Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058.

226 citing documents.

Paragon Lofts Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Paragon Lofts, L.L.C. 55 So. 3d 970 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2011
Board of Ethics In re Davies 55 So. 3d 918 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
The Board maintains the legislature did express its intent in this case by giving the statute a future effective date, and other cases.
Metairie III v. Poche' Construction, Inc. 49 So. 3d 446 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
“Once a party’s cause of action accrues, it becomes a vested property right that may not constitutionally be divested.”
Marcel v. DELTA SHIPBUILDING CO. 45 So. 3d 634 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc., 01-1598, pp. 25-26 (La.9/4/02), () Moreover, the Court held that a survival action accrues simultaneously with the tort and is transmitted to the heirs of the victim upon his death.
Marchand v. Asbestos 44 So. 3d 355 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
the Supreme Court established a “significant exposure” test to determine when a cause of action accrues in a long-latency disease case.
Ricks v. KENTWOOD OIL CO., INC. 38 So. 3d 363 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
1061 and 1066 (La.1992) [7] (wherein the plaintiffs in that case had sustained "asbestos-related occupational diseases" and the Court determined that "the key relevant events giving rise to a claim in long-latency occupational disease cases are the repeated tortious exposures resulting in continuous, on-going damage
DiBenedetto v. Noble Drilling Co. 23 So. 3d 400 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc., 2001-1598, p. 25 (La.9/4/02), , 1154
ADELMANN-CHESTER v. Kent 33 So. 3d 187 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc. 16 So. 3d 1065 La. 2009
Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.1983), cert.
Hixon Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc. v. Donald Ray Lewis La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009
In order to classify the 2006 amendment, : “First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
HIXSON AUTOPLEX OF ALEXANDRIA, INC. v. Lewis 6 So. 3d 423 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2009
In order to classify the 2006 amendment, (La.
Hymel v. Eagle, Inc. 7 So. 3d 1249 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2009
4 Cir. 5/8/96) , and a but neither case involve a settlement and, consequently, neither case has any bearing on the instant case.
Reggio v. E.T.I. 15 So. 3d 951 La. 2008
Mitch David Bourque v. Tomas Drake La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
we interpreted these two provisions as requiring a two-fold inquiry: First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
Bourque v. Drake 995 So. 2d 1215 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
we interpreted these two provisions as requiring a two-fold inquiry: First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
MJ Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 998 So. 2d 16 La. 2008
Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co. 988 So. 2d 186 La. 2008
Morial, 785 So.2d at 10 , (La.
Burmaster v. Plaquemines Parish Government 982 So. 2d 795 La. 2008
Duplechian v. Sba Network Services, Inc. 980 So. 2d 907 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
Southern Silica of La. v. La. Ins. Guar. 979 So. 2d 460 La. 2008
this court adopted the significant exposure theory for purposes of establishing the applicable trigger for insurance coverage.
Thibodeaux v. Asbestos Corp. 976 So. 2d 859 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2008
Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.1983), cert.
Gibson v. Packett 975 So. 2d 166 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
In order to determine whether Acts 2006, No. 365 should be applied retroactively, : "First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
Patrick Gibson v. Ashley M. Packett La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008
In order to determine whether Acts 2006, No. 365 should be applied retroactively, : “First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
Johnson v. Orleans Parish School Bd. 975 So. 2d 698 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2008
(La.1992); Austin v. Abney Mills, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.9/4/02), .
Arceneaux v. Amstar Corp. 969 So. 2d 755 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007
Trentecosta v. Beck, 00-0860, p. 6 (La.App.
Southern Silica v. Liga 966 So. 2d 45 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2007
Terrance v. Dow Chemical Co. 971 So. 2d 1058 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2007
Emery, 813 So.2d at 452 .
Graves v. Riverwood Intern. Corp. 949 So. 2d 576 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007
Palermo v. Port of New Orleans 951 So. 2d 425 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2007
Patriot v. Mississippi Land Holdings 948 So. 2d 249 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006
State v. All Prop. and Cas. Ins. Carriers 937 So. 2d 313 La. 2006
[10] *322 Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., XXXX-XXXX p. 7 (La.4/3/01)
Beutler England Clinic (Marie Kershaw) v. Mermentau Rice, Inc. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
BEUTLER ENG. CHIRO. CLIN. v. Mermentau Rice 931 So. 2d 553 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006
we interpreted these two provisions as requiring a two-fold inquiry: First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
Palermo v. Port of New Orleans 933 So. 2d 168 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2006
Grefer v. Travelers Insurance Company 919 So. 2d 758 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2005
Adams v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 921 So. 2d 972 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005
the Louisiana Supreme Court outlined a framework to assist in determining when a cause of action accrues in long-latency occupational disease cases.
Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc. v. Kennedy 914 So. 2d 533 La. 2005
Unwired, 03-0732 at p. 15, 903 So.2d at 404 ().
Grefer v. Alpha Technical 901 So. 2d 1117 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2005
art. 2315.3 to survival actions is triggered by the date of exposure
Gatlin v. Entergy Corp. 904 So. 2d 31 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2005
Cole [ v. Celotex Corp. ], [(La.1992)].
Samuel Alexander v. Thiokol Corporation La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2005
Alexander v. Thiokol Corp. 893 So. 2d 920 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005
Unwired Telecom v. Parish of Calcasieu 903 So. 2d 392 La. 2005
we interpreted these two provisions as requiring a two-fold inquiry: First, we must ascertain whether in the enactment the legislature expressed its intent regarding retrospective or prospective application.
Tammatha Messina v. Isle of Capri Casino La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
Messina v. Isle of Capri Casino 891 So. 2d 780 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004
Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. 888 So. 2d 1017 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
as interpreted by this Court in Bulot I, the trial court found that, based | ¡.upon the evidence and pleadings submitted, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Thomassie’s substantial, injury-producing exposures occurred prior to September 4, 1984.
Smith v. Quarles Drilling Co. 885 So. 2d 562 La. 2004
Cole v. Celotex Corporation , (La.App.
Cichirillo v. Avondale Industries 888 So. 2d 947 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2004
[3] -85 (La.1992), (J. Dennis, concurring).
Breaux v. Avondale Industries, Inc. 880 So. 2d 36 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
1 The respondents suggest that the Supreme Court’s requires application of the law in effect at the time of the tortious acts complained of, Mr. Breaux’s exposure to asbestos in the 1960s, to the Texas judgment recognizing the release.
Landry v. Avondale Industries, Inc. 877 So. 2d 970 La. 2004
had held that tortious exposure in *973 diseases of long latency is subject to the law at the time of exposure, but Cole was not a wrongful death case.
Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc. 872 So. 2d 1094 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
(quoting Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Med.