State of Louisiana v. Terrance Malik Dangerfield

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,693-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

TERRANCE MALIK DANGERFIELD Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 393,286

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant
SERVICE
By: Remy Starns
Michael Anthony Mitchell
Corrie R. Gallien

TERRANCE MALIK DANGERFIELD Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
KODIE K. SMITH
CHRISTOPHER BOWMAN
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Terrance Malik Dangerfield (“Dangerfield”) was indicted by grand

jury on February 15, 2025, on the following four charges:

Count 1: Manslaughter per La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a);
Count 2: Manslaughter per La. R.S. 14:31(A)(2)(a);
Count 3: Possession of firearm or carrying concealed weapon by
a person convicted of certain felonies per La. R.S. 14:95.1; and
Count 4: Illegal Carrying of Weapons While in Possession of a
Controlled Dangerous Substance – Second Offense per La. R.S.
14:95(E).

Dangerfield was convicted on all counts after a jury trial held

November 6, 2024. At a hearing on January 23, 2025, the trial court found

Dangerfield guilty of being a fourth felony habitual offender as to Counts 1

and 2, and a third felony habitual offender as to Counts 3 and 4. The trial

court sentenced Dangerfield to a term of life imprisonment each for Count 1

and Count 2; 30 years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence for Count 3; and 40 years without benefits for Count 4. All

sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with credit for time served.

Dangerfield’s trial counsel did not file a motion for reconsideration or

a motion for appeal on his behalf. Dangerfield filed a pro se motion for

appeal, which the trial court initially denied. After writs were taken, this

Court remanded with instructions to treat the appeal as a timely filed post-

conviction relief application requesting an out-of-time appeal. The trial

court granted Dangerfield’s post-conviction relief and motion for appeal.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the sentences as

AMENDED.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 10, 2023, Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) Officer

Aaron Moran (“Officer Moran”) was on patrol when he initiated a traffic

stop of a Hyundai vehicle, later determined to be driven by Dangerfield.

Dangerfield failed to pull over and a pursuit ensued, in which Dangerfield

drove in excess of 80 miles per hour. Dangerfield exited Highway 3132,

accelerated and ran the traffic light at the Walker Road intersection, and

collided into the driver’s side of the vehicle driven by Faith Alexander.

Both Faith Alexander and her four-year-old daughter, who was in a car seat

in the rear seat, were transported from the scene to the hospital. Faith

Alexander underwent emergency surgery, but she soon succumbed to her

injuries. Her daughter passed away shortly after arriving at the hospital.

Dangerfield fled the scene into a wooded area, then to a nearby

residence where he called from the resident’s mobile phone for someone to

pick him up. The resident’s phone showed that Dangerfield called his

mother, which was the same number provided by Dangerfield in a later

report. The resident was also able to identify Dangerfield in a lineup, in

which he pointed out distinctive neck tattoos. Dangerfield was ultimately

apprehended on January 11, 2023. Dangerfield’s residence and the Hyundai

were also searched, revealing two handguns and large quantities of

marijuana, which were the basis of Counts 3 and 4. DNA evidence was

obtained affirmatively linking him to the vehicle and handgun.

Dangerfield’s identification as the perpetrator is not disputed.

Dangerfield was convicted as charged of two counts of manslaughter,

one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and one count of

illegal carrying of weapons while in possession of a CDS – second offense.

The State filed a habitual offender bill of information on November 7, 2024,

asserting that Dangerfield had the following prior felony convictions:

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1. Obstruction of Justice, to which he pled guilty on February 20,
2018, in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo, Louisiana in
Docket No 345549. He was sentenced to 3 Years Hard Labor.

2. Attempted Aggravated Criminal Damage to Property to which
he pled guilty on November 19, 2019, in the Twenty-Sixth
Judicial District Court of Bossier, Louisiana in Docket No
219038. He was sentenced to 2 Years Hard Labor Suspended, 2
years Supervised Probation.

3. Illegal Carrying of Weapons While in Possession of a
Controlled Dangerous Substance to which he pled guilty on June
15, 2021, in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo, Louisiana
in Docket No 367771. The defendant was sentenced to 5 Years
Hard Labor.

The State used Counts 1 and 2 to establish Dangerfield’s fourth felony

conviction and Counts 3 and 4 to establish his third felony conviction.

Dangerfield filed a motion to quash the habitual offender bill on December

27, 2024, which was denied.

The trial court sentenced Dangerfield to life imprisonment at hard

labor for Count 1; life imprisonment at hard labor for Count 2; 30 years

without benefits for Count 3; and 40 years without benefits for Count 4. All

sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with credit for time served.

No motion for reconsideration was filed. Dangerfield’s trial counsel

did not file a motion for appeal on his behalf, but Dangerfield filed a pro se

motion for appeal, which the trial court initially denied. The State filed a

response to Dangerfield’s appeal motion, indicating it had no objection to

Dangerfield filing an out-of-time appeal. On May 14, 2025, this Court

granted Dangerfield’s writ application on the denial of his appeal and

remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to treat the out-of-

time appeal as a timely filed post-conviction relief application requesting an

out-of-time appeal. The trial court granted Dangerfield’s post-conviction

relief and motion for appeal.
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DISCUSSION

Denial of Motion for Sanity Commission

Defense counsel filed a motion to appoint a sanity commission on

October 30, 2024, approximately one week before trial. The State was not

notified of the filing. No documents were included with the pleading.

According to the State, defense counsel was not present in court when the

matter was called, but he appeared later that morning to present the motion

and submit Dangerfield’s medical records under seal. Defense counsel

explained that he did not file the records with the motion due to HIPAA, but

he felt comfortable filing them in court with his client present. When

presenting the motion, defense counsel informed the trial court that

Dangerfield had difficulty assisting in his own defense, stating in particular:

I was able to show that Mr. Dangerfield has been in and out --
and the only reason we don’t have more documentation of his
medical condition is that his mother couldn’t get more because
he’s over 18 now, but from 13 to 18 he went to the mental
institutions or whatever the proper term is on at least four
different occasions, and I’ve been able to give that to the Court.

***
I talked to the client. I talked to the mamma. I talked to
everybody to make sure because this thing is as inconvenient for
me and my client as it is for the Court because if they find that
he’s not competent they are just going to stick him somewhere
until they get him competent. So this is not something that I take
lightly or anybody should take lightly. It has to be something
given the right amount of consideration, but I can’t get into the
specifics of our conversations, but after -- when you’re getting
ready for trial, the conversations are more frequent and they are
longer, and I became concerned about his ability to understand
the magnitude or the gravity of the case.

Dangerfield’s motion included the following assertion of mental

incompetency:

Mr. Dangerfield has been charged with Two Counts of
Manslaughter. The defense alleges that based on Mr.
Dangerfield’s medical history [sic] suggests that he suffers from
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mental disease, defect or abnormality which precludes him from
having the capacity to proceed to trial, to understand the nature
of the proceeding against him or to assist his attorney in the
defense.

The trial court denied the motion, referring to State v. Lott, 574 So. 2d

417 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1991), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 666 (La. 1991), stating

that “the appointment of a sanity commission is not a perfunctory matter or

administerial [sic] duty of the trial court, and it’s not guaranteed in every

case.” It further stated:

Based on everything that I’ve observed - - and, you know, the
reports you filed into the record are from 2013 and 2014 where
he was admitted because he was homicidal and suicidal because
in the eighth grade his girlfriend broke up with him and slept with
another guy, that has no bearing on this case. I’ve seen, based
on his behavior, nothing to indicate to me that he cannot
comprehend the case or assist in his defense, and the Motion to
Appoint Sanity Commission is hereby denied.

In State v. Strain, 42,809 (La. App. 2 Cir 12/05/07), 972 So. 2d 1184,

1187, this Court held that:

A person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing his
defense may not be subject to trial. State v. Nomey, 613 So. 2d
157 (La. 1993). Due process also demands adequate
anticipatory, protective procedures to minimize the risk that an
incompetent person will be convicted. Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 120 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1992). Louisiana’s
statutory scheme for detecting mental incapacity “jealously
guards a defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Nomey, supra. Thus,
when there is a bona fide question raised regarding a defendant’s
capacity, the failure to observe procedures to protect a
defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent
to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.
State ex rel. Seals v. State, 00-2738 (La. 10/25/02), 831 So. 2d
828. Once the determination that a bona fide question has been
raised regarding a defendant’s capacity, the failure to resolve the
issue of capacity may result in nullification of the conviction and
sentence or a nunc pro tunc hearing to determine competency
retrospectively. Id. Mental incapacity to proceed exists when,
as the result of mental disease or defect, a defendant presently
lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or
to assist in his defense. La. C. Cr. P. art. 641. The defendant’s
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mental incapacity to proceed may be raised at any time by the
defense, the district attorney, or the court. When the question of
the defendant’s mental incapacity to proceed is raised, there shall
be no further steps in the criminal prosecution, except institution
of prosecution, until the defendant is found to have the mental
capacity to proceed. La. C. Cr. P. art. 642. The court shall order
a mental examination of the defendant when it has reasonable
ground to doubt the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed. La.
C. Cr. P. art. 643.

This Court further discussed the determination of a defendant’s

mental capacity in State v. Gilbert, 55,257 (La. App. 2 Cir. 09/27/23), 372

So. 3d 403, 412, writ denied, 23-01422 (La. 4/3/24), 382 So. 3d 105, as

follows:

“Reasonable ground” refers “to information which, objectively
considered, should reasonably raise a doubt about the
defendant’s competency and alert the court to the possibility that
the defendant can neither understand the proceedings, appreciate
the proceedings’ significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in
his defense.” State v. Anderson, 06-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996 So.
2d 973, 992, cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1165, 129 S. Ct. 1906, 173
L. Ed. 2d 1057 (2009). The trial court’s decision regarding a
defendant’s competency to stand trial should not turn solely upon
whether he suffers from a mental disease or defect but must be
made with specific reference to the nature of the charge, the
complexity of the case, and the gravity of the decision with which
the defendant is faced. A judicial examination of a defendant’s
competency focuses primarily on whether he understands the
nature of the charge and can appreciate its seriousness. State v.
Odenbaugh, 10-0268 (La. 12/6/11), 82 So. 3d 215, cert. denied,
568 U.S. 829, 133 S. Ct. 410, 184 L. Ed. 2d 51 (2012).

The Court goes on to state, “It is not enough that the defense has filed a

motion urging the defense, but there must be sufficient evidence to raise a

reasonable doubt as to such capacity.” Id. at 413.

In its decision in State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529, (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.

2d 877, 892, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1227, 123 S. Ct. 1266, 154 L. Ed. 2d

1089 (2003), the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the law as follows:

Simply because a defendant’s capacity to proceed is called into
question by formal motion does not mandate a mental
examination be ordered and a sanity commission be appointed.
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La. C. Cr. P. arts. 643, 644; State v. Goins, 568 So. 2d 231, 234
(La. App. 3 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 573 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (La.
1991). Appointing a sanity commission is neither a perfunctory
matter nor a ministerial duty of the trial court; it is not guaranteed
to every accused in every case. State v. Lott, 574 So. 2d 417, 424
(La. App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 580 So. 2d 666 (La. 1991). Given
the presumption of sanity, before the court is required to appoint
a sanity commission, the defendant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that reasonable grounds exist to
doubt his mental capacity to proceed. State v. Bickham, 404 So.
2d 929, 934 (La. 1981); Goins, supra. A reviewing court owes
the trial court’s determination on these matters great weight, and
the trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion. Bickham, supra.

The motion to appoint a sanity commission refers to Dangerfield’s

medical records and includes the basic assertion that he suffers from a

mental condition which precludes him from having the capacity to proceed

at trial. Defense counsel stated during the hearing on the motion that he was

concerned about Dangerfield’s ability to understand the magnitude of the

case. However, defense counsel did not elaborate upon the reasoning for his

concern.

It is apparent that the trial court reviewed the medical records, but

they were not included in the appellate record for review. Nonetheless, we

would point out several instances that would bolster the trial court’s

determination that Dangerfield was competent to stand trial. There was

nothing in the record other than defense counsel’s assertions that would

indicate Dangerfield did not understand the proceedings. As shown in

previous court transcripts, Dangerfield was actually actively engaged in the

proceedings such that it was evident he was well versed in legal processes.

Following trial, Dangerfield filed pro se pleadings. Notably, all of the

instances took place after Dangerfield had been admitted into the institutions

as supposedly was shown in the medical records. In addition, the

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circumstances of the traffic stop itself and resulting fleeing from authorities

indicated that Dangerfield was aware that there would be consequences

resulting from having firearms and drugs in his vehicle.

The trial court observed Dangerfield’s behavior in court and noted

there was nothing to indicate that he lacked capacity to understand the

proceedings or assist in his defense. It also found that the medical records

from years before concerning a teenage breakup had no bearing on

Dangerfield’s mental competency to proceed to trial. Especially given the

presumption of sanity, Dangerfield failed to establish by a preponderance of

the evidence that reasonable grounds existed to doubt his mental capacity to

proceed to trial. The decision to grant or deny a motion to appoint a sanity

commission is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Odenbaugh,

supra; Gilbert, supra. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Constitutionally Excessive Sentence

Dangerfield attempts to make certain arguments regarding mitigating

factors for his sentence such as his youth, as well as the circumstances of his

prior convictions used in the State’s habitual offender bill. However, as the

State points out, no motion to reconsider sentence was filed. The failure to

file a motion to reconsider sentence relegates sentencing review to

constitutional excessiveness. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(E); State v. Parker,

54,947 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/23), 358 So. 3d 220, writ denied, 23-00417 (La.

10/3/23), 370 So. 3d 1073; State v. Nabors, 53,357 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/22/20), 295 So. 3d 974, writ denied, 20-00709 (La. 10/6/20), 302 So. 3d

527. Therefore, arguments concerning mitigating factors allegedly not

considered are not properly before this Court, and the only issue for review

is that of the constitutional excessiveness of Dangerfield’s sentence.
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A sentence that is grossly out of proportion to the serious of the

offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain

and suffering is constitutionally excessive in violation of La. Const. art. I,

§20. State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Jackson, 52,606

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1217, writs denied 19-00699 (La.

10/15/19), 280 So. 3d 560 and 19-00797 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So. 3d 1056. A

grossly disproportionate sentence is one, which viewed in light of the harm

done to society, shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La.

1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; Jackson, supra. The reviewing court considers

only whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not

whether some other sentence may have been more appropriate. State v.

Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043,

117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1996).

Dangerfield urges that his age, lack of maturity, and the context of the

prior convictions establish that consecutive life sentences are grossly

disproportionate, and that a constitutionally proportionate sentence imposed

on someone his age must allow for growth, development, and rehabilitation.

He argues that this Court should weigh these factors together and find that

his sentence is unconstitutionally excessive and nothing more than the

purposeless imposition of pain and suffering.

The trial court noted that the evidence proved Dangerfield fled from

police, failed to stop at an intersection, ran a red light, and slammed into the

side of the vehicle, killing Faith Alexander and her four-year-old daughter.

He then fled the scene, and a search of his vehicle uncovered two Glock

handguns and 1.8 pounds of marijuana. It reasoned that someone speeding

who ran a red light while fleeing police would surely contemplate that his
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actions could cause or threaten serious harm. The trial court further pointed

out that Dangerfield was on parole at the time of these offenses.

The trial court explained the sentencing ranges for the convicted

offenses. For the manslaughter of Faith Alexander, the range was

imprisonment at hard labor for not more than 40 years. For the

manslaughter of her four-year-old daughter (a person under the age of ten

years), the range was imprisonment at hard labor and without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for not less than 10 nor more

than 40 years. For Count 3, the offense carried a sentence of not less than

five nor more than 20 years at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence, and be fined not less than $1,000 nor

more than $5,000. Count 4 carried a sentence of imprisonment at hard labor

for not less than 20 nor more than 30 years without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. However, as a fourth felony offender

for Counts 1 and 2, the sentences are 40 years to life. As a third felony

offender for Count 3, the sentence is 10 to 40 years without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. As a third felony offender for

Count 4, the sentence is 20 to 60 years without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence.

Dangerfield is a repeat offender as shown by his adjudication as a

third and fourth felony offender. He has had ample opportunity for

rehabilitation, but he has chosen not to do so. Even while on parole, he

possessed both firearms and drugs and fled police to avoid being caught with

them. He dangerously drove at excessive speeds and ran a red light, which

resulted in the death of a young mother and her young child. He continued

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to avoid accountability by fleeing the scene on foot instead of showing any

concern for the welfare of the victims.

The consecutive life sentences for the manslaughter convictions of

Faith Alexander and her daughter were appropriate in light of the

circumstances. The sentences imposed for the two firearm offenses were

midrange. For a habitual offender who showed complete disregard for the

lives of others in order to continue his pattern of committing crimes, the

consecutive sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

offenses or shocking to the sense of justice, and they are not purposeless and

needless inflictions of pain and suffering. The sentences imposed are not

constitutionally excessive, and the trial court did not abuse its sentencing

discretion.

Error Patent Review

Although the trial court correctly referred to the sentencing provisions

for each offense during its explanation of the sentencing ranges, when the

court pronounced Dangerfield’s sentence, it failed to specify that the

sentences were at hard labor as provided in each statute. The minutes of

court reflect that the sentences are to be served at hard labor. The trial

court’s oversight in failing to state whether Dangerfield’s sentences were to

be served at hard labor renders the sentences illegally lenient. State v.

Shannon, 55,697 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/17/24), 399 So. 3d 52, writ denied, 24-

00987 (La. 11/20/24), 396 So. 3d 70; State v. Martinez, 52,882 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 467; State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20), 292 So. 3d

61. However, because the statutes for all Dangerfield’s convicted offenses

require the sentences to be served at hard labor, the error is self-correcting.
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Id. Consequently, all of Dangerfield’s sentences shall be served

at hard labor.

Further, La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A) provides that an illegal sentence may

be corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an

appellate court on review. As such, any commitment order should be

corrected to reflect that Dangerfield’s sentences are at hard labor.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated hereinabove, Dangerfield’s sentences are

hereby AFFIRMED as AMENDED to reflect that each are to be served at

hard labor.

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