State of Louisiana v. Donald E. Daniels, Jr.

Judgment rendered November 19, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,468-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

DONALD E. DANIELS, JR. Defendant-Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Franklin, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2020-315

Honorable Will Barham, Judge

*****

THE HARVILLE LAW FIRM, LLC Counsel for
By: Douglas Lee Harville Defendant-Appellant

KEVIN H. JOHNSON
TREY N. MAGEE

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for
District Attorney Plaintiff-Appellee

CAROLINE HEMPHILL
AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant, Donald E. Daniels, Jr., was charged by bill of indictment

with two counts of aggravated (first degree) rape, in violation of La. R.S.

14:42(A)(4),1 and one count of molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13,

in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (D). Following a trial, a

unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to

serve life in prison without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence for each first degree rape conviction and to 99 years without the

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for the conviction for

molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13. The sentences were ordered to

be served consecutively. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s

convictions and sentences, and we remand this matter with instructions.

FACTS

Defendant, Donald E. Daniels, Jr., is the biological father of the

victims, D.D. and J.D. He is the stepfather of the victim, T.M.2

In November 2013, a teacher at an elementary school in Franklin

Parish overheard a disturbing conversation between a 12-year-old girl, T.M.,

and other students; the teacher reported the conversation to the principal,

Terri Shirley. After speaking to the other students, Ms. Shirley spoke to

1
By Acts 2015, Nos. 184 and 256, the Louisiana legislature amended La. R.S.
14:42 to rename the offense of “aggravated rape” to “first degree rape.” The statute was
also amended to add Paragraph E, which provides:

For all purposes, “aggravated rape” and “first degree rape” mean the
offense defined by the provisions of this Section and any reference to the
crime of aggravated rape is the same as a reference to the crime of first
degree rape. Any act in violation of the provisions of this Section
committed on or after August 1, 2015, shall be referred to as “first degree
rape.”
2
D.D.’s date of birth is April 11, 2006; J.D.’s date of birth is February 1, 2005;
T.M.’s date of birth is January 30, 2001.

T.M. and asked her if she had been molested or “bothered” in any way.

T.M. reported that defendant, her stepfather, had “raped” her. Ms. Shirley

reported the allegations to the Department of Children and Family Services

(“DCFS”), and an investigation ensued.

The following day, T.M. was examined by a pediatrician, Dr. Meade

O’Boyle. T.M. reported to Dr. O’Boyle that defendant had been sexually

abusing her, and the most recent incident had occurred at the family

residence three weeks before she reported the abuse to her principal. The

sexual assault examination did not reveal any physical signs of sexual abuse.

A complaint was submitted to the Franklin Parish Sheriff’s Office

(“FPSO”). During her interview with law enforcement officers, T.M.’s

mother, “Christy,” stated she did not believe T.M.’s allegations. Christy

also expressed her belief that T.M. created the false allegations because she

wanted to move to Texas to live with her father. Defendant was also

interviewed, and he denied the allegations of sexual abuse. DCFS closed its

investigation, and FPSO investigation stalled. Eventually, T.M. moved to

Texas to live with her father.

In 2015, defendant’s biological children, D.D. and J.D., who have

cognitive and developmental disabilities, were living with their mother in

Fort Worth, Texas. In March of 2015, the children visited defendant in

Franklin Parish during spring break. When they returned to Texas, D.D.,

who was eight years old, reported to her mother that defendant would

remove her clothing, spit on his “weewee,” and “stick his weewee” in her

“private part,” and when he does so, “it hurts to go poo.” D.D. also

informed her mother that defendant would “spread” her vagina and look at it

before putting his penis in her “where [she] poopoos from.” D.D.’s mother
2

alerted law enforcement officials and took D.D. to Cook’s Children’s

Hospital in Fort Worth, Texas to be examined. The physical examination

did not reveal any physical signs of sexual abuse.

Defendant was interviewed by the FPSO in 2015 regarding D.D.’s

allegations. He denied the allegations and told the law enforcement officers

that D.D.’s mother made up the allegations because of problems regarding

child support. The 2015 investigation was not pursued due to the lack of

physical evidence.

By 2019, D.D., J.D., and their mother had moved to Tampa, Florida.

D.D. confided in her mother’s boyfriend, Barry, that defendant had sexually

abused her in the past.3 D.D. also told Barry that defendant would put his

“weewee in her butt,” and it caused her to have to go to the bathroom

afterwards. In November 2019, D.D. was examined by a forensic examiner,

and the physical findings did not support or refute her allegations.

During the 2019 investigation, defendant’s son, J.D., was interviewed.

J.D. reported that defendant had “stuck his wiener” in J.D.’s “butt.” Law

enforcement officials in Tampa, Florida contacted Deputy Todd Roberts of

the FPSO regarding the allegations that defendant had sexually abused D.D.

and J.D. Deputy Roberts also learned of the 2015 investigation of sexual

abuse in Fort Worth, Texas involving the allegations made by D.D. Deputy

Roberts reviewed the files from the Florida and Texas investigations and

learned that both investigations indicated that the acts of sexual abuse

3
D.D. also told the forensic interviewer that her mother’s boyfriend paid her $50
to look at her private area, and he rubbed his private parts on her private parts.
According to D.D.’s mother, she and her then-boyfriend merely wanted to examine D.D.
to see if there were any physical signs of sexual abuse. The allegations regarding the
mother’s boyfriend are not at issue in this case.

3

occurred in Franklin Parish. He also reviewed the 2013 investigation into

T.M.’s complaint. During the course of the investigation, Deputy Roberts

reviewed the forensic interviews of T.M., D.D., and J.D. and noted that the

similarities between the interviews were “very striking.”

Again, defendant was interviewed by the FPSO. He denied the

allegations, and he stated this ex-wife was “coaching” D.D. and J.D. to make

false accusations against him.

By this time, T.M. had returned to Franklin Parish, and initially, she

declined to be interviewed by law enforcement officers. However, T.M.

later agreed to be interviewed, and she recanted the claims she made in

2013. Subsequently, after T.M. moved back to Texas, she contacted Deputy

Roberts and informed him that she was ready to “tell the truth.” She

reiterated the allegations she made in 2013, telling Deputy Roberts that

defendant anally raped and molested her over the course of approximately

two years, and the acts occurred when she was 10 to 12 years old. T.M. also

stated the incidents took place in her mother’s bedroom, her bedroom, and at

“the tattoo shop.” T.M. further stated defendant vaginally raped her when

she was 12 years old, and she was afraid to report the abuse because

defendant had threatened to kill her.

The FPSO completed its investigation and turned the case over to the

District Attorney’s Office. Ultimately, the matter was presented to a grand

jury. Thereafter, the grand jury returned a bill of indictment, charging

defendant with two counts of first degree rape (involving D.D. and J.D.), in

violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4), and one count of molestation of a juvenile

under the age of 13 (involving T.M.), in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1)

and (D).
4

During the trial, T.M., D.D., and J.D. testified regarding the sexual

abuse perpetrated by defendant, and law enforcement officers testified as to

the investigations. Expert witnesses also testified as to why child victims of

sexual abuse often recant their allegations, and why it is rare to find physical

signs of sexual abuse in child victims.

A unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He was

sentenced to serve life in prison without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence for each first degree rape conviction and to 99 years

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for the

conviction for molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13. The court

ordered the sentences to run consecutively, “given the fact that these involve

three different victims.” Defendant did not file a motion to reconsider

sentence.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions. He argues there was no physical, medical, scientific, or any

other “reliable evidence” to substantiate the victims’ testimony. According

to defendant, T.M.’s testimony lacked factual support, was not credible

regarding the extent of the alleged abuse, and she retracted the allegations

she made in 2013. Moreover, defendant argues that D.D.’s and J.D.’s

testimony was not supported by any physical evidence, and their testimony

was “result-driven based on their mother’s needs . . . to keep her lover safe

from criminal charges related to his alleged molestation of D.D.” 4

4
D.D. reported to law enforcement officers that Barry “did the same thing that my
daddy did,” and during her forensic interview she reported acts of molestation perpetrated
5

Defendant maintains there is uncontroverted evidence that D.D.’s and J.D.’s

mother coached them to make allegations against him, and “any reasonable

trier of fact would have to reject not only their testimony, but also all other

testimony based on, arising from, or related to their inconsistent and

incredible claims.”

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now codified in La. C.

Cr. P. art. 821, does not afford the appellate court with a means to substitute

its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v.

Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Johnson, 55,254

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/23), 370 So. 3d 91.

Appellate courts neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-

3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. Where there is conflicting testimony

concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

by Barry. As noted by the trial court, “The acts alleged against Barry were committed in
Tampa, Florida, and therefore, jurisdiction for that offense is in Florida.”
6

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 849 So.

2d 566, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert denied,

540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158 L. Ed 2d 90 (2004).

Pursuant to La. R.S. 14:41, rape is defined as the act of anal, oral, or

vaginal sexual intercourse with a person committed without the person’s

lawful consent. At the time the offenses were committed, La. R.S.

14:42(A)(4) provided as follows:

Aggravated rape is a rape committed *** where the anal, oral,
or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful
consent of the victim because it is committed *** when the
victim is under the age of thirteen years.

Thus, in order to convict defendant of aggravated rape of a child

under the age of 13, the State was required to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt that (1) the defendant engaged in anal, oral, or vaginal intercourse

deemed to be without consent of the victim because (2) the victim was less

than 13 years of age at the time of the rape. State v. Lewis, 50,546 (La. App.

2 Cir. 5/4/16), 195 So. 3d 495, writ denied, 16-1052 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d

330; State v. Ricks, 49,609 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 194 So. 3d 614.

In the instant case, the ages of the victims at the time of the offenses

are not in dispute. During the trial, D.D., who by then was 16 years old,

testified that she and her brother, J.D., visited defendant in Franklin Parish

during school breaks. D.D. referred to defendant’s penis as his “weewee.”5

She stated defendant would take her into the bedroom he shared with “Ms.

Christy,” remove their clothing, spit on his weewee, and “stick his weewee

5
The record showed D.D.’s intellectual function is that of a 10-12-year old child.

7

in [her] private part.” According to D.D., defendant told her his actions

“would help [her] pee and poop better.” She described defendant’s actions

as “weird,” and she stated he made her feel “weird.” D.D. also testified she

did not tell anyone because she “just didn’t know what to do.” She stated

that she told her “birth mother” when she got older, and her mother told

defendant to “stop.”6 D.D. testified that defendant stopped “for a few

weeks” or “a month,” but he later resumed sexually abusing her. As stated

above, D.D. has developmental and cognitive disabilities, and she was

unable to recall when the acts occurred.7 She was also unable to recall how

many times defendant sexually abused her; she stated the acts occurred

“most of my life.” D.D. further testified that she knows the difference

between a lie and the truth, and her birth mother did not tell her to lie or

make up the allegations. She stated that she loves her birth dad, and she

would not lie about him or the things he did to her.

By the time defendant’s trial took place, J.D. was 18 years old, and he

testified via closed circuit television.8 During his testimony, J.D. recognized

6
By the time the trial took place, D.D. and J.D. had been removed from their
mother’s custody. During their testimony, they referred to their biological mother as
their “birth mother” and to defendant as their “birth father” or “birth dad.”
7
During the trial in the instant case, defense counsel questioned D.D. regarding
Barry’s acts of molestation. D.D. stated that Barry did not molest her, and she
“accidently” told the officers that he did so because they kept asking her “the same
question until I just said something random.”

J.D. testified that he knew about the statements that D.D. made about their
mother’s boyfriend. He also stated that he overheard his mother telling her boyfriend that
they would “figure something out” so he (the boyfriend) would not go to jail.
8
La. R.S. 15:283 provides, in relevant part:

A. On its own motion or on the motion of the attorney for any party, a
court may order that the testimony of a protected person who may have
been a *** victim of a crime be taken in a room other than the courtroom
and be simultaneously televised by closed circuit television to the court
and jury[.]
***
8

photographs of the houses in Franklin Parish where he would visit defendant

during school breaks. He stated that he had seen defendant’s “private parts,”

and he referred to defendant’s penis as his “wiener.” J.D. also testified that

defendant would put “clear medicine” on his hands, his wiener, and J.D.’s

B. The court shall ensure that the protected person cannot see or hear the
accused unless such viewing or hearing is requested for purposes of
identification. However, the court shall ensure that the accused is afforded
the ability to consult with his attorney during the testimony of the
protected person.
***
E. For the purposes of this Section, “protected person” means a person
who is the victim of a crime or a witness in a criminal prosecution who is
either of the following:

(1) Under the age of seventeen years.
(2) Has a developmental disability as defined in R.S. 28:451.2[11].

Further, La. R.S. 28:451.2(11) provides:

“Developmental disability” means either:

(a) A severe, chronic disability of a person that:

(i) Is attributable to an intellectual or physical impairment or combination
of intellectual and physical impairments.
(ii) Is manifested before the person reaches age twenty-two.
(iii) Is likely to continue indefinitely.
(iv) Results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the
following areas of major life activity:
(aa) Self-care.
(bb) Receptive and expressive language.
(cc) Learning.
(dd) Mobility.
(ee) Self-direction.
(ff) Capacity for independent living.
(gg) Economic self-sufficiency.
(v) Is not attributed solely to mental illness.
(vi) Reflects the person’s need for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and
coordinated.

(b) A substantial developmental delay or specific congenital or acquired
condition in a person from birth through age nine which, without services
and support, has a high probability of resulting in those criteria in
Subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph later in life that may be considered to
be a developmental disability.

9

“butt,” and then stick “his wiener in my butt.” According to J.D., he would

tell defendant to stop, but defendant told him it was “medicine,” and he was

performing the acts to help J.D. “use the restroom.” J.D. testified that

defendant penetrated his anus with his penis “two or three” times. J.D.

stated that he knew the difference between the truth and a lie, and he

confirmed that he loved defendant, but he “didn’t like what he did.”

Alexis Harrison, a licensed master social worker, was qualified as an

expert in forensic interviewing. She testified that, as a forensic interviewer,

she is a “neutral party,” and she does not work for law enforcement, DCFS,

the district attorney, or the medical center. She stated she is “highly trained

to talk to children utilizing and understanding child dynamics about abuse,

family dynamics, [and] child development[.]” Ms. Harrison also testified

that over 50 percent of the children she had interviewed had delayed

disclosing sexual abuse, and some children will recant the allegations. She

explained that recantations typically occur “when a child is either coached to

take it back, maybe they are in fear or afraid of their family breaking apart,

they see Social Services getting involved, and they see . . . the gravity of

what they’ve said is potentially causing, or maybe it just didn’t happen.”

She further testified that she was trained to monitor victims of child abuse

for signs of coaching.

Ms. Harrison also testified that she conducted D.D.’s forensic

interview in March 2015, and only she and D.D. were in the room when the

interview occurred.9 She described D.D. as “very direct” and “adamant that

she would not let me say something that wasn’t right,” which was

9
The videotaped interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
10

“noteworthy” for a child her age. Ms. Harrison also stated that D.D. “was

very direct about her description of the event as it related to her experience

regarding how her body felt, what happened after the sexual assault, of what

happened to her body when she went to the bathroom,” and D.D. “had great

details of those sensory experiences that she encountered.” When asked

whether D.D. exhibited any signs that she had been coached, Ms. Harrison

testified as follows:

I didn’t have any indicators of coaching[;] it appeared the
description of the events was something she experienced. I
know I asked some source monitoring questions, and it
appeared this was something that she had experienced and –
and been a part of and not something someone told her. And
typically, children are told not to say something more than
they’re ever actually coached to say something.

Ms. Harrison further testified that after rewatching D.D.’s forensic

interview, she did not have any concerns that D.D. had been coached.

Stacie Henley, a registered nurse, was accepted as an expert in

forensic sexual assault examinations. She testified that there is a “very low”

probability of finding physical injuries in prepubescent victims of sexual

assault. She explained that anal, genital, and oral tissues heal quickly, and

when the abuse is not immediately reported, it is not uncommon to find no

signs of physical injury during a physical examination. Ms. Henley testified

as follows:

[O]ne of the things sometimes they don’t even outcry right
away for many reasons and then that time frame doesn’t allow
us to see injuries in a timely fashion. But that type of tissue that
is in the anal and genital region is a special type of tissue that
heals very easily, and it also is the function of like the anus, in
particular, is to open up and let large bowel movements come
out and so there’s often times when we don’t see any injury
whatsoever, most times. *** Even if it was frequent.

11

She further testified that there is a “less than five percent” probability of

finding evidence of vaginal penetration in prepubescent girls.

Ms. Henley stated that she performed D.D.’s sexual assault

examination at Cook Children’s Hospital in Fort Worth, Texas. She testified

that D.D.’s mother accompanied her to the hospital for the examination;

however, she interviewed D.D. and her mother separately. She explained

D.D. was not in the room when she spoke to her mother, and her mother was

not in the room when she spoke to D.D.

Ms. Henley testified that D.D. was eight years old at the time, and her

physical examination was “normal.” She stated she did not examine D.D.’s

cervix or vaginal vault because using a speculum on a prepubertal girl is “a

hundred percent not appropriate.” According to Ms. Henley, her clinical

impression was sexual abuse; however, she did not detect any anal or genital

injuries in D.D.

Ms. Henley further testified that during the examination, D.D. was

asked whether anyone had ever “hurt her or done something to her,” and she

documented D.D.’s statements in her medical records as follows:

Just my daddy, my daddy only use[s] his weewee, he spits on
his weewee, it [sic] easier to put in between my private part but
it hurts and I don’t like it. *** Every time he does it, it makes
me pee, and it hurts. He does it a lot every day when I go to
Daddy’s, a lot of days. [J.D.] only got it done one day. Daddy
did it to [J.D.] one day. *** He’s trying to think that spit is
medicine. He spits on it, his hand and he rubs it on his weewee.
He pushes it up and down.

During cross-examination, Ms. Henley was questioned about the lack

of physical signs of anal penetration. She testified that if a prepubescent girl

was anally raped repeatedly, physical signs of trauma would depend on

12

factors such as lubrication, position, the child’s rectal sphincters, and the

degree of penetration.

Moreover, Ms. Henley testified that she is trained to look for signs of

coaching in child victims of sexual abuse. She stated signs of coaching

include being unable to maintain consistency in statements and being unable

to provide sensory details of the incidents. Ms. Henley also stated that

medical professionals are specially trained to solicit information from child

victims without asking leading questions, and children are provided with

neutral forensic interviewers who are “able to ask question in a non-leading

way and, most importantly, who understand child developmental levels[.]”

Ms. Henley testified she did not detect any signs of coaching during her

interaction with D.D.

Detective Mark Delmonte, a member of the Special Victims’ Unit of

the Tampa Police Department in Tampa, Florida, also testified. He stated

that most cases of child sexual abuse in Florida are reported through DCFS.

Det. Delmonte testified that in October 2019, he was assigned to investigate

D.D.’s allegations involving her mother’s boyfriend, Barry. He stated that

D.D. provided specific details concerning Barry’s actions, and during the

interview, D.D. stated that what Barry did to her “was okay because it

wasn’t as bad as what her dad did to her.” He testified that based on D.D.’s

remarks regarding defendant, he contacted her mother, Lacey, who told him

that “this was a misunderstanding and a false allegation and that her

daughter had made it up.” Det. Delmonte decided to have D.D. examined by

a forensic interviewer. He stated he watched D.D.’s forensic interview, and

he recognized “obvious signs of coaching” regarding the allegations against

13

Barry.10 With regard to the allegations against defendant, Det. Delmonte

testified that D.D. did not show any signs that she had been coached. He

explained as follows:

What struck me about the interview, when she spoke about
[defendant] was the specifics that she gave, the nature of the
abuse[.] *** The specifics that she gave would be very difficult
to teach a child to come up with these statements.
***
Some of the things that she mentioned during the interview
about her dad spits on his penis, rubs it in her butt, leans on her,
makes the hole bigger, makes her have to go to the bathroom,
these are – again I think it would be difficult to teach a child to
know these things.
***

Det. Delmonte testified that he asked Lacey about D.D.’s allegations

against defendant, and Lacey informed him that defendant lived in

Louisiana, and she had reported the allegations of sexual abuse “at least once

before in another state.” Det. Delmonte also testified that J.D. also reported

that defendant had sexually abused him. According to Det. Delmonte, J.D.

stated that defendant “would put clear jelly, medicine, on his penis and insert

it in his anus for the purpose of helping him defecate.”11 Lacey provided

Det. Delmonte with defendant’s name and date of birth, and he forwarded

the information to Det. Roberts in Franklin Parish.

Lacey, D.D.’s and J.D.’s mother, also testified at trial. She stated she

has “learning disabilities,” and she was in special education classes in

school. Lacey vehemently denied coaching D.D. and J.D. to accuse

10
Det. Delmonte confronted Lacey with his suspicions that D.D. had been
coached, and she “eventually relented and admitted that she had coached [D.D.] to not
get Barry in trouble because she was afraid that his probation would be violated.” He
also checked Lacey’s phone and discovered that Barry had driven her and D.D. to the
interview, and Lacey was keeping him updated via text messages during the interview.

11
Det. Delmonte testified that he did not interview J.D. Rather, J.D. was
interviewed by “the civilian investigators for the Child Protection Investigative Division”
of the sheriff’s department.
14

defendant of sexual abuse. She admitted that she signed an affidavit in

which she attested that she “falsely accused” defendant of sexual abuse. She

stated that the affidavit was drafted and mailed to her by defendant’s sister,

and she signed it in the presence of a notary without reading it. Lacey

testified that she told defendant’s sister she was “conflicted” and “didn’t

know who to believe,” and she signed the affidavit because she believed it

contained the statements she had made to defendant’s sister. The affidavit

was introduced into evidence and published to the jury.

Lacey reiterated that she did not persuade D.D. and J.D. to make up

the allegations. Lacey testified that in 2015, she and her children were living

in Fort Worth, Texas, and D.D. and J.D. visited defendant in Franklin Parish

during their spring break. When the children returned home, D.D. told her

that defendant “was doing the weewee thing, sticking his weewee in her

private part.”12 Lacey stated she called law enforcement and child protective

services, and she took D.D. to be interviewed and physically examined;

however, the case in Texas was “closed” because D.D.’s physical

examination did not reveal any physical signs of abuse.

Lacey further testified that J.D. never disclosed the abuse to her; she

learned about the allegations involving J.D. from the detectives in Florida.

She also stated that when she and defendant were married, he liked to

engage in anal sexual intercourse, and she accommodated his sexual desires.

Lacey stated she continued to send the children to Louisiana to visit

defendant after the allegations were made in 2015.13

12
Lacey also testified that D.D. made “accusations” against Barry to detectives in
Florida; however, “nothing was ever founded, and everything was dropped.”

13
Lacey testified that the detectives in Florida told her not to allow the children to
be around Barry. Ultimately, in December 2019, D.D. and J.D. were removed from
15

Moreover, Lacey denied defendant’s claim that she coerced their

children to make the accusations due to a custody dispute. She stated

defendant “would always threaten” to take her back to court to revise the

custody agreement whenever she “wouldn’t give in to his demands when he

wanted them.” Lacey also testified defendant wanted her to move back to

Louisiana with the children, and when she refused to do so, “he would

threaten me to take me to Court and take the kids from me.” Lacey

compromised by moving from Corpus Christi to Fort Worth, Texas to be

closer to Louisiana, and thereafter, she and defendant “weren’t arguing that

much anymore.”

Based on the testimony and evidence adduced at trial, we find the

State presented sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for the

aggravated rape of D.D. Despite her cognitive challenges and inability to

recall specific dates, D.D. was able to describe, in detail, the times she was

sexually violated by defendant in his and “Ms. Christy’s” bedroom. The

lack of physical evidence that defendant had been sexually abusing D.D. was

consistent with the experts’ testimony that young children most often will

not exhibit physical signs of sexual abuse. Further, D.D. underwent forensic

interviews in Texas and Florida, and the expert witnesses testified they did

not observe any signs that she had been coached by her mother. Although

Det. Delmonte testified that he could observe signs that D.D. had been

coached with regards to the allegations against Barry in Florida, he clearly

stated that he saw no signs that she had been coached or induced to make

false statements regarding defendant. D.D.’s testimony was sufficient to

Lacey’s custody because she “kept going around Barry and then [she] sent the kids back
to [defendant] after the fact of the initial allegations in 2015.

16

prove defendant’s commission of the crime, and it is apparent from the

verdict that the jury found D.D.’s testimony to be credible.

Additionally, our review of the trial evidence shows the State met its

burden of proving defendant committed the aggravated rape of J.D. It is

apparent that J.D. has cognitive limitations and lacked understanding of the

meaning of sexual abuse, as during his forensic interview, J.D. stated that

defendant did not sexually abuse him. Nonetheless, J.D. informed the

interviewer that defendant put “medicine” on his (defendant’s) penis and

used his penis to insert the medicine into J.D.’s rectum to assist him in using

the bathroom. J.D.’s testimony at trial was consistent with the statements he

made during his forensic interview. Despite defendant’s insistence, there is

no evidence that J.D. had been coached. J.D. testified that he knew the

difference between the truth and a lie, and he stated he was telling the truth

about what defendant did to him. The jury chose to believe J.D.’s testimony,

and this Court affords great deference to such credibility determinations.

Notwithstanding counsel’s assertions during oral arguments before

this Court, Lacey did not testify that she coached D.D. and J.D. During her

testimony at trial, Lacey repeatedly denied making up the allegations against

defendant. It is undisputed that Lacey signed a sworn statement, in which

she attested she had “made up” the allegations against defendant. However,

she explained that the document was drafted by defendant’s sister, and she

(Lacey) signed it without knowing or understanding the contents of it.

Based on this record, the evidence presented overwhelmingly supports

defendant’s convictions for aggravate rape. This assignment lacks merit.

Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to support this

conviction for molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13 regarding T.M.
17

According to defendant, T.M.’s testimony lacked factual support and was

not credible regarding the extent of the alleged abuse. Defendant also argues

that T.M. retracted the allegations she made in 2013, and her statements

“depended on what she needed and where she wanted to live at the time.”

Defendant further asserts that T.M. testified that defendant anally raped her

nearly every day over a two-year period, yet her physical examination did

not show any physical signs of sexual abuse.

At the time of offenses regarding T.M., November 1, 2011, through

November 30, 2013, La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) provided, in relevant part:

Molestation of a juvenile is the commission by anyone over the
age of seventeen of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person
or in the presence of any child under the age of seventeen,
where there is an age difference of greater than two years
between the two persons, with the intention of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desires of either person, by the use of
force, violence, duress, menace, psychological intimidation,
threat of great bodily harm, or by the use of influence by virtue
of a position of control or supervision over the juvenile. Lack of
knowledge of the juvenile’s age shall not be a defense.

During the trial, T.M. testified she was 10 years old when defendant

moved into the house occupied by her, her mother, and her brothers. She

stated she and her brothers were often left in defendant’s care while her

mother worked. T.M. testified that the acts of molestation began with

defendant touching her over her clothing and escalated over time. T.M. also

testified defendant would carry her to the bedroom he shared with her

mother, and he would penetrate her anus with his penis. She stated the acts

occurred every day after school, when she and defendant were alone in the

house, or after her mother went to sleep. She also stated that on some

afternoons, she would accompany defendant to “the tattoo shop” where he

would penetrate her anus with his penis. T.M. further testified that the last

18

time defendant assaulted her, he attempted to penetrate her vaginally, and

she threatened to “tell everyone” about the sexual abuse. T.M. stated that

defendant threatened to kill her entire family if she disclosed the abuse, and

she believed he would do so.

According to T.M., defendant had “anger issues,” and she was afraid

to disclose the sexual abuse because she was afraid for her family. She also

described behaviors, such as defendant “fighting” with her mother and

punching holes in the walls of their home. Additionally, T.M. testified that

when she finally disclosed the abuse, her mother did not believe her, and her

grandmother told her to stop talking about the sexual abuse because doing so

would “tear the family apart and she [T.M.] would be taken away.” T.M.

explained that she began denying the abuse because defendant was not

arrested in 2013, when she initially disclosed the sexual abuse, and she did

not have any family support. She stated she went to live with her father, and

when she would return to Franklin Parish to visit her mother, she would feel

“nervous, worried, and uncomfortable.” However, during visits, she was not

left alone with defendant. Furthermore, T.M. testified that she believed her

mother and grandmother created the lie about her making up the allegations

out of a desire to move to Texas with her father, and her mother told her to

“stick with the same story” when law enforcement officers reached out to

her in 2019.

Moreover, T.M. testified that she was telling the truth about what

defendant did to her and she had nothing to gain from lying. She stated,

“I’m a twenty-two year old grown woman with two baby girls of my own[.]

I have nothing to gain but peace of mind and clarity knowing that justice has

been served.”
19

Christy, T.M.’s mother, testified that T.M. was often left alone with

defendant after school, and T.M. would sometimes “seem upset” after

spending time with defendant. Christy also recalled occasions when

defendant would leave their bedroom during the night, and she also

recollected one occasion when T.M. began to tell her “something” but

stopped, stating she did not think her mother would believe her. Cristy

further confirmed defendant’s proclivity for anal sexual intercourse, and she

described it as “his most wanted desire.” According to Christy, defendant

had expressed to her that if she would not engage in anal intercourse with

him, then “he’d get it elsewhere.”

Further, Christy testified that defendant was the one who told her that

T.M. was making up the allegations of sexual abuse because she wanted to

move to Texas to live with her father, and she (Christy) repeated the story to

the authorities during the investigation in 2013. Cristy also corroborated

T.M.’s testimony regarding defendant’s “anger issues.” She testified as

follows:

He would punch things, he punched the window pane out of the
door, slammed his fist on top of the dresser and broke it one
time, he shot a gun off in the bathroom window right next to
my older son that was standing there beside him, [and] he
would scream, holler, yell, right in front of my face.

Amanda Chapaton, a licensed professional counselor, was accepted as

a generalist in traumatic behaviors in sexual abuse victims. She prepared

and presented a series of slides which listed common myths in child sexual

abuse cases. Ms. Chapaton stated that one common myth is that if a child is

being sexually abused, there will be medical evidence. She explained that

medical evidence of sexual abuse is usually only obtained in cases where the

abuse is reported or discovered as soon as the incident occurred. She also
20

testified that research has shown that less than five percent of child sexual

abuse cases will provide medical evidence. Ms. Chapaton further testified

that another common myth pertains to false allegations of sexual abuse. She

stated that false allegations are uncommon and only occur in four percent of

reported cases. Additionally, she stated one of the biggest myths in child

sexual abuse cases is that children usually tell someone when they are being

sexually abused. According to Ms. Chapaton, research has found that most

child victims delay or never disclose child sexual abuse to friends, family, or

authorities. She stated that some children do not disclose sexual abuse

because they are afraid, and some children will “partially disclose” the

extent of the abuse.

Ms. Chapaton also addressed the issue of why some children recant

the allegations, provide inconsistent information, and are reluctant to testify

against the offender. She testified as follows:

[E]vidence of recantations and inconsistencies are common and
again the misconception is that it’s the opposite, that once I tell,
I’ve decided to tell and there you go. And what we know is that
there’s reluctance, there’s inconsistencies. I may have a lot of
motivation to recant. *** Child sexual abuse victims are more
likely to recant or have inconsistencies in their story when the
abuse is perpetrated by a family – a familiar person, especially
family. That feels like it should be common sense but
unfortunately it’s not. I use the word motivation in saying that
the motivation to make things okay is strong, right, with
children. They can’t just pick up and leave and you know, get
in their car and go somewhere else. So often times they want to
try to fix it, right. And so there’s some variables that will come
up for children as far as ‘Who is the person to me. I still love
the person. I may not want the person to get into trouble even
though I don’t like what they did.’ *** So out of just some
common reactions related to sexual abuse, so victims recant in a
variety of ways, there’s no one size fits all response to sexual
abuse. There’s no one size fits all response to trauma.
***

21

After reviewing this record in its entirety, we find the evidence was

sufficient to prove defendant committed the offense of molestation of a

juvenile under the age of 13. T.M. was 12 years old when she made the

allegations in 2013, and defendant was 36 years old. Thus, it is undisputed

that T.M. was under the age of 13, defendant was over the age of 17, and the

age difference between T.M. and defendant was more than two years. It is

also undisputed that defendant, as T.M.’s stepfather, was in a position of

supervision or control over her, and he committed the offenses “with the

intention of arousing or gratifying” his sexual desires. T.M.’s testimony,

including her statements during her forensic interview, was detailed and

consistent. The jury, as the factfinder, reasonably accepted T.M.’s testimony

as credible and rejected defendant’s denials of wrongdoing.

Based upon the testimony of the victim alone, the jury could

reasonably have found that the State proved the essential elements of the

crime of molestation of a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, under

the Jackson standard, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s

conviction for the molestation of T.M.

Further, defendant’s argument regarding T.M.’s alleged inconsistent

statements and her recantation in 2013 was refuted by the testimony of Ms.

Chapaton, who described, in great detail, the reasons many child victims of

sexual abuse often provide inconsistent statements and/or recant the

allegations. Additionally, defendant’s argument concerning the lack of

physical evidence of sexual abuse was also repudiated by the testimony of

Ms. Henley and Ms. Chapaton. Specifically, Ms. Henley testified that anal

and genital tissues heal quickly, and signs of physical injuries are usually

22

absent unless the abuse is immediately reported. This assignment lacks

merit.

Defendant also contends the sentences imposed – two sentences of life

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, to be

served consecutively with each other and consecutively with the 99-year

sentence without benefits – are constitutionally excessive. Although

defendant did not file a motion to reconsider sentence, he now argues that

the trial court failed to consider factors such as his criminal history, the

gravity or dangerousness of the offenses, the viciousness of the crimes, the

harm done to the victims, whether defendant constitutes an unusual danger

to the public, the potential for defendant’s rehabilitation, and whether

defendant had received a benefit from a plea bargain.

Defendant also argues he is “a disabled veteran who served his

country honorably,” and despite his disabled status, he “sought employment,

was involved in the church, had sought to make himself a better person and

had provided support to his children and to his stepchildren.” He maintains

the sentences should be vacated because they are grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the offenses and constitute nothing more than needless

infliction of pain and suffering. Moreover, defendant contends concurrent

sentences are warranted because his convictions arise from the same act or

transaction and constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.

Generally, an excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining

whether the trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and whether the sentence is constitutionally

excessive. State v. Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d

749; State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357,
23

writ denied, 20-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065. However, when a

defendant fails to timely file a motion to reconsider sentence, the appellate

court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare minimum claim of

constitutional excessiveness. State v. Benson, 53,578 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/10/20), 305 So. 3d 135.

Defendant, by failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence, has

waived his right to have his sentence reviewed for compliance with La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1. As a result, the sole remaining question in this appeal is

whether his sentences exceed the punishment allowed by the state and

federal constitutions.

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

I § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or

excessive punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it

may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979). The

appellate court must determine if the sentence is constitutionally excessive.

State v. Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1. To assess a claim that a

sentence violates La. Const. art. I § 20, the appellate court must determine if

the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or

nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and

suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno,

384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-

0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ denied, 18-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So.

3d 1208.
24

The sentencing court has wide discretion to impose a sentence within

the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed will not be set aside as

excessive absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-

3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Gaines, 54,383 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 2/22/23), 358 So. 3d 194, writ denied, 23-00363 (La. 6/21/23),

362 So. 3d 428; State v. Tubbs, 52, 417 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 285 So.

3d 536, writ denied, 20-00307 (La. 7/31/20), 300 So. 3d 404, on recons., 20-

00307 (La. 9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 30, and writ denied, 20-00307 (La. 9/8/20),

301 So. 3d 30.

Regarding concurrent and consecutive sentences, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883

provides:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on
the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served
concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all
be served consecutively. Other sentences of imprisonment shall
be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that
some or all be served concurrently.

The decision to make sentences consecutive, rather than concurrent, is

within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Farria, 412 So. 2d 577 (La.

1982); State v. Moss, 55,454 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 379 So. 3d 285.

When the court makes sentences consecutive, it must state the

considerations, which may include the defendant’s criminal history, the

gravity or dangerousness of the offense, the viciousness of the crimes, the

harm done to the victims, whether the defendant constitutes an unusual risk

of danger to the public, the potential for the defendant’s rehabilitation, and

whether the defendant has received a benefit from a plea bargain. State v.
25

Gant, 54,837 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 354 So. 3d 824; State v. Dale,

53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.

Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by

life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:42(D). Further, at the time the offenses

concerning T.M. were committed, the sentencing range for molestation of a

juvenile under the age of 13 was 25-99 years at hard labor, with at least 25

years to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence. La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1).

The trial court ordered a presentence investigation which it reviewed

prior to imposing sentence. The court noted that defendant was a first felony

offender but was arrested in 1995 in Texas for misdemeanor theft for which

he received six months’ probation. The court also reviewed defendant’s

family and social history and his educational, employment, and military

background. The court also noted defendant was 46 years old at the time of

sentencing. The court specifically stated that defendant is a veteran of the

Gulf War era, and he served in the United States Navy from 2001-2009.

Further, the court noted defendant was diagnosed with an unspecified

depressive disorder, which caused impaired judgment, impaired abstract

thinking, disturbances of motivation and mood, and difficulty in establishing

and maintaining effective work and social relationships.

The court also read into the record a letter submitted by T.M., in

which she outlined the devastating impact the sexual abuse had on her life.

T.M. asserted that what defendant did to her was “the worst thing that could

ever happen to a kid,” his actions caused physical and emotional damage

that will never heal, the sexual abused has changed the way she feels and
26

interacts with others, and she has permanent “trust issues.” T.M. further

stated:

He has damaged our entire family. And if you listen to him talk,
he will make you think that he did nothing wrong or that we’re
all crazy. That’s the most hurtful thing, he believes he hasn’t
done anything wrong. I don’t believe that he has the ability to
see himself as anything but better than everyone else. He is
dangerous to public safety. He needs to spend the rest of his life
in jail.

Christy also submitted a statement, expressing her belief that

defendant “should get the maximum sentence of life in prison without the

possibility of parole.” She also stated she “suffered mental, verbal,

emotional, and sexual abuse” from defendant, but she was “just too afraid to

speak up.” Christy also acknowledged that she “failed” T.M. by not

believing her allegations in 2013.

In their statement to the court, the adoptive parents of D.D. and J.D.

expressed the hardships and the psychological consequences of the sexual

abuse inflicted by defendant. The adoptive parents noted that a life sentence

was mandatory and requested that the court “allow the severity of the

sentence to reflect the severity of the crime.”

The court also considered defendant’s written statement, in which he

acknowledged that he had been convicted of “the worst crimes a person

could commit.” Defendant requested leniency and asked the court to

consider his status as a “model inmate” during his incarceration.

The trial court imposed life sentences for the aggravated rape

convictions as mandated by statute, and the maximum sentence, 99 years,

for the molestation conviction. The court stated that it was ordering the

sentences to run consecutively to one another, “given the fact that these

involve three different victims.”
27

We note that in cases involving first-felony offenders, concurrent

sentences are ordinarily imposed, particularly where the convictions arise

out of the same course of conduct. However, in this case, defendant

sexually abused three different victims at varying times. Defendant, as the

father of D.D. and J.D., and the stepfather of T.M., was in a position of trust

and authority over the victims. Rather than protecting and guiding the

young victims, defendant used his position and access to them to prey upon

them. Defendant’s repeated sexual abuse of D.D., J.D., and T.M. negatively

impacted their lives and have caused long-lasting and devastating effects.

Our review of the record shows defendant exhibited no remorse for

his actions. When the allegations were asserted by T.M. in 2013, defendant

falsely stated that T.M. made the allegations out of a desire to move to Texas

to live with her father, and he managed to convince Christy to believe him.

Thereafter, when D.D.’s allegations surfaced in 2015, defendant blamed

Lacey, and he told law enforcement that the allegations were brought forth

due to a non-existent custody dispute. Again, he convinced Christy that

D.D.’s allegations were due to a custody dispute, and she expressed the same

to law enforcement officials. Throughout the proceedings and on appeal,

defendant has maintained his position, and he offered no apology to the

victims of his crimes.

We find that the trial court appropriately considered defendant’s lack

of remorse, the devastating impact the offenses had on the victims, and the

fact that defendant sexually abused three young victims. Given the level of

the breach of trust involved and the profound negative impact of these

offenses on three young victims, we do not find that the trial court abused its

discretion in the sentences and the consecutive nature thereof.
28

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. Our review of this record has

revealed three errors patent.

First, the trial court failed to specify that the sentences would be

served at hard labor, as mandated by the penalty provisions of La. R.S. 14:42

and 14:81.2(D). The failure to impose hard labor is harmless and self-

correcting when there is a mandatory felony requiring any sentence to be

served at hard labor. State v. Smith, 53,827 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/3/21), 315 So.

3d 407; State v. Burns, 53,250 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 290 So. 3d 721;

State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ

denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d 61. Because violations of La.

R.S. 14:42 and 14:81.2(A)(1) and (D) are mandatory felonies requiring any

sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and self-correcting.

Nonetheless, we remand this matter to the trial court to allow the court

minutes to be amended to reflect that defendant’s sentences shall be served

at hard labor.

Next, the trial court ordered defendant’s sentences to be served

without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Although the court minutes correctly reflect that the sentences are to be

served without benefits, the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order does

not reflect the same. Accordingly, on remand, we order the trial court to

issue an amended Commitment Order that correctly reflects defendant’s

sentences shall be served the without the benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence.

29

Finally, although the record reveals that the trial court provided

defendant with written notice of the sex offender notification and

registration requirements, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:542-543.1, the minutes do

not reflect that defendant was provided with notice of the sex offender

notification requirements. On remand, we instruct the trial court to make an

entry in the court minutes stating that the written notification was provided

to defendant in accordance with La. R.S. 15:543(A).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm defendant’s convictions and

sentences. This matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to

amend the court minutes to reflect that defendant’s sentences shall be served

at hard labor. We also remand this matter to the trial court to correct and

amend the Uniform Order of Commitment to correctly reflect that

defendant’s sentences shall be served without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence; the court is further ordered to send a copy

of the amended Commitment Order to the clerk of this court within 45 days

of this judgment. Finally, we order the trial court to amend the court

minutes to reflect that the written sex offender notification was provided to

defendant.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED;
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

30