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Public record · Human review · No verdicts asserted

Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339.

37 citing documents.

  • State v. Hills 761 So. 2d 516 La. 2000
    ...; (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character; (4) the other crimes evidence must tend to prove a
  • State v. Pollard 760 So. 2d 362 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000
    (2) The other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show the defendant's general criminal character ( concurring opinion); (3) The other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue ( (4) The method of commission of both the charged and the uncharged crime must be so distinctively similar that one may logically infer that the sam
  • State v. McArthur 702 So. 2d 1047 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997
    However, as the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, I.e., "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they (the two crimes) are the work of the same person," (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976).
  • State v. Crawford 672 So. 2d 197 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
    However, as the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, I.e., `so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they (the two crimes) are the work of the same person,' (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976).
  • State v. Lee 637 So. 2d 656 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
    (La.1973); see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Duke 625 So. 2d 325 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993
    190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.
  • State v. Hicks 607 So. 2d 937 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992
  • State v. Jones 593 So. 2d 1301 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
  • State v. Magouirk 539 So. 2d 50 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989
    1977); (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.
  • State v. Muntz 534 So. 2d 1317 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988
  • State v. Charles 502 So. 2d 1095 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    3), see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, Section 190, pp. 451-452 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Moore 440 So. 2d 134 La. 1983
    1977) (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability *140 that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal ch
  • State v. Henry 436 So. 2d 510 La. 1983
    (La.1973), see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Humphrey 431 So. 2d 751 La. 1982
    (La.1973); see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Talbert 416 So. 2d 97 La. 1982
    190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged *100 offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (La.
  • State v. Talbot 408 So. 2d 861 La. 1981
  • State v. McDermitt 406 So. 2d 195 La. 1981
    (La.1973); see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Hatcher 372 So. 2d 1024 La. 1979
    (La.1973); see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of c
  • State v. Hamilton 364 So. 2d 585 La. 1978
  • State v. Bradford 367 So. 2d 745 La. 1978
    United States v. Marionneaux, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977); cert.
  • State v. Lewis 358 So. 2d 1285 La. 1978
  • State v. Showers 359 So. 2d 104 La. 1978
    However, as the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, — i. e., "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they [the two crimes] are the work of the same person," (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976).
  • State v. Nelson 357 So. 2d 1100 La. 1978
  • State v. Dunbar 356 So. 2d 956 La. 1978
  • State v. Mitchell 356 So. 2d 974 La. 1978
    (concurring opinion of Justice Dennis) quoted in State v. Jackson, 352 So.2d at 196.
  • State v. Stripling 354 So. 2d 1297 La. 1978
  • State v. Frentz 354 So. 2d 1007 La. 1978
    "As the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, —i. e., `so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they [the two crimes] are the work of the same person,' (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976).
  • State v. Young 352 So. 2d 1293 La. 1977
    See State v. Lee, La., (1976).
  • State v. Williams 352 So. 2d 1295 La. 1977
  • State v. Carter 352 So. 2d 607 La. 1977
    1977); State v. Moore, supra
  • State v. Tennant 352 So. 2d 629 La. 1977
  • State v. Jackson 352 So. 2d 195 La. 1977
    As the jurisprudence has clarified, the other crime must be distinctively similar in system, —i. e., "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that they [the two crimes] are the work of the same person," (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dennis) (La.1976).
  • State Ex Rel. Clark v. Marullo 352 So. 2d 223 La. 1977
  • State v. Sheppard 350 So. 2d 615 La. 1977
  • State v. Williams 349 So. 2d 286 La. 1977
    1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)
  • State v. Frank 344 So. 2d 1039 La. 1977
    State v. Lee, La., (1976); State v. Maduell, La., (1976); State v. Newman, La., (1973), cert.
  • State v. Ledet 345 So. 2d 474 La. 1977
    [2] In this case, unlike other cases on this issue, see State v. Gaines, supra ; State v. Waddles, supra ; State v. Clark, supra ; State v. Moore, supra ; State v. Prieur, supra , the extraneous offense occurred under factual circumstances so much more violent and brutal than the charged offense as to make the evidence too prejudicial for admission even had it been extremely relevant.