Raymond Crowley v. Caesar Rojas dba Rojas Paint

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,647-WCA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

RAYMOND CROWLEY Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

CAESAR ROJAS DBA ROJAS Defendant-Appellee
PAINT

*****

Appealed from the
Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 1-W
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 21-02580

Brenza Irving-Jones
Workers’ Compensation Judge

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THE SMITH LAW OFFICE, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: Eskridge E. Smith, Jr.

ANZELMO LAW Counsel for Appellee
By: Donald J. Anzelmo

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and THOMPSON, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Plaintiff-Appellant Raymond Crowley appeals the Workers

Compensation Judge’s (the “WCJ”) granting of an exception of res judicata

in favor of Defendant-Appellee Cesar Rojas.1 For the following reasons, we

reverse the judgment of the WCJ and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

This case was previously before this court in Crowley v. Rojas, 55,616

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 386 So. 3d 1243, writ denied, 24-00792 (La.

10/15/24), 394 So. 3d 822 (“Crowley I”). In Crowley I, this court stated the

following facts relevant to this appeal:

On May 12, 2021, Crowley filed a disputed claim for
compensation. He stated that he was employed as a general
laborer by Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint. He alleged that he
fractured his ankle, which required surgery, in September 2020
when he and Rojas were cutting a tree on Rojas’s property. He
stated that he had not been provided medical treatment and
contended that penalties and attorney fees were due to him.

On June 25, 2021, Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint filed an
answer denying that it employed Crowley at the time of the
alleged injury or that Crowley was performing services arising
out of and in the course of his employment at the time of the
alleged injury. It denied that Crowley was temporarily or
permanently disabled, that he sustained an injury resulting in a
loss of earning capacity and that he is entitled to rehabilitation
services.

On October 25, 2021, Crowley filed a supplemental and
amending claim for workers’ compensation benefits. He
contended that if his employer was not Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas
Paint, then he was in the employ of Rojas, individually, such
that he was employed either by Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint,
an entity owned by Rojas, or he was employed by Rojas,
individually, and had an accident in the course and scope of his
employment.

On August 9, 2022, Crowley filed a request for compromise or
lump sum settlement. He named “Rojas Painting, LLC” as the
employer and Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company as the

1
Rojas’s first name is incorrectly spelled as “Caesar” in the case’s caption.

insurer. On August 19, 2022, Crowley, “Rojas Painting, LLC”
and Bridgefield filed a joint petition, order and release with
reservation of rights. They agreed that Crowley would receive
$7,500 in a lump sum and stated that this settlement was
limited to Crowley’s claims against “Rojas Painting, LLC”
and Bridgefield and did not include his claims against
Rojas, individually. The WCJ approved the settlement and
dismissed the matter with prejudice, with reservation of
Crowley’s rights against Rojas, individually. (Emphasis
added.)

On April 13, 2023, Rojas filed a peremptory exception of
prescription. He requested that all claims against him be
dismissed because any such claims prescribed after not being
brought within one year of the accident at issue. He noted that
the alleged accident occurred in September 2020; that on May
3, 2021, Crowley filed the original claim naming Cesar Rojas
d/b/a Rojas Paint as the defendant; and that on October 20,
2021, Crowley filed the amended claim to add Rojas,
individually, as a defendant.

On May 12, 2023, Crowley filed an opposition to the exception
of prescription. He argued that the original claim satisfactorily
named Rojas as a defendant, whether as an individual or as a
person running a business. In the alternative, he argued that the
amended claim was not untimely because it did not add a new
party or change the basis for the claim for benefits. He
explained that the amendment clarified the status of the
defendant and related back to the original claim.

A hearing on the exception was held on June 5, 2023. . . . The
WCJ determined that Rojas, individually, is a different party
from Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint and granted the exception
of prescription.

On June 13, 2023, the WCJ signed an order granting the
peremptory exception of prescription. It dismissed all of
Crowley’s claims against Rojas with prejudice.

Crowley appealed. This court determined that:

[T]he WCJ erred in determining that Rojas, individually, and
Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint are different parties and then
granting Rojas’s exception of prescription. Rojas, individually,
and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint are one and the same. Cesar
Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint is not a juridical person separate and
apart from the natural person, Cesar Rojas. The amended
petition did not name a new defendant and related back to the
date of the filing of the original petition, which was timely filed
within the one-year prescriptive period.

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Accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the WCJ and remanded for

further proceedings. Rojas filed an application for a writ of certiorari with

the Louisiana Supreme Court, which the Court denied.

On December 13, 2024, Rojas filed a peremptory exception of res

judicata. He argued that Crowley’s claims are barred because they were

decided by the August 2022 settlement. He noted that the settlement was

between Crowley, Rojas Painting, LLC and its insurer. He explained that as

this court in Crowley I determined that Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas

d/b/a Rojas Paint are one and the same, the claims against Rojas,

individually, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Crowley

already reached a settlement with “Rojas Paint, LLC.”

On January 13, 2025, Crowley filed an opposition to the exception of

res judicata. He noted that the settlement was limited to his claim against

Rojas Painting, LLC and its insurer and did not include his claim against

Rojas, individually. He argued that his remaining claims against Rojas,

individually, have not been the subject of a prior judgment and are not

subject to dismissal.

A hearing on the exception was held on February 24, 2025. Counsel

for Rojas argued that because of this court’s decision in Crowley I that

Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint are the same party,

Crowley cannot reserve rights against the party that he also released.

Counsel for Crowley argued that Rojas Painting, LLC is not the same party

as Rojas, individually, or Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint. Counsel contended

that the only parties that were dismissed by the settlement were Rojas

Painting, LLC and its insurer and that Crowley’s claims were reserved

against Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint. The WCJ
3

concluded that it did not find a distinction between Rojas Painting, LLC and

Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint. Therefore, it determined that the claims are

barred by the doctrine of res judicata as they were decided by the settlement.

On March 5, 2025, the WCJ granted the exception of res judicata and

dismissed with prejudice all Crowley’s claims against Rojas.

Crowley appeals.

ARGUMENTS

Crowley argues that the WCJ erred in concluding that Rojas Painting,

LLC is the same party as Rojas, individually; granting the exception of res

judicata; and dismissing his claims against Rojas, individually, and Cesar

Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint. He contends that this court’s ruling in Crowley I

that Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint are the same

juridical person does not change the legal premise that Rojas Painting, LLC

is a distinct and separate party from Rojas, individually. He states that his

settlement was with Rojas Painting, LLC and its insurer; that Rojas,

individually, was not a party to the settlement; and that he reserved all

claims against Rojas, individually, in the settlement.

Rojas argues that the WCJ correctly granted his exception of res

judicata. He contends that the settlement with Rojas Painting, LLC released

Rojas, individually, because this court in Crowley I ruled that Rojas,

individually, and his painting company are one and the same.

Louisiana’s law on res judicata is set forth in La. R.S. 13:4231 and

states:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
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transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent
action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant
is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with
respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its
determination was essential to that judgment.

A reading of La. R.S. 13:4231 reveals that a second action is

precluded when all of the following are satisfied: (1) the judgment is valid;

(2) the judgment is final; (3) the parties are the same; (4) the cause or causes

of action asserted in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in

the first litigation; and (5) the cause or causes of action asserted in the

second suit arose out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject

matter of the first litigation. Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385 (La. 2/25/03),

843 So. 2d 1049. Both the civilian law and the common law mandate that

there must be “identity of parties” before the doctrine of res judicata can be

used to preclude a subsequent suit. Id. This requirement does not mean that

the parties must have the same physical identity but that the parties must

appear in the same capacities in both suits. Id.

There are two kinds of persons: natural persons and juridical persons.

La. C.C. art. 24. A natural person is a human being. Id. A juridical person

is an entity to which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a

partnership. Id. The personality of a juridical person is distinct from that of

its members. Id.

An LLC is an entity to which the law attributes personality and is,

therefore, a juridical person. Ogea v. Merritt, 13-1085 (La. 12/10/13),

130 So. 3d 888. Therefore, as a general proposition, the law considers an
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LLC and the member(s) comprising the LLC as being wholly separate

persons. Id. “Piercing the corporate veil,” which is not at issue in the case

sub judice, is an exception to this general proposition. Id.

The party who urges the exception of res judicata bears the burden of

proving its essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Eddens

v. Exceptional Client Care, LLC, 48,747 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/14),

135 So. 3d 784.

The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is

reviewed de novo. B.A. Kelly Land Co., LLC v. Aethon United BR LP,

54,115 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 327 So. 3d 1071, writ denied, 21-01828

(La. 2/8/22), 332 So. 3d 671.

A de novo review of the record before this court on appeal confirms

that the WCJ erred in granting the exception of res judicata and dismissing

Crowley’s claims against Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas

Paint. This court in Crowley I determined that Rojas, individually, and

Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint are the same party because a trade name does

not have a separate existence apart from the individual doing business under

that trade name. See Holmes v. Lee, 35,021 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/01), 795

So. 2d 1232. The analysis in Crowley I is inapplicable to determining

whether Rojas Painting, LLC and Rojas, individually, are one and the same.

Louisiana law and jurisprudence are clear that an LLC and the member(s)

comprising the LLC are wholly separate persons. Therefore, Rojas Painting,

LLC and Rojas, individually, are not the same parties, and the WCJ erred in

ruling that they are for the purposes of res judicata. Pursuant to the

reservation of rights set forth in the settlement between Crowley, Rojas

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Painting, LLC and its insurer,2 Crowley reserved his right to pursue claims

against Rojas, individually, and Cesar Rojas d/b/a Rojas Paint, and these

claims are not barred by res judicata.

Accordingly, this assignment of error has merit, and we need not

address Crowley’s remaining assignments of error.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the WCJ’s granting of the

exception of res judicata and remand for further proceedings. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Defendant-Appellee Cesar Rojas.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

2
The reservations of rights states that Crowley agreed to accept the settlement:
[I]n full, final, complete, and absolute satisfaction of any and all claims,
actions, or demands, of every nature whatsoever, whether past, present, or
future, that appearer may have against ROJAS PAINTING, LLC,
BRIDGEFIELD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and/or any of
their respective insureds, insurers, affiliates, subsidiaries, parent
companies, employees, representatives, agents, heirs or assigns, or against
any other individual, business, firm, entity, or any other person or persons,
whether in workers’ compensation, tort, contract, or otherwise . . . .
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