State of Louisiana v. Ahkeem Jamal Wiggins, Jr.

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,427-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

AHKEEM JAMAL WIGGINS, JR. Defendant-Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 401,201

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for
By: Annette Fuller Roach Defendant-Appellant

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for
District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee

JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
MARGARET E. RICHIE GASKINS
ASHLIN NICOLE THOMAS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant, Ahkeem Jamal Wiggins, Jr., was charged by bill of

information with battery of a pregnant dating partner, in violation of La. R.S.

14:34.9(K), and battery of a dating partner by strangulation, in violation of

La. R.S. 14:34.9(L). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged.

Defendant was sentenced to serve three years at hard labor without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for each count. The

sentences were ordered to be served consecutively with each other and any

other sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Defendant, Ahkeem Jamal Wiggins, Jr., and the victim, Ebony Baker,

were childhood friends who reconnected in 2023. Ms. Baker was married to

another man, but she and her husband were estranged. By February 2024,

defendant and Ms. Baker were involved in a relationship, which Ms. Baker

described as “dating,” “courting,” “getting to know each other,” and “having

sex.” She had two children from previous relationships, and she was

pregnant with defendant’s child. Defendant was aware of Ms. Baker’s

marital status and that he was the father of her unborn child. He

accompanied her to several obstetric appointments. Over time, Ms. Baker

ceased being sexually intimate with defendant because she “didn’t want to

make a wrong judgment [about] being in a relationship with him.”

On February 24, 2024, Ms. Baker informed defendant that she was

planning to move to Houston, Texas the following year, and according to

Ms. Baker, the conversation did not end well. On the morning of February

25, 2024, defendant and Ms. Baker exchanged text messages and that

evening, she and some of her family members went to dinner at a restaurant.

As Ms. Baker was driving home from the restaurant, defendant called her to

continue the conversation about her moving to Texas. Defendant requested

to meet with Ms. Baker to continue the conversation in person; however, she

declined to do so.

Ms. Baker drove home while talking to a friend on her cellphone.

Within minutes of her pulling into her driveway, defendant pulled into the

driveway behind her. Ms. Baker exited her car, admonished defendant about

coming to her home unannounced, and told him to leave. Ms. Baker got

back into her car and attempted to close the door. Defendant reopened the

door, and Ms. Baker told him to leave her alone; defendant refused and

remained in the doorway of her vehicle. Ms. Baker attempted to push

defendant out of her way so she could exit her vehicle. Defendant grabbed

Ms. Baker around her neck and began to strangle her. According to Ms.

Baker, defendant strangled her “so hard that [she] couldn’t breathe.” As he

was strangling her, defendant told her he was a “different breed,” and he

stated, “I’ll kill you. I’ll kill you.”

Eventually, Ms. Baker managed to extricate herself from defendant.

However, as she attempted to move away from him, defendant grabbed her,

and they both fell to the ground. While on the ground defendant put Ms.

Baker in a headlock, by placing his arm around her throat, and attempted to

strangle her again. After a struggle, Ms. Baker escaped the headlock, but

defendant wrapped his legs around her torso and began to squeeze her body

using his legs. Ms. Baker cried out that defendant was hurting her and

begged him to let her go; yet, he refused to release her. According to Ms.

Baker, defendant stated, “Oh, you think you’re going to kill my baby? I’ll

kill you and this baby.” Defendant released Ms. Baker after she verbally
2

placated him by agreeing to talk with him. The two of them had a

conversation, and defendant left Ms. Baker’s home.

The entire incident was captured by Ms. Baker’s Ring Doorbell

camera and a security camera installed underneath her carport. The video

clearly depicted defendant holding Ms. Baker by her neck and lifting her off

the ground. The recording also captured defendant stating to Ms. Baker,

“I’m a different breed. I’m a different breed. I’ll kill you. I’ll kill you.”

Both of defendant’s hands were wrapped around Ms. Baker’s neck while he

made the threats.1

After defendant left Ms. Baker’s home, she called the Shreveport

Police Department (“SPD”) to report the incident, and Officer James Oates

responded to the call. When Officer Oates arrived, he observed scratches on

Ms. Baker’s face, and he documented her statement.

In April 2024, defendant was interviewed by Detective Kimberly

Monereau of the SPD. After being advised of his Miranda rights and

signing a waiver of rights form, defendant stated that he and Ms. Baker had

been sexual partners and were expecting a child together. He also asserted

that Ms. Baker described their relationship as “friends with benefits,” and

she had expressed concerns about having the baby because she did not want

to have children “from different fathers.” Defendant also stated that tensions

arose because he wanted to raise his unborn child in the same household as

Ms. Baker, but she did not want to live together.

1
The video footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at trial.
During her testimony, Ms. Baker identified herself and defendant as the people depicted
in the video.
3

During the interview, defendant recounted his version of the incident.

He stated that he was “triggered” when Ms. Baker pushed him twice, and he

responded by grabbing her by her neck. Defendant denied choking Ms.

Baker, and, initially, he denied threatening to kill her. However, after the

officers confronted him with the video surveillance footage, he admitted to

that he threatened to kill Ms. Baker “in the heat of the moment.”

Additionally, defendant stated that it was Ms. Baker who pulled him to the

ground. According to defendant, Ms. Baker bit him, and he responded by

biting her back. He denied using his legs to squeeze Ms. Baker around her

abdominal area. Although defendant apologized for his actions, he stated

the only reason he was in jail was “because of a woman who is traumatized”

by her past relationships.

Defendant was charged by bill of information with battery of a dating

partner (while pregnant), in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.9(K), and battery of a

dating partner (strangulation), in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.9(L). A jury

trial was held on October 24, 2024.

During the trial, Ms. Baker testified as to the events that transpired on

February 25, 2024. Officer Oates and Det. Monereau also testified about

their investigation of the incident.

Defendant declined to testify in his defense. However, against the

advice of counsel, defendant addressed the trial court and stated that he

wanted his grandmother, Annie Wiggins, to testify as a character witness.

The trial court allowed Ms. Wiggins to testify, and she testified that she

raised defendant, and he lived with her until he was 16 or 17 years old. She

stated defendant had a good heart, and she had never known him to be

abusive, violent, or disrespectful. During her testimony on cross-
4

examination, Ms. Wiggins admitted that she knew defendant had a prior

conviction for armed robbery, and she heard he had been convicted of

introducing contraband into a correctional facility.

The unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial

court denied defendant’s motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and

new trial. Defendant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment at hard

labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for

each count. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively with

each other and any other sentence.2 The trial court denied defendant’s

motion to reconsider sentence.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the

convictions. He argues the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that defendant and Ms. Baker were “dating partners,” which is a necessary

element of the offense. Defendant asserts he and Ms. Baker had engaged in

sexual intercourse “a few times,” and they conceived their child during this

“brief period of intimacy.” According to defendant, Ms. Baker was still

legally married to another man, and she did not want her relationship with

defendant to go any further.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

2
At the time the instant offenses were committed, defendant was on parole after
serving 13 years in prison for armed robbery.
5

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now codified in La. C.

Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford the appellate court with a means to substitute

its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v.

Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Johnson, 55,254

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 91.

Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-

3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. Where there is conflicting testimony

concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 849 So.

2d 566, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert denied,

540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed 2d 90 (2004).

As stated above, defendant was convicted of battery of a pregnant

dating partner and battery of a dating partner by strangulation. La. R.S.

14:34.9(B)(3) provides, in pertinent part:

“Dating partner” means any person who is involved or has been
involved in a sexual or intimate relationship with the offender
characterized by the expectation of affectionate involvement
independent of financial considerations, regardless of whether
the person presently lives or formerly lived in the same
residence with the offender. “Dating partner” shall not include a

6

casual relationship or ordinary association between persons in a
business or social context.

In State v. Smith, 23-399 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/23), 380 So. 3d 109,

the defendant appealed his conviction for battery of a dating partner, arguing

the victim did not meet the definition of “dating partner.” During the trial,

the victim was asked whether she and the defendant were involved in a

“romantic relationship,” and she responded, “We were just having sex.” The

defendant argued that a casual and purely sexual relationship did not meet

the definition of “dating partner.” The Court stated:

[T]he two factors that encompass a “dating partner” are: 1) a
past or current sexual or intimate relationship, and 2) an
expectation of affectionate involvement.
***
For purposes of statutory interpretation, courts have commonly
used dictionaries as a valuable source for determining the
“common and approved usage of words.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “expectation” as “1. The act of looking
forward; anticipation. 2. A basis on which something is
expected to happen; esp., the prospect of receiving wealth,
honors, or the like.” The term “affection” is defined as “a
feeling of liking and caring for someone or something: tender
attachment: fondness.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“affection” as “[f]ond attachment, devotion, or love.” Finally,
the term “involved” is defined as “having a part in something:
included in something: actively participating in something:
having a romantic or sexual relationship.” Therefore,
considering the common usage of the words included in the
phrase “expectation of affectionate involvement,” we interpret
that phrase to mean the prospect of liking someone or
something that also includes having a romantic or sexual
relationship.

Id. at 115-6 (internal citation and footnotes omitted).

The Court concluded the State met its burden of proving the defendant

and the victim were dating partners as defined in the statute. The Court

considered the following facts: the defendant and the victim were

romantically involved for approximately two years; they texted and called
7

each other; the defendant had a key to the victim’s home; the victim

chauffeured the defendant upon request; the defendant and the victim “hung

out” together; and the victim would bring the defendant to the home where

her children were present.

In the instant case, Ms. Baker admitted that she did not want to be

involved in a committed relationship with defendant. Nevertheless, she used

the terms “dating” and “courting” to describe her relationship with

defendant. Additionally, the jury was able to view the video of defendant’s

interview with law enforcement officers. During the interview, defendant

described his relationship with Ms. Baker as “complicated.” He stated he

and Ms. Baker spent a lot of time together, they texted and called each other,

and he sometimes spent the night at her home where her children were

present. Defendant expressed his desire to live in the same household as Ms.

Baker so they could raise their unborn child together. Defendant further

stated that he spent the night at Ms. Baker’s residence, and he would assist

her children, particularly her four-year-old son, in getting ready for school to

allow Ms. Baker to rest in the mornings. He also asserted that Ms. Baker’s

12-year-old son had expressed confusion because although his mother told

him that defendant was her “friend,” the child had witnessed intimate and

affectionate gestures between his mother and defendant.

We have reviewed this record in its entirety. According to Ms.

Baker’s testimony and the defendant’s description of the relationship, it is

clear that defendant and Ms. Baker “ha[d] been involved in a sexual

relationship with an expectation of affectionate involvement independent of

financial considerations.” Consequently, based on our review of this record

and the applicable law, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the
8

jury’s determination that defendant and Ms. Baker were “dating partners,”

within the meaning of La. R.S. 14:34.9.

Defendant also contends the evidence was insufficient “to overcome

Ms. Baker’s implied consent to the battery.” He argues his verbal

disagreement with Ms. Baker did not become physical until she pushed him

twice and “got in his face.” According to defendant he merely reacted by

grabbing her around her neck.

Battery of a dating partner is the intentional use of force or violence

committed by one dating partner upon the person of another dating partner.

La. R.S. 14:34.9(A). In a non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense

requires a dual inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used

was reasonable under the circumstances; and second, a subjective inquiry

into whether the force used was apparently necessary. State v. Walker,

53,975 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 321 So. 3d 1154, writ denied, 21-01334

(La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 83; State v. Broadway, 53,105 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/15/20), 288 So. 3d 903, writ denied, 20-00372 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So. 3d

78; State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 764. In

any criminal proceeding in which the justification of self-defense is raised,

the state shall have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant did not act in self-defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 390.

We find that the evidence adduced at trial does not support

defendant’s claim that he acted in self-defense. Ms. Baker testified that

defendant arrived at her house unannounced, after she expressly told him not

to do so, and she told him to leave several times before the physical

altercation began. She stated she was seated in her vehicle, and defendant

blocked her escape by standing in the doorway of the vehicle. Ms. Baker,
9

who is 5’2” tall, repeatedly told the 6’4” defendant to leave, and she

attempted to push him out of her way so she could exit the vehicle. The

video showed that defendant responded by grabbing Ms. Baker by her neck,

briefly lifting her off the ground by her neck, and threatening to kill her. As

she attempted to extricate herself from defendant’s grip, they fell to the

ground, where defendant continued to strangle her by placing her in a

headlock, while simultaneously using his legs to pin her down. While the

defenseless Ms. Baker struggled against his grasp, she repeatedly told him,

“Stop Ahkeem.”

Under the facts of this case, we find the evidence adduced at trial was

sufficient to satisfy the elements of battery of a pregnant dating partner by

strangulation. The jury was able to weigh the evidence presented and arrive

at the conclusion that defendant’s use of force was unreasonable and

unnecessary under the circumstances. This assignment lacks merit.

Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion when it

allowed him, rather than his trial counsel, to decide to call his grandmother,

Ms. Wiggins, to testify as a character witness. He argues the testimony of

Ms. Wiggins led to the impermissible introduction of other crimes evidence,

i.e., his criminal history. Defendant also argues that trial management was

in the province of his counsel, who was responsible for deciding which

witnesses to call, what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to

raise, and what evidence to introduce.

In the instant case, after the State concluded its case, the following

colloquy occurred:

COUNSEL: Your Honor, I don’t anticipate calling any
witnesses –

10

COURT: And do you wish to testify?

DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor, I don’t wish to testify, but
I would like the character witness that’s here
on my behalf to make a statement as far as
my character.

COURT: Is there a character witness?

COUNSEL: There is, Your Honor, and we had initially
considered calling her, although it is my
determination that it would be best for Ms.
Wiggins’ case that I not call her.

COURT: I think he’s got a – I mean, if that’s what he
wishes to do. I think you’re going to have to
do it.

COUNSEL: Okay –

COURT: [T]he defendant has the right to present his
case the way he wishes. I mean, if that’s
what he wishes to do. I think you have to do
it but note for the record that it’s against it’s
over the – or against the advice of counsel.

COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
***

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant’s

right to the effective assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.

335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963); State v. Brooks, 94-2438 (La.

10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 1333; State v. Bayles, 53,696 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/17/21), 329 So. 3d 1149. To gain assistance of counsel, a defendant need

not surrender control entirely to counsel. In granting to the accused

personally the right to make his defense, the Sixth Amendment “speaks of

the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an

assistant.” McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 421, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508,

200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018), quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-

11

820, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). The Sixth Amendment

“contemplates a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is a master of

his own defense.” McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. at 422, quoting Gannett

Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382, n. 10, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d

608 (1979).

In the instant case, in lieu of testifying in his own defense, the

defendant, whose competency was never questioned throughout these

proceedings, opted to have his grandmother testify “on [his] behalf to make

a statement as far as [his] character.” The defendant has the undeniable right

to make decisions regarding his own defense, and based on this record, we

see no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in granting defendant’s request to

allow Ms. Wiggins to testify.

Moreover, the erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence is a

trial error, i.e., an error which occurs during the case’s presentation to the

trier of fact, which may be quantitatively assessed in the context of the other

evidence. As such, it may be reviewed for harmless error. State v. Johnson,

94-1379 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So. 2d 94; State v. Allen, 54,153 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/15/21), 331 So. 3d 1101; State v. Floyd, 51,869 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 1165, writ denied, 18-1292 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So. 3d

288. In this context, the proper analysis for harmless error review is to

determine whether the guilty verdict actually rendered at trial was surely

unattributable to the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence. See,

State v. Allen, supra; State v. Kurz, 51,781 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 245 So.

3d 1219, writ denied, 18-0512 (La. 1/18/19), 262 So. 3d 285, and writ

denied, 18-0529 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 598, cert. denied, 587 U.S. 973,

139 S. Ct. 1624, 203 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2019).
12

The jury heard the testimony of Ms. Baker, reviewed the surveillance

footage of the attack, and reviewed defendant’s videotaped interview with

law enforcement. During his interview, defendant mentioned that he had

reconnected with Ms. Baker after serving 13 years in prison. There is no

indication that the jury’s verdicts were attributable to Ms. Wiggins’

testimony regarding defendant’s criminal history. Consequently, defendant

has not shown he was prejudiced by Ms. Wiggins’ testimony regarding his

criminal history. This assignment lacks merit.

Defendant further contends the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing consecutive maximum sentences of three years without the benefit

of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Therefore, the sentences

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the

Louisiana Constitution. Defendant argues that he acted “under strong

emotions,” but he is not the worst offender, and this is not the worst offense

to justify consecutive maximum sentences.

The law concerning excessive sentences is well-settled. Claims are

reviewed by examining whether the trial court adequately considered the

guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d

1065. A review of the sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Id. The goal of La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 is to articulate an adequate factual basis for the sentence, not to

achieve rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State v.

Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir.
13

6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. There is no requirement that any specific factor

be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. Taves, 03-0518 (La.

12/3/03), 861 So. 2d 144.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20 if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Efferson,

52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 18-2052

(La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131. To constitute an excessive sentence, a

reviewing court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime as to shock the sense of justice or that the sentence

makes no reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is

nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.

Griffin, 14-1214 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1262; State v. Efferson, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116; State v. Efferson,

supra. Generally, maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved for

the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.

2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665. On review, an appellate court does not determine

whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but whether the

trial court abused its discretion. Id.; State v. McKeever, 55,260 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1156, writ denied, 23-01429 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So.

3d 149.

When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction,

or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment
14

shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or

all be served consecutively. La. C. Cr. P. art. 883. It is within the court’s

discretion to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent. State v.

Dunams, 55,443 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 251, writ denied, 24-

00205 (La. 9/17/24), 392 So. 3d 632; State v. Robinson, 49,677 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 829, writ denied, 15-0924 (La. 4/15/16), 191 So.

3d 1034; State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.

Concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of conduct are not

mandatory, and consecutive sentences under those circumstances are not

necessarily excessive. State v. Dunams, supra; State v. Hebert, 50,163 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 795.

When consecutive sentences are imposed, the court shall state the

factors considered and its reasons for the consecutive terms. State v.

Dunams, supra; State v. Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d

711. However, the failure to articulate specific reasons for consecutive

sentences does not require remand if the record provides an adequate factual

basis to support consecutive sentences. State v. Kennon, 50,511 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 661, writ denied, 16-0947 (La. 5/19/17), 220 So.

3d 747.

At the time defendant committed these offenses, La. R.S. 14:34.9(K)

provided:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is pregnant and the offender knows that
the victim is pregnant at the time of the commission of the
offense, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed
pursuant to this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for
not more than three years.

La. R.S. 14:34.9(L) provided:

15

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the
offense involves strangulation, the offender, in addition to any
other penalties imposed pursuant to this Section, shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not more than three years.

Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court considered the factors set

forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Namely, the court considered defendant’s

personal, family, educational, and criminal background. The record reveals

that defendant received his GED and welding certification while he was

incarcerated for the prior armed robbery, and he was enrolled in barber

school when he committed the instant offenses. At the time of the offenses,

defendant was unemployed and living with his mother, stepfather, and sister.

At the time of sentencing, defendant was 34 years old, and he was the father

of Ms. Baker’s two-month-old daughter.

The trial court also considered the following aggravating factors: (1)

defendant’s conduct during the commission of the offenses manifested

deliberate cruelty to the victim; (2) defendant used threats of or actual

violence in the commission of the offenses; and (3) defendant was convicted

of armed robbery in 2009, had been on “good time parole supervision” since

January 6, 2023, and was on parole when he committed the instant offenses.

The trial court found that none of the mitigating factors applied. The court

stated:

[I]n your own words you stated that you were a different breed
and you’re capable of killing in anger. Society is not safe with
you on the streets. These sentences will run consecutive[ly],
and they will run consecutive[ly] to your parole, whatever
you’re backing up on parole.

After reviewing this record, we find the sentences were amply

supported by the record. The trial court properly considered aggravating

factors and found that no mitigating factors applied. The record reveals that

16

defendant grabbed a pregnant Ms. Baker by her neck with both hands, lifted

her off the ground by her neck, and threatened to kill her. Although

defendant expressed remorse for his actions during sentencing, he attempted

to minimize his behavior by stating he acted “out of emotions and not

intentionally” because he “was enraged.”

Further, although the record reflects the convictions arose from the

same act/transaction, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court thoroughly

discussed the applicable sentencing factors, including defendant’s violent

actions and threats to kill Ms. Baker. Considering the entirety of the record

before us and the wide discretion afforded to the sentencing court, we cannot

say the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the consecutive three-

year sentences in this case. Thus, this assignment lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions and sentences

are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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