Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Guilbeau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 338 So. 2d 600.
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Roberson v. Gordon
24 So. 3d 1031
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
App. 1 Cir. 1975), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, (La.
- Harper v. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORR. 664 So. 2d 841 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1995
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Latiolais v. BFI of Louisiana, Inc.
567 So. 2d 1159
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990
App. 1st Cir.1975), writ granted, three cases, affirmed in part, reversed in part, on remand, (La.App.
- Shroyer v. Grush 555 So. 2d 534 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
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Guidry v. Sam Grimmett, Inc.
557 So. 2d 249
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989
Co., on remand, (La.App.
- Pratt v. Lifemark Corp. 531 So. 2d 488 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
- Gales v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products 493 So. 2d 611 La. 1986
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Freeman v. Varnado
480 So. 2d 980
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985
Co., Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut.
- Cell-O-Mar, Inc. v. Gros 479 So. 2d 386 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
- Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 471 So. 2d 709 La. 1985
- Sosa v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. 454 So. 2d 1124 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
- Guillot v. Fisherman's Paradise, Inc. 437 So. 2d 840 La. 1983
- Larson v. Huskey 440 So. 2d 769 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
- Brown v. Lykes Bros. SS Co., Inc. 422 So. 2d 213 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982
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Bradley v. Tripkovich
415 So. 2d 999
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982
Co., Baumgartner v. State Farm Ins.
- Mills v. Ganucheau 416 So. 2d 361 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982
- Dye v. Kean's 412 So. 2d 116 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
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Oliver v. Capitano
405 So. 2d 1102
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1981
1976, , is equally applicable whenever the menacing momentum of a massive automotive vehicle intrudes upon the nonmenacing presence of a person not also operating an automotive vehicle.
- Cenac v. Zurich Insurance Co. 397 So. 2d 870 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981
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Widcamp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
381 So. 2d 937
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1980
Co., where we said: "Under Louisiana jurisprudence, an operator of a vehicle or heavy equipment who observes, or who should by the exercise of reasonable care have observed, a pedestrian in a position of peril of which the latter is apparently unaware, is responsible for injuries caused when his vehicle strikes
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Dufrene v. Dixie Auto Ins. Co.
373 So. 2d 162
La. 1979
Co., Belshe v. Gant, 235 La.
- Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co. 370 So. 2d 511 La. 1979
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Devore v. Hobart Mfg. Co.
367 So. 2d 836
La. 1979
(citations omitted): "Actionable negligence results from the creation or maintenance of an unreasonable risk of injury to others.
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McLaughlin v. HOME INDEMNITY INS. CO.
361 So. 2d 1227
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
the court stated: *1230 "Actionable negligence results from the creation or maintenance of an unreasonable risk of injury to others.
- Baumgartner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 356 So. 2d 400 La. 1978
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Marine Services, Inc. v. A-1 INDUSTRIES
355 So. 2d 625
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978
App. 1st Cir. 1975), affirmed (1976), "[w]hether or not an agreement to cooperate in the execution of a particular work project constitutes a `joint venture' in the legal significance of that term is determined by the circumstances and all aspects of the agreement of the parties and not by any label which the parties themselves may place upon thei
- Dupas v. City of New Orleans 354 So. 2d 1311 La. 1978
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McGregor v. United Film Corp.
351 So. 2d 1224
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
1st Cir. 1975) affirmed on this point in
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Guilbeau v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
345 So. 2d 79
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977
On remand from the Supreme Court, Guilbeau et al. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, La., (1976), this matter involves: (1) the tort claims of a *80 widow on behalf of herself and minor children, for the death of their husband-father decedent, who was killed when struck by a dump truck while at work; (2) the alleged coverage of the truck driver under policies covering corporate members of a joint venture t
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Pierre v. Landry
341 So. 2d 891
La. 1977
: "Under Louisiana jurisprudence, an operator of a vehicle or heavy equipment who observes, or who should by the exercise of reasonable care have observed, a pedestrian in a position of peril of which the latter is apparently unaware, is responsible for injuries caused when his vehicle strikes the pedestrian