Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Pique v. Saia, 450 So. 2d 654.

45 citing documents.

Love v. Sirey 119 So. 3d 732 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
Distinguished Romano v. Altentaler 77 So. 3d 282 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011
We distinguish the cases relied on by Romano and Altentaler, and Bilbo, 698 So.2d at 694-695 .
Harris v. Dunn 48 So. 3d 367 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010
Norwood v. VariVeckhoven, 34,891 (La.App.2d Cir.6/22/01)
Canterberry v. Chamblee 953 So. 2d 900 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007
In arguing ambiguity in the policy, and Norwood v. Van Veckhoven, supra , all of which involved policies with language excluding liability coverage for bodily injury "either expected or intended from the standpoint of the Insured."
Michael R. Fontenot v. Kipp L. Duplechine La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
Exclusionary provisions in insurance contracts are strictly construed against the insurer, and any ambiguity is 2 The Appellants in King did not cite Yount, but rather cited another supreme court case, which addressed exclusionary language similar to that in Breland.
Fontenot v. Duplechine 891 So. 2d 41 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
[2] The Appellants in King did not cite Yount , but rather cited another supreme court case, which addressed exclusionary language similar to that in Breland .
Young v. Brown 846 So. 2d 88 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
the supreme court defined what it meant by intentional injury: An injury is intentional, i.e., the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that the
King v. Galloway 828 So. 2d 49 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002
The appellants reference two cases, rehearing denied (Nov.
Ott v. LPK Systems, Inc. 812 So. 2d 38 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001
(1984) that the clause is indeed ambiguous.
Ford v. Bienvenu 804 So. 2d 64 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001
1982)("A cardinal rule in the construction of contracts is that the contract must be viewed as a whole and, if possible, practical effect given to all its parts, according to each the sense that results from the entire agreement so as to avoid neutralizing or ignoring any of them or treating them as surplusage.") (citations omitted); (La.
Norwood v. Van Veckhoven 792 So. 2d 836 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001
Great American Insurance Company v. Gaspard, supra .
Sperli v. Guiterrez 772 So. 2d 805 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2000
Classert v. Butler 746 So. 2d 787 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1999
Newby v. Jefferson Parish School Bd. 738 So. 2d 93 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999
the court, applied two basic principles of policy interpretation in construing the intentional injury exclusion in the policy: (1) policies should be construed to effect, not deny, coverage; and (2) an exclusion from coverage should be narrowly construed.
Holt v. Phipps 733 So. 2d 693 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999
In Gaspard, 608 So.2d at 985 the Court stated: An injury is intentional, i.e., the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that the result is substantially certain to follow from his
Nelson v. Want Ads of Shreveport, Inc. 720 So. 2d 1280 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998
and Hawthorn v. City of Bossier City, 29,621 (La.App.2d Cir.6/18/97), .
Bilbo for Basnaw v. Shelter Ins. Co. 698 So. 2d 691 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1997
Hawthorn v. City of Bossier City 697 So. 2d 680 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997
we interpret the subject provision the same as the provision at issue in Breland , excluding coverage only for those injuries which the insured subjectively desired to inflict, as measured not only by the insured's expressions of his intent but also by all the facts and circumstances bearing on such intent
Jones v. Doe 673 So. 2d 1163 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996
(1984), the Louisiana Supreme Court held: An act is intentional, i.e., the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that result is substantially certain to fol
Smith v. Perkins 648 So. 2d 482 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994
the Supreme Court held that an injury is the result of an intentional act for purposes of an exclusionary clause when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that the result is substantially ce
Yount v. Maisano 627 So. 2d 148 La. 1993
Breland, supra ; Great American Insurance Co., supra .
Shaw v. Bourn 615 So. 2d 466 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993
In construing the policy language in Breland , above, and applied the two rules of policy interpretation that: (1) "Policies should be construed to effect, not deny, coverage.
Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard 608 So. 2d 981 La. 1992
Great American Ins. Co. v. Gaspard 594 So. 2d 981 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
Cavin v. Elliot 597 So. 2d 1255 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted an exclusionary clause similar to this one, holding: "An injury is intentional, i.e. the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from
Keathley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. 594 So. 2d 963 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
Williamson v. Kovac 591 So. 2d 788 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991
Doe v. Smith 573 So. 2d 238 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
In support of their position, plaintiffs rely heavily on Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d at 609
Baugh v. Redmond 565 So. 2d 953 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990
Menard v. Zeno 558 So. 2d 744 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990
Breland v. Schilling 550 So. 2d 609 La. 1989
(1984) that the clause is indeed ambiguous.
Kersh v. Heffner 542 So. 2d 1118 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1989
a suit against a homeowners' liability carrier, as follows: An injury is intentional, i.e., the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that that r
Alombro v. Salman 536 So. 2d 764 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988
Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co. 527 So. 2d 524 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
Schexnider v. McGuill 526 So. 2d 513 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that an injury is intentional for purposes of denying coverage under a policy exclusion similar to the one in defendant McGuill's homeowner's policy "only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that re
Succession of Brooks v. National Service Insurance Co. 524 So. 2d 141 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
Johnson v. Hitchens 518 So. 2d 1154 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
Ark-La-Tex Timber Co. v. Georgia Casualty & Surety Co. 516 So. 2d 1217 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987
Barras v. Benoit 509 So. 2d 668 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
was confronted with an issue very similar to the issue in the instant case.
Sabri v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 488 So. 2d 362 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court had occasion to interpret an exclusion similar to the one here before us, holding: "An injury is intentional, i.e. the product of an intentional act, only when the person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of that result ha
Parrino v. Royal Ins. Co. of America 484 So. 2d 282 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
Articles 2056 and 2057; Nida v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Walpole v. Weathersby 465 So. 2d 950 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985
Fleming v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 461 So. 2d 614 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
the Louisiana Supreme Court construed a policy clause identical to the one in this case, finding that it excluded coverage only for intentional injuries.
Bloodworth v. Carroll 455 So. 2d 1197 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
Nida v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 454 So. 2d 328 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1984