Stephanie Ramsey v. Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC & Walmart, Inc.

Judgment rendered February 25, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 56,736-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STEPHANIE RAMSEY Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

WAL-MART LOUISIANA, LLC Defendants-Appellees
& WALMART, INC.

*****

Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Union, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 50,908

Honorable Thomas W. Rogers, Judge

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SMITH & NWOKORIE Counsel for Appellant
By: Brian G. Smith

BLANCHARD, WALKER, O’QUIN & Counsel for Appellees
ROBERTS, APLC
By: Stacey D. Williams

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Ramsey appeals the district court’s

denial of her motion for new trial regarding its granting of summary

judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC and

Wal-Mart, Inc. (collectively, “Walmart”). For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTS

On August 4, 2023, Ramsey filed a petition for damages against

Walmart. She alleged that on August 6, 2022, she was shopping at Walmart

Store #1110 when a law enforcement officer approached her and advised her

that she had to leave the store because of a complaint he received from a

store employee.1 She stated that she had no choice but to leave the store in

the presence of other customers. She argued that Walmart knew or should

have known of the employee’s actions and that it failed to provide adequate

training to this employee. She alleged that Walmart’s actions were

negligent, reckless and without reason and that she suffered damages

including inconvenience, mental anguish, emotional distress, false

containment and defamation.

On September 6, 2023, Walmart filed an answer and denied Ramsey’s

allegations. It argued that the fault of Ramsey was the sole cause of the

alleged damages and that she failed to mitigate her damages. In the

alternative, it pled the comparative fault of Ramsey or third persons.

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In a subsequent filing, Walmart alleged that on August 1, 2022, Ramsey was
arrested on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile and that a special
condition of her bond was that she have no contact or communication with the juvenile or
the juvenile’s mother. The juvenile’s mother is the employee who reported Ramsey’s
presence in the store. Walmart stated that Ramsey was not handcuffed or issued a
citation, and she was not banned from Walmart.

On December 2, 2024, Walmart filed a motion for summary

judgment. It argued that Ramsey could not prevail on her claim that it

breached a duty owed to her. It contended that she could not prove vicarious

liability because the employee bore no liability for any tort.

On December 30, 2024, Ramsey filed a motion for continuance and

for an extension of time to file an opposition to the motion for summary

judgment. She noted that a hearing on the motion was set for January 16,

2025, but that she and Walmart agreed to a continuance of the hearing.2

On January 3, 2025, the district court filed an order resetting the

hearing to March 13, 2025. The record includes two pages entitled “Notify”

in which the clerk’s office provided counsel for both parties with the order to

reset the hearing.

A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held on

March 13, 2025. Counsel for Walmart appeared and noted that counsel for

Ramsey was not present and had not filed an opposition. Following

arguments by Walmart’s counsel, the district court granted the motion. The

court later filed a judgment granting Walmart’s motion and dismissing

Ramsey’s claims with prejudice.3

On March 14, 2025, Ramsey filed a motion for new trial. She alleged

that her counsel was not served with notice of the March 13, 2025 hearing as

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She stated that she and Walmart also agreed to a continuance of the trial date.
On December 30, 2024, Walmart filed a motion to continue the trial date and
acknowledged that Ramsey requested a continuance of the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment.
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The district court also filed a ruling stating that Walmart was not responsible for
asking Ramsey to leave the store, that Ramsey was never banned from the store, that the
employee had the right to assert the protection afforded under the protective order, that
the employee was not joined as a defendant and that the request that Ramsey leave the
store was not based on a directive from Walmart. It determined that Ramsey’s claim was
baseless under the law, perhaps even to the point of being sanctionable.
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required by La. C.C.P. art. 1313(C) and, therefore, was not present at the

hearing. She argued that she would be greatly prejudiced if the district court

did not grant her motion for new trial.

On March 26, 2025, Walmart filed an opposition to the motion for

new trial. It stated that the resetting of the hearing date was discussed during

a telephone conference with counsel for both parties and the district court on

January 3, 2025; that the district court indicated it would sign the motion to

reset the hearing; and that on January 6, 2025, Walmart’s counsel received

notice from the clerk’s office that the hearing was set for March 13, 2025. It

stated that the clerk’s office mailed an identical notice to Ramsey’s counsel.

It argued that Ramsey’s counsel could have discovered the hearing date by

contacting the clerk’s office to follow up on Ramsey’s own motion for a

continuance. Walmart contended that Ramsey’s counsel did not request

service and did not set forth any reasons why Ramsey would be greatly

prejudiced if the new trial were not granted.

A hearing on the motion for new trial was held on May 12, 2025.

Counsel for both parties were present and presented arguments. The district

court noted that it was Ramsey’s counsel’s duty to “keep up” with the

motion he filed and when it was set to be heard. Counsel replied that he was

waiting to be served by certified mail. The court asked counsel if he

requested service by certified mail, and he responded that he did not because

he did not think he was required to do so. The court responded that it signed

the order on January 3, 2025, and that counsel did not have his client’s best

interest in mind if he waited over two months to check if the hearing date

had been reset. The court denied the motion for new trial and stated:

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This is of your own making and you filed the motion, it was
incumbent on you to keep up with the date that the hearing
would be set. . . . There’s a certificate in the record that shows
that notice was mailed to [Walmart’s counsel] and you. I have
no doubt that if she got hers you must have gotten yours. Now
if your office overlooked it, that’s on you.

On May 14, 2025, the district court filed an order denying the motion

for new trial.

Ramsey appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for new trial.

DISCUSSION

In her three assignments of error, Ramsey argues that the district court

erred in denying her motion for new trial. She contends that the district

court should have granted a new trial pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1972(1) as

the granting of summary judgment was clearly contrary to the law due to

lack of notice. She states that the record does not contain proof of service by

certified or registered mail or by other methods provided in La. C.C.P. arts.

1313(C) or 1314. She states that the court’s failure to ensure compliance

with service rules deprived her of her right to be heard, and the only remedy

is to vacate the judgment and remand for a properly noticed hearing.

Walmart argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Ramsey’s motion for new trial and that it properly granted summary

judgment. It contends that La. C.C.P. arts. 1313 and 1314 did not apply and

service via regular mail was adequate and proper. Walmart also argues that

by discussing the continuance, identifying alternative dates for the hearing,

participating in a telephone conference with the district court regarding the

continuance and knowing at the conclusion of the conference that the court

would issue an order of continuance, Ramsey’s counsel indicated that he did

not expect formal service of the order granting the continuance.

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A new trial shall be granted when the judgment appears clearly

contrary to the law and the evidence. La. C.C.P. art. 1972(1). A new trial

may be granted in any case if there is good ground therefor, except as

otherwise provided by law. La. C.C.P. art. 1973. Although a trial judge has

much discretion in determining if a new trial is warranted, an appellate court

may set aside the ruling of the trial judge in a case of manifest abuse of that

discretion. Johnson v. Eur. Motors-Ali, 48,513 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13),

129 So. 3d 697, writ denied, 13-2964 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So. 3d 1178.

Notwithstanding La. C.C.P. art. 1313(A), if a pleading or order sets a

court date, then service shall be made by registered or certified mail or as

provided in La. C.C.P. art. 1314, by actual delivery by a commercial courier

or by emailing the document to the email address designated by counsel or

the party. La. C.C.P. art. 1313(C). La. C.C.P. art. 1314 provides for service

by the sheriff.

In Little v. Pou, 42,872 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/30/08), 975 So. 2d 666, writ

denied, 08-0806 (La. 6/6/08), 983 So. 2d 920, this court addressed a similar

matter in which the plaintiffs argued that the resetting of a hearing on a

motion for summary judgment was governed by La. C.C.P. arts. 1313 and

1314. This court stated:

Articles 1313 and 1314 pertain to service of pleadings from the
moving party to adverse parties. Also, service of incidental
orders setting a hearing date obtained by the moving party are
addressed in those provisions. Initially, Article 1314 would
have applied to Dr. Pou for the first setting of the August 28,
2007 hearing on his motion for summary judgment. However,
plaintiffs admittedly received notice of Dr. Pou’s pleading and
notice of that initial hearing date. The second setting occurred
as the result of the plaintiffs’ own pleading for a continuance.
Accordingly, we find that Articles 1313 and 1314 do not govern
the issue of notice to the plaintiffs.

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This court determined that granting the continuance and rescheduling the

hearing date were interlocutory judgments pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1841

and, therefore, that notice requirements set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1914

applied.

La. C.C.P. art. 1914 states in pertinent part:

A. Except as provided in Paragraphs B and C of this Article, the
rendition of an interlocutory judgment in open court constitutes
notice to all parties.
B. The interlocutory judgment shall be reduced to writing if the
court so orders, if a party requests within ten days of rendition
in open court that it be reduced to writing, if a judgment is
granted or an exception is sustained in accordance with Article
1915(C), or if the court takes the interlocutory matter under
advisement. The clerk shall mail or deliver in open court notice
of the judgment to each party. Delivery of the signed judgment
in open court shall constitute notice of judgment and shall be
documented in the record of the proceeding.

This court in Little v. Pou, supra, determined that the resetting of a

hearing during a telephone conference satisfied La. C.C.P. art. 1914(A) and

stated:

[A]lthough not in open court, the district judge granted the
continuance for the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment in the phone conference. This oral ruling was
received by [the attorney] on behalf of all plaintiffs by his
participation in the conference. The actual dates for resetting
the motion and the jury trial were identified later on the day of
the conference by the written Memorandum Order of the trial
court.

This court determined that the parties also received notice pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 1914(B) when the clerk mailed the order to the attorneys as

requested by the plaintiffs in their rule to show cause. This court then found

that the notice requirements set forth in La. C.C.P. art. 1572 were

inapplicable as the plaintiffs did not make a written request for notice of the

trial date.

This court in Little v. Pou, supra, concluded:
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As the moving parties who received clear notice that the trial
court had granted them a continuance, the determination of a
new date for the matter was not something the plaintiffs could
simply assume might never occur. Yet, plaintiffs waited 73
days, attempting no review of the matter, with the original
October setting for jury trial of the entire case having come and
gone. The trial court’s reflections on the process indicate that
the determination of the date for the resetting was clearly
understood as imminent at the close of the phone conference.
The date was selected that very day, and its identification in the
Memorandum Order was transmitted adequately to the
attorneys for the moving parties. The trial court’s ruling not to
reopen the matter after this procedural default was not an abuse
of discretion.

In the case sub judice, this court’s analysis of the facts and applicable

statutes is consistent with the discussion in Little v. Pou, supra. In the

instant case, Ramsey was served with notice of Walmart’s motion for

summary judgment and the initial hearing date pursuant to La. C.C.P.

arts. 1313 and 1314. Ramsey filed a motion for a continuance of the hearing

date, which the district court granted. The district court’s order resetting the

hearing is an interlocutory judgment to which the notice requirements of La.

C.C.P. art. 1914 apply. Attorneys for Walmart and Ramsey participated in

the January 3, 2025 telephone conference with the district court and received

the court’s oral ruling that it would reset the hearing. On that same day, the

clerk filed the district court’s order resetting the hearing to March 13, 2025,

and mailed notice to counsel for both parties with the order to reset the

hearing. Nothing in the record suggests that either party requested that the

order be reduced to writing. Therefore, service by registered or certified

mail was not required for the March 13, 2025 hearing date; the attorneys’

participation in the telephone conference regarding the continuance and the

clerk’s mailing of the order to the attorneys were sufficient means of notice;

and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramsey’s

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motion for new trial. As noted by the district court, it was incumbent upon

Ramsey’s counsel to know the date of the hearing continued at his request.

Accordingly, these assignments of error lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Ramsey’s motion for new trial. Costs of this

appeal are assessed to Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Ramsey.

AFFIRMED.

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