56,579-KA Precedential Convictions Affirmed. Sentences for Simple Battery and Attempted Cruelty to the Infirm Affirmed. Sentence for Domestic Abuse Bat Processed

State of Louisiana v. John D. LaFleur

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed November 19, 2025

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

Judgment rendered November 19, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,579-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JOHN D. LaFLEUR Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 397,839

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPEALS & WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant
By: Holli Herrle-Castillo

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ASHLIN N. THOMAS
ERIC M. WHITEHEAD
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

John LaFleur, age 78, was convicted by a jury of domestic abuse

battery with strangulation, simple battery, and attempted cruelty to the

infirm. The victim in all three of these crimes was LeFleur’s wife of 58

years, Patricia, age 76. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three

years at hard labor, with one year to be served without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for domestic abuse battery with

strangulation; six months for simply battery; and five years for attempted

cruelty to the infirm. While not contesting his convictions, LaFleur does

appeal his maximum sentences, arguing they are unconstitutionally

excessive. We find no statutory authority for imposing any of the three-year

sentence for domestic abuse battery involving strangulation without benefits,

and therefore amend the sentence to delete that provision. In all other

respects, the sentences are affirmed.

FACTS

These crimes occurred at the LeFleurs’ home in Shreveport on

September 20, 2023, a week before they were reported to the police.

Patricia testified at trial and described what happened to her while she and

her husband were alone together at their home. Patricia said LeFleur asked

her for something, but she told him no. After telling her you don’t tell me

no, he punched her in the mouth with his fist causing a tooth to go through

her tissue, and hit her with his cane. When she unsuccessfully tried to

defend herself with her own cane, LaFleur then choked her, pushed his

thumbs against her throat, and did a “karate chop” to her throat. He

momentarily stopped battering her and went to lie down on the sofa, giving

Patricia an opportunity to retrieve her walker and try to walk past him. This

caused LaFleur to jam the walker against Patricia’s legs and he then

repeatedly hit her with his fists, quitting only when she begged him to stop.

The beating caused serious and significant black and blue bruising,

with Patricia testifying LaFleur refused to let her leave their home for a

week, even for medical appointments, because her bruising was so bad.

When asked why she didn’t initially call the police, Patricia testified LaFleur

told her if she did, he would kill her. Because he had two loaded guns in the

house, as well as several large hunting knives, Patricia believed his threats

were legitimate. Finally, a week after the beating, LeFleur agreed to allow

his wife to leave their home to go grocery shopping with their daughter-in-

law, Rosa, who is married to their son, James. Patricia testified she was

surprised he let her leave their home because significant bruising was still

very visible.

On September 27, Rosa picked Patricia up from her home to take her

grocery shopping at Walmart. When Rosa saw the bruises, Patricia told her

told what happened. Rosa described her mother-in-law’s demeanor as

scared and quiet. They called James to let him know what occurred and

Rosa described his mother’s injuries to him; James told his wife and mother

to call the police, a suggestion also made by employees at Walmart who saw

the severe bruising.

Officer Amanda Peele with the Shreveport Police Department was

dispatched to the Walmart in response to this call. Upon arrival she met

with Patricia, who told the officer how her husband had beaten her and

caused bruising on her arms, hands, face, and neck. After taking Patricia’s

and Rosa’s statements, Ofc. Peele took photographs of the severe bruising,

which she identified and described at trial. Ofc. Peele then proceeded to the
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LaFleurs’ home and arrested him for domestic abuse battery with

strangulation.

Once LaFleur was arrested, Patricia moved the money in their joint

bank accounts into an account only in her name because of her fear that if he

had access to that money, he might bond himself out of jail and come find

her. She also hired a divorce attorney. Patricia testified the bruising from

the beating she received took a month or two to subside. She also testified

her husband had been hitting her for years in inconspicuous places so any

resultant bruising would be hidden from others by her clothing, but she did

not report any of those incidents to the police because of threats he made.

LaFleur testified in his own defense and denied any physical

altercations with his wife on the date of the incident. LaFleur maintained his

age and physical limitations made it impossible for him to beat his wife so

severely. He testified he saw no bruises on his wife when she left for

Walmart that day.

LeFleur was charged with domestic abuse battery with strangulation,

La. R.S. 14:35.3(L); aggravated battery, La. R.S. 14:34; and cruelty to the

infirm, La. R.S. 14:93.3. After deliberating for a little less than two hours,

the jury convicted LaFleur of as charged of domestic abuse battery with

strangulation, and responsively to simple battery, and attempted cruelty to

the infirm.

At sentencing, the trial court stated it had never seen bruising as

severe as that shown in the photographs of Patricia, which depicted bruising

on her neck and face, shoulders and chest, a large knot on her left cheek, and

multiple scratches and other injuries. The trial court found several

aggravating factors applicable, but the only mitigating factor was LaFleur’s
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lack of criminal history. After the concurrent sentences were imposed,

LeFleur filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was summarily denied.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

LaFleur argues his three-year sentence for domestic abuse battery

with strangulation and five-year sentence for attempted cruelty to the infirm

are excessive because the trial court failed to consider mitigating

circumstances as required by La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. He contends the

conduct is unlikely to occur again because Patricia cut him off financially,

filed for divorce, and refused to allow LaFleur to live with her again should

he be released. LaFleur argues he is likely to respond well to probationary

treatment because it is his first offense, he has been incarcerated since his

arrest, and his advanced age and poor health make his compliance with

probation more likely. He also argues the imposition of two maximum

sentences amounts to excessive hardship due to his age and physical

limitations. In support of this argument, he points to his need for a

wheelchair to get around, his reliance on narcotic medications, his bad back,

and his issue with repeatedly falling down. LaFleur claims the imposition of

maximum sentences serves no purpose other than to needlessly inflict pain

and suffering, and he asks this court to vacate his sentences and remand for

the imposition of less harsh sentences.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.

Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). A trial judge is in the best

position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a
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particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State

v. Williams, 56,184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 409 So. 3d 306, writ denied,

25-00372 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So. 3d 218, citing State v. Bell, 53,712 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.

12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.

2d 957. As a general rule, maximum or near sentences are reserved for the

worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.

2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Williams, supra.

Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged

inquiry. State v. Caldwell, 56,269 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 411 So. 3d 934,

citing State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d 114.

First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so long

as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines. Id. No

sentencing factor is accorded greater weight by statute than any other factor.

Id.

The second prong is unconstitutional excessiveness. A sentence

violates La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the

seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless

imposition of pain and suffering. Id. A sentence is deemed grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice or makes no

reasonable contribution to acceptable penal goals. Id. The sentencing court

has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limits, and such
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a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse

of that discretion. Id. The issue is not whether some other sentence might

have been more appropriate, but whether the district court abused its

discretion. Id.

At the time of the commission of LeFleur’s crimes, La. R.S.

14:35.3(L) provided that if the domestic abuse battery involved

strangulation, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more

than three years.1 Cruelty to the infirm, La. R.S. 14:93.3(E)(1), provides a

sentence of up to ten years, with or without hard labor, with at least one year

of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence when the act of cruelty to persons with infirmities

was intentional and malicious. As LaFleur was found guilty of attempted

cruelty to the infirm, the maximum penalty allowed at the time of the

offense would have been five years at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:27(D)(3).

As to the first prong of this court’s review for excessiveness, we find

the district court fully complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1; the record

supports the trial court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors

prior to imposing LaFleur’s sentences. The second prong of our review also

reveals no abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion and no violation

of La. Const. art. 1, § 20. The sentences imposed are statutorily permitted,

and they certainly do not shock the sense of justice when considering the

facts of this case.

1
Act. No. 131 of the 2024 Regular Legislative session, now codified as La. R.S.
14:35.3(L)(2), became effective on August 1, 2024, and provided additional penalties for
persons convicted of domestic abuse battery involving strangulation. As revised, La.
R.S. 14:35.3(L)(2) now states if the strangulation results in serious bodily injury, the
offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to present law, shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than 50 years without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
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While maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders,

considering the severity of the abuse by LaFleur, the injuries resulting from

that abuse, and the apparent prolonged nature of this misconduct during the

course of their marriage, the evidence offered at trial supports the state’s

argument that LaFleur should be considered one of the worst offenders. In

light of the photographs of Patricia’s injuries, which depict horrific bruising

despite being taken a week after she was beaten, and which the trial court

described as the worst photographs of bruising it had ever seen, we cannot

say the trial court erred in determining the maximum sentences were

appropriate in LaFleur’s case.

Further, though three and five years are the maximum terms of

imprisonment for their respective offenses, the trial court imposed the

sentences concurrently, rather than consecutively. While it is common for

sentences arising out of a single course of conduct to be served concurrently,

concurrent sentences are not mandatory in such situations. State v. Heath,

53,559 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/10/20), 304 So. 3d 1105, writ denied, 20-01422

(La. 4/7/21), 313 So. 3d 981. By receiving concurrent sentences, LeFleur

has received a benefit as compared to consecutive sentences, which the

record may have supported.

Ultimately, because the record contains adequate support for the

sentences imposed, we find the excessive sentence claims made by LaFleur

lacking in merit.

ERROR PATENT

We note the trial court erred by imposing one year of the three-year

sentence for domestic abuse battery with strangulation without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. There is no provision in this
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statute allowing any denial of benefits. La. R.S. 14:35.3(L). The Louisiana

Supreme Court has consistently held that when a defendant is sentenced

under a statute that contains no prohibition of parole, the district court must

sentence the defendant to a term that does not include such a prohibition,

because parole eligibility under La. R.S. 15:574.4 is to be determined by the

Department of Corrections. State ex rel. Porter v. State, 04-2080 (La.

11/28/05), 916 So. 2d 123; State v. Small, 56,089 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25),

408 So. 3d 441. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882 provides that an illegal sentence may

be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an

appellate court on review. Therefore, we amend the defendant’s sentence

for domestic abuse strangulation and delete the portion that imposed one

year of the three-year sentence without benefits. State v. Simmons, 47,857

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 114 So. 3d 535.

CONCLUSION

John LaFleur’s convictions are affirmed. The sentence for domestic

abuse battery with strangulation is amended to delete the provision that

imposed one year of the three-year sentence to be without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. In all other respects, the

sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED. SENTENCES FOR SIMPLE

BATTERY AND ATTTEMPTED CRUELTY TO THE INFIRM

AFFIRMED. SENTENCE FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE BATTERY

WITH STRANGULATION AMENDED AND, AS AMENDED,

AFFIRMED.

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