Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Defrances, 351 So. 2d 133.

21 citing documents.

  • State v. Hair 784 So. 2d 1269 La. 2001
  • State v. Palermo 765 So. 2d 1155 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000
    1979): The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment `has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden', or when `the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for the person of ordinary intelligence.'
  • State v. Palermo 765 So. 2d 1139 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000
    1979): The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment `has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden', or when `the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for the person of ordinary intelligence.'
  • State v. Byrd 708 So. 2d 401 La. 1998
  • State v. Hart 687 So. 2d 94 La. 1997
    we stated that broad language is not in itself vague, particularly where it is clear that the legislature intended to make criminal all acts of a certain kind.
  • State v. Wilson 588 So. 2d 733 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
    1979), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated at page 417: “The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment ‘has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden,’ or when ‘the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for a person of ordinary intelligence.’ State v. Cloud, 248 La.
  • State v. Cohen 549 So. 2d 884 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1989
  • State v. Massey 539 So. 2d 1211 La. 1989
  • State v. Coleman 528 So. 2d 192 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
  • State v. Lambert 514 So. 2d 550 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    : The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment ‘has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden’, or when ‘the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning, for the person of ordinary intelligence.’ State v. Cloud, 248 La.
  • State v. Griffin 495 So. 2d 1306 La. 1986
  • State v. Union Tank Car Co. 439 So. 2d 377 La. 1983
    : The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment `has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden', or when `the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for the person of ordinary intelligence.'
  • State v. Farris 412 So. 2d 1039 La. 1982
  • State v. Pearaa 403 So. 2d 1194 La. 1981
    The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment “has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden.” or when “the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for a person of ordinary intelligence.” State v. Cloud, 248 La.
  • State v. McCoy 395 So. 2d 319 La. 1980
  • State v. Crater 388 So. 2d 802 La. 1980
    applied the Miller test in Louisiana obscenity cases.
  • State v. Franzone 384 So. 2d 409 La. 1980
  • State v. Cannon 383 So. 2d 389 La. 1980
    or when `the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for a person of ordinary intelligence.'
  • State v. Dousay 378 So. 2d 414 La. 1979
    The constitutional requirement of definiteness is satisfied when the language of a criminal enactment "has a generally accepted meaning such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be given fair notice of what conduct is forbidden," or when "the crucial words [or] phrases in the criminal statute have a fixed and definite meaning for a person of ordinary intelligence."
  • State v. Mallett 357 So. 2d 1105 La. 1978
  • State v. Tucker 354 So. 2d 1327 La. 1978