State of Louisiana v. Jaroderick Harper

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,619-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JARODERICK HARPER Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 388,840

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

JARODERICK HARPER Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY J. JOHNSON
COURTNEY RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court,

Caddo Parish, the Honorable Chris Victory presiding. Defendant Jaroderick

Harper (“Harper”) was convicted of one count of molestation of a juvenile

under the age of 13, in violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1) and (D)(1), and

sentenced to 60 years at hard labor with at least 25 years to be served

without benefits. Harper appealed his conviction and sentence; this court

affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the case for

resentencing. State v. Harper, 56,060 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/18/24), 402 So. 3d

1247. Harper was resentenced to 60 years’ hard labor with the first 25 years

to be served without benefits. Harper now appeals his sentence. For the

following reasons, defendant’s sentence is affirmed. The case is remanded

with instructions to correct a minute entry.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are drawn, in part, from Harper’s prior appeal.

On May 19, 2022, the state filed a bill of information charging Harper with

molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13, in violation of La. R.S.

14:81.2(A)(1) and (D)(1). The offense occurred on January 16, 2022.

Harper pled not guilty.

A jury trial was held where the victim’s mother, Charlotte Singleton

(“Charlotte”), testified that she was away from home on the night of January

16, 2022. She left her minor child, Z.S., in Harper’s care. While Charlotte

was away, Z.S. texted her mother saying she needed to tell her something.

At home, Z.S. disclosed to Charlotte that Harper touched her. Charlotte

confronted Harper, who said that Z.S. was lying. Z.S. gave an interview at

the Gingerbread House, in which she described how Harper showed her a
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pornographic video, placed her on a bed, put her legs over his shoulders, and

attempted to kiss her on her face, cheeks, and private area. Z.S. said that she

kicked him to make him stop. At the time, Harper was 30 years old, and

Z.S. was 10 years old.

Harper denied ever having touched Z.S. inappropriately and testified

that Charlotte arranged for Z.S. to claim he molested her because he caught

Charlotte having sex with another man.

The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. On November 29,

2023, Harper was sentenced. The court asked about mitigating factors;

Harper’s counsel responded that there were none. Harper declined to speak

before sentencing. The trial court considered the factors found in La. C. Cr.

P. art. 894.1, finding that Harper needed correctional treatment in a custodial

environment and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of

his offense. The court said that he committed the offense upon a child that

he supervised and who referred to him as “dad.” The court listed the

following aggravating factors: 1) Harper knew the victim was particularly

vulnerable due to her age; and 2) he used his position as Z.S.’s supervisor to

facilitate his offense. The court noted that Harper had a 2012 conviction for

illegal possession of stolen things, a 2014 conviction for felony theft, a 2018

conviction for simple burglary, a 2022 conviction for resisting an officer,

and multiple felony arrests.

The court then sentenced Harper to 60 years’ hard labor with at least

25 years to be served without benefits. The court informed him that he had

to register as a sex offender for life. Harper refused to sign his sex offender

registration; his counsel signed it instead. The court also informed Harper of

his appellate and post-conviction relief time constraints.
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Harper filed a motion to reconsider sentence arguing that his sentence

was excessive. He said that the trial court improperly labeled at least two

factors as aggravating, the age of the victim and his position of authority

over the victim, which were the elements of the offense and not factors that

made his offense worse than that of any other defendant with the same

conviction. He also argued that the trial court improperly used his criminal

history because the weight of his conviction for molestation of a juvenile

was greater than that of any other offense, so his unrelated criminal history

should not have significantly enhanced his sentence. The trial court denied

his motion to reconsider sentence.

Harper appealed arguing that his sentence was excessive. This court

found that his sentence was indeterminate and affirmed his conviction but

vacated his sentence and remanded his case for resentencing.

On March 6, 2025, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. The

trial court said it was going to maintain the original sentence of 60 years at

hard labor and added that the first 25 years were to be served without

benefits. Harper asked if he might speak; the court denied his request and

referred him to his counsel. Defense counsel said that defendant would

respond in writing, if necessary. The court did not inform Harper of his

appellate and post-conviction relief time constraints. Defendant filed a

motion to reconsider sentence incorporating the argument from his prior

motion to reconsider, asserting that his sentence was harsh and excessive.

The trial court denied his motion. Harper now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Harper’s sole assignment of error is that his 60-year sentence at hard

labor with the first 25 years to be served without benefits is constitutionally
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excessive. He argues that the trial court did not consider the factors found in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, requiring the court to consider the factual basis for

the sentence. Harper contends that no mitigating circumstances were

mentioned at his sentencing and that defense counsel provided none when

the court inquired about them. He asserts that the trial court did not reflect

on the fact that he had no prior convictions for violent or sexually related

offenses. Harper points out that Charlotte and Z.S. testified that he had not

engaged in similar behavior prior to his January 16, 2022, offense.

Harper states that the trial court did not order a presentence

investigation report (“PSI”), which would have assisted the trial court in

determining whether his sentence was constitutionally excessive. Harper

contends that the trial court did not contemplate his background, personal

life, education, employment, family, or other relevant facts in arriving at his

sentence. He says that at his resentencing hearing, the court would not let

him address the court, but said that he should speak with his attorney, who

replied that defendant would respond to the court in writing. Harper

provides the following language from State v. Wilson, 53,913, p. 8 (La. App.

2 Cir. 5/26/21), 317 So. 3d 923, 930:

The defendant must be given an opportunity to rebut or explain
misinformation upon which the trial court relies or to which it is
exposed in its sentencing decision. The jurisprudence also
holds that the accused must likewise be given an opportunity to
make a showing, by argument of counsel or otherwise, of
mitigating factors under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B), which the
trial court may have overlooked. The opportunity to do so is
waived if not asserted before sentence is passed. Moreover,
error in denying the defendant this opportunity is harmless if
there is no proof that the sentencing information was materially
and prejudicially false.

The court does not have the affirmative duty to ask whether the
defendant has anything to say at a sentencing hearing. (internal
citations omitted.)
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Harper argues that in his case, any deficiencies in his trial counsel’s

performance should not have prevented him from presenting any mitigating

circumstances that might have led to a reduction of the maximum number of

years he must serve without benefits. Given that there was no PSI to provide

his background, he claims that the court should have listened to what he had

to say to see if that influenced the court’s sentencing decision. He asks that

this court vacate his sentence and remand his case for resentencing.

An appellate court uses a two-pronged test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. State v. Jones, 54,264 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335

So. 3d 532, writ denied, 22-00656 (La. 6/22/22), 339 So. 3d 642. First, the

record must show the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. Id. The trial court is not required to list every

aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the record reflects

adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article. State v. Smith, 433

So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Jones, supra.

Articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of Article

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the

record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed,

remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with

the article. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982). The elements

which the court should consider include the defendant’s personal history

(age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal

record, the seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation.

State v. Jones, supra.

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The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside

as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of this discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Jones, supra. On

review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may

have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Williams, supra; State v. Jones, supra.

Second, this court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive and in violation of La. Const., art. I, § 20. A

sentence can be constitutionally excessive, even when it falls within

statutory guidelines, if: 1) the punishment is so grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime that, when viewed considering the harm done to

society, it shocks the sense of justice; or 2) it serves no purpose other than to

needlessly inflict pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La.

1993).

Whoever commits the crime of molestation of a juvenile when the

victim is under the age of 13 years shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not

less than 25 years nor more than 99 years. At least 25 years of the sentence

imposed shall be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension

of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1).

In the present case, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve 60

years at hard labor with 25 years to be served without benefits and ordered

him to register as a sex offender. While resentencing defendant, the trial

court did not mention the factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1; however,

at his original sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the factors found

in that article. So, while the court did not comply with sentencing
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requirements during Harper’s resentencing hearing, the record clearly shows

an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, and we find that remand

is unnecessary.

The trial court previously stated that Harper’s original sentence was

based upon the young age of the minor victim, defendant’s supervisory

relationship with the victim, and his criminal history. That statement reflects

the trial court’s consideration of the Article 894.1 factors concerning

defendant’s knowledge of the child’s particular vulnerability due to her age

and the significant harm inflicted on her. Further, the trial court found that

Harper needed correctional treatment in a custodial environment and that a

lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of his crime. This record

reflects the trial court adequately considered the guidelines of Article 894.1.

The trial court sentenced Harper to the same sentence he had before, but the

court corrected the period for the restriction of benefits to make it

determinate and in compliance with the law.

Harper’s criminal record demonstrates he has at least one prior felony

conviction, which could have increased his sentencing exposure if the state

had filed a multiple offender bill of information. In addition, defendant

benefited from the trial court’s decision to impose only the mandatory

minimum requirement that 25 years of his sentence be served without

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Harper complains that the trial court erred by not allowing him to

speak at his resentencing hearing. We disagree. According to the case

Harper cited, State v. Wilson, supra, the court does not have the affirmative

duty to ask whether the defendant has anything to say at a sentencing

hearing, and the opportunity to do so is waived if not asserted before
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sentence is passed. Also, any error in denying the defendant the opportunity

to speak is harmless if there is no proof that the sentencing information was

materially and prejudicially false. Id. The trial court referred Harper to his

defense counsel, who said that defendant would respond in writing. Harper

filed a motion to reconsider, in which he could have included any mitigating

factors. We observe that at Harper’s original sentencing hearing, when the

trial court asked about mitigating factors, his counsel stated that there were

none. Any complaints Harper has about deficient representation are best

addressed in an application for post-conviction relief.

We find that the sentence imposed is commensurate with the

egregious nature of defendant’s crime of sexually abusing a 10-year-old

child entrusted to his care. Based upon this record, we cannot say the trial

court abused its discretion in imposing Harper’s sentence, which

appropriately reflects the severity of his crime. Thus, his assignment of

error lacks merit, and we affirm his sentence.

Error Patent Review

We reviewed the record for errors patent, and two were found. First,

the trial court failed to properly advise Harper of his post-conviction relief

time limits as found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(A). We now advise defendant

by this opinion that no application for post-conviction relief shall be

considered if it is filed more than two years after his conviction and sentence

become final.

Second, the court minutes for Harper’s resentencing incorrectly state

that the trial court advised him of his “right to post-conviction relief

proceedings,” which the transcript does not reflect. When there is a

discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript, the transcript prevails.
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State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732 (La. 1983). We remand this matter to the

trial court with instructions to amend the minutes to correct the entry.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jaroderick Harper’s sentence is affirmed.

We remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to amend the

minutes to correct the entry which states that the trial court advised

defendant of his “right to post-conviction relief proceedings.”

AFFIRMED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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