State of Louisiana v. Fatonious Darrell Ballard

Judgment rendered October 7, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 57,028-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

FATONIOUS DARELL Appellant
BALLARD

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 400,341

Honorable John D. Mosely, Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPEALS AND Counsel for Appellant
WRIT SERVICE
By: Douglas D. Brown

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

WILLIAM JACOB EDWARDS
MARY JOINER ABLE
KODIE K. SMITH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, COX, and ROBINSON, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Fatonious Darrell Ballard (“Ballard”) was charged by indictment on

May 15, 2024, with one count of second degree murder in violation of La.

R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. A jury trial was held September 24,

2025, through October 2, 2025. Ballard was found guilty as charged on both

counts. He filed motions for judgment of acquittal and for new trial on

October 29, 2025, which were denied. Ballard waived sentencing delays

and received the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor

without benefits for the second degree murder charge and a sentence of 20

years at hard labor without benefits for the felon in possession of a firearm

charge, to be served concurrently and with credit for time served. Ballard’s

motion to reconsider sentence filed on November 26, 2025, was denied. His

motion for appeal filed on December 18, 2025, was granted.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the convictions and

sentences.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Around 6:00 pm on February 18, 2024, Dwight Green (“Green”) was

cooking at a community barbecue inside the parking lot gate of C&C

grocery and liquor store (“C&C”) in Shreveport when he was fatally shot

eight times in the back. Ballard was approximately 20 to 30 feet from Green

when Green was shot in the leg, shattering his femur. He collapsed on the

sidewalk and was immobile until transported via ambulance to Ochsner LSU

Health for emergency treatment. A 911 call reported a black male in a red

hoodie running northward through the neighborhood, jumping fences, with a

handgun. A second 911 call advised that one of the shooters was the man

lying on the sidewalk that had been shot, and another shooter was the man

wearing the red hoodie who fled the scene.

Eight 9 mm Blazer cartridge cases were recovered near the grill

approximately five feet from Green’s body. Eight .45 caliber R-P cartridge

cases were recovered from a separate location nearby. An empty Glock

9mm ten-capacity magazine and a box of Blazer 9mm ammunition

containing 15 cartridges were recovered from Ballard’s jacket pocket.

The next day, February 19, 2024, a Glock model 43X 9mm pistol was

recovered from a trash can two blocks away at the home of Beverly

Clarkson (“Clarkson”), who raised Green. Clarkson had lived in the

neighborhood for 60 years and was a respected figure in the community.

Following the shootings, she spread the word that she needed the gun that

was used to shoot Green, although she did not care who had it. Clarkson

testified that she received an anonymous phone call telling her to look in her

outside trash can, and she found a firearm lying on the top of the trash inside

the trash can she kept at her back gate. The magazine of the recovered

firearm was fully loaded with ten 9 mm Blazer cartridges, and the chamber

was empty.

DNA testing of the Glock 43X recovered from Clarkson’s home

revealed two DNA contributors. The major contributor was unknown, and

the minor contributor was Ballard. Ballard’s DNA was present on the grip

and trigger of the firearm. Ballistics testing concluded that the eight fired

Blazer 9 mm cartridge casings collected from the scene next to the grill and

Green’s body were determined to have been fired from the 9 mm Glock 43X

recovered from Clarkson’s home. Bullets recovered from the same scene, as

well as from Green’s body, were 9 mm with the same class characteristics as
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the bullets from the 9 mm Glock 43X, but the bullets were not able to be

positively identified due to firing damage done to the thin metal jacketing

around the bullets.

One of the witnesses at the scene was Chelcie Hamilton (“Hamilton”).

At the time of the shooting, Hamilton was sitting in her car parked in front

of the building next to the grill, across from C&C. She testified that “five,

ten minutes at the most” before the shooting, Ballard had walked up to the

passenger side of her car and was standing on the steps of the building she

was parked in front of, and they had talked. Hamilton further testified that

just a few seconds after she heard shots, she saw Ballard walking in front of

her car heading down the street holding a black gun. She did not see anyone

other than Ballard near Green before the shooting, did not see anyone else

walk away, and did not see anyone else with a gun. However, she did not

see Ballard shoot Green. Hamilton left in her vehicle after Green was shot

and did not hear a second set of shots.

Hamilton initially testified that she had not seen Ballard with a gun at

all; however, she stated in a prior recorded police interview that she had seen

a gun sticking out of Ballard’s pocket before Green was shot. After being

questioned on the discrepancy, she then testified that she told the grand jury

she only saw Ballard with a gun after the shooting. Hamilton also stated in

her police interview that there had been an altercation between Green and

Ballard while Ballard was with Bruce Edwards (“Edwards”) about a week

prior to the shooting. However, she testified at trial that she did not recall

making any statement regarding an altercation between Green and Ballard or

Edwards.

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Another witness, Quincy Jones (“Jones”), a close friend of Green’s,

testified that he knew Ballard and had spoken to him while Ballard was

standing near the grill, and he thought Ballard was being quiet and acting

differently than normal. Jones was standing near Hamilton’s car when he

heard the shots that killed Green. He testified that the last time he saw

Ballard prior to the shooting, he was near the grill next to Phillip Bush

(“Phillip”), whom he identified by his Kansas City jacket. However, he

stated that he did not see who was standing next to Green at the exact time

of the shooting, nor did he see who shot Green. After Green was shot, he

saw Ballard walk away and then saw him on the ground. He further testified

that Ballard and Green had gotten into an altercation two to three months

prior to the shooting.

Phillip and Shreka Bush (“Shreka”), husband and wife, were also at

the scene at the time of the shooting. Phillip had crossed the street from

C&C to get a plate and was standing at the grill next to Green when Green

was shot. Phillip fainted during the shooting and fell to the ground but was

uninjured. He testified that he did not know the man at the grill. He noticed

someone standing next to the man at the grill but did not know him either.

Shreka was parked at C&C, backed in facing across the street. She testified

that she heard Jones say, “there’s the shooter,” referring to a man on the

ground; however, Jones denied the statement during his testimony at trial.

Surveillance video from both inside and outside C&C was introduced

at trial. It showed Ballard standing on the passenger side of Hamilton’s car,

near Green at the grill, and that he was the only person, other than Phillip,

standing near Green during the 40 minutes prior to the shooting. Footage

from inside C&C showed reactions by the patrons to gunfire at two different
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times approximately 30 seconds apart, when Green was shot and again when

Ballard was shot. A man in a red hoodie was also seen on video footage just

prior to the shooting.

Ballard was interviewed by Detective Ronald DeBello (“Det.

DeBello”) on February 21, 2024, while he was still in the hospital but after

he had been weaned off narcotics. Ballard did not initially indicate that he

knew Green, referring to him as “the barbecue man.” He stated that, on the

day of the shooting, he had been walking from his cousin’s house to a

friend’s house listening to music on his cousin’s phone. When asked about

the phone, he stated that he did not know the passcode and that his cousin

had unlocked it for his use. He stated that while he was walking, he started

seeing sparks like bullets were hitting around him but could not hear

anything due to wearing ear buds. He denied seeing or knowing of a

previous shooting and being near the grill. He initially stated that he had not

seen Green prior to the shooting, then later indicated that he had. He further

stated that he had stolen the box of ammunition and the Glock magazine off

the back of a small black pickup truck that was in the parking lot, intending

to trade the ammunition for drugs. Ballard admitted knowing Edwards but

denied ever seeing Green in the presence of Edwards.

Ballard made two jail calls on May 29, 2024, to his friend, Richard

Ware (“Ware”). Recordings of the calls were played in their entirety at trial.

In the first call, he identified himself by his nickname, “Fat,” and said he

would call back through someone else. A second call was made to Ware

seconds later using another inmate’s PIN. During Ballard’s conversation

with Ware, Ballard stated:

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Marty hand delivered the gun to [the police]. … They didn’t say
who it was from. They found that motherf***a! Who else they
gonna get it from? Ain’t nobody but Pookie had that b***h.
Umm, I think his name Pookie. Mark’s brother. That’s who got
it from me, the little dark-skinned old-school ni**a with the
dreads. He musta gave it to Marty and Marty went and turned
that b***h in. That’s why I was tellin you, tryin to tell Matt get
that b***h from him. It could be a 9 Smith & Wesson, it could
be a mother***in 9 mm Taurus, a 9 mm Genesis, a 9 mm Ruger.
How the f**k [the police] know it was a Glock? They got the
mother***er. That’s why I was tryin to tell y’all to get that
mother***er from Pookie’s a**! I ain’t even trust him anyway.
… If they did that, b***h it’s over with! I might as well get ready
for them to give me life!

Neither Ware nor any of the persons referred to by Ballard during the

conversation were ever identified.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of Evidence – Identity as Perpetrator of Killing

The standard for appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State

v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 248 (2004); State v. Cummings, 95-1377 (La.

2/28/96), 668 So. 2d 1132; State v. Crossley, 48,149 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/26/13), 117 So. 3d 585, writ denied, 13-1798 (La. 2/14/14), 132 So. 3d

410; State v. Murray, 36,137 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/29/02), 827 So. 2d 488, writ

denied, 02-2634 (La. 9/5/03), 852 So. 2d 1020. This standard does not

provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation

of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. McGehee, 15-2140 (La.

6

6/29/17), 223 So. 3d 1136; State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.

2d 517; State v. Robertson, 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So. 2d 1165.

An appellate court neither assesses credibility nor reweighs evidence

and great deference must be given to the trier of fact’s decision to accept or

reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Smith, 94-3116

(La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442; State v. Carr, 55,692 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/24), 387 So. 3d 886, writ denied, 24-00776 (La. 2/28/25), 402 So. 3d

486; State v. Myrick, 54,606 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 92; State

v. Eason, 43,788 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/25/09), 3 So. 3d 685, writ denied, 09-

0725 (La. 12/11/09), 23 So. 3d 913; State v. Morrison, 40,852 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/12/06), 927 So. 2d 670. The jury’s reasonable credibility

determination is not to be second-guessed on a Jackson sufficiency of the

evidence review. State v. Marshall, 04-3139 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 362,

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 905, 128 S. Ct. 239, 169 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007).

Further, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of

fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Fussell,

55,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 381 So. 3d 899; Myrick, supra. However,

a reviewing court may impinge on a trier of fact’s discretion to the extent

necessary to guarantee the fundamental due process of law. State v. Casey,

99-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.

Ct. 104, 148 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2000); State v. Turner, 51,228 (La. App. 2 Cir.

04/05/17), 217 So. 3d 601; State v. Woodard, 47, 286 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/3/12), 107 So. 3d 70, writ denied, 12-2371 (La. 4/26/13), 112 So. 3d 837.

The Jackson standard is legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art.

821 and is applicable in cases involving both direct and circumstantial
7

evidence. State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622,

writs denied, 02-2595 (La. 3/28/03), 840 So. 2d 566, and 02-2997 (La.

6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1185, 124 S. Ct. 1404, 158

L. Ed. 2d 90 (2004); State v. Rhodes, 29,207 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/22/97), 688

So. 2d 628, writ denied, 97-0753 (La. 9/26/97), 701 So. 2d 980; State v.

Combs, 600 So. 2d 751 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 973

(La. 1992). All evidence, both circumstantial and direct, must be sufficient

under Jackson to satisfy a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. Rhodes, supra. An appellate court reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence

by viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Allen, supra.

When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by that

evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the

crime. Id.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157

So. 3d 1127. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; Broome, supra. The circumstantial evidence rule is neither separate

from nor stricter than the Jackson standard of review. State v. Cole, 55,287

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/24), 378 So. 3d 343, writ denied, 24-0235 (La.

9/24/24), 392 So. 3d 1140.

8

When the issue raised in a sufficiency claim is the defendant’s identity

as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is

required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v.

Mathis, 52,500 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 263 So. 3d 613. However, in the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient to support a requisite factual conclusion. Fussell, supra; Myrick,

supra; State v. Burd, 40,480 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/06), 921 So. 2d 219, writ

denied, 06-1083 (La. 11/9/06), 941 So. 2d 35. The Louisiana Supreme

Court held in State v. Dorsey, 10-0216 (La. 9/7/11), 74 So. 3d 603, as

follows:

A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to
support a conviction. A victim’s or witness’s testimony alone is
usually sufficient to support the verdict, as appellate courts will
not second-guess the credibility determinations of the factfinder
beyond the constitutional standard of sufficiency. In the absence
of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical
evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the factfinder,
is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion.

The evidence adduced at trial, including testimony, audio/video, and

physical evidence, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ballard shot and

killed Green with the Glock 43X recovered in Clarkson’s trashcan. Ballard

stood near Green at the grill for approximately 40 minutes prior to the

shooting. Phillip Bush was the only other person at the grill when Green

was shot. Ballard walked away from the grill immediately after the shooting

with a gun in his hand. Another man in a red hoodie was identified leaving

the scene after Ballard was shot. There were two different groups of two

different types of casings that were in separate locations. The casings from

the scene where Green was shot were determined to have been fired from the

9

Glock 43X that was delivered to Clarkson’s trash can after her appeal to the

community. Ballard’s DNA was found on the grip and trigger of the Glock

43X, although he was not the major contributor, presumably because

someone else handled the gun after Ballard. Most incriminating was

Ballard’s jail call in which he was appeared extremely upset that a 9 mm

firearm that had been turned over to police was specifically identified as a

Glock model, he admitted the firearm was taken from him, and he

acknowledged that he may get life imprisonment.

Ballard presented several hypotheses of innocence essentially

pertaining to his identification as the perpetrator, based on the lack of

witnesses to the shooting, the unidentified person who shot him, and the

unknown major contributor of DNA on the Glock 43X that was determined

to be the murder weapon. He also points out the inconsistencies in

statements made by Hamilton and Jones regarding whether Hamilton saw

Ballard with a gun prior to the shooting and Jones’ denial of identifying

Ballard as the shooter. However, we do not find any of the hypotheses of

innocence to be reasonable in light of the evidence adduced, which is more

than sufficient despite any inconsistencies in the witness statements.

Sufficiency of Evidence – Possession of Firearm

Ballard also argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he

possessed the Glock 43X at any point in time, because the State did not

prove the requisite dominion and control per La. R.S. 14:95.1. He notes that

the gun was not on his person, and the empty magazine and box of

ammunition he possessed could only generically be matched to the Glock

43X. He also refers to Hamilton’s testimony that Ballard had a black gun

after the shooting, which did not identify the weapon with any specificity.
10

There is ample evidence to show Ballard possessed a firearm. His

DNA was on the Glock 43X. Hamilton’s statements may have been

inconsistent as to whether she saw Ballard possessing a firearm prior to the

shooting, but she was consistent in her statement that she saw him carrying a

gun as he walked away immediately after the shooting. Further, Ballard’s

jail call statement that the police had the gun that Pookie “got it from me”

would indicate his possession of a firearm. It is uncontested that Ballard is a

convicted felon prohibited from possessing a firearm, and the ten-year

cleansing period has not passed. Therefore, we find the evidence clearly

sufficient to prove Ballard was in possession of a firearm.

Constitutionally Excessive Sentence

Per La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1, an appellant must file a motion to

reconsider and set forth the specific grounds upon which the motion is based

in order to raise an objection to the sentence on appeal. This Court in State

v. Butler, 37,226 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/03), 850 So. 2d 932, 939, held:

The record reflects that the defendant timely filed a motion to
reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. However, in
the motion, the defendant asserts only that his sentence is
excessive. The defendant neither objected to the order that the
sentences be served consecutively nor complained of failure to
adequately articulate reasons for sentence under La. C. Cr. P. art.
894.1. Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 881. l, the failure to include
a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based precludes the defendant from raising the ground
for relief on appeal. Thus, the defendant’s claim of sentencing
error is limited to the issue of constitutional excessiveness.

When the motion to reconsider sentence raises only a claim of constitutional

excessiveness, a defendant is relegated to review of the sentence on that

ground alone. State v. Doyle, 56,576 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/25), 425 So. 3d

304.

11

Ballard attempts to argue noncompliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

However, he did not state specific grounds for his motion to reconsider

sentence and only raised a general claim of excessiveness. Therefore,

Ballard’s sentencing claim is limited to constitutional excessiveness review.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Kennon,

19-0998 (La. 9/9/20), 340 So. 3d 881; State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La.

3/4/98), 706 So. 2d 672; State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State

v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980); State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307; State v. Jackson, 51,575 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17),

244 So. 3d 764. A sentence is excessive when it makes no measurable

contribution to acceptable goals of punishment or is grossly disproportionate

to the severity of the crime. Dorthey, supra. A sentence is considered

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v.

Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Scott, 50,920 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 248, writ denied, 17-0353 (La. 11/13/17),

229 So. 3d 478; State v. Modisette, 50,846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/16), 207 So.

3d 1108. As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum sentences are

reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto,

07-2031 (La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 22-00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So.

3d 1053 State v. Cotton, 50,747 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So. 3d 299;

State v. Hogan, 47,993 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 113 So. 3d 1195, writ

denied, 13-0977 (La. 11/8/13), 125 So. 3d 445.
12

Trial courts have wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within

the statutory limits, and such sentences should not be set aside as excessive

in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-

3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116; State v. Diaz, 46,750 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11),

81 So. 3d 228. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore,

is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Gaines, 54,383 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/22/23), 358 So. 3d 194, writ denied, 23-00363 (La. 6/21/23), 362 So.

3d 428; State v. Jeter, 56,386 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 419 So. 3d 438. On

review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may

have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Bell, supra; State v. Burns, 53,920 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 322 So. 3d 928,

writ denied, 21-01112 (La. 11/23/21), 328 So. 3d 78.

Ballard argues that he does not fit the worst-offender profile, because

he only had one prior felony from 2013, and the State did not prove that he

owned the firearm, used it habitually, or trafficked in firearms. He also

claims that the conduct supporting the possession charge is wholly

subsumed within the conduct of the murder charge, which already produced

a mandatory life sentence. He claims, therefore, that an additional 20-year

sentence, even imposed concurrently, accomplishes nothing beyond the life

sentence.

The evidence is clear that Ballard possessed a firearm and used it to

fire eight rounds into Green’s back while he was grilling food for the

community, also putting nearby individuals close by at risk of injury or

death. He immediately left the scene and handed off the firearm to another
13

person in an effort to avoid apprehension. Ballard’s possession of a firearm

that was used in such an egregious offense warranted the trial court’s

sentence of 20 years for possession of a firearm by a felon. Ballard is

among the worst type of offenders. His sentence does not shock the sense of

justice, it is not a needless infliction of pain and suffering, and it was not an

abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, Ballard’s sentences are not

constitutionally excessive.

Motion in Limine re: Jones’ Cross-examination – Confrontation Clause

Ballard includes the assignment of error in his brief that:

The trial court violated [Ballard’s] right to confrontation under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution when it
granted the State’s motion in limine and prohibited cross-
examination of the State’s witness [Jones] about the factual
details of his pending Caddo Parish felony charges.

In his summary of the arguments, he adds:

[Ballard’s] bias theory, that [Jones], facing felony exposure in
the same parish from the same district attorney’s office, had a
motive to deflect blame onto [Ballard], was directly relevant
under Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and the controlling
cases of State v. Brady, 381 So. 2d 819 (La. 1980), and State v.
Nash, 475 So. 2d 752 (La. 1985). He further claims the error is
not harmless under Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673
(1986).

Outside of Ballard’s assignment of error statement and summary of the

arguments, he briefly referred to his claim in the motion in limine that he

was prevented from advancing his bias theory, because the State’s only

witness placing Ballard near Green at the grill was an internally inconsistent

witness whose bias the defense was barred from fully exposing. The

reference was embedded into his separate assignment of error argument

regarding sufficiency of evidence as to his identity as the perpetrator of the

murder.
14

Assignments of error neither briefed nor argued are considered

abandoned. La. U.R.C.A. 2-12.4(B)(4); State v. Green, 446 So. 2d 814 (La.

1984); State v. Domingue, 298 So. 2d 723 (La. 1974); State v. Edwards, 261

La. 1014 (La. 1972); State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 86 So. 2d 895 (1956); State

v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937); State v. Dabbs, 228 La. 960, 84

So. 2d 601 (1955). A mere statement of the assignment of error in a brief

does not constitute briefing of the assignment; therefore, the assignment is

deemed abandoned. State v. Cannon, 55,708 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/2/24), 399

So. 3d 853; Fobbs v. CompuCom Systems, Inc., 55,173 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/27/23), 371 So. 3d 1146; State v. Easter, 32,940 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/7/00),

756 So. 2d 703, writs denied, 00-1321 (La. 2/9/01), 758 So. 2d 28, and 00-

2529 (La. 6/29/01), 794 So. 2d 823.

Ballard only included a brief summary of an argument on the issue

and a reference to the issue within a separate assignment of error discussion,

but there was no separate, full argument on the issue. Although the matter

was orally argued, the issue itself was not argued; rather, there was only

argument as to whether the issue had been abandoned. We do not consider

the limited references to Ballard’s assignment of error regarding a violation

of the Confrontation Clause to be a briefing of the assignment. Therefore,

this assignment of error is deemed abandoned.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated hereinabove, Ballard’s convictions and

sentences are hereby AFFIRMED.

AFFIRMED.

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