Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Jackson, 352 So. 2d 195.

30 citing documents.

State of Louisiana v. William Chester Farry Jr. AKA William Chester Farry AKA William C. Farry AKA William … La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2016
State v. Farry 206 So. 3d 1222 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016
State v. Garcia 108 So. 3d 1 La. 2012
State v. Odenbaugh 82 So. 3d 215 La. 2011
State v. Willis 75 So. 3d 17 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011
State v. Lee 976 So. 2d 109 La. 2008
State v. Kennedy 803 So. 2d 916 La. 2001
Our opinion today is in some respects inconsistent with the language, but not the holdings
State v. Tilley 767 So. 2d 6 La. 2000
State v. Hills 761 So. 2d 516 La. 2000
...; (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character; (4) the ot
State v. Pollard 760 So. 2d 362 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000
(2) The other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show the defendant's general criminal character ( concurring opinion); (3) The other crimes evidence must tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue ( (4) The method of commission of both the charged and the uncharged crime must be so distinctively similar t
State v. Lee 637 So. 2d 656 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1994
rewith; see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crim
State v. Duke 625 So. 2d 325 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993
190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character.
State v. Magouirk 539 So. 2d 50 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989
th; see also, State v. Gaines, *59 (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (La.
State v. Charles 502 So. 2d 1095 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, Section 190, pp. 451-452 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crimi
State v. Guarisco 466 So. 2d 1356 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985
ow a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character, (3) the other crimes evidence does tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue, and (4) the probative value of the extraneous *1362 crimes evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, State v. Prieur, supra ."
State v. Moore 440 So. 2d 134 La. 1983
State v. Henry 436 So. 2d 510 La. 1983
rewith; see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crim
State v. Humphrey 431 So. 2d 751 La. 1982
rewith; see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crim
State v. Talbert 416 So. 2d 97 La. 1982
190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged *100 offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (La.
State v. McDermitt 406 So. 2d 195 La. 1981
rewith; see also, (concurring opinion); McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 451-52 (2d ed. 1972); (2) the modus operandi employed by the defendant in both the charged and the uncharged offenses must be so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say they are the work of the same person; (concurring opinion); (3) the other crimes evidence must be substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of crim
State v. Walker 394 So. 2d 1181 La. 1981
to show a probability that the defendant committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character, (3) the other crimes evidence does tend to prove a material fact genuinely at issue, and (4) the probative value of the extraneous crimes evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, (La.
State v. Hatcher 372 So. 2d 1024 La. 1979
State v. Lecompte 371 So. 2d 239 La. 1979
State v. Jackson 367 So. 2d 353 La. 1979
State v. Lewis 358 So. 2d 1285 La. 1978
In order to be admissible to prove identity the other crimes must be distinctively similar in system, or "so peculiarly distinctive that one must logically say that [the two crimes] are the work of the same person."
State v. Showers 359 So. 2d 104 La. 1978
State v. Nelson 357 So. 2d 1100 La. 1978
State v. Mitchell 356 So. 2d 974 La. 1978
State v. Slayton, 338 So.
State v. Frentz 354 So. 2d 1007 La. 1978
State v. Williams 352 So. 2d 1295 La. 1977
and many decisions therein cited.