Robert Troy Richard v. Karl M. Miller

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-1448

ROBERT TROY RICHARD

VERSUS

KARL M. MILLER, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 01-C-4071-D
HONORABLE DONALD WAYNE HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, and Elizabeth A. Pickett, Judges.

Cooks, J., concurs. I agree with the trial judge that La.R.S. 32:24 is applicable, but
even using ordinary negligence as the applicable standard, the grant of summary
judgment is appropriate.

Amy, J., concurs in the result
AFFIRMED.

Guy Olden Mitchell III
Attorney at Law
225 Court Street
Ville Platte, LA 70586-4492
(337) 363-0400
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Robert Troy Richard

James L. Pate
Laborde & Neuner
P.O. Box 52828
Lafayette, LA 70505-2828
(337) 237-7000
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
City of Opelousas
Larry Caillier
Lt. Mark Guidry

PICKETT, Judge.

FACTS

This suit arises out of an automobile collision that occurred on October 1, 2000.

On that date, Lieutenant Mark Guidry (Lt. Guidry) of the Opelousas Police

Department was conducting night patrol near Blanchard and Academy streets in

Opelousas, Louisiana. Lt. Guidry was driving a white Ford Crown Victoria unmarked

police unit equipped only with a revolving dash light. As Lt. Guidry approached the

stop sign at Blanchard street, he observed a white male drive by in a red Taurus. Lt.

Guidry turned around behind the Taurus and began proceeding in the same direction.

The driver of the Taurus failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of Blanchard

and Foster streets, which Lt. Guidry observed. He tried to conduct a traffic stop on

the driver but the driver sped off driving an estimate of fifty (50) miles per hour in a

twenty-five (25) mile per hour area. Lt. Guidry called in a description of the vehicle,

requested back up, and continued to trail the vehicle with the dash light in his unit

flashing. Because he did not have a siren, Lt. Guidry stopped at each stop sign that

he encountered while in pursuit of Miller. He remained at least six blocks behind

Miller as a result.

On that same night, Robert Troy Richard was a guest passenger in a vehicle

being driven by his brother, Jared Lane Richard. They were proceeding in a westerly

direction on Landry Street in Opelousas, Louisiana, when their vehicle was struck by

the Taurus which was being driven by Karl M. Miller. Jared Richard died and Robert

Richard sustained serious bodily injuries as a result of the collision. Richard brought

an action for damages against Miller, the liability insurer of the vehicle that Miller was

operating, Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, the Opelousas Police

Department, Larry Caillier, who is the Chief of Police of the Opelousas Police

Department, Lt. Guidry, the liability insurer of his brother’s automobile, American

Colonial Insurance Company and ABC Insurance Company of Louisiana, the public

liability insurer of the Opelousas Police Department.

The Opelousas Police Department, the Chief of Police, Larry Caillier, and Lt.

Mark Guidry filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The

motion was heard on June 30, 2003. On July 18, 2003, the trial court issued a

judgment granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants and

dismissing the plaintiff’s action with prejudice.

It is from this judgment that the plaintiff appeals.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court committed

legal or manifest error in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, under the same criteria

which governs the district court’s consideration of the appropriateness of summary

judgment. Schroeder v. Board of Sup’rs of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342

(La.1991).

Summary Judgment

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 provides the standard for

considering motions for summary judgment. That article provides, in pertinent part:

(2) The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, except those
disallowed by Article 969. The procedure is now favored and shall be
construed to accomplish these ends.

B. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

C. (1) After adequate discovery or after a case is set for trial, a

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motion which shows that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and
that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law shall be granted.

(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the
movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is
before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant’s
burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential
elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to
point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one
or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support
sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary
burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

The plaintiff submits that summary judgment was not proper in this case

because there are questions of fact as to the issue of whether or not there was a pursuit

(by Lt. Guidry) and, if so, whether he was reckless and disregarded the safety of

others.

Duty of Care for Emergency Vehicles

La.R.S. 32:24 prescribes the privileges and duties of the driver of an emergency

vehicle, and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from,
a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but
subject to the conditions herein stated.

B. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter;

(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation;

(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger
life or property;

(4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or
turning in specified directions.

C. The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle
shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual
signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police

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vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in
front of the vehicle.

D. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all
persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the
consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.

In Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, the supreme court

addressed the standard of care set forth in subsection D of Louisiana’s emergency

vehicle statute stating that:

La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(D) sets out two standards of care for an
emergency vehicle drivers depending on the circumstances of the case.
If, and only if, an emergency vehicle driver’s actions fit into subsections
A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24, will an emergency vehicle driver be
held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the
safety of others. On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver’s
conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24, such
driver’s actions will be gauged by a standard of “due care.”
“Due care” is synonymous with ordinary negligence. “Reckless
disregard,” however, connotes conduct more severe than negligent
behavior. “Reckless disregard” is, in effect, “gross negligence.” Gross
negligence has been defined by this court as “the want of even slight care
and diligence. It is the want of that diligence which even careless men
are accustomed to exercise.” State v. Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917
(1942). “Reckless disregard” or “gross negligence” is the standard to be
applied if the emergency vehicle driver’s actions fit La.Rev.Stat.
32:24(A) through La.Rev.Stat. 32:24(c). Otherwise, the standard is
ordinary negligence.

(emphasis ours)

Thus, if the provisions of subsections A, B and C of La.Rev.Stat.
32:24 apply to the accident or incident in question, then the driver will
be held liable only for his conduct which constitutes reckless disregard
for the safety of others. For example, for the actions of a driver in
circumstances like that involved in this case to be scrutinized under the
reckless disregard standard of care, the following must be met:

The emergency vehicle must be authorized and the driver must be:

Responding to an emergency call; (or in pursuit of an actual or
suspected violator of the law; or returning from a fire alarm)

and the accident or incident in question must arise out of the
emergency vehicle driver's parking or standing; (or proceeding past a
red or stop signal or stop sign; or exceeding the maximum speed limits;

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or moving or turning against the normal flow of traffic)

and the driver must make use of audible or visual signals sufficient
to warn motorists of their approach. (A police vehicle, however, need
not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the
vehicle.)

In the instant case, upon reviewing the depositions of Karl Miller, Lt. Guidry,

the law, and evidence, the trial court found that Lt. Guidry was, in fact, in pursuit of

Miller and, therefore, La.R.S. 32:24 was invoked. We disagree.

As previously noted in Lenard, 805 So.2d 175, the supreme court found that

the standard of care relative to emergency vehicle drivers is set forth in subsection D.

It determined that if the provisions of subsections A, B and C of the statute apply to

the accident or incident in question, then the driver will be held liable only for his

conduct which constitutes reckless disregard for the safety of others. On the other

hand, if the emergency vehicle driver’s conduct does not fit subsections A, B and C

of La.Rev.Stat. 32:24, such driver’s actions will be gauged by a standard of “due

care.” “Due care” is synonymous with ordinary negligence. Id. at 180.

The trial court found that La.R.S. 32:24 was invoked because the facts clearly

show that Lt. Guidry was in pursuit of Miller. Therefore, we must determine whether

the trial court was reasonable in finding that Lt. Guidry’s actions fit into subsections

A, B and C of La.R.S. 32:24.

Upon reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that Lt. Guidry’s actions fit

subsection A of La.R.S. 32:24, because on the night of the incident in question, Lt.

Guidry was operating his unmarked police patrol unit in pursuit of an actual or

suspected violator of the law. We find, however, that his actions do not fit subsection

B. Although he was in pursuit of an actual violator of the law, the incident in question

did not arise out of the emergency vehicle driver’s parking or standing; or proceeding

past a red or stop signal or stop sign; or exceeding the maximum speed limits; or

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moving or turning against the normal flow of traffic.

In order to be subjected to one of the standards of care set forth in La.R.S.

32:24, the emergency vehicle driver’s actions must fit into subsections A, B and C of

the statute. Because Lt. Guidry’s actions do not fit into subsection B, our analysis

ends here and La.R.S. 32:24 is not applicable to the instant case. As set forth by the

supreme court in Lenard, the applicable standard in this case is ordinary negligence.

A trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the “manifest error” or “clearly

wrong” standard of review. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989). However,

when the issue is a question of law, the appellate court simply determines whether the

trial court’s decision is legally correct or incorrect. Scobee v. Brame, 98-564 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/28/98), 721 So.2d 977, writ denied, 98-2952 (La. 1/29/98), 736 So.2d 833.

In this instance, we find that the trial court held Lt. Guidry to the standard of

gross negligence, thus, it applied the wrong standard of care in determining that he did

not breach the duty he owed to Richard. The proper standard to apply in this instance

was ordinary negligence. We must conduct a de novo review of the record and

determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.

Negligence

In Syrie v. Schilhab, 96-1027, pp. 4-5 (La. 5/20/97), 693 So.2d 1173, 1176-77,

the supreme court set out the duty-risk analysis used to determine whether liability

exists:

Under this analysis, plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question was
a cause-in-fact of the resulting harm, the defendant owed a duty of care
to the plaintiff, the requisite duty was breached by the defendant and the
risk of harm was within the scope of the protection afforded by the duty
breached. Berry v. State, Through Dept. of Health and Human
Resources, 93-2748, p. 4 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 412, 414; Mundy v.
Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 620 So.2d 811, 813 (La.1993).
Under the duty-risk analysis, all four inquires must be affirmatively

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answered for plaintiff to recover. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp. ,
94-0952, p. 4 (La. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 318, 322.

In addressing the duty owed by the state trooper in that case to the plaintiffs, the

Supreme Court stated:

We stated in Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 596 (La.1993), that
the legislature has given law enforcement officers the exclusive power
to regulate traffic and the public has a corresponding obligation to follow
traffic regulations. Law enforcement officers are duty bound to exercise
this power reasonably to protect life and limb and to refrain from causing
injury or harm. When a law enforcement officer becomes aware of a
dangerous traffic situation, he has the affirmative duty to see that
motorists are not subjected to unreasonable risks of harm. Monceaux v.
Jennings Rice Drier, Inc., 590 So.2d 672, 675 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1991). In
Mathieu, 94-0952 at 10, 646 So.2d at 325, this court stated that the scope
of an officer’s duty is to choose a course of action which is reasonable
under the circumstances. In other words, the scope of an officer’s duty
to act reasonably under the circumstances does not extend so far as to
require that the officer always choose the “best” or even a “better”
method of approach.

Dorty v. City of Pineville, 01-1470 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/02), 815 So.2d 393, writ

denied, 02-1271 (La. 8/30/02), 823 So.2d 950.

In the instant case, as a law enforcement officer, Lt. Guidry had a duty to

choose a course of action during his pursuit of Miller that did not subject other

motorists to unreasonable risks of harm. We find that by coming to a complete stop

at each stop sign that he encountered, Lt. Guidry did not breach the duty owed to

motorists such as Richard to act reasonably under the circumstances. We further find

that Lt. Guidry’s actions were not a cause-in-fact of the collision that occurred, but

rather, Miller’s failure to obey the traffic laws by not stopping at the stop signs and

by driving at a rate of speed that was in excess of the posted speed limit in the area

was the cause-in-fact of the collision.

DECREE

There are no genuine issues of material fact. The question before the court is

purely legal. We find no negligent behavior or actions on the part of Lt. Guidry, and

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find Guidry’s actions were not a cause-in-fact of the collision. Therefore, the mover

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiff-appellant, Robert T. Richard.

AFFIRMED.

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