Tonya Parrott Individually and on behalf of her minor daughter, Israel Jadon Parrott v. Pelican Port-A-Buildings, LLC; Daniel Edward Massey, and Progressive Insurance Co.

Judgment rendered December 17, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,722-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

TONYA PARROTT, INDIVIDUALLY Plaintiffs-Appellants
AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR
DAUGHTER, ISRAEL JADON
PARROTT

versus

PELICAN PORT-A-BUILDINGS, Defendants-Appellees
LLC; DANIEL EDWARD MASSEY,
AND PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE
CO.

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 20222882

Honorable Bernard Scott Leehy, Judge

*****

TONYA PARROTT In Proper Person,
individually and on behalf
of her minor daughter,
Israel Jadon Parrott

JONES WALKER, LLP Counsel for Appellees,
By: Ian Alexander McDonald Pelican Port-A-Buildings,
Trey K. Bartholomew LLC, Daniel Edward
Massey

STRAUSS, MASSEY, DINNEEN, LLC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Richard Daniel Serio, Jr. United Financial Casualty
Company

*****

Before THOMPSON, ROBINSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Tonya Parrott appeals a judgment granting a motion for summary

judgment and dismissing United Financial Casualty Company (improperly

referred to as “Progressive Insurance Company” in her petition) from her

lawsuit. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Parrott hired Daniel Massey’s business, Pelican Port-a-Buildings,

LLC (“Pelican”), to move her mobile home in Ouachita Parish. Pelican

began dismantling the home on August 31, 2021, and moved it a few days

later. She alleged that Massey and Pelican severely damaged her home

during the move.

A red 2011 Ford F-350 was used to tow her home. According to

Parrott, the truck’s license plate number was Z232252, and the DOT number

3612408 was written on the driver’s door along with business information.

Progressive Insurance had issued an Arkansas commercial auto

insurance policy to Pelican. The policy number was 03950178-0, and the

relevant policy period was from August 11, 2021, to August 11, 2022. The

policy was underwritten by United Financial Casualty Company (“United”).

The listed vehicles on the declarations page were a 1998 Peterbilt 379 and a

2006 RNR trailer.

On August 19, 2022, Parrott filed suit on her own behalf and on

behalf of her minor daughter against Pelican, Massey, and Progressive.

She alleged that Pelican severely damaged her home during the move and

made it uninhabitable. In particular, she alleged that Pelican bent the

home’s frame, never reassembled the home, left the home exposed to the

elements, and placed the home in an unauthorized location. She also

alleged that Pelican breached its contract with her, and that Pelican engaged

in unfair trade practices. Parrott was represented by Walter McClatchey, Jr.

of Acadiana Legal Services Corporation when the suit was filed. Parrott

later amended her petition to allege additional damages and to allege that

United had denied coverage and refused to provide her with a copy of the

policy.

On November 13, 2013, United filed a motion for summary judgment

in which it asserted that Pelican and Massey operated a 2011 Ford F-350

truck during the transport of Parrott’s home. United argued that its policy

provided no coverage for Parrott’s alleged damages because the truck, which

had the VIN 1FDRF3H62BEC41768 and was insured under a policy issued

by Louisiana Farm Bureau at the time of the move, did not meet any

definition of “insured auto” under the policy. United’s motion for summary

judgment was refiled on December 7, 2023, because of a clerical error in an

attachment.

The United policy issued to Pelican provided under “PART I-

LIABILITY TO OTHERS”:

Subject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay the premium for
liability coverage for the insured auto involved, we will pay
damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, for bodily
injury, property damage, and covered pollution cost or expense
for which an insured becomes legally responsible because of an
accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
that insured auto.

Under the general definitions section of the policy, an “insured auto”

was defined as:

a. Any auto specifically described on the declarations page; or

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b. An additional auto for Part I-Liability To Others and/or Part
II-Damage To Your Auto on the date you become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on the
declarations page;
(ii) we insure all autos owned by you that are used in your
business;
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto;
and
(iv) you tell us within 30 days after you acquire it that you want
us to cover it for that coverage.
.....
c. Any replacement auto on the date you become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on the
declarations page;
(ii) the auto that you acquire replaces one specifically described
on the declarations page due to termination of your ownership
of the replaced auto or due to mechanical breakdown of,
deterioration of, or loss to the replaced auto that renders it
permanently inoperable; and
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto.

United also noted that there is a definition of “insured auto” used only

in Part I of the Policy. It states that when used in Part I-Liability to Others,

“insured auto” also includes:

1. Trailers designed primarily for travel on public roads, while
connected to your insured auto that is a power unit;
2. Mobile equipment while being carried or towed by an
insured auto;
3. Any temporary substitute auto; and
4. Mobile equipment that is:
a. owned by you;
b. leased, hired, or borrowed by you and you have purchased
either “Hired Auto Coverage” or “Any Automobile Legal
Liability Coverage” from us; or
c. not owned, leased, hired, or borrowed by you and you have
purchased either “Employer’s Non-Ownership Liability
Coverage” or “Any Automobile Legal Liability Coverage”
from us.
However, mobile equipment meeting any of those three criteria
will qualify only if at the time of loss it is being:
a. used in your business;
b. operated on a public highway; and
c. operated in a state or province where it is subject to a
compulsory or financial responsibility law or other motor
vehicle insurance law.

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A “temporary substitute auto” is defined in the policy as “any auto

you do not own while used with the permission of its owner as a temporary

substitute for an insured auto that has been withdrawn from normal use due

to breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”

The policy contained a motor truck cargo legal liability coverage

endorsement. It stated that “insured auto” meant:

a. Any auto specifically described on the declarations page that
is not a trailer;
b. An additional auto that is not a trailer on the date you
become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on the
declarations page;
(ii) we insure all autos owned by you that are used in your
business;
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto;
and
(iv) you tell us within 30 days after you acquire it that you want
us to cover it;
c. Any replacement auto that is not a trailer on the date you
become the owner if:
(i) you acquire the auto during the policy period shown on the
declarations page;
(ii) the auto that you acquire replaces one specifically described
on the declarations page due to termination of your ownership
of the replaced auto or due to mechanical breakdown of,
deterioration of, or loss to the replaced auto that renders it
permanently inoperable;
(iii) no other insurance policy provides coverage for that auto;
and
(iv) you tell us within 30 days after you acquire it that you want
us to cover it;
d. A trailer designed primarily for travel on public roads, only
when the trailer is attached to a power unit that is an insured
auto or while it is in due course of transit by a power unit that is
an insured auto; and
e. Any temporary substitute auto that is not a trailer.

Submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment were: (1)

Parrott’s petition for damages; (2) Farm Bureau’s certificate of insurance;

(3) a July 26, 2021, letter from Farm Bureau to Massey; (4) the United

policy; and (5) an affidavit from Roy Meyers, a claims adjuster with United.

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Farm Bureau issued a policy to Massey d/b/a Pelican Portable

Building LLC covering the 2011 Ford F-350 truck with a VIN of

1FDRF3H62BEC41768. The effective date of the policy was November 9,

2020. The letter from Farm Bureau to Massey showed that the 2011 Ford F-

350 had been insured by Farm Bureau since July 18, 2018.

Meyers stated in his affidavit that he adjusted Parrott’s claim, which

she reported on October 6, 2021. Pelican and Massey used the 2011 F-350

to transport Parrott’s mobile home, but there was no bill of lading. Massey

has had the 2011 F-350 since at least July 2018, and it was listed as an

insured vehicle under Massey’s Farm Bureau policy in effect at the time of

the incident. On December 4, 2021, United advised Parrott that the United

policy did not provide coverage because the 2011 F-350 was not an insured

vehicle under its terms. The policy included a motor truck cargo legal

liability coverage endorsement. Attached to Meyers’ affidavit was a motor

vehicle report showing that as of February 15, 2023, the 2011 F-350 was

registered to Ideal Portable Buildings LLC. It also showed the 2011 F-350

was registered to Massey as of December 15, 2020.

On November 21, 2023, Parrott’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw

as counsel of record. On June 25, 2024, the trial court permitted

McClatchey and Acadiana Legal Service Corporation to withdraw as

counsel of record. Proceedings were stayed for 90 days to allow Parrott to

obtain other counsel. Parrott did not obtain counsel and has appeared pro se

since.

On February 18, 2025, United filed a motion to reset the hearing on its

motion for summary judgment. It was reset for April 24, 2025.

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On March 10, 2025, Parrott filed a motion to continue the summary

judgment hearing. She stated that on February 25, 2025, she issued a

subpoena to the Louisiana administrator for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (“FMCSA”) to obtain documentation as to whether the F-

350 was insured at the time of the incident. The subpoena was processed as

a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. She was advised in a

March 3, 2025, letter from the FMCSA that it may take up to five months for

her to receive a response. The motion for a continuance was set for hearing

on April 24, 2025.

On March 25, 2025, Parrott filed a motion to compel production of

United’s policy CA3950178. She claimed the FMCSA website showed

United as providing liability coverage to Pelican through that policy number.

On April 9, 2025, Parrott filed her opposition to the motion for

summary judgment. She argued that United denied coverage for a F-350

that was not the F-350 that moved her home. She asserted that the F-350

which moved her home had the DOT number 3612408 on its driver’s door

and the license plate number Z232252. She maintained that the F-350 for

which United denied coverage also used the same license plate number but

had the DOT number 7292429 issued to it.

Submitted by Parrott in opposition to the motion for summary

judgment were: (1) Parrott’s affidavit; (2) an annual oversize/overweight

heavy equipment permit from DOTD; (3) a claim made by Daniel Massey

against United; (4) Pelican’s contract with Parrott; (5) the declarations page

for the United policy; (5) a FMCSA acceptance report; and (6) the March 3,

2025, letter concerning the FOIA request.

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Parrott stated in her affidavit that the red F-350 which moved her

home had the DOT 3612408 number on its side, the license plate number

Z232252, and a metal bar across the hood. When she went to Pelican’s

place of business on June 26, 2024, she saw a very similar looking red F-350

which did not have a metal bar or any lettering on it. That truck had the VIN

1FDRF3H62BEC41768 and the license plate Z232252. Photos of the trucks

taken in 2021 and 2024 were attached to her affidavit.

The DOTD permit was for a 2011 Ford truck with the VIN

1FDRF3H62BEC41768 and the license plate number Z232252. It was

issued to Pelican from December 24, 2020, to December 23, 2021. It listed

a DOT number of 007292429, which was different from the DOT number on

the side of the truck as well as the number listed in Pelican’s contract with

Parrott.

The claim made by Massey against United lists an incident date of

September 4, 2021. Massey’s date of birth is listed as January 1, 2001,

which Parrott asserts could not be the birthdate of the Massey from Pelican.

The FMSCA acceptance report listed United as the insurer for

Pelican. The policy number was CA3950178, with an effective date of

August 11, 2021. That policy was the object of Parrott’s motion to compel.

United filed an opposition to the motion to compel. It argued that the

motion was moot since it had already provided the policy to Parrott. United

asserted that it had repeatedly informed Parrott that policy 03950178-0 is the

same policy as CA3950178. The “CA” means commercial auto, and the “-

0” means it’s the first issuance of the policy.

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At the hearing on the motions, the court denied the motion to compel,

granted the motion for summary judgment, and dismissed United,

improperly referred to as “Progressive Insurance Company,” from the

lawsuit.

Parrott has appealed.

DISCUSSION

The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those

disallowed by Article 969; the procedure is favored and shall be construed to

accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). After an opportunity for

adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the

motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

A summary judgment is reviewed on appeal de novo, with the

appellate court using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s

determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate; i.e., whether

there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Samaha v. Rau, 07-1726 (La.

2/26/08), 977 So. 2d 880.

Interpretation of an insurance policy ordinarily involves a legal

question that can be properly resolved by a motion for summary judgment.

Landry v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 21-00621 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So. 3d 712;

United Home Care, Inc. v. Simpson, 54,797 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/22), 351

So. 3d 904, writ denied, 22-01831 (La. 3/28/23), 358 So. 3d 518.

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When determining whether or not a policy affords coverage for an

incident, it is the burden of the insured to prove the incident falls within the

policy’s terms. Jumper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

Company, 54,184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22), 335 So. 3d 1001. An insurer

seeking to avoid coverage through summary judgment bears the burden of

proving some provision or exclusion applies to preclude coverage. Beck v.

Burgueno, 43,557 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/17/08), 996 So. 2d 404.

Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance

policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the

policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence

supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded. Reynolds v.

Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So. 2d 1180; Kansas City

Southern Railway Company v. Wood Energy Group, Inc., 53,096 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 671.

Federal law

Parrott first argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was

no genuine issue of material fact as to whether federal law required United

to provide insurance to Pelican covering the vehicle that damaged her home.

In support of her argument, Parrott cites federal provisions, including 49

U.S.C. §13902, 49 U.S.C. §13906, 49 U.S.C. §31134, 49 U.S.C. §31139, 49

C.F.R. §365.107, 49 C.F.R. §365.109, and 49 C.F.R. §387.7.

This is the first time that Parrott has raised this argument. Normally,

an argument raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.

Segura v. Frank, 93-1271 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 714; Kelley v. Kelley,

55,879 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/2/24), 400 So. 3d 1129. However, even if this

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court were to consider the argument, there is no merit to it. The cited

provisions refer to responsibilities of Pelican, not United.

Motion to compel

Parrott contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to

compel and then granting summary judgment despite her outstanding FOIA

request.

In her motion to compel, Parrot sought United policy CA3950178,

which United asserts is the same policy as 03950178-0 that has been

provided to her. The “CA” merely refers to “Commercial Auto.” The

policy issued by United to Pelican was a commercial policy.

The mere contention of an opponent that he lacks sufficient

information to defend the motion for summary judgment and needs

additional time to conduct discovery is insufficient to defeat the motion.

Dean v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 51,243 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217

So. 3d 611. The district court has the discretion to render a summary

judgment or to require further discovery. Id.

The motion for summary judgment had been pending for well over a

year, with much of the delay attributed to the motion to withdraw. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel, denying a

continuance, and in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Summary

judgment was not premature.

Summary judgment

Parrott maintains that the trial court erred in determining there were

no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the policy provided

coverage to the F-350 that moved her home.

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The policy is clear and unambiguous that coverage was not provided

to the F-350 which moved Parrott’s home. It was not an insured auto under

any provision of the policy. It was not specifically described on the

declarations page. It was not an additional auto or a replacement auto

because it was not acquired by Pelican during the policy period and because

another insurance policy provided coverage for it. It was not a trailer,

mobile equipment being carried or towed by an insured auto, or a temporary

substitute auto.

Parrott maintains that Farm Bureau has asserted a policy exclusion

because the truck was being used for a commercial purpose. This is of no

moment as Farm Bureau provided coverage for the vehicle, just not to an

unlimited extent. In any event, the truck was still not an additional or

replacement auto as it was not acquired during the policy period.

Parrott also maintains there are discrepancies as to when Pelican

acquired the vehicle. She notes that the earliest that Pelican began using the

truck was in July of 2018. A motor vehicle report showed that the 2011 F-

350 was registered to Massey as of December 15, 2020. That same motor

vehicle report showed it was registered to Ideal Portable Buildings on

February 15, 2023. However, none of this establishes that the F-350 was

acquired during the policy period.

Parrott also asserts that there are two different Daniel Masseys

because the Daniel Massey who made the claim against United was too

young to be the same Daniel Massey who moved her home. This does not

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the F-350 was an

11

insured auto under the policy. We also note that this claim was marked as

waived and the matter was closed.

Parrott notes that the Louisiana DOTD permit issued from December

24, 2020, to December 23, 2021, has a different DOT number for the F-350

with license plate number Z232252 and the VIN 1FDRF3H62BEC41768.

However, this does not change the fact that no F-350 was listed on the

United policy’s declarations page or that a F-350 with that VIN was insured

by the Farm Bureau policy since 2018.

Finally, Parrott argues that there are two 2011 Ford F-350s, and the

one that moved her home was not the one with the VIN

1FDRF3H62BEC41768. Her proof consists of photographs of the vehicles

taken three years apart. The latter photographs show no lettering on the F-

350. However, she did not establish that the vehicles have different VINs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no genuine issue

of material fact that the 2011 Ford F-350 which moved Parrott’s home was

not an insured auto under the policy issued by United to Pelican. United’s

motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Parrott is to pay all

appeal costs to the extent allowed by La. C.C.P. art. 5188.

AFFIRMED.

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