56,442-KA 56,443-KA (Consolidated Cases) Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Ikerryunt'a Vernell Stewart

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed October 1, 2025

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

  • 409 So. 3d 491 not in our corpus

Opinion text

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,442-KA
No. 56,443-KA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

IKERRYUNT’A VERNELL STEWART Appellant

*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 401,392

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Christopher Albert Aberle

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

COURTNEY RAY
ERIC MATTHEW WHITEHEAD
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

STONE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, the

Honorable John Mosely, Jr., presiding. The defendant is Ikerryunt’a Stewart

(“Stewart”). On April 16, 2024, he was charged with: (1) one count of

second degree murder; (2) eight counts of attempted second degree murder;

and (3) four counts of aggravated criminal damage to property. On May 6,

2024, Stewart pled guilty to one count of manslaughter and eight counts of

attempted second degree murder. The trial court initially imposed a

cumulative sentence of 110 years. On reconsideration, the trial court

imposed a cumulative 65-year sentence: 30 years for manslaughter and 35-

year concurrent sentences for each count of attempted second degree murder.

The court ordered that the manslaughter sentence run consecutively to the

sentences for attempted second degree murder. In this appeal, Stewart does

not challenge his convictions; rather he assigns two errors regarding the

alleged excessiveness of his sentences: (1) the cumulative 65-year sentence

is constitutionally excessive; and (2) the trial court’s order that the

manslaughter sentence and attempted second degree murder sentences run

consecutively renders the cumulative whole excessive.

Guilty plea

On May 6, 2024, Stewart pled guilty to the aforementioned crimes. In

exchange for his plea of guilty to manslaughter (instead of the original

charge of second degree murder), the state dismissed the four counts of

aggravated criminal damage to property. Following Stewart’s plea, the

prosecution stipulated that Stewart’s killing of Kel’vonte Daigre was

committed in sudden heat of passion pursuant to La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) ―

thus giving Stewart a partial defense that he would have had the burden of

proving at trial. Sentencing was left to the trial court.

The prosecution asserted the following factual basis for the plea, to

which the defendant agreed:

MS. RAY: On or about September 4, 2021, in
[Shreveport,] Caddo Parish, Louisiana…Stewart was in a
gray Kia Optima with Ja’shun Smith, Christopher
Davenport and Rodney Lewis at the Circle K gas station at
the intersection Youree Drive and East Bert Kouns,
when…Stewart [and others] exited the vehicle, shooting
approximately 50 rounds into the intersection.
Stewart was armed with an AK-47-style handgun and
fired 21 rounds. Then they all re-entered the car and fled
the scene ultimately leading the police on a high-speed
chase through Cedar Grove. When the pursuit…[came] to
an end…Stewart exits the vehicle and fled on foot while
carrying one of the guns used in the shooting, which
resulted in the death of 13-year-old Kel’vonte Daigre, an
injury to Kentravious Kennedy and Kaitlyn Harper.
Additionally, Zuniga McGee and her two children
Zyjerrica Butler and Telemacus McGee and John Harper
and Dawn Sterling were all in their vehicles that were
struck by gunfire and their lives were endangered by the
actions of the defendant.
…Stewart admitted to being involved in the shooting
in text message[s] and Instagram messages. He stated to
Nico Stewart…“We went on a bad chase”…[and asked]
Nico to pick him up and sent him his location.
Additionally, the defendant sent Instagram messages
during the time he was hiding from the police,…[stating,]
“I just had a bang out…Mane, on the West it started from
Youree and I hopped out with the K on a white Honda.
Laws got on our trail.”

These messages were sent to username Brat on
Instagram and he said to thuglife on Instagram, quote,
“Shunky with me. We just had a bang out at Circle-K,”
unquote. The shooting was captured on video
and…Stewart can be seen wearing the clothes he was
ultimately captured in as well as firing his weapon.

While the State asserts that…Stewart committed the
specific intent murder of Kel’vonte Daigre for the
purposes of this plea, we stipulate that he committed it in
the the sudden heat of passion or heat of blood…
2

Additionally, he committed eight counts of attempted
second degree murder by firing 21 rounds into the
intersection w[h]ere [sic] multiple people were present and
vehicles struck by gunfire with the specific intent to kill.
….
THE COURT: All right. So did you hear the facts stated by
the district attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And are those facts true?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”)
After the plea was entered on the record, the court ordered a

presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI revealed that Stewart was

born April 9, 2004, making him 17 years old when he committed the crimes

to which he pled guilty. Stewart’s father died in 2006. Stewart dropped out

of school after the ninth grade and admitted to smoking marijuana at least

twice per day. He has a child who was born January 3, 2022, and has never

been married. Notably, Stewart committed the manslaughter and attempted

murders while his child’s mother was nearing the end of her second trimester

of pregnancy.

While Stewart had no prior adult convictions, he had been adjudicated

delinquent (the equivalent of an adult criminal conviction) as a juvenile for

illegal possession of a stolen firearm and illegal possession of a firearm by a

juvenile. 1 Stewart was on felony juvenile probation when he committed

this manslaughter and attempted murders.

Stewart declined to make a statement regarding his crimes.

1
La. Ch. C. art. 804.
3

The family of 13-year-old Kel’vonte Daigre submitted a victim impact

letter expressing their grief and tremendous sense of loss resulting from his

death.

Initial Sentencing
On September 18, 2024, the court held a sentencing hearing. Stewart

chose not to testify. Instead, defense counsel spoke on Stewart’s behalf,

asserting his remorse, acceptance of responsibility, potential for

rehabilitation, and the fact that he chose not to burden the victim’s family

with a jury trial. Following defense counsel’s oration, the trial court noted

the defendant’s lack of any expression of remorse, and the likelihood that the

defendant would kill again if given the opportunity. Thereafter, the court

imposed 30 years for the manslaughter conviction and 10 years for each

count of attempted second degree murder. The court ordered that these

sentences would all run consecutively.

Reconsideration and resentencing
On November 13, 2024, the trial court reduced the cumulative

sentence to 65 years pursuant to the defendant’s motion to reconsider

sentence: 30 years for manslaughter and 35-year concurrent sentences for

each count of attempted second degree murder. The trial court explained

that the reduction was due to the defendant’s youth (he was 17 years old at

the time of the shooting) and the sentences imposed on the other defendants.

Law

In State v. Boswell, 56,200 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25) 409 So. 3d 491,

we recently reiterated the law concerning excessive sentence claims:

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining
whether the trial court adequately considered the

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guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and
whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive.
Ordinarily, appellate review of sentences for
excessiveness utilizes a two-prong process. However,
when the motion to reconsider sentence raises only a claim
of constitutional excessiveness, a defendant is relegated
[under La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(E)] to review of the sentence
on that ground alone.
Boswell, by failing to state specific grounds for his
motion to reconsider sentence, has waived his right to
have his sentence reviewed for compliance with art. 894.1.
As a result, the remaining question is whether his sentence
exceeds the punishment allowed by the state and federal
constitutions.
The Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana
Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive
punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory
limits, it may be excessive.
The appellate court must determine if the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. To assess a claim that a
sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, the appellate court
must determine if the sentence is grossly disproportionate
to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A
sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when
the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm
done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.
The sentencing court has wide discretion to impose a
sentence within the statutory limits, and the sentence
imposed will not be set aside as excessive absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion. On review, an appellate
court does not determine whether another sentence may
have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court
abused its discretion. (Internal case citations omitted.)

“Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be

punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.” La. R.S. 14:30.1. This is a statutorily

mandated life sentence.

In contrast, the crime of manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of

40 years with no minimum limit. La. R.S. 14:31. Manslaughter is defined

as follows:

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A homicide which would be murder under either Article
30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree
murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or
heat of blood immediately caused by provocation
sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control
and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a
homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the
offender’s blood had actually cooled, or that an average
person’s blood would have cooled, at the time the offense
was committed.

La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1).

Analysis

The defense brief to this court asserts that Stewart’s sentence is too

harsh, i.e., that it constitutes “cruel or unusual” punishment. The defense

brief claims that this is so because of: (1) Stewart’s youth, specifically his

17-year-old brain was “not fully developed” when he opened fire with his

AK-47 style handgun and sprayed bullets all over a busy traffic intersection;

and (2) Stewart’s potential for improvement, i.e., that as Stewart’s brain fully

develops while in prison, he will become more susceptible to education and

rehabilitation.

We disagree. In addition to killing a 13-year-old boy, Stewart

intentionally subjected an untold number of uninvolved bystanders to the

risk of being shot merely for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

We note that Stewart makes no claim of developmental delay or mental

impairment. Thus, the trial court could, should, and most likely did

conclude that Stewart knew that spraying bullets into a busy traffic

intersection is heinously wrong—and that he knew so before he did it.

Stewart’s lack of empathy and disregard for human life is both terrifying and

unapologetic. His actions demonstrate that human life does not matter to

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him. The public’s right to not be randomly shot while in traffic or in a

parking lot matters much more to this court than a theoretical possibility that

human life may begin to matter to Stewart in the future.

Stewart chose to accept the state’s plea offer, chose to refrain from

making any statement for inclusion in the PSI, and twice given the

opportunity by the court to make a statement at sentencing, again, chose to

decline comment and remained silent. Additionally, we note that Stewart, in

his plea deal, was granted the heat of passion defense. A jury, however, may

well have found him guilty of second degree murder, which carries a

mandatory life sentence.2 This appeal is without merit.

Finally, we point out that the consecutive sentences are not

inappropriate, and the trial court carefully tailored sentences specific to

Stewart and the facts of the case. Stewart’s bullet-spraying adventure ― i.e.,

mass shooting ― had multiple victims, and their lives matter. We find that

the trial court was particularly considerate and appropriately lenient in

ordering that the eight sentences for attempted murder ― concerning eight

separate victims ― run concurrently.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of

Ikerryunt’a Stewart are AFFIRMED.

2
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) held that a mandatory
life sentence for a juvenile violates the bar against cruel or unusual punishment.

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