Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State v. Allen, 496 So. 2d 301.

30 citing documents.

  • State v. Bourg 260 So. 3d 679 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018
    State v. Jackson , overruled on other grounds by State v. Allen , and overruled on other grounds by State v. Sanders
  • State of Louisiana v. David Bourg La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2018
  • State v. Devillier 258 So. 3d 230 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018
    1986), affirmed as amended , (La.
  • State v. Sneed 119 So. 3d 850 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
    was only entitled to limited retroactivity because the need for notice was based on due process.
  • State v. Rodriguez 112 So. 3d 402 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
    14:64.3, the court held: the supreme court held that a sentencing enhancement statute cannot be utilized by a trial judge when the prosecutor has failed to notify the defendant prior to trial of his intention to seek enhancement of the penalty by application of the enhancement statute.
  • State v. Willis 56 So. 3d 362 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2010
    the supreme court partially overruled Jackson , limiting that decision’s retroactive application, but the court reaffirmed its prospective application and explained its rationale: When the applicability of a sentencing enhancement statute (Art. 893.1 in this case) depends upon a finding, based on evidence p
  • State of Louisiana v. Darrell James Fontenot La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010
    2 Cir.1985), writ granted, affirmed as amended, the Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s maximum 50-year sentence for attempted first degree murder despite the defendant’s argument that the trial court did not consider his mental problems.
  • State v. Falkins 9 So. 3d 190 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
    2 Cir. 1985), sentence affirmed as amended to delete firearm enhancement, (La.
  • State v. Johnson 981 So. 2d 253 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008
  • State v. Taylor 956 So. 2d 25 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2007
    App. 2 Cir.1985), writ granted, affirmed as amended, the Second Circuit upheld the defendant's maximum 50-year sentence for attempted first degree murder despite the defendant's argument that the trial court did not consider his mental problems.
  • State v. Curtis 880 So. 2d 112 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
  • State of Louisiana v. Matthew Curtis La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
    Nor have we found any subsequent cases in which the defendant 8
  • State v. Frith 711 So. 2d 388 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998
    See Art. 893.1 et seq., as amended in 1988
  • State v. Williams 688 So. 2d 1277 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997
    App. 2 Cir.1985), sentence affirmed as amended to delete firearm enhancement, (La.App.
  • State v. Rubin 588 So. 2d 1289 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
    We also affirmed a maximum 50-year hard labor sentence for attempted first degree murder of a writ granted in part, denied in part, affirmed as amended
  • State v. King 563 So. 2d 449 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
  • State v. Lilly 552 So. 2d 1036 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989
    Thereafter, the Court further noted as follows: When the applicability of a sentencing enhancement statute (Article 893.1 in this case) depends upon a finding, based on evidence presented at trial, that a firearm was used in the commission of a crime and the defendant's sentence may be substantially increased as a
  • State v. Boyd 538 So. 2d 736 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989
    Subsequently, following appeal, this court, while affirming defendant’s conviction, and remanded this matter to the trial court for resentencing.
  • State v. Sanders 523 So. 2d 209 La. 1988
    [5] , 304 n. 5 (La.1986), the author of the opinion, Justice Lemmon, noted that in his opinion "[w]hen a rule based on constitutional principles (such as the rule we formulated in Jackson pertaining to Section 95.2) is adopted by the court for the purpose of promoting the truth-finding function of a trial, the rule is gen
  • State v. Boyd 525 So. 2d 42 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
    Subsequently, following appeal, this court, while affirming defendant’s conviction, and remanded this matter to the trial court for resentencing.
  • State v. McKnight 518 So. 2d 6 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    -269 (La.1985), the Louisiana Supreme Court, after discussing the nature of the “crime” defined in R.S.
  • State v. Prince 520 So. 2d 778 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
  • State v. Ayrow 515 So. 2d 530 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    However, as the defendant correctly notes in his brief, overruled in part on other grounds, specifically held that La.R.S.
  • State v. Huddleston 517 So. 2d 902 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    However, the Court held that this second rule was to be given limited retroactivity, applicable to those cases still subject to review on direct appeal, similar to the requirement regarding R.S.
  • Overruled State v. Puerto 513 So. 2d 320 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
  • State v. Brown 504 So. 2d 1086 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
    Although the instant case was tried before Jackson, supra, was rendered, allowed limited retroactivity to the case.
  • State v. Boyd 503 So. 2d 747 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
    Late last year, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-evaluated this holding.
  • State v. Slayton 499 So. 2d 549 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
    (1986) and changed with this holding: *551 "We now explicitly reconsider the pronouncement on retroactivity in Jackson and conclude that due process notice considerations do indeed form the basis for the requirement that the prosecutor notify the defendant a reasonable period of time in advance of trial of his intenti
  • State v. Mason 499 So. 2d 551 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
    and changed with this holding: We now explicitly reconsider the pronouncement on retroactivity in Jackson and conclude that due process notice considerations do indeed form the basis for the requirement that the prosecutor notify the defendant a reasonable period of time in advance of trial of his intention
  • State v. Collatt 497 So. 2d 1001 La. 1986
    under the mistaken impression that both cases presented the same issue of whether La.C.Cr.P.