Brandon M. Rowe v. 4-Aces Property Management LLC

Judgment rendered November 19, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,520-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

BRANDON M. ROWE Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

4-ACES PROPERTY Defendant-Appellant
MANAGEMENT LLC

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 164,781

Honorable Allen Parker Self, Jr., Judge

*****

KENNETH J. BECK Counsel for Defendant-
Appellant, 4-Aces Property
Management, LLC

DAVID L. WHITE Counsel for Plaintiff-
Appellee, Brandon M. Rowe

CHARLES ROWE Counsel for Plaintiff-
Appellee, Brandon M. Rowe
and In Proper Person,
Intervenor-Appellee

SHIRLEY ROWE In Proper Person,
Intervenor-Appellee

DOROTHY WATSON-COLLINS In Proper Person,
Third Party-Appellee

*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and HUNTER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This civil matter arises from the 26th Judicial District, Parish of

Bossier, the Honorable Parker Self, Judge, presiding. The plaintiff, Brandon

M. Rowe (“Brandon”), filed a petition against the defendant, 4-Aces

Property Management, LLC (“4-Aces PM”), seeking rescission of the sale of

immovable property located in Jones Cypress Subdivision in Bossier Parish

for lesion beyond moiety, lack of authentic form, and fraud. The trial court

found in favor of Brandon, rescinded the purported sale as a relative nullity,

and awarded damages and attorney fees. For the following reasons, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2021, Brandon filed a petition to rescind the sale of

immovable property for lesion beyond moiety, lack of authentic form, fraud,

and for injunctive relief. In the petition, Brandon alleged that in February

2021, he was arrested by Bossier City Police. Brandon then contacted

Anthony Bowers, who he knew was a bondsman, to assist in his release. In

order to secure money for the bond, Brandon decided to use Lots 41 and 42

of Jones Cypress Subdivision (“the lakefront property”) as collateral, and he

asked if he could pay Bowers back over a 60- to 90-day period after

Brandon secured a loan from the bank. Brandon further alleged that Bowers

agreed to this arrangement but that there was no agreement between the

parties relating to a transfer of ownership of the lakefront property.

Brandon further alleged that on March 15, 2021, Bowers presented

him with documents in printed form reflecting their agreement that the

lakefront property would serve as collateral to secure Brandon’s repayment

of the bond. The petition further averred that the documents contained no

language that payment of the bond would begin over the next 60 to 90 days.

Instead, this information was handwritten on the document. Finding the

handwritten portion to be satisfactory, Brandon signed the documents.

Bowers, an agent of 4-Aces, bonded Brandon out of jail later that evening.

The petition alleged that the bond paper showed 4-Aces Bail Bonds, LLC

(“4-Aces Bail Bonds”) as the bonding company and Financial Casualty and

Surety as the insurance company standing behind the bond.1 The petition

also asserted that Brandon never received a copy of the documents he

signed.

According to the petition, several days after Brandon’s release, he

went to the courthouse and discovered that a cash sale deed had been filed,

showing that Brandon had sold the lakefront property to 4-Aces PM for

$36,000. Brandon alleged in his petition that it was neither his intention to

sell anything nor did he receive money from 4-Aces PM. The petition also

stated that the signature on page two of the purported cash sale deed was not

where had Brandon signed the document and was not the same document he

had signed. Brandon further alleged that there were no witnesses present at

1
The following exchange occurred during the testimony related to the $36,000
bond:

Q: Now the $36,000 that Brandon has acknowledged is-is owed, is
owed to who?
Bowers: To me. To 4 Aces Prop—I mean, yeah, 4 Aces Property
Management, I used funds from there to pay 4 Aces Bail Bonds to post
the bond.
Q: So that’—
A: And all of – both of them are mines.
Q: So, the money is actually owed to 4 Aces Property Management
Company, your company; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And – and that’s because you, uh, pay the, the uh, the fidelity
company and is a portion of your fees; is that correct?
A: That is correct.

2

the signing of the document on March 15. The only people present at the

signing, according to the petition, were Brandon, Bowers, and the notary

public, Dorothy Watson-Collins. Similarly, no handwritten statement was

part of the cash sale deed document.

On November 24, 2021, 4-Aces PM filed a third-party demand,

alleging that Dorothy Watson-Collins, the notary public, be made a third-

party defendant in the matter. On that same date, 4-Aces PM filed a motion

to recuse counsel of record and alleged that Charles R. Rowe was a witness

in the matter and was prohibited from representing Brandon under the

Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. On June 13, 2022, Charles R.

Rowe and Shirely C. Rowe filed a petition for intervention. In it, the pair

alleged: they purchased the lakefront property on June 25, 1998, and donated

one-half interest in the property to Brandon on June 20, 2000; Charles and

Shirely then donated the remaining one-half interest in the lakefront property

to Brandon on August 11, 2006; however, the donation did not contain any

language of acceptance by Brandon, resulting in Charles and Shirely being

the owners of the lakefront property. On December 9, 2022, 4-Aces PM

filed an exception of no right of action or no cause of action in response to

the petition to intervene. The trial court ultimately granted 4-Aces PM’s

exception, finding that the donation was accepted by Brandon through

possession, and the trial court dismissed the Rowes’ petition of intervention.

On December 22, 2022, Brandon filed a motion for summary

judgment, alleging that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to lesion

beyond moiety, lack of authentic form, fraud, and failure of acceptance.

Following the summary judgment hearing held on February 28, 2023, the

trial court initially granted Brandon’s summary judgment motion on the
3

issue of lesion beyond moiety. However, the trial court filed an amended

ruling and reasons for judgment on May 8, 2023, wherein it instructed that

4-Aces PM supplement the original amount paid with the price established

by the court with legal interest from the time the demand for rescission was

made if 4-Aces PM wished to retain ownership of the lakefront property.

Alternatively, it ordered that 4-Aces PM could return the lakefront property

to Brandon, and Brandon tender the original price paid for the lakefront

property with legal interest from the date of notification of the intent to

return the lakefront property.

Following a rehearing on the motion for summary judgment held on

August 23, 2023, the trial court opined that it had made an error relating to

its determination to a reasonable legal certainty of the value of the lakefront

property. Consequently, the trial court on its own motion set aside its

previous May 8, 2023, judgment and determined that there were genuine

issues of material fact which could not be resolved on a motion for summary

judgment. Ultimately, the trial court denied Brandon’s motion for summary

judgment.

A bench trial began on February 29, 2024. At the beginning of the

trial, 4-Aces PM raised concerns about Charles Rowe continuing on as

counsel for Brandon. It argued that Charles had a direct interest in the

matter as he had intervened, claiming to be the owner of the lakefront

property. Furthermore, 4-Aces PM suggested that Charles had direct

knowledge as it relates to the evaluation of the property, and Charles was

presently collecting money from the property. Given this direct interest in

the case, 4-Aces PM urged that Charles should be sequestered and be

required to recuse. In response, Brandon argued that the intervention claim
4

had been dismissed, an expert would be testifying as to the value of the

lakefront property, and Charles had done 80-90% of the work on the case,

resulting in undue hardship on Brandon if Charles were required to recuse.

The trial court concluded that there would be no reason for Charles to testify,

given the extensive witness list. The court stated that Charles had no

ownership interest in the property, and Charles was not involved in the

“transaction” that took place between Bowers and Brandon.

Robert Williams, a residential real estate appraiser, was qualified as an

expert and the first witness to take the stand at trial. Williams testified that

he viewed the property in person. It was a lakefront property with a mobile

home on it and was valued at $175,000. He took pictures of the property,

and the images were included in his appraisal report.

Next to testify at trial was Dorothy Watson-Collins, the third-party

defendant. Ms. Collins testified that she has been a notary public for 24

years. She stated that three years ago, Bowers contacted her to meet him at

the jail, and she was under the impression that he was bonding someone out

and that the bond had something to do with property. She also testified that

Bowers had her bring a second page or execution page. She indicated that

once the discussion between Bowers and Brandon began, she realized that it

was about deeding property rather than someone being bonded out of jail.

Ms. Collins testified that there were no witnesses in the interview room with

the three of them. She stated that she handwrote some information on the

documents to make the agreement more clear between Bowers and Brandon.

Ms. Collins testified that Brandon ultimately signed the documents once the

parties came to an agreement that included a 60-day payment option. Ms.

Collins stated that she felt she had done everything legally expected of her.
5

Although Ms. Collins did attempt to record the exchange, she indicated that

she was unsuccessful in doing so and never had any video footage of the

encounter.

Brandon’s girlfriend, Amy Hill, also testified at trial. She indicated

that she was arrested in February 2021, and her family contacted Bowers to

obtain a bond for her release. She testified that once she was released, she

tried to assist in Brandon’s release by contacting Bowers. Ms. Hill related to

the court that she and Brandon discussed using the lakefront property as

collateral to obtain a loan from the bank and to use the property as collateral

to get a property bond from a bondsman to assist in Brandon’s release. She

testified that, despite frequent contact with Bowers leading up to Brandon’s

release, she was unable to reach Bowers after Brandon was released from

prison.

Brandon testified that on March 15, 2021, he was under the

impression that he was signing something to put up his lakefront property as

collateral with time to pay it back. He indicated that the witnesses listed on

the document were not present at the meeting, but he did acknowledge his

signature on the documents. Following his release, Brandon testified that he

went to the courthouse to obtain the deed for the lakefront property to take

with him to the bank to get a loan. When he asked for the deed, Brandon

stated that he was surprised to find that Bowers had recorded a deed that

indicated that 4-Aces PM owned the lakefront property. Brandon testified

that he believed he had committed himself to paying $36,000 to Bowers

within 60 days.

Anthony Bowers testified that he prepared the first sheet of the

documents involved in the transaction, and Ms. Collins prepared the second
6

page. He stated that he filed the paperwork at the courthouse to protect

himself and to prevent Brandon from selling the property. Bowers indicated

that if Brandon paid the money back, Bowers would have allowed Brandon

to “redeem” the property. He testified that he routinely deals with similar

instances involving property like cars and computers. He testified that

individuals sell him the property, and he gives them a certain amount of time

within which to recover the property. During his interactions with Brandon,

Bowers was not intending to do anything differently from his normal

business practices. Despite Ms. Hill and Brandon’s claims about no contact

from Bowers following Brandon’s release, Bowers testified that Brandon

never reached out after he was released, and Brandon never returned a

$36,000 payment.2

As it relates to the lakefront property, Bowers stated that after 60 days

had passed, he went to the lakefront property and informed the tenant that he

was taking possession of the property. Bowers testified that, following his

conversation with the tenant, the lessee paid rent to him on one occasion.

Bowers also related that Ms. Collins filmed the exchange at the jail, which is

why he contacted her about obtaining the recording. Bowers testified that he

saw Ms. Collins filming the exchange, and they checked to be sure the

footage was on her phone. Bowers stated that Ms. Collins explained to

Brandon that he was deeding the property to Bowers and that he would have

2
In its judgment, the trial court clearly articulated that the defendant, 4-Aces
Property Management, did not pay any funds towards Brandon’s release. Rather, 4-Aces
Bail Bonds was the company affiliated with paying the fees associated with the actual
bond. Despite Bowers’ testimony that he personally gave the money to 4-Aces PM
which in turn gave the money to 4-Aces Bail Bonds to pay the bonding fees, the trial
court concluded that limited liability corporations do not work that way. Instead, the trial
court found, that the named defendant in the current lawsuit, 4-Aces Property
Management, LLC, was not entitled to receive monies which it did not expend.
7

60 days within which to redeem it. As it relates to the signature of

witnesses, Bowers testified that Ms. Collins suggested that he have someone

sign as witnesses, and if anyone had questions about the documents, the

video would be available to resolve any of those questions.

Following the bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Brandon

and against 4-Aces PM, rescinding the cash sale deed signed by the parties

on March 15, 2021. In its written reasons for judgment filed on April 8,

2024, the trial court explained that the entity allegedly acquiring the

lakefront property from Brandon was 4-Aces PM. However, it explained

that a different company, 4-Aces Bail Bonds, paid the fees associated with

the actual bond. The trial court ascertained that the evidence showed 4-Aces

PM did not pay any funds towards Brandon’s release from prison.

Consequently, 4-Aces PM was not entitled to receive monies which it did

not expend, and the court ordered the Clerk of Court to cancel the “deed.”

The trial court also found that Brandon was owed $3,000, plus interest, due

to 4-Aces PM’s fraud, and the court awarded attorney fees in the amount of

$10,000. The trial court also dismissed Ms. Collins as a third-party

defendant at 4-Aces PM’s cost, and 4-Aces PM was assessed with all costs

of the proceedings. The trial court’s judgment was rendered and signed on

April 30, 2024. It is from this judgment that 4-Aces PM has appealed.

DISCUSSION

4-Aces PM alleges four assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred

in allowing an attorney to represent a client in court when the attorney is a

former party in the case, has a personal interest in the outcome of the case,

and is a necessary and material witness in the case; (2) the trial court

incorrectly ruled that the sale document is unenforceable; (3) the trial court
8

erred in not enforcing the sale document because the deadline to exercise the

redemption option had passed; and (4) the trial court incorrectly awarded

damages, attorney fees, and costs as there was insufficient evidence

presented to justify such awards.

Assignment of Error No. 1:

4-Aces PM first urges that an attorney cannot represent a client in

court when the attorney is a former party in the case, has a personal interest

in the outcome of the case, and is a necessary and material witness in the

case. Brandon argues, however, that there were no grounds for his father,

Charles Rowe, to be recused from representing him.

A motion to disqualify counsel requires the court to balance several

important factors: (1) the right of a party to retain counsel of his choice, and

(2) the substantial hardship which might result from disqualification as

against the public perception of and the public trust in the judicial system.

The disqualification of counsel must be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, 49,973 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/25/15), 184 So. 3d

773, writ denied, 16-0236 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1204; Stevens v. St.

Tammany Par. Gov’t, 19-1555 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/21), 322 So. 3d 1268, writ

denied, 21-00800 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So. 3d 898; Succession of Armand, 19-

751 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/27/20), 297 So. 3d 37.

The burden of proving disqualification of an attorney rests on the

party making the challenge. Walker v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 01-

2078 (La. 5/14/02), 817 So. 2d 57. The refusal to disqualify an attorney is

typically subject to review under the manifest error standard. Succession of

Armand, supra.

9

Rule 3.7 of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a

lawyer from acting as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to

be called as a necessary witness except under certain circumstances. Rule

3.7 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal
services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client.

At the hearing on the motion to disqualify, in support of its contention

that Attorney Charles Rowe should have been recused from the matter, 4-

Aces PM asserted that Charles had a direct interest in the matter considering

Charles and his wife filed an intervention claim. 4-Aces PM also urged that

Charles had direct knowledge as it relates to the evaluation of the lakefront

property, and 4-Aces PM considered Charles to be a material witness. In

response, Charles maintained that he had an expert witness to testify about

the evaluation of the lakefront property. Charles also requested that the trial

court consider he had performed 80-90% of the work on the case, filing

motions and preparing for trial. However, Charles made it clear he did not

intend to testify but would if necessary. He also suggested that it would

place a substantial hardship on his client if the court saw it fit to disqualify

him.

The trial court ultimately determined that although 4-Aces PM would

have the right to call Charles as a witness, the court saw no reason to classify

Charles as a necessary witness. The court stated that Charles had no

ownership in or interest in the lakefront property, as previously established

in the dismissal of Charles’s intervention petition, and Charles did not
10

participate in the “transactions” that occurred between Brandon and Bowers.

Given these reasons, the trial court denied 4-Aces PM’s motion to have

Charles Rowe disqualified as Brandon’s attorney, and the record supports

this conclusion.

4-Aces PM failed to prove how and why Charles Rowe would be a

necessary witness. 4-Aces PM’s contentions that Charles had direct

knowledge of the evaluation of the property and had attempted to intervene

in the proceedings as a party failed to establish how Charles would be

considered a necessary witness. The record clearly reflects that Charles had

no interest or ownership in the lakefront property, and he had no

participation in the scenario at issue at trial. He simply was the previous

owner of the lakefront property before donating the property to Brandon, his

son. This is not grounds for disqualification, and the trial court correctly

dismissed 4-Aces PM’s motion to have Charles recused. Consequently, this

assignment of error lacks merit.

Assignments of Error Nos. 2 and 3:

Next, 4-Aces PM maintains that the sale document is enforceable,

despite its formality deficiency, because it was acknowledged by all parties

in open court as having been signed by them. 4-Aces PM cites La. C.C. arts.

1834 and 1836 and argues that if a party acknowledges signing a document

that is at issue and is allegedly not in authentic form, either before the court

or before a notary, it is the law between the parties. Although the trial court

found that there was no consent between the parties, 4-Aces PM also urges

that this finding is contrary to the evidence presented at trial, pointing out

that that the redemption clause contained in the document specifically used

the word “purchase” and that there was a “purchase” made. 4-Aces PM
11

asserts that the contract specified, “Anthony Bowers hereby gives Brandon

Rowe sixty (60) days to purchase said property back for the amount of

$36,000.00 cash.”

In response, Brandon maintains that the issue related to the sales

document is not merely a signature issue but rather a deception issue. He

argues that he was deceived by 4-Aces PM in how the documents were

prepared, the representations made to him at the time of signing, and the

actions taken following the signing of the document. He urges that the

evidence shows that the purpose of the agreement was to use the lakefront

property as collateral to allow him time to secure a loan in order to repay his

bond fee to Bowers. Brandon asserts that he never intended or agreed to sell

his lakefront property to 4-Aces PM.

A sale is a contract whereby a person transfers ownership of a thing to

another for a price in money. The thing, the price, and the consent of the

parties are requirements for the perfection of a sale. La. C.C. art. 2349.

Because a sale is a conventional obligation, a valid contract must exist. A

contract is an agreement between two or more parties whereby obligations

are created, modified, or extinguished. La. C.C. art. 1906. A contract is

formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and

acceptance. La. C.C. art. 1927. The court must find there was a meeting of

the minds of the parties to constitute the requirement of consent. Succession

of Davisson, 50,830 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/22/16), 211 So. 3d 597, writ

denied, 17-0307 (La. 4/7/17), 218 So. 3d 111; Worley v. Chandler, 44,047

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/09), 7 So. 3d 38.

Consent may be vitiated by error, fraud, or duress. La. C.C. art. 1948.

Fraud is a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the
12

intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss

or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result from silence or

inaction. La. C.C. art. 1953. Fraud does not vitiate consent when the party

against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained the truth

without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill. However, this exception

does not apply when a relation of confidence has reasonably induced a party

to rely on the other’s assertions or representations. La. C.C. art. 1954.

Fraud need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence and

may be established by circumstantial evidence. La. C.C. art. 1957.

Parol evidence is permissible when error, fraud, or duress is alleged.

Revision Comment (b), La. C.C. art. 1848. Even without evidence of

specific statements, fraud may be proved by “highly suspicious facts and

circumstances surrounding a transaction.” Succession of Davisson, supra;

Skannal v. Bamburg, 44,820 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/10), 33 So. 3d 227, writ

denied, 10-0707 (La. 5/28/10), 36 So. 3d 254.

Ultimately, the trial court concluded there was no “meeting of minds”

between the parties, and Ms. Collins’ testimony served to substantiate

Brandon’s claims that at no time did he intend to transfer ownership of the

lakefront property to Bowers. The trial court found that Brandon intended to

execute a contract of surety. We agree. The evidence and testimony clearly

reflect that the agreement between Brandon and Bowers lacked the required

consent to form a valid sales contract. Brandon clearly sought to use the

property to obtain a loan from the bank in order to repay Bowers the $36,000

used to bail Brandon out of jail. However, Brandon was unable to obtain

these funds given he no longer had ownership of the lakefront property,

which had been transferred to 4-Aces PM through the recorded deed.
13

Bowers’ actions of recording the deed as well as visiting the property and

collecting rent from the tenant on the property shows he believed himself to

be the owner of the lakefront property rather than simply holding the

documents until such time that Brandon could repay the $36,000, which was

Brandon’s understanding of the agreement. These circumstances and the

parties’ understandings of the agreement show that Brandon and Bowers had

no meeting of the minds in relation to the status of the lakefront property.

As a result, we agree with the trial court’s determination that the deed

purporting to transfer the lakefront property from Brandon to 4-Aces PM

was a relative nullity and therefore must be rescinded.

Furthermore, in its thorough written reasons for judgment, the trial

court found that the recorded “Cash Sale” deed differed from the documents

executed at the jail. The recorded instrument contains signatures of two

witnesses, but both Brandon and Ms. Collins testified that no witnesses were

present at the jail for the signing of the documents. The trial court discussed

Bowers’ testimony that Ms. Collins informed him to acquire two witness

signatures for the document, as well as Ms. Collins’ testimony denying that

claim. Despite Bowers’ contention that there was video footage of the jail

transaction, Ms. Collins testified and the trial court concluded that no such

video existed. The trial court also considered Bowers’ actions to be contrary

to his testimony that he only desired to be paid the $36,000 he utilized for

the bond, yet he visited the lakefront property as well as informed a tenant

on the property that rent should be paid to him, the new owner, indicating to

the trial court that Bowers believed himself to be the owner of the lakefront

property. In reference to conversations between Bowers and Ms. Collins,

the trial court concluded that Bowers intended to have Ms. Collins
14

remember the execution of the jail documents “differently” from what

actually occurred. These reasons led the trial court to find Bowers guilty of

fraud.

Given the subsequent witness signatures appearing on the recorded

deed and the testimony related to the differences between the documents

executed at the jail and the deed recorded, clearly the circumstances and the

facts surrounding the transaction between Brandon and Bowers are “highly

suspicious.” See Succession of Davisson, supra; Skannal v. Bamburg, supra.

The evidence and testimony clearly show that no witnesses were present at

the jail during the execution of the purported agreement, but two witness

signatures appear on the “Cash Sale” deed. Ms. Collins stated she wrote the

60-day redemption agreement on the document executed at the jail, but this

clause was not included in the deed recorded. These acts were clear

misrepresentations or suppressions of the truth made with the intention to

obtain ownership of the lakefront property. Consequently, we do not find

error in the trial court’s finding of fraud or its determination that the parties

failed to come to a “meeting of the minds” as to the object of their contract.

4-Aces PM’s second and third assignment of errors are without merit.

Assignment of Error No. 4:

Lastly, 4-Aces PM asserts that an award of damages and attorney fees

and the imposition of costs is not justified because there was insufficient

evidence presented at trial in support thereof. Brandon urges this Court to

affirm the trial court’s awards as supported by the evidence and testimony.

The party against whom rescission is granted because of fraud is

liable for damages and attorney fees. La. C.C. art. 1958. Because the trial

court found that Bowers committed fraud, it exercised its discretion in
15

awarding $3,000 in damages and $10,000 in attorney fees to Brandon in

compliance with the statute. We see no abuse of discretion in this matter and

affirm the trial court’s determination. As a result, 4-Aces PM’s fourth

assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court in favor

of the plaintiff, Brandon Rowe, and against the defendant, 4-Aces Property

Management, LLC, rescinding the cash sale deed between the parties,

awarding damages and attorney fees to the plaintiff, Brandon Rowe, and

assessing court costs to the defendant, 4-Aces Property Management, is

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendant, 4-Aces

Property Management, LLC.

AFFIRMED.

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