Melvin G. Guillot, Indiv. Etc v. John Doe, Indiv.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

03-1754

MELVIN GUILLOT, ET AL.

VERSUS

JOHN DOE, ET AL

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 98-387
HONORABLE JULES D. EDWARDS, III, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billie Colombaro Woodard, and Marc T. Amy,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

Amy, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

Dean A. Doherty
Post Office Box 3372
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 269-7300
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Melvin Guillot and Tammy Guillot

Brian T. Roy
Preis, Kraft & Roy
Post Office Drawer 94-C
Lafayette, LA 70509
(337) 237-6062
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS:
Diane Lubiecki, Julien Lubiecki, and Allstate Insurance Company

WOODARD, Judge.

During a birthday party/sleep over at Mrs. Diane Lubiecki and Mr. Julien
Lubiecki’s home, a child attending the party accidently shot Jonathan Guillot in the
forehead while attempting to unload a pellet gun. On appeal, the Lubieckis request
that this court reverse the trial court’s allocation of fault and its $45,000.00 general
damage award. Also, the Lubieckis contend that the trial court improperly awarded
Mrs. Tammy Guillot $5,000.00 for her mental anguish/emotional distress, under
La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6. We affirm the trial court’s $45,000.00 general damage
award and its allocation of fault, but we reverse its decision to award Mrs. Guillot
damages.

*****

On January 24, 1997, the Lubieckis invited several children to attend a birthday
party/sleep over at their home for their eleven-year-old son, Robert. Previously,
Robert told the children who attended the party to bring their BB or pellet guns, if
they had one, so they could go on a hunting trip for birds and other small animals.
The Guillots initially agreed to allow two of their sons, Brandon and Ryan, to
spend the night, only, if the Lubieckis promised to supervise the children while they
were using the guns. Specifically, Mr. Lubiecki told the Guillots: “[D]on’t worry
about it. You know, we’ll treat [your children] like they’re our own.” The Lubieckis
also promised to lock the guns up in their bedroom closet when the children were not
hunting. At trial, Mr. Guillot recalled Mr. Lubiecki’s words of assurance: “I promise
you [the guns] will be locked up. Nobody will be around them without me
supervising.”
The Guillots did not want their youngest son, Jonathan, to spend the night, since
he was only seven years old at the time and had never slept over at a friend’s house.
However, after receiving repeated assurances from the Lubieckis, the Guillots
eventually allowed him to spend the night, as well. Mr. Guillot testified:

A [I] . . . went over the same thing again . . . . Asked [Mr.
Lubiecki], “You know, you’re sure y’all going to watch him, and
you know, [Jonathan’s] my little guy [and] he’s only . . . seven .
. . .”

1

[He said,] “Oh, yes. Don’t worry about it.”

....

A [He said,] “[Jonathan’s] going to be fine. We’re going to
watch him; treat him like our own.”

Basically, . . . Mr. Lubiecki probably thought I was a nut
because I kept going over and over it. . . .

Q You repeated the same instructions - -

A Yes, sir.

Q - - about gun safety?

A Yes, sir.

Q And were you given the same assurance?

A Yes, sir.

Later that night, the Lubieckis went to bed at approximately 10:00 p.m., but
they did not lock the guns in their closet as they promised. At around midnight,
before Brandon went to bed, he placed his pellet gun in Robert’s unlocked bedroom
closet with the rest of the guns that were already in there, which allegedly included a
couple of shotguns and a twenty-two (.22) caliber rifle.
The following morning, on January 25, 1997, Mr. Lubiecki went outside to his
shed, which was approximately thirty yards from the house, to work on his van. Soon
afterwards, Mrs. Lubiecki, who was unaware of the fact that her husband was in the
shop, drove to the store and, thus, left the children that were still in the house without
adult supervision.
At some point after Mrs. Lubiecki left the home, one of Robert’s friends, Belton
Richard, III, found Brandon’s pellet gun and accidentally fired it, causing a pellet to
strike Jonathan in the forehead. Belton dropped the rifle and ran outside screaming:
“I shot him. I shot him. Help, help, help.”
When Mr. Lubiecki heard Belton’s screams, he found Jonathan and inspected
the wound to his head. Mr. Lubiecki told Jonathan that “it was just a nick” and placed

2

a Band-Aid on it. Robert’s older sister, Shannon, who came in the house soon after
the accident, took the Band-Aid off and cleaned the wound “with a Q-Tip.”
After treating his wound, she called the Guillots to tell them about their son’s
injury. When Mrs. Guillot answered the phone, Shannon told her: “[Jonathan’s] been
scratched, and I don’t think it’s really anything, but you might want to come and
look.”
Mrs. Guillot had a bad feeling that the situation was more serious than Shannon
had revealed, so she told her husband the news and they rushed to the Lubieckis’
home. When they arrived, Mr. Lubiecki was outside on the porch. As they
approached the house, the first thing he told them was that, when he heard Belton
screaming “I shot him,” he initially thought that Belton had grabbed the twenty-two
(.22) in the closet. Mr. Lubiecki also expressed how relieved he was when he found
out that Jonathan had been shot with a pellet gun: “Man, thank God it was a pellet
gun [because] I thought [Belton] had grabbed the twenty-two (.22).”
At trial, Mr. Guillot described Jonathan’s condition when they first saw him:

Q Okay. Was [Jonathan] crying?

A Just a little. He was more like shaking, scared, you know,
shaken up.

Q Okay. Could you see any blood on his forehead?

A Yes.

Q Was there a Band-Aid covering the wound?

A Yes sir.

Q Despite the Band-Aid, could you still see blood on his
head?

A Yes sir.

Q Was it dripping or was it just dried up?

A It was kind of still wanting to bleed, you know, but it
wasn’t gushing or anything. [Mr. Lubiecki and Shannon] had
cleaned him up.

3

When Mrs. Guillot saw her son’s condition, she began to cry. She was also
very angry, since she believed Shannon misrepresented the severity of Jonathan’s
injury by calling it a mere scratch.
Soon afterwards, the Guillots took Jonathan to the emergency room at Our Lady
of Lourdes Regional Medical Center (OLOL). Dr. Scott Thompson, the treating
emergency room physician, made the following notations, concerning Jonathan’s
injury, in OLOL’s “Emergency Record/Physician’s Record”:

HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: This little boy took a BB or pellet
to the right forehead. He didn’t get hit anywhere else. He said it stung
a little bit.

....

PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: VITAL SIGNS: Stable. GENERAL:
Polite little boy. He has a little divot of skin about the size of a BB
missing on the right mid forehead. Superior and lateral to that is a little
knot under the skin consistent with a BB. It is about an inch removed
from the entry site. There is no other bony irregularity. . . .

IMPRESSION: BB SUBCUTANEOUS.

TREATMENT: I told the family that because this is a young boy and it
is on the face, I am going to ask one of the plastic’s people to remove it.
I did try to “thumbnail” the BB forward and it seems pretty much locked
in the skin.

Later, Dr. Kenneth L. Odinet, a plastic surgeon, also examined Jonathan’s
wound. He noted:

On radiograph, you can see the pellet embedded in the frontal
bone. I saw the child initially in the emergency room, having [no]
symptoms and no complaints and I told the parents we could just leave
the pellet there, but they insisted on removal.

On January 28, 1997, three days after Jonathan was released from the
emergency room, Dr. Odinet performed a minor surgical procedure at Lafayette
General Medical Center to remove the pellet.
On February 3, 1997, he returned to Dr. Odinet for a follow-up examination,
after which the doctor informed the Guillots that Jonathan’s physical wound would
heal quickly; although, he warned that psychological treatment might be necessary in

4

the future to heal any emotional scars.
Approximately five years after being shot, in December of 2001, Jonathan
opened up about the accident for the first time. He asked his parents: “Why would
[Belton] want to do that to me?” He also told his mother he blamed himself because
he had asked to spend the night at Robert’s house. At this point, Mrs. Guillot decided
that her son needed psychological counseling.
On January 29, 2002, Dr. Maureen Brennan, a clinical psychologist, met with
the Guillots to discuss Jonathan’s medical history, background, and their goals for
therapy. Afterwards, Dr. Brennan met with Jonathan on three separate occasions for
therapy and diagnosed him with “chronic adjustment disorder.” After the third
session, Dr. Brennan noted that Jonathan’s condition had improved dramatically; as
such, she did not expect him to need further counseling.
Sometime later, at the request of the Lubieckis’ insurer, Allstate Insurance
Company, Dr. Kenneth R. Bouillion performed an independent psychological
evaluation of Jonathan’s condition. According to Dr. Bouillion, Dr. Brennan’s initial
diagnosis of Jonathan’s condition as “chronic adjustment disorder” was accurate.
On May 9, 2003, the trial court signed a final judgment, awarding damages as
follows: (1) $45,000.00 in general damages and $3,454.76 in special damages to Mr.
Guillot, as Jonathan’s representative; and (2) $5,000.00 in general damages to Mrs.
Guillot.
On appeal, the Lubieckis contend that the trial court erred: (1) by awarding Mr.
Guillot, as Jonathan’s representative, $45,000.00 in general damages; (2) by finding
them 85% at fault for Jonathan’s damages; and (3) by awarding Mrs. Guillot damages
for her mental anguish/emotional distress.

*****

EXCESSIVE DAMAGES

The Lubieckis assert that $45,000.00 is an excessive general damage award
under the circumstances of this case, specifically, given Jonathan’s particular injuries.
An appellate court should rarely disturb an award of damages due to the great

5

and, even, vast discretion vested in the trial court.1 We can disturb such awards, only,
when the trial court clearly abused its discretion.2
Reasonable people often disagree over the appropriate measure of general
damages in a particular case.3 Yet, “[i]t is only when the award is, in either direction,
beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the
particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the
appellate court should increase or reduce the award.”4
We should not rely on a comparison of prior awards in cases with similar
medical injuries to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion.5 “The primary
considerations in assessing damages are the severity and duration of the injured
party’s pain and suffering.”6 The facts and circumstances of this case, alone, should
determine an award’s adequacy or inadequacy.7 Therefore, in this instance, we must
determine whether the trial court’s award for Jonathan’s particular injuries, under the
particular circumstances, was a clear abuse of its broad discretion.8
While attempting to unload a pellet gun, Belton accidentally caused it to
discharge. The pellet that struck Jonathan lodged against his skull and caused “a 2 to
3 mm open wound” to his forehead. This wound did not bleed profusely; however,
it was still bleeding when his parents got to the scene of the accident.
Dr. Odinet advised the Guillots that they could safely leave the pellet in
Jonathan’s head, but they insisted that it be surgically removed. During surgery, he
was given surgical anesthesia, which involved the use of intravenous sedation as well

1
Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1114, 114 S.Ct. 1059 (1994).
2
See Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976).
3
Youn, 623 So.2d 1257.
4
Id. at 1261.
5
See Id.
6
Iorio v. Grossie, 94-846, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663 So.2d 366, 372
(citing Andres v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 568 So.2d 651 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1990)).
7
See Youn, 623 So.2d 1257.
8
See Id.

6

as nitrous oxide. Afterwards, he had headaches for three months and was left with a
visible scar that bothered him continuously until the time of trial.
The Lubieckis correctly point out that the injury to Jonathan’s forehead was,
fortunately, a very minor wound, and the only residual indication of the wound, “a
small pink mark,” migrated up his forehead as he grew older to the point it is no
longer visible without manipulating his hair. However, while it is true that his
physical suffering was negligible, the Lubieckis fail to acknowledge the significance
of his psychological injuries.
Jonathan testified that he had nightmares for over a year after the accident.
Also, at trial, he acknowledged that he suffered with the following symptoms for more
than five years: self-blame, being withdrawn, easily startled by loud noises, trouble
concentrating in school because he kept thinking about the accident, a loss of interest
in activities that he used to enjoy, and trouble interacting with his siblings.
Jonathan was unable to verbalize his feelings about being shot for almost five
years, but, during that time, Mrs. Guillot could see that he was troubled. She gave this
account of the dramatic changes she saw in her son’s personality and behavior
following the accident:

Before, Jonathan was just my little—I called him my—tambourine
shaker. I mean, [he was] just super excited about everything [and he
was] always just willing to go anywhere and do anything . . . .

After this accident, Jonathan stayed to himself. He didn’t want to
really . . . go anywhere. He didn’t want to ride his horse. He just
seemed like he wasn’t trusting of strangers or even of some family
members. And he just wasn’t himself. He just . . . wanted to stay to
[himself], like a little loner.

When she noticed these changes in him, initially, she thought they would pass in time.
She testified:

As a mother, you hope that they’ll pass, and at times I saw that
they would. I would just speak with him. I’d try to move him right on
out of the self-pity stage or the I did something wrong in this little game
stage, or [Mr. Guillot and I] did encouragement. We tried to just get him
to move along.

7

She also sought advice from her pastor, the pastor’s wife, and other friends that
attended her church. However, not until Jonathan reached adolescence, when he was
first able to reveal to her the inner turmoil that he was suffering with due to the
accident, did she realize that he needed professional counseling. Nevertheless, the
Lubieckis insist that, by not getting a professional to treat their son earlier, the Guillots
failed to mitigate his damages.
“[A]n accident victim has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence and ordinary
care to minimize [his/her] damages after the injury has been inflicted.”9 The plaintiff
does not need to make extraordinary or impractical efforts, but s/he must undertake
those that are reasonably prudent under the circumstances.10 The defendant bears the
burden of proving what extent the plaintiff should have mitigated his/her damages.11
“[T]he rule of mitigation of damages is to be applied with extreme caution.”12
Under the circumstances, we believe the Guillots exercised reasonable diligence
in dealing with Jonathan’s psychological injuries. Dr. Brennan confirmed that the
reason Jonathan, who was seven years old at the time of the accident, could not
express his feelings for almost five years was because he needed time for his verbal
skills to develop. Also, she believed the Guillots handled the situation appropriately
by seeking professional counseling as soon as their son could express himself.
Anyone injured through the fault of another is entitled to full indemnification
for his/her damages.13 Defendants take victims as they find them and are responsible
for all natural and probable consequences of their tortious conduct.14
In this instance, Jonathan was a young child not yet able to verbalize his
feelings. As such, the Defendants must bear full responsibility for Jonathan’s

9
Jacobs as Tutor of Jacobs v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 432 So.2d 843, 845
(La.1983).
10
Id.
11
Moreau v. N. Am. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 01-976 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/26/01), 806
So.2d 809.
12
Id. at 816.
13
Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-492 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So.2d 70.
14
Am. Motorist Ins. Co. v. Am. Rent-All, Inc., 579 So.2d 429 (La.1991).

8

suffering during those years when his silence prevented him from getting professional
treatment for his psychological injuries.
We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award
$45,000.00 in general damages. Clearly, the award is not the result of passion or
prejudice, and it bears a reasonable relationship to the proved damages.15 Other triers
of fact could have determined that a lower award was more appropriate, but from the
entirety of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in
the trial court, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have fixed this award at
the level set.16 Moreover, this is not one of those unusual cases where the award is
contrary to reason.17
Thus, we affirm the trial court’s $45,000.00 general damage award.

ALLOCATION OF FAULT

The trial court concluded that the Lubieckis were 85% at fault, Cindy Fridge,
as Belton’s representative, was 10% at fault, and the Guillots were 5% at fault. The
Lubieckis, however, assert that the Guillots, who allowed their son to spend the night
when they had full knowledge of the presence and intended use of pellet guns, should
bear a percentage of fault equal to theirs.
Concerning an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s allocation of fault, our
supreme court in Clement v. Frey explained: “[T]here is an analogy between
excessive or inadequate quantum determinations and excessive or inadequate fault
percentage determinations.”18 In both, unlike the appellate court, the trier of fact has
the benefit of witnessing the entire trial and reviewing first hand all the evidence.19
The trier of fact’s allocation of fault is a question of fact; therefore, we should
not overturn its determination, absent a showing of manifest error.20 If the trial court’s

15
See Youn, 623 So.2d 1257.
16
See Id.
17
See Id.
18
95-1119 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d 607, 610.
19
Id.
20
See Conrad v. City of New Iberia, 03-121 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/13/03), 847 So.2d
784.

9

determination was reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, an
appellate court may not reverse even though convinced that had it been sitting as the
trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.21
In the instant matter, the trial court succinctly stated its basis for its allocation
of fault:

Before agreeing to allow Jonathan to spend the night, the Guillots talked
with the Lubieckis about gun safety. The Lubieckis assured the Guillots
that all children attending the sleep over would be supervised. The
Lubieckis specifically said the various guns in the home would not be
where the children would have access to them. However, prior to the
Guillots leaving the Lubiecki’s home[,] they observed several pellet and
BB rifles and pistols in an area that was accessible to the children. On
the next morning, [Mr. and Mrs. Lubiecki] exited the home with children
still at the residence[,] and the guns were still accessible to the children.
As a direct result of this lack of supervision, Belton Richard was able to
negligently handle the pellet gun and injure Jonathan. There were no
adults present in the Lubiecki home when Belton injured Jonathan.

The Court hereby apportions the fault as follows: Diane and
Julien Lubiecki, eighty-five (85) percent; Belton Richard, ten (10)
percent; and Melvin and Tammy Guillot, five (5) percent.

After reviewing the record, we find no manifest error and agree with the trial
court’s determination that, due to the Lubieckis’ lack of supervision, they should bear
the greatest percentage of fault.
Therefore, we affirm its allocation of fault.

BYSTANDER RECOVERY

The trial court awarded Mrs. Guillot $5,000.00 for her mental
anguish/emotional distress, under La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6, from witnessing the
wound to Jonathan’s forehead soon after Belton shot him. Nevertheless, the Lubieckis
contend that she is not eligible for bystander recovery.
Two categories of cases allow claimants to recover for their mental
anguish/emotional distress: (1) traditional cases, in which a defendant’s negligence
is aimed directly at the plaintiff and (2) bystander recovery cases, in which the
defendant’s negligence is aimed at a third person and the plaintiff suffers emotional

21
Id.

10

distress/mental anguish from having viewed the injury.22 Clearly, Mrs. Guillot’s claim
falls within the latter category, since she was a bystander who witnessed her son’s
injury soon after he was shot with a pellet gun.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.6, which does not interfere with traditional
theories of negligent infliction of emotional distress and solely deals with bystander
recovery,23 provides:

A. The following persons who view an event causing injury to
another person, or who come upon the scene of the event soon thereafter,
may recover damages for mental anguish or emotional distress that they
suffer as a result of the other person’s injury:

(1) The spouse, child or children, and grandchild or grandchildren
of the injured person, or either the spouse, the child or children, or the
grandchild or grandchildren of the injured person.

(2) The father and mother of the injured person, or either of them.

(3) The brothers and sisters of the injured person or any of them.

(4) The grandfather and grandmother of the injured person, or
either of them.

B. To recover for mental anguish or emotional distress under this
Article, the injured person must suffer such harm that one can
reasonably expect a person in the claimant’s position to suffer serious
mental anguish or emotional distress from the experience, and the
claimant’s mental anguish or emotional distress must be severe,
debilitating, and foreseeable. Damages suffered as a result of mental
anguish or emotional distress for injury to another shall be recovered
only in accordance with this Article.

(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, Article 2315.6 allows certain classes of bystanders,
who view an event causing injury to another person or come upon the scene soon
afterwards, to recover damages for their mental anguish/emotional distress.24

22
Norred v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 95-748 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95), 665 So.2d
753.
23
Id.
24
Ford v. State, 99-1297 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/12/00), 760 So.2d 478, writ denied,
00-1935 (La. 9/27/00), 769 So.2d 1214, writs denied, 00-1938, 00-1864 (La. 9/29/00),
770 So.2d 352, 770 So.2d 350.

11

Bystander damages are available when serious emotional distress arises directly
and immediately from the claimant’s observation of a traumatic injury-causing event
to the direct victim or from the observation of the aftermath of the traumatic injury-
causing event soon thereafter.25 Thus, our Legislature intended to compensate
claimants for his/her immediate shock after witnessing the direct victim’s harm that
is both severe and apparent but not for the anguish and distress that normally
accompany an injury to a loved one under all circumstances.26 As our supreme court
explained in Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hospital:

The emotional distress sustained must be both serious and reasonably
foreseeable to allow recovery. Serious emotional distress, of course,
goes well beyond simple mental pain and anguish. Compensation for
mental pain and anguish over injury to a third person should only be
allowed where the emotional injury is both severe and debilitating. For
instance, . . . “serious emotional distress may be found where a
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope
adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of
the case.” A non-exhaustive list of examples of serious emotional
distress includes neuroses, psychoses, chronic depression, phobia and
shock.[27]

(Emphasis added.)
In order for Mrs. Guillot to recover, she must prove the following four elements
by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) she viewed an event causing injury to another
person, or came upon the scene of the event soon thereafter; (2) she is within the class
of relatives able to recover; (3) the injured person suffered such harm that one can
reasonably expect someone in her position to suffer serious emotional distress from
the experience; and (4) her mental anguish/emotional distress must be severe,
debilitating, and foreseeable.28
Within minutes of the shooting, Mrs. Guillot arrived on the scene. When she
saw Jonathan’s forehead bleeding, she broke down and began to cry hysterically. She
continued to cry at the emergency room, so the emergency room doctor decided to

25
Trahan v. McManus, 97-1224 (La. 3/2/99), 728 So.2d 1273.
26
Id.
27
556 So.2d 559, 570 (La.1990).
28
See La.Civ.Code art. 2315.6.

12

sedate her with Valium.
Notwithstanding, even though the evidence clearly suggests that she was very
upset, she did not suffer the degree of “serious emotional distress” our Legislature
envisioned. Her anguish was more akin to the anguish and distress that any mother
would feel in this situation. Also, in Trahan v. McManus the supreme court noted that
“the essence of the tort is the shock caused by the perception of the especially
horrendous event.”29 (Emphasis added.)
Without minimizing Jonathan’s pain and suffering or the seriousness of the
accident, we find that this accidental injury, which resulted in a minor physical
wound, does not qualify as a “horrendous event.” As such, the mental
anguish/emotional distress that Mrs. Guillot felt, after viewing her son’s injury, is not
compensable.
Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court’s $5,000.00 award for her mental
anguish/emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s $45,000.00 general damage award and its allocation
of fault. However, we must reverse its decision to award Mrs. Guillot $5,000.00 for
her mental anguish/emotional distress. We assess all costs of this appeal evenly
between the Plaintiffs/Appellees, Melvin and Tammy Guillot, and the
Defendants/Appellants, Diane Lubiecki, Julien Lubiecki, and Allstate Insurance
Company.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND RENDERED.

29
728 So.2d at 1279 n.8 (quoting Lejeune, 556 So.2d at 570 n.11).

13

NUMBER 03-1754

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

MELVIN GUILLOT, ET AL.

VERSUS

JOHN DOE, ET AL.

AMY, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the apportionment of fault is supported by the

record and must, therefore, be affirmed. Furthermore, I agree that the award of

damages to Mrs. Guillot for her mental anguish/emotional distress following the

accident must be reversed. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

affirmation of the $45,000 in general damages awarded to Jonathan Guillot. Given

the limited nature of the injury reflected in the record, I conclude that a substantial

reduction in the general damages is required. Therefore, according to the dictates of

Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976), I would reduce the award of

general damages to the highest point reasonably within the trial court’s discretion.