Bruce A. Baker v. Mazda Motor of America

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-280

BRUCE A. BAKER

VERSUS

MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, ET AL.

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 204,256
HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

**********
ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
JUDGE
**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Sylvia R. Cooks, and Billy Howard
Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Fred Andrew Pharis
PHARIS & PHARIS
831 DeSoto Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
Telephone: (318) 445-8266
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - Bruce A. Baker

David A. Hughes
Hughes & LaFleur
P. O. Box 1831
Alexandria, LA 71309-1831
Telephone: (318) 443-4090
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.

Stephen Craig Carleton
Simoneaux, Carleton, Etc., LLC
2431 S. Acadian Thruway #600
Baton Rouge, LA 70808-0000
Telephone: (225) 928-6880
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Mazda Motor of America and Hixon
Autoplex

THIBODEAUX, Judge.

In this automobile redhibition case, the defendants, Mazda Motor

Company of America, Inc., (Mazda) and Hixson Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc.,

(Hixson) appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Bruce Baker

(Mr. Baker), $6,000.00, representing a reduction in the purchase price of the vehicle.

Mr. Baker filed an answer to the defendants’ appeal contesting the trial court’s

failure to award attorney fees for the post-trial work done by his counsel in this matter

and on appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

regarding the reduction in the purchase price of Mr. Baker’s vehicle. Further, we

award the amount of $2,500.00 for plaintiff’s counsel’s work done on appeal.

I.

ISSUES

We shall consider: (1) whether Mr. Baker carried his burden of proving

that a vice or defect existed at the time the vehicle was manufactured and (2) whether

the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Mr. Baker’s witness, Steve Dauzat,

the owner of Auto-Tech, a vehicular parts and service shop, as an expert in auto

mechanics and basing its decision thereon.

II.

FACTS

Mr. Baker purchased a 1999 Mazda 626 passenger vehicle from Hixson

on April 17, 1999. The car came with a three year/fifty thousand mile warranty.

Susan Baker, Mr. Baker’s wife, testified that the couple’s practice was to keep a

1

purchased vehicle for a couple of years after it was paid off. Later, the couple would

trade in the old car for a new one.

By January 2001, the Mazda had been driven sixty-one thousand miles.

Mrs. Baker testified that it was in January 2001 that the car first experienced trouble.

While driving to an appointment, the car began sputtering, and smoke came out of the

back. Mrs. Baker drove the car home. She explained that in her job as an insurance

salesperson for various insurance companies, she used the car to drive all over

Louisiana and parts of Texas; thus, the reason for the high mileage. The Bakers

testified that they changed regularly the proper oil and filter as well as regularly

checked other fluids and the tires on the car. Mrs. Baker recalled driving the car in

the rain but denied that the car had ever been submerged in water.

The Bakers took the car to Hixson, the dealership from where they

bought the car, to have it examined. The service manager told Mrs. Baker that the car

had been water-damaged. Mrs. Baker expressed surprise at that diagnosis since none

of her other cars ever had water damage, and because she had driven in Louisiana rain

for thirty years. Mr. Baker testified that he was told a rod had been bent that would

cost $5,700.00 to fix because they would have to put in a new engine. He was not

told about any water getting in the engine. Mr. Baker did not want to put a new

engine in the car. Hixson told him that they did not rebuild engines and would only

put in a new engine. Mr. Baker thought that it was best to take the car to a place that

could rebuild the engine in the car or put in a used engine at a much lower cost.

When his wife informed him that the service manager at Hixson

concluded that water caused the engine problems, Mr. Baker called his insurance

company. The service manager had advised Mr. Baker that the insurance company

should pay to fix a water-damaged engine. By January 22, 2001, the car had been

2

examined by State Farm, the Bakers’ insurance company. Mr. Baker was told that the

engine had not suffered water damage. After paying for the diagnostics done at

Hixson, the Bakers had their car taken to Auto-Tech, an automobile repair shop.

State Farm agreed to look at the engine again for evidence of water damage after it

was taken apart at Auto-Tech. Again, State Farm’s investigator did not find any

evidence of water damage, nor did the investigator see a bent rod. Ultimately, State

Farm denied payment of the Bakers’ claim.

The Bakers’ only options were to install a new engine or a rebuilt used

engine. Due to the expense, they opted not to use a new engine. Mr. Dauzat of Auto-

Tech was able to find a used engine with low mileage for $3,000.00. Even after the

engine was replaced, the Bakers continued to experience problems with the car, most

notably, the fuel pump. Mr. Baker testified that he replaced the fuel pump several

times. With the exception of one week in March 2001, the Bakers did not have the

use of their car from January 15, 2001 through March 5, 2001. When the Bakers’ car

was returned, they still experienced problems.

The Bakers had problems with the “check engine” light coming on.

Thus, they returned the car to Hixson so that a diagnostic test could be run on the car

to determine the reason the “check engine” light stayed on. The Hixson mechanics

replaced an oxygen sensor in the engine which caused the “check engine” light to go

out. Mr. Baker was also told that the torque converter of the transmission needed to

be replaced. At that point, Mr. Baker decided that it was not worth the expense to fix

the transmission. Mr. Baker decided to get rid of the car. When the Bakers traded

in the Mazda 626 for another vehicle, the trade-in value was less because of the

problems with the car.

3

State Farm denied the Mr. Baker’s claim and neither Hixson nor Mazda

accepted responsibility for the problems the Bakers had with the car. Thus, Mr.

Baker filed the present redhibition action seeking a reduction in the purchase price

of the car. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Baker and awarded a reduction in the

purchase price in the amount of $6,000.00 and attorney fees in the amount of

$7,500.00. Thereafter, the defendants, Mazda Motor of America, Inc. and Hixson

filed the present appeal.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The determinative issue on appeal concerns the factual findings of the

trial court. The jurisprudence in this area is well-settled. The standard of appellate

review was set forth by the Supreme Court in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840

(La.1989) and in Lewis v. State Through DOTD, 94-2370, pp. 4-5 (La. 4/21/95), 654

So.2d 311, 314 (La.1995). That standard is manifest error.

Redhibition

Redhibition is defined in La.Civ.Code art. 2520:

The seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory
defects, or vices, in the thing sold.

A defect is redhibitory when it renders the thing
useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed
that a buyer would not have bought the thing had he known
of the defect. The existence of such a defect gives a buyer
the right to obtain rescission of the sale.

A defect is redhibitory also when, without rendering
the thing totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its
value so that it must be presumed that a buyer would still
have bought it but for a lesser price. The existence of such

4

a defect limits the right of a buyer to a reduction of the
price.

An action in redhibition lies only if the defect existed at the time of

delivery. La.Civ.Code art. 2530. In this case, the trial court also relied on

La.Civ.Code art. 2545 in assessing damages, which governs the liability of sellers

who know of a redhibitory defect in a thing sold. Louisiana Civil Code Article 2545

states:

A seller who knows that the thing he sell has a defect
but omits to declare it, or a seller who declares that the
thing has a quality that he knows it does not have, is liable
to the buyer for the return of the price with interest from
the time it was paid, for the reimbursement of reasonable
expenses occasioned by the sale and those incurred for the
preservation of the thing, and also for damages and
reasonable attorney fees. If the use made of the thing, or
the fruits it might have yielded, were of some value to the
buyer, such a seller may be allowed credit for such use of
fruits.

A seller is deemed to know that the thing he sells has
a redhibitory defect when he is a manufacturer of that
thing.

Further, a buyer may limit his demand to the reduction of the price, as the Bakers

have done in the present case, pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2541, and is the only

recourse if the buyer no longer owns the vehicle. Cloud v. Huffman Motor Co., Inc.,

416 So.2d 266 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1982).

The term “defect” as contemplated by La.Civ.Code art. 2520 in a

redhibitory action was discussed by this court in Harper v. Coleman Chrysler-

Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 510 So.2d 1366, 1369 (La.App. 3 Cir.1987):

[Defect] means a physical imperfection or deformity;
or a lacking of necessary components or level of quality.
Ezell v. General Motors Corporation, 446 So.2d 954
(La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1350
(La.1984); Williams v. Louisiana Machinery Company,
Inc., 387 So.2d 8 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1980). The
defectiveness of the thing sold is a factual determination by

5

the trier of fact, whose factual conclusions will not be
disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Orcinus v.
Dominum, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978).

The Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the burden of proof in a

redhibition action in Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So.2d 840, 843 (La.1974) as follows:

The buyer may prove the existence of redhibitory
defects at the time of the sale not only by direct evidence
of eyewitnesses, but also by circumstantial evidence giving
rise to the reasonable inference that the defect existed at
the time of the sale. (Citations omitted). As stated in
Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Co., . . . 245 So.2d 151, 155
“. . . proof by direct or circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to constitute a preponderance when taking the evidence as
a whole, such proof shows the fact or causation sought to
be proved is more probably than not.”

The plaintiffs in a redhibition action are not required to negate all other causes of a

defect. Ewing and Salter, Inc. v. Gafner Automotive & Mach, Inc., 392 So.2d 762

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 933 (La.1981).

The defendants contend that Mr. Baker did not prove that a defect

existed in the car at the time of its manufacture. They argue that the problems

experienced by the Bakers with the 1999 Mazda 626 occurred because of Mr. Baker’s

and his wife’s excessive use of the car and their failure to conduct the proper

maintenance on the vehicle as well as water intrusion in the engine. Mr. Baker asserts

that although they used the vehicle extensively, they followed the proper maintenance

schedule as determined by the owner’s manual.

Mr. Baker denied that the car had been driven through high water during

the two years following the purchase of the car. He also denied that the car had been

submerged. The State Farm investigators examined the car after the engine was taken

apart at Auto-Tech. Its property damage adjusters opined in their testimony that the

engine problems were not caused by water intrusion. Craig Jones, one of the State

farm adjusters, testified that Hixson did not tell him about any sand or debris in the

6

engine’s air filter, although at trial the Hixson mechanics testified that there was sand

and leaves in the air cleaner. A Hixson mechanic also testified that the actual cause

of the engine failure was not known. Craig Jones, who examined the car for State

Farm, noted that the oil looked like it had not been changed. However, Mr. Jones

admitted that he was not a mechanic and that the dark color of the oil could have been

caused by the heat. Mr. Baker testified that no one at Hixson told him his engine

problems were caused by a lack of maintenance. Richie Quinn, Hixson’s service

manager at the time of trial but not at the time the Bakers experienced engine

problems, testified in his deposition that he would not expect a car engine to fail at

61,000 miles. He further testified that any costs to repair the vehicle would have to

be borne by the Bakers.

In the final analysis, neither the Auto-Tech mechanics nor the State Farm

investigators, the only people to examine the engine after it had been taken apart,

could find any evidence of water intrusion into the engine of the Bakers’ 1999 Mazda

626. The trial court heard evidence that the Bakers perhaps did not conduct the

proper maintenance on the vehicle. However, this was never a reason given to the

Bakers at the time they reported engine problems. Mr. Baker testified that he had the

oil and filter changed on a regular basis. Further, prior to the engine failure in

January 2001, the Bakers reported to Hixson that the “check engine light” was on.

The service report of that day indicated that Hixson merely screwed the car’s gas cap

on tighter which seemed to make the light go off.

It has been recognized for a number of years:

It is not incumbent upon the buyer to seek out, allege, and
prove the particular and underlying cause of the defect
which makes the thing sold unfit for the purpose intended,
particularly when the thing is a complicated piece of
machinery; but it suffices if he alleges and afterwards
proves as a fact that such defects exist.

7

Crawford v. Abbot Automobile Co., 154 La. 59, 101 So. 871 (1924).

In this case, there is proof that there was a defect in the manufacture of

the car’s engine and the components thereof. The evidence supports that there was

no fault in the maintenance of the car’s engine. By testimony of the car dealership’s

service manager, this engine should have lasted longer than 61,000 miles although

it was no longer under warranty. The trial court found the plaintiff proved that the

failure of the engine was due to mechanical problems which, in the absence of proof

by the defendants of other causes, was more properly attributed to faulty manufacture.

We are satisfied from the facts in this record that Mr. Baker has discharged his burden

of proving by circumstantial evidence, and logical inferences, that a defect existed in

the manufacture of the engine at the time the car was sold. Thus, we find no error in

the trial court’s determination of fact that a redhibitory defect existed in the vehicle,

such that Mr. Baker is entitled to a reduction in the purchase price.

Admission of Expert Witness Testimony

The defendants assert that the trial court erred in allowing Dauzat of

Auto-Tech to testify as an expert in auto mechanics. They argue that Dauzat merely

owned and operated a parts and service shop and had not worked as a mechanic in

over twenty-three years. Further, the defendants argue that Dauzat had no training

or education with respect to servicing foreign cars and more specifically, Mazda

vehicles. Mr. Baker argues that prior to becoming a parts and service shop owner,

Dauzat worked as a line mechanic and service advisor for a Chevrolet dealership. His

work included major engine rebuilding and replacement. Dauzat also worked at two

Oldsmobile dealerships as service advisor. Part of Dauzat’s job as a service advisor

was to oversee the mechanics working on the vehicles and to help diagnose problems.

In his present position as owner of Auto-Tech, he supervises ASE-certified mechanics

8

and has been doing this type of work for sixteen years. His job is to diagnose vehicle

problems and conduct major engine repairs.

The requirements of expert testimony are set forth in La.Code Evid. art.

702, which states: “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” In Mistich v. Volkswagen

of Germany, Inc., 95-0939, p. 8 (La. ½9/96), 666 So.2d 1073, 1079, the supreme

court noted, “[f]ormal education or training in a particular field is not always

necessary to qualify as an expert in a particular field. Experience alone is sufficient.”

On appeal, a trial court's acceptance of a witness as an expert will not be disturbed,

unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Although Dauzat does not have specific training

to work on Mazda vehicles, he has worked on foreign vehicles and Mazda vehicles.

Considering Dauzat’s extensive experience and training, we find no error with the

trial court's acceptance of him as an expert.

Attorney Fees

Mr. Baker answered the appeal of defendants and requested attorney fees

for work done defending this appeal. In Johnson v. Louisiana Container Co., 02-382,

pp. 24-25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 834 So.2d 1052, 1067, writ denied, 02-3099 (La.

5/9/03), 843 So.2d 394 we quoted our decision in Sinegal v. Able Glass Co., Inc.,

95-10, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/95), 663 So.2d 393, 396, with respect to awards of

attorney fees:

An increase in attorney's fees is awarded on appeal
when the defendant appeals, obtains no relief, and the
appeal has necessitated more work on the part of the
plaintiff's attorney, provided that the plaintiff requests such
an increase. Pitcher v. Hydro-Kem Services, Inc., 551

9

So.2d 736 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 553 So.2d 466
(La.1989).

In the present case, a review of the additional work necessitated by this

appeal reveals that an award of $2,500.00 in attorney fees is warranted. See Poirrier

v. Otis Engineering Corp., 602 So.2d 207 (La.App. 3 Cir.1992).

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court if affirmed. We

additionally award plaintiff, Bruce Baker, $2,500.00 in attorney fees for all work

performed on appeal. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Mazda Motor

Company of America, Inc. and Hixson Autoplex of Alexandria, Inc.

AFFIRMED.

10