Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 415 So. 2d 174.
-
Hall v. Folger Coffee Co.
874 So. 2d 90
La. 2004
On original hearing in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., a case involving a dispute between successive employers over liability for workers' compensation benefits when plaintiff suffered total and permanent disability caused by silicosis, we explained that sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, not of fact, when the evidence before the trial court
-
STATE DEPT. OF TRANSP. & DEV. v. Scramuzza
673 So. 2d 1249
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1996
See Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., (La.App.
-
Pickett v. Stine Lumber Co.
640 So. 2d 769
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
See, e.g., Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., , 180-181 & n. 2 (La.1982) (on rehearing).
-
STATE, DOTD v. Scramuzza
608 So. 2d 1069
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1992
See Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., (La.App.
-
Austin v. Howard Discount Stores, Inc.
569 So. 2d 659
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990
See Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., (La.App.
-
Gales v. Gold Bond Bldg. Products
493 So. 2d 611
La. 1986
The trial court interpreted this court's decision in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., as holding that only the last causative employer may be held liable to an employee disabled by an occupational disease.
-
Shally v. Control Insulation, Inc.
475 So. 2d 1119
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., Maryland Casualty moved for a summary judgment which was granted.
-
Gales v. Gold Bond Building Products, a Division of National Gypsum Co.
472 So. 2d 82
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
The trial judge, ruled that plaintiff had asbestosis as a result of his asbestos exposure; but, since International Building Products was the last caus *84 ative employer, Gold Bond/National Gypsum was not responsible for worker’s compensation benefits.
-
Estave v. McCarty Corp.
464 So. 2d 873
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
Four of the defendant employers — the McCarty Corp. (and its insurer Travelers Insurance Company), Reilly-Benton Co., Inc., Mechanical Insulations, Inc., and AC & S Inc., — relying on Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that they were not plaintiff’s “last causative” employer.
-
Hartman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
462 So. 2d 1310
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
In Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., the court held that no contribution was owing from former employers of a worker, even though their conditions of work may have contributed to the disease, except as provided in La.R.S.
-
Collier v. Williams-McWilliams Co., Inc.
459 So. 2d 719
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984
They urge a simple reading of the definition of "occurrence", along with the principles set out in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., (1982) should substantiate their position.
-
Kerwin v. Nu-Way Const. Service, Inc.
451 So. 2d 1193
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1984
The second was filed on November 30, 1983, and on December 9, 1983, the motion was granted based on the application of Carter v. Avondale Shipyard, Inc., and Myles v. T.L.
-
Thornell v. Payne & Keller, Inc.
442 So. 2d 536
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
-
Calais v. Louis Ortis Boat Co.
440 So. 2d 970
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
shall become compensable.’ 23:1031.1 D.” Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
-
Myles v. T.L. James & Co.
436 So. 2d 737
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
The trial court granted defendants’ and third party defendants’ motions for summary judgment based upon the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., denying contribution or apportionment of compensation between present and past employers.
-
Hebert v. Lake Charles American Press
427 So. 2d 916
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc.
-
Blount v. Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc.
416 So. 2d 358
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1982
We have additionally considered the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Carter v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., on rehearing No. 80-C-2903, , May 17, 1982, wherein the court refused to require contribution from a former employer whose working conditions might have contributed to the occupational disease which ultimately disables the workers.