State of Louisiana v. Rapheal Clark

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 56,697-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RAPHEAL CLARK Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 399,096

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant
By: Remy V. Starns
Michael A. Mitchell
Caitlin Fowlkes

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ASHLIN N. THOMAS
ERIC M. WHITEHEAD
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Rapheal Clark pled guilty to theft of merchandise valued between

$1,000 and $5,000. Clark was also on parole for a felon in possession of a

firearm conviction, and the plea was made with the understanding the state

would not file a habitual offender bill, but no agreement was made regarding

sentencing. The trial court ultimately sentenced Clark to serve four years at

hard labor, consecutive to any other sentence, which Clark now appeals as

being constitutionally excessive. Finding no merit to this argument, we

affirm.

FACTS

Clark pled guilty as charged to theft of merchandise after he and a

codefendant, Ashtari Draper, stole three backpack leaf blowers, a chainsaw,

and a generator, valued collectively at $3,655, from Lowe’s in Shreveport on

November 9, 2023. Clark elected to revoke his parole prior to sentencing.1

At sentencing, defense counsel provided the trial court with information

about Clark’s sickle cell anemia diagnosis and his contention he failed to

receive proper medical treatment while incarcerated. Counsel also informed

the trial court about Clark’s strong family ties to the area, which included his

mother, two sisters, two children, and a grandchild born while Clark was

incarcerated pending trial. Finally, Clark’s educational background and

work history were discussed, as well as his role in the theft from Lowe’s.

Clark expressed remorse for his crimes.

The trial court found an undue risk that Clark would commit another

crime if he received a suspended sentence, and any lesser sentence would

deprecate the seriousness of the underlying offense. Clark’s fairly extensive

criminal history was noted, which included: a conviction in Caddo Parish for

aggravated battery in 2012; Texas convictions for attempted unlawful

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and felony possession of a

controlled dangerous substance in 2017; a Texas conviction for unlawful

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 2018; and convictions in

Caddo Parish for felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent

to distribute a schedule II controlled dangerous substance in 2021; the

instant theft was Clark’s seventh felony conviction. The trial court also

noted Clark had been on parole for only about six months at the time he

committed the theft. The sole mitigating factor found applicable was

Clark’s conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily harm. Clark

was sentenced to serve four years at hard labor, consecutive to any other

sentence, with credit for time served.

Clark filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing it was excessive

and in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal

followed.

DISCUSSION

Clark makes several arguments in support of why he believes his

sentence is excessive and should be set aside. He first argues the trial court

did not adhere to the requirements set out in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when it

failed to consider as mitigating factors his significant medical condition

(sickle cell anemia), his lack of access to necessary healthcare for that

condition (he contends no medication or treatment has been rendered for his

sickle cell anemia since his initial incarceration), his ties to the community,

and family obligations. Clark points out his sentence is harsher than his

codefendant, Draper, who Clark believes was more culpable in the theft
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from Lowe’s. Clark contends near-maximum sentences are reserved for the

worst offenders, which he cannot be because his conduct did not endanger

anyone’s safety, and he argues his conduct is unlikely to reoccur because it

was an isolated incident. Clark also claims the four-year sentence violates

the Constitution because it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense.

The state first argues Clark failed to raise the claims of lack of

compliance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 with sufficient specificity in his

motion to reconsider sentence and, therefore, his right to make those claims

on appeal was not preserved. As such, the state argues this court’s

consideration of Clark’s appeal of his sentence is limited to bare

constitutional excessiveness.

In the alternative, the state argues the record clearly shows the trial

court complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and specifically tailored its

sentence to Clark. The state points to Clark’s criminal history, which

includes previous convictions for aggravated battery, felony drug

possession, and felon in possession of a firearm. The state contends the

four-year sentence is especially appropriate in this case as Clark’s previous

unsuccessful attempts at probation in no way deterred his continued

participation in criminal endeavors, and asks us to affirm.

Appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a two-pronged

inquiry. State v. Caldwell, 56,269 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25), 411 So. 3d 934,

citing State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 336 So. 3d

114. First, the record must show that the court complied with La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1. The court need not list every aggravating or mitigating factor so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines. Id.
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No sentencing factor is accorded greater weight by statute than any other

factor. Id.

The second prong is constitutional excessiveness. A sentence violates

La. Const. art. 1, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition of

pain and suffering. Id. A sentence is deemed grossly disproportionate if,

when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to

society, it shocks the sense of justice or makes no reasonable contribution to

acceptable penal goals. Id.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.

Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). A trial judge is in the best

position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a

particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State

v. Williams, 56,184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/25), 409 So. 3d 306, writ denied,

25-00372 (La. 5/20/25), 409 So. 3d 218, citing State v. Bell, 53,712 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.

12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7, citing State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So.

2d 957. As a general rule, maximum or near sentences are reserved for the

worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031 (La.

2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Williams, supra.

Theft is defined as the misappropriation or taking of anything of value

which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the
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misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or

representations; an intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever may

be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential. La. R.S.

14:67(A). When the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value of

$1,000 or more, but less than a value of $5,000, the offender shall be

imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or may

be fined not more than $3,000, or both. La. R.S. 14:67(B)(3).

Clark did not specifically describe the trial court’s lack of compliance

with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in his motion to reconsider sentence and may

have failed to preserve any claims beyond bare constitutional

excessiveness. Even if this minimal articulation was sufficient to preserve

the issue, there is no support in the record for Clark’s claim the trial court

failed to adequately consider the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth

in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. While the court did not walk through each factor

individually, it is not required to as long as it is clear the factors were fully

considered. The sentencing transcript reflects Clark’s presentation of

mitigating evidence, including information regarding his medical condition

and ties to the community, which supports the state’s contention the trial

court was aware of these factors and took them into consideration when

imposing sentence. We find Clark failed to satisfy the first prong of the test

for excessiveness.

The second prong requires this court to determine if the sentence

imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is grossly out of

proportion with the underlying offense. We cannot say the trial court’s

imposition of a four-year sentence, which is less than the maximum allowed

by statute, shocks the sense of justice in this case. Clark was on felony
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parole for felon in possession of a firearm when he chose to commit the

underlying crime, his criminal history is extensive including multiple felony

convictions, and there is no indication probationary treatment has effectively

deterred him from criminal behavior when offered previously. For these

reasons, we do not find the sentence imposed is constitutionally

excessive.

CONCLUSION

Rapheal Clark’s four-year sentence for theft of merchandise, with a

value of more than $1,000 and less than $5,000, is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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