Tammey Webber v. City of Shreveport, Caddo Community Action Agency, Inc. D/B/A C. E. Galloway Head Start Center, And Guideone Speciality Insurance Co.

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,705-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

TAMMEY WEBBER Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

CITY OF SHREVEPORT, CADDO Defendants-Appellees
COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY,
INC. D/B/A C. E. GALLOWAY
HEAD START CENTER, AND
GUIDEONE SPECIALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY

*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 640,057

Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge

*****

THE LAW OFFICE OF ALLEN Counsel for Appellant
COOPER, L.L.C.
By: J. Allen Cooper, Jr.

WASHINGTON AND WELLS Counsel for Appellee,
By: Alex J. Washington, Jr. City of Shreveport

GREGORY ENGLESMAN Counsel for Appellee,
GuideOne Specialty
Insurance Company

*****

Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of

Caddo, the Honorable Brady O’Callaghan presiding. Tammey Webber

appeals the trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment filed

by Caddo Community Action Agency, Inc. d/b/a C.E. Galloway Head Start

Center (“CCAA”) and GuideOne Specialty Insurance Company

(“GuideOne”) (CCAA and GuideOne collectively referred to as

“defendants” or “appellees”), finding that there was no genuine issue of

material fact that defendants were on notice of a defect in the premises. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

CCAA is an agency that operates C.E. Galloway Head Start Center on

Olive Street in Shreveport, Louisiana. Its mission is to promote the school

readiness of young children from low-income families. On October 21,

2021, Ms. Webber was walking on the public sidewalk with several children

in front of the Galloway Head Start Center when she tripped and fell over an

uneven area of the sidewalk, causing her harm.

On October 11, 2022, Ms. Webber filed a petition for damages against

CCAA, its insurer GuideOne, and the City of Shreveport (the “City”). She

alleged that as she was walking on the sidewalk in front of CCAA, she

stepped in a hole, causing her to lose her balance and fall. She said that as

she was losing her balance, she grabbed onto a nearby bollard, meant to

deter vehicular traffic, which came loose and led to her fall. Ms. Webber

claimed “severe and disabling” injuries because of the fall.

On October 31, 2022, CCAA and GuideOne answered the petition and

generally denied any liability for Ms. Webber’s fall. On December 8, 2022,

the City filed its answer denying plaintiff’s allegations and asserting

contributory negligence as an affirmative defense.

On April 25, 2024, CCAA and GuideOne filed a motion for summary

judgment, arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law

because Ms. Webber had no evidence of a defect creating an unreasonable

risk of harm, nor that CCAA knew or should have known of any defect.

Defendants attached an affidavit from Mattie Smith, Vice President of

CCAA, who testified that no previous accidents occurred at the location

where plaintiff tripped and that CCAA had no knowledge of any defect in

the premises at that location. Defendants also attached an affidavit from

Bobby Thomason, an adjuster for Frontier Adjusters of Shreveport. Mr.

Thomason investigated the incident and took photographs, demonstrating no

holes in the area where the incident occurred and no differences in elevation

exceeding one inch.

On December 30, 2024, Ms. Webber filed her opposition to the

motion for summary judgment, arguing that CCAA had actual or

constructive notice of the uneven concrete and unstable bollard outside its

front door. In support, she attached the 1442 deposition of CCAA in which

she claimed the company’s representative admitted to having actual

knowledge of the hazardous condition in the sidewalk for one to two years

prior to the incident. Ms. Webber also claimed the 1442 deposition showed

that CCAA admitted responsibility for: (1) inspecting and repairing the

unstable bollard, (2) reporting the hazardous sidewalk to the city, and (3)

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warning people about the hazardous sidewalk and bollard. She asserted the

existence of numerous fact issues which precluded summary judgment.

On February 7, 2025, the trial court granted summary judgment in

favor of CCAA and GuideOne. The trial court was unpersuaded by Ms.

Webber’s arguments about the faulty bollard, finding that the installation of

such a device does not obligate its owner to guarantee its suitability as a

handrail or anything other than an apparent deterrent to unauthorized vehicle

traffic. The trial court further found that while Ms. Webber established that

CCAA knew there were cracks in the sidewalk, the lack of any history of

falls at that location combined with the jurisprudence meant that CCAA was

not on notice of a defect; thus she would be unable to carry her burden of

proof at trial.

Ms. Webber now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Notice of an unreasonably dangerous condition

Ms. Webber argues that the trial court erred in finding that because

there were no prior falls in the area, there was no genuine issue of material

fact as to whether CCAA knew that there was a defect in the sidewalk. She

claims that Louisiana law does not require there to be a history of falls at the

complained-of location for the finder of fact to determine that a condition is

unreasonably dangerous. Ms. Webber asserts that after the trial court

determined that CCAA had actual knowledge of the cracks in the sidewalk,

it became a genuine issue of material fact for the trier of fact to determine

whether those cracks in the sidewalk constituted an unreasonably dangerous

condition.

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Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same

criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146 (La. 1/21/04), 864 So.

2d 129. A trial court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the

motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). Summary judgment procedure is

now favored under our law and will be construed to secure the just, speedy,

and inexpensive determination of every action except those disallowed by

La. C.C.P. art. 969. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2); Farrell v. Circle K Stores,

Inc., 22-00849 (La. 3/17/23), 359 So. 3d 467.

The burden of proof rests with the mover; nevertheless, if the mover

will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court

on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion

does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s

claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of

factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s

claim, action, or defense. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that

the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. When a motion

for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in La. C.C.P. art.

967(A), an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of

his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in La.

C.C.P. art. 967(A), must set forth specific facts showing that there is a

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genuine issue for trial. La. C.C.P. art. 967(B). If he does not so respond,

summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be rendered against him. Id.

A fact is material if it potentially ensures or precludes recovery,

affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal

dispute. Freeman v. W. Carroll Par. Police Jury, 54,750 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 637, writ denied, 22-01583 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So. 3d

83. A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons

could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there

is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate.

Harris v. City of Shreveport, 53,101 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So. 3d

978; Maggio v. Parker, 17-1112 (La. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 874. In

determining whether an issue is genuine, a court should not consider the

merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony, or weigh

evidence. Chanler v. Jamestown Ins. Co., 51,320 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17),

223 So. 3d 614, writ denied, 17-01251 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So. 3d 1230.

La. C.C. art. 2317 provides that “[w]e are responsible, not only for the

damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of

persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our

custody.” Further, La. C.C. art. 2317.1 provides that:

The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage
occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that
he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have
known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage,
that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of
reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable
care.

To recover for damages caused by a defective thing, a plaintiff must

prove that the thing was in defendant’s custody, that the thing contained a

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defect, that this defective condition caused damage, and that defendant knew

or should have known of the defect. La. C.C. art. 2317.1; Harris, supra.

A “defect” in a thing, for which one having custody of the thing may

be liable for damages caused, is a condition or imperfection that poses an

unreasonable risk of injury to persons exercising ordinary care and prudence.

Gauthier v. Foster Homes LLC, 53,143 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 284 So.

3d 1206. The determination of whether a defect presents an unreasonable

risk of harm is a matter wed to the facts and must be determined in light of

facts and surrounding circumstances of each particular case. Id. To be

liable for damages caused by a defect, the defect must be dangerous or

calculated to cause injury. Harris, supra. Moreover, not every imperfection

or irregularity is a defect for purposes of imposing liability. Mason v.

Monroe City Sch. Bd., 43,595 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/17/08), 996 So. 2d 377.

Here, Ms. Webber claims that “the trial court found that CCAA knew

about the uneven area of concrete which caused [Ms. Webber] to trip and

fall.” This statement, however, is at odds with the trial court’s actual ruling,

which was that CCAA knew about the cracks in the sidewalk, but not that

those cracks were unreasonably dangerous. This is an important distinction.

Knowledge of a condition is not the same as knowledge of an unreasonably

dangerous condition. Courts have ruled on numerous claims of defects in

sidewalks and parking lots and upheld dismissals on lack of notice and lack

of proof of a defect that was unreasonably dangerous.

In Laffitte v. D&J Commercial Props., LLC, 52,823 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 460, the plaintiff tripped on a ramp in a parking lot.

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The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with the affidavit of the

owner, who established that no one had complained about the ramp and no

one had fallen on it. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of an engineer claiming

the ramp was violative of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).

The trial court granted the motion, stating that without prior incidents at the

ramp, the plaintiff failed to establish knowledge by the defendant. This

court upheld the granting of summary judgment, finding no evidence that the

owner knew or should have known of the defect, even over an affidavit by

plaintiff’s expert finding that the alleged defect violated the ADA.

In Mackey v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. CV 20-1350, 2023 WL

4067962, at *1 (E.D. La. May 16, 2023), plaintiff tripped and fell on the

sidewalk in front of a movie theatre. The sidewalk had deviations in height

of ¾ of an inch to ⅞ of an inch. The court listed a host of Louisiana cases

where the elevation differences ranged from one inch to two inches. Finding

that the defect was not unreasonably dangerous, the court granted summary

judgment in favor of defendants.

In Scott v. Galleria Operating Co., 17-104 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/15/17),

230 So. 3d 682, writ denied, 17-2080 (La. 2/9/18), 236 So. 3d 1262, the

plaintiff tripped over a hole in the concrete surface of a parking garage. The

court held that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge of

the defect and, thus, granted the defendant’s summary judgment.

In Reitzell v. Pecanland Mall Assocs., Ltd., 37,524 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/20/03), 852 So. 2d 1229, a summary judgment was granted on a claim by

plaintiff for injuries suffered when she fell on a patched area between a

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parking lot and missing tiles on a handicap ramp, finding that the defect did

not create an unreasonable risk of harm.

In Dowdy v. City of Monroe, 46,693 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/2/11), 78 So.

3d 791, summary judgment was granted by the trial court and upheld by this

court where the plaintiff sued after tripping over a patched hole in an asphalt

roadway to the Civic Center, finding that no unreasonable risk of harm was

established.

Similarly, Ms. Webber failed to prove that the cracks in the sidewalk

were unreasonably dangerous. Not all cracks in the sidewalk present an

unreasonably dangerous condition. Moreover, the portion of the sidewalk at

issue is traveled every day as the main passage into CCAA’s building, and

there were no prior incidents nor were there any complaints. Thus, even if

Ms. Webber had been able to supply proof of an unreasonably dangerous

condition, she failed to prove that anyone at CCAA knew about it.

Ms. Webber’s reliance on CCAA’s 1442 deposition testimony to

prove knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition is misplaced. The

fact that CCAA’s representative admitted that she knew about cracks in the

sidewalk does not create a genuine issue of material fact because there is no

evidence that she knew the cracks in the sidewalk created an unreasonably

dangerous condition. This assignment of error is without merit.

Ms. Webber also argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists

due to the failure of CCAA to report the allegedly hazardous sidewalk to the

City. It is true that CCAA acknowledged there were cracks in the sidewalk

and that the City repaired the sidewalk after the fall. However, such

acknowledgment does not establish a defect, nor does it establish notice.

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What it does establish is that CCAA reported an issue to the City as soon as

they became aware of it and that the City proactively responded by fixing

the issue. Because we find that CCAA had no knowledge of an

unreasonably dangerous condition with respect to the sidewalk in front of its

building, we hold that it was under no duty to report anything to the City.

This assignment of error has no merit.

Ms. Webber’s other assignments of error all complain that the trial

court failed to find a defect with respect to the cracks in the sidewalk and the

bollard. However, since the trial court’s decision was based on a lack of

notice rather than a defect, those assignments of error are without merit.

The sidewalks in Louisiana are rarely smooth. Many are uneven,

cracked, or pitted. A crack in a sidewalk does not become a defect under La.

C.C. art. 2317.1 until it becomes unreasonably dangerous in normal use.

However, even if the defect is unreasonably dangerous, the entity having

garde over the property must have knowledge of the defect and fail to repair

it in a timely manner. Here, without any prior trips, falls, or complaints to

CCAA about the location of the trip, there was no way for CCAA to be

aware of any potential defect, nor was there any way for CCAA to repair

anything or report an issue to the City. Plaintiff failed to establish a defect

and failed to establish notice of any defect by CCAA.

CONCLUSION

At Ms. Webber’s cost, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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