. Majeste, 30,384 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/8/98), 711 So. 2d 333. Where there is doubt as to the

existence, validity, or extent of building restrictions, the issue should be

resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the immovable. La. C.C. art.

783; McGinty, supra.

Once building restrictions are recorded in the public records, a

subsequent acquirer of immovable property burdened with such restrictions

is bound by them. Childers v. Laurel Lakes Ests. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc.,

22-0936, (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/24/23), 368 So. 3d 1123. In the case of building

restrictions imposed on a subdivision, the restrictions may be likened to a

contract among the property owners and the developer. Thus, when disputes

arise as to the extent or limitation of a restriction affecting immovable

property, courts look to the express intention of the party encumbering the

property as set forth in the instruments embodying the restrictions, giving

due consideration to the entire document. Id.

In this Court’s de novo review, we find that the trial court did not err

in denying the Cahills’ exception of no right of action or in granting MHA’s

permanent injunction. As provided in Article VIII, Section 3, the covenants

and restrictions of the Declaration continue to run with and bind the land

until 20 years from the date of recordation, and thereafter, automatically

renew for additional 10-year successive periods. Although “period” is

singular, the word “successive” immediately preceding it indicates that the

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drafters intended there to be multiple, automatic 10-year periods following

the initial 20-year anniversary date.

Despite the Cahills’ assertion to the contrary, the provision does not

provide that an amendment must be filed and recorded to extend the term of

the Declaration; rather, the provision specifically provides that the covenants

and restrictions, may only be “amended by an instrument signed by not less

than seventy-five percent (75%) of the members of the Association.” The

provision is silent as to the actions members of the association must take to

terminate or prevent the expiration of the Declaration.

However, even if the language of Article VIII, Section 3 was

ambiguous, La. R.S. 9:1141.3(E) provides that “[t]he existence, validity, or

extent of a building restriction affecting any association property shall be

liberally construed to give effect to its purpose and intent.” In adhering to

the language of the statute, we arrive at the same conclusion that the drafters

intended for the covenants and restrictions of the Declaration to continue to

run with and bind the properties in the subdivision unless otherwise

terminated by members of the association. No amendment or instrument

was presented purporting to terminate the Declaration; therefore, it remains

enforceable, and the trial court correctly denied the Cahills’ exception of no

right of action.

In determining that the Declaration has not expired, we conclude that

the trial court did not err in granting the MHA’s injunction. Specifically,

Article VII, Section 1, provides in part that, “[n]o [l]ot shall be used except

for residential purposes.” In the present case, it is established that the

Cahills used their property as a short-term commercial business, listed the

property on short-term rental websites such as Airbnb and VRBO, and
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profited from the venture. Such activities are a clear violation of the

provision, and therefore, MHA’s injunction to cease use and operation of the

home as a business was appropriate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

ruling regarding MHA’s injunction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed. Costs

of this appeal are assessed against the Cahills.

AFFIRMED.

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