State of Louisiana v. Chester L. Johnson, Jr.

Judgment rendered October 1, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,455-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CHESTER L. JOHNSON, JR. Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 374,229

Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula C. Marx

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

SENAE DENEAL HALL
ALEXANDRA PORUBSKY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before COX, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

COX, J.

This case arises out of the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish,

Louisiana. Chester Johnson, Jr. was convicted of battery of a correctional

facility employee. He was adjudicated a fourth felony offender and

sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment at hard labor. Johnson appeals his

sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm Johnson’s conviction and

sentence.

FACTS

Johnson was charged by an amended bill of information with battery

of a correctional facility employee, in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.5. A sanity

commission was appointed, and Johnson was found competent to proceed to

trial.

The jury trial began on August 8, 2024. Randy Leone testified that he

is a nurse at the Caddo Parish Correctional Center. Mr. Leone stated that on

February 16, 2020, he was escorted by a deputy to the housing unit of the

correctional facility to pass out morning medications. Mr. Leone testified

that when he got to Johnson’s cell, he stood at the door and asked Johnson to

come get his medication; Johnson walked toward him, wrapped a towel

around his hand, and hit him in the head multiple times. Mr. Leone stated

that this was not his first time delivering medications to Johnson’s cell. Mr.

Leone testified that he was taken to the hospital for medical treatment; his

forehead bled, but he did not require stitches.

On cross-examination, Mr. Leone stated that Johnson had not

previously responded that way toward him, but Johnson had been reluctant

to take his medication in the past.

Sergeant John Childress testified that he is employed at the Caddo

Parish Sheriff’s Office in the Special Investigation Unit at the jail. Sgt.

Childress identified a surveillance video of the incident, which was played

for the jury.

Corporal Clyde Williams testified that he worked in security at Caddo

Parish Correctional Center at the time of the incident. He stated that he saw

Mr. Leone and a deputy approach Johnson’s cell door, the door opened, and

Johnson punched Mr. Leone.

The jury unanimously found Johnson guilty as charged of battery of a

correctional facility employee. Johnson filed a motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, both of which were denied.

Johnson filed a statement on sentencing, in which he argued the following

mitigating circumstances from La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 should be considered:

(23) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal
conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.
(29) The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of
circumstances unlikely to recur.
(30) The defendant is particularly likely to respond
affirmatively to probationary and mental health treatment.
(31) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive
hardship to himself and/or his dependents.
(33) Any other relevant mitigating circumstance.

Johnson was adjudicated a fourth felony offender. The trial court

sentenced Johnson to 40 years at hard labor and stated, “Regarding

sentencing, this Judge has duly reviewed all of the sentencing guidelines in

accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 894.1. The Court

believes any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of this

offense.”

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Johnson filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing his sentence is

excessive and unconstitutionally harsh. The trial court denied his motion.

Johnson now appeals his sentence.

DISCUSSION

Excessive Sentence

Johnson argues that the trial court erred in imposing an

unconstitutionally excessive sentence; the record does not support the

imposition of a 40-year sentence; and the trial court failed to particularize

his sentence. He asserts that his mental illness, as detailed in Dr. Jennifer

Russell’s report, should have been a mitigating factor in his sentence.

Johnson notes that the trial court gave limited, insufficient support for the

sentence. He requests that his sentence be vacated and remanded for

resentencing.

The State argues that Johnson’s sentence is not constitutionally

excessive. The State notes that in Johnson’s motion to reconsider sentence,

he only argued that his habitual offender sentence was excessive and

unconstitutionally harsh. Therefore, the State asserts that he is limited to a

bare claim of Constitutional excessiveness and barred from arguing that the

trial court failed to adequately comply with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

Ordinarily, appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-

step process, the first being an analysis of the trial court’s compliance with

the sentencing guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and second a review of

the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. However, because Johnson’s

motion to reconsider sentence raised only a claim that the sentence imposed

was constitutionally excessive, he is relegated to review of his sentence on

that ground alone. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La.
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App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d 131, writ not cons., 18-0017 (La. 3/9/18),

237 So. 3d 1190.

Constitutional review turns upon whether the sentence is illegal,

grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or shocking to the

sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly

out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than the

purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Trotter, 55,477

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 380 So. 3d 866; State v. Baker, 51,933 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-0858 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So.

3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 196.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and sentences should not be set aside as excessive

in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Trotter, supra.

Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute

its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a

particular sentence. Id.

If at the time of the commission of the offense the offender is under

the jurisdiction and legal custody of the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections, or is being detained in any jail, prison, correctional facility,

juvenile institution, temporary holding center, halfway house, or detention

facility, the offender shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and

imprisoned with or without hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence for not less than one year nor more than five years.

La. R.S. 14:34.5(B)(2).
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As a fourth habitual offender, Johnson faced a sentencing range of not

less than 20 years nor more than his natural life. La. R.S. 14:34.5 and La.

R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a).

The trial court stated that a lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of the offense. We agree. The trial court was aware of

Johnson’s criminal history in his habitual offender proceedings and was

previously able to review his mental health in his sanity proceedings.

Johnson, unprovoked, punched a correctional facility nurse, not an armed

officer. Johnson is a fourth felony offender and could have been given a life

sentence. For these reasons, Johnson’s 40-year sentence is not shocking to

the sense of justice and is not an abuse of the trial court’s wide discretion.

ERRORS PATENT

The record does not reflect that Johnson was properly advised of his

rights prior to his habitual offender proceedings in accordance with La. R.S.

15:529.1(D). However, the failure to advise a defendant of his rights is

considered harmless error when the defendant’s habitual offender status is

established by competent evidence offered by the State at the hearing rather

than by admission of the defendant. State v. Simpson, 55,304 (La. App. 2

Cir. 11/15/23), 374 So. 3d 1056, writ denied, 23-01641 (La. 5/29/24), 385

So. 3d 703. Here, Corporal John McCain of the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s

Office testified regarding Johnson’s prior convictions. The State submitted

competent evidence of Johnson’s habitual offender status. Therefore, the

trial court’s failure to advise Johnson of his rights was harmless error.

The trial court referenced La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8 at the end of

sentencing but did not specifically state the prescriptive period for seeking

post-conviction relief. Therefore, we advise Johnson, by way of this
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opinion, that no application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it

is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence

has become final under La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 and 922. State v. Kelly,

52,731 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 855, writ denied, 19-01845 (La.

6/3/20), 296 So. 3d 1071.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Johnson’s conviction and

sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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