Betty Garrett v. Celeste McGaskey

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-175

BETTY GARRETT
VERSUS
CELESTE MCGASKEY, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. 76,667
HONORABLE ERIC R. HARRINGTON, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ARTHUR J. PLANCHARD,
JUDGE PRO TEMPORE

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Court composed of Judges John D. Saunders , Michael G. Sullivan, and Arthur J.
Planchard.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

Honorable Louie Bernard
Clerk, Natchitoches Parish
Post Office Box 476
Natchitoches, LA 71457-0476
(318) 352-8152
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

Charles Raymond Whitehead, Jr.
Whitehead Law Offices
Post Office Box 697
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0697
(318) 352-6481
COUNSEL FOR: PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
Betty Garrett

Nathaniel Williams, Esq.

WILLIAMS FAMILY LAW FIRM
Post Office Box 15
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0015
(318) 352-6695
COUNSEL FOR: DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
Celeste McGaskey

Planchard, Judge.

The Defendant-Appellant, Celeste McGaskey, appeals the judgment

nullifying and voiding her candidacy for councilperson for district number three

of the City of Natchitoches and ordering her name stricken from the list of

qualified candidates for this elected office. For the reasons given herein, we

reverse and set aside the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment

dismissing the instant action.

The Plaintiff-Appellee, Betty Garrett, filed this suit challenging

McGaskey’s candidacy for councilperson for district number three of the City

of Natchitoches. The action alleges that McGaskey is an employee of the

United States Postal Service (USPS), and that as such, she is statutorily

precluded from being qualified to run for this position. Furthermore, Garrett

contends that McGaskey is barred from becoming a candidate for this position

pursuant to the USPS employees’ regulations.

McGaskey filed several exceptions and an answer to the petition.

McGaskey raised the exceptions of prematurity, no cause of action, and res

judicata.

Trial of this matter was held on February 9, 2004. The trial court entered

a written, signed judgment on this same date declaring that McGaskey’s

candidacy was null and void. The trial court ordered the clerk of court to strike

McGaskey’s name from the list of qualified candidates. McGaskey filed a

motion for appeal from this ruling on February 10, 2004, which was granted

this same date. The record in this case was lodged in this court on February 12,

2004.

Through the exception of prematurity, McGaskey attempts to

characterize this action as a challenge to her holding office brought pursuant to

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La.R.S. 42:65. To the contrary, Garrett’s suit challenges McGaskey’s

candidacy pursuant to La.R.S. 18:481, et seq. McGaskey admits that this action

was filed following her qualifying to run for the city council position.

Therefore, we find that the exception of prematurity is not well founded and

must be denied.

McGaskey next argues in this court that the exception of no cause of

action should be maintained because Garrett has asserted no ground cognizable

under La.R.S. 18:492 to challenge her candidacy. However, La.R.S.

18:492(A)(3) and (A)(4) provide that an action objecting to a person’s

candidacy may be based on the ground that, “(3) The defendant does not meet

the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election,” and “(4) The

defendant is prohibited by law from becoming a candidate for one or more of

the offices for which he qualified.” In the instant case, Garrett argues that

La.R.S. 42:63 prohibits McGaskey from qualifying as a candidate for the city

council position. If, on consideration of the merits of this case, it is determined

that La.R.S. 42:63 prohibits a person by law from qualifying as a candidate,

then Garrett has a cause of action for challenging McGaskey’s candidacy

pursuant to 18:492. Thus, we find that the essence of McGaskey’s argument

in this regard goes to the merits of this action, and we, therefore, deny the

exception of no cause of action.

McGaskey argues next that the trial court should have dismissed this

action on her exception of res judicata. McGaskey relies on an action filed by

Sylvia Morrow which also challenged her candidacy. This earlier filed action

was dismissed with prejudice on the motion of the plaintiff therein before the

matter went to trial. McGaskey avers that the petition in the earlier filed action

was identical to the petition instituting the matter sub judice other than the

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change in the identity of the plaintiff. Therefore, McGaskey posits that this

matter is now res judicata.

McGaskey acknowledges that La.R.S. 13:4231 requires that in order for

res judicata to apply, the actions must be between the same parties.

Regardless, McGaskey cites this court to several cases in support of her

position that jurisprudential exceptions to the party identification have been

established. We find the cases cited by McGaskey to be inapposite to the

instant case.

In State, Dept. of Social Serv. v. Coleman, 616 So.2d 844 (La.App. 3 Cir.

1993), the state’s action on behalf of a minor child to establish paternity was

found to be precluded by res judicata since the child herself, represented by

counsel, had previously pursued and lost a paternity action against the

defendant in the state’s suit. However, in Coleman there was an identity of the

parties between the two actions in that the child had brought the first action and

the state was bringing the second action on behalf of the same child. Similarly,

in the second case on which McGaskey relies, Frank v. St. Landry Parish

School Bd., 540 So.2d 1200 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989), this court found that the

plaintiffs in the case on appeal were also parties in prior litigation between the

same defendants on the same claims.

In the instant case, the plaintiff in the earlier suit did not represent the

interests of the plaintiff in the current action. There is no identity of parties

between these two actions; therefore, there is no res judicata effect from the

dismissal of the earlier suit on the instant matter. Thus, we find the exception

of res judicata is without merit.

In considering the merits of the instant case, we would first note that the

trial court did not find that Garrett could challenge McGaskey’s candidacy

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based on the regulations for employees with the USPS. No party to this

litigation has challenged this portion of the trial court’s ruling; therefore, this

court pretermits any discussion as to that issue.

Garrett argues that McGaskey is in violation of La.R.S. 42:63. As stated

above, based on this premise, Garrett contends that McGaskey does not meet

the qualifications for a candidate for the city council seat and should be found

by this court to be prohibited by law from seeking this position.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 42:63(A) reads:

A. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Subsection, no person
holding an elective office, appointive office, or employment in any of the
branches of state government or of a political subdivision thereof shall
at the same time hold another elective office, appointive office, or
employment in the government of a foreign country, in the government
of the United States, or in the government of another state.

McGaskey has admitted that she is an employee with the USPS.

However, we find that the trial court erred in interpreting this statute to

disqualify McGaskey from qualifying to run for the city council position.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 9 states, “When a law is clear and unambiguous

and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be

applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the

intent of the legislature.” The prohibition pronounced in 42:63 is from

“holding an elective office,” not from qualifying as a candidate to hold an

elective office. The importance of this distinction is that the former only

requires a choice of the person once the conflicting position is assumed,

whereas the latter would require a choice before assuming the conflicting

position.

Had the legislature intended to prohibit a person holding a government

job from qualifying to run for an elective position or vice versa, the legislature

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could have very easily expressed this intent in the wording of 42:63. However,

since the words of this statute are clear and unambiguous and since the

application of this statute as worded does not lead to absurd consequences, we

find that the trial court erred in disqualifying McGaskey under this statute.

Accordingly, we hereby reverse and set aside the ruling of the trial court.

Judgment is rendered dismissing this action, and Louis Bernard, Clerk of Court

for Natchitoches Parish, is hereby ordered to reinstate Celeste McGaskey as a

qualified candidate for the position of councilperson for district three of the

City of Natchitoches. All costs of this matter are assessed against the Plaintiff-

Appellee.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

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