Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So. 2d 1306.

22 citing documents.

  • Ortego v. Hickerson 989 So. 2d 777 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
  • Paul Ortego v. Eldridge Hickerson La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
  • Gregory R. Aymond v. Rich Dupree La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
  • Aymond v. Dupree 928 So. 2d 721 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
    Davis v. Borskey, 94-2399, p. 10-11 (La.9/5/95), ( cert.
  • Cathy Darden v. R. Craig Smith and the Ferriday Villa Partnership La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
  • Darden v. Smith 879 So. 2d 390 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
  • Fitzgerald v. Tucker 715 So. 2d 1281 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998
  • Davis v. Borskey 660 So. 2d 17 La. 1995
  • Henderson v. Richardson 649 So. 2d 134 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1995
    Moreover, the public official plaintiff *136 must meet this burden not merely by a preponderance of the evidence, but with “clear and convincing proof.” citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 , 94 S.Ct.
  • Davis v. Borskey 643 So. 2d 179 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
    the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed this burden of proof as follows: A public official may not recover damages for a defamatory statement, even if false, relating to his official conduct "unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or w
  • Sassone v. Elder 626 So. 2d 345 La. 1993
  • Bates v. TIMES-PICAYUNE PUBLISHING CORP. 527 So. 2d 407 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988
    However, our Supreme Court reversed a lower court award in favor of a "public official" against the defendant newspaper.
  • Brannan v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 516 So. 2d 157 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988
    2d 1271—Reversed on other grounds Cert.
  • Spears v. McCormick & Co., Inc. 520 So. 2d 805 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
  • Cavalier v. HOUMA COURIER NEWSPAPER CORP. 472 So. 2d 274 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
  • Buratt v. Capital City Press, Inc. 459 So. 2d 1268 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
    In its prior decision on this matter the First Circuit Court of Appeals again cited the law applicable herein: "As to the legal issue of malice, our Supreme Court, stated: `A public official may not recover damages for a defamatory statement, even if false, relating to his official conduct "unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or *1273 with reckless disregard or whether it was false or not."
  • Moity v. Acadian Woodworks, Inc. 435 So. 2d 597 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
  • Magill v. Owen Const. Co., Inc. 434 So. 2d 520 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983
    Our state supreme court apparently recognized *522 the propriety of such a [reversed on other grounds] when it observed that "the motion for summary judgment was improperly denied" in the trial court.
  • Buratt v. Capital City Press, Inc. 399 So. 2d 687 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981
    As to the legal issue of malice, our Supreme Court, stated: "A public official may not recover damages for a defamatory statement, even if false, relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
  • McHale v. Lake Charles American Press 390 So. 2d 556 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1980
    at 1308 (La.1978), states the New York Times standard regulating recovery of damages by a public official claiming defamation: "A public official may not recover damages for a defamatory statement, even if false, relating to his official conduct `unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that
  • Millet v. Johnson 381 So. 2d 1293 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980
    our Supreme Court indicated that summary judgment might have been a proper remedy in that case, although the case had been tried on its merits and the decision was rendered following such a trial.
  • Domino v. Striplen 366 So. 2d 1035 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
    Summary adjudication may be thought of as a useful procedural tool and an effective screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harassment of defendants by unmeri-torious actions which threaten the free exercise of rights of speech and press.” the Supreme Court, quoting Judge Lottinger’s dissent in the First Circuit Court of Appeal decision ( ), stated: “* * * Where in the ordinary type of case he [plaintiff] could be successful in defeating the motion by only putting forth a minimum of eviden