Stephanie Lacross v. Cornerstone Christian Academy of Lafayette, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-341

STEPHANIE LACROSS

VERSUS

CORNERSTONE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY OF LAFAYETTE, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NUMBER 2002-4294
HONORABLE EDWARD D. RUBIN, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Chief Judge Ulysses G. Thibodeaux, Billie Colombaro Woodard,
and Oswald A. Decuir, Judges.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

David C. Gibbs, III Larry Lane Roy
Matthew J. Davis Dawn L. Morris
Gibbs Law Firm Jonathan L. Woods
5666 Seminole Blvd., Suite 2 Preis, Kraft & Roy
Seminole, Florida 33772 Post Office Drawer 94-C
(727) 399-8300 Lafayette, Louisiana 70509
COUNSEL FOR (337) 237-6062
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT: COUNSEL FOR
Cornerstone Christian DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Academy of Lafayette, Inc. Cornerstone Christian
Academy of Lafayette,
Randall M. Guidry Inc.
Durio, McGoffin, Stagg & Ackermann
Post Office Box 51308
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505
(337) 233-0300
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Stephanie LaCross

WOODARD, Judge.

The Defendant, Cornerstone Christian Academy of Lafayette, Inc.
(Cornerstone), appeals the trial court’s determination that it breached a contract when
it fired the Plaintiff, Stephanie LaCross, one of its middle school teachers, for lying
on her employment application by claiming that she did not drink alcohol and for
violating the school’s standard of personal holiness. We find no breach by
Cornerstone. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s ruling.

*****

In February of 2002, Stephanie LaCross submitted an application for
employment as a teacher with Cornerstone. On it, she answered “no” to “Do you use
alcoholic beverages?” The application specifically stated: “Falsification may be the
cause for dismissal.”
On June 27, 2002, Cornerstone offered her a job to serve as one of its middle
school teachers, and she signed an employment agreement to serve in that capacity for
a two-year term. The employment agreement made it clear that Cornerstone is not
only an institution of elementary education; it is a religious ministry and, as such, its
teachers must adhere to a very strict standard of conduct. For instance, its contract
includes the requirement that a Cornerstone teacher must “integrate all instruction
with Biblical truth.” Also, a Cornerstone teacher’s employment is subject to the
following condition: “The teacher/administrator will make personal holiness before
the Lord a first concern, and spiritual fellowship with God’s people a priority.”
That summer, soon after Mrs. LaCross executed her teaching contract and
before she assumed her teaching responsibilities, she and a female co-worker, who
worked at the same law firm as Mrs. LaCross, went out with a single male attorney
from another law firm to celebrate her new teaching job with Cornerstone. Later,
Mrs. LaCross admitted that she had drank “four to five beers” that evening.
At the law firm, the next day, Mrs. LaCross was overheard laughing and
discussing the details of her night out drinking. Upon hearing about Mrs. LaCross’
evening out, Mrs. Cheryl Scurlock called Cornerstone’s administrator, Mrs. Diana
Case, to tell her that Mrs. LaCross cursed, drank alcohol to the point that she made a
public spectacle, went out drinking with a man who was not her husband, and boasted

about her drunkenness the next day. Also, Mrs. Scurlock warned Mrs. Case that she
would withdraw her grandchildren from Cornerstone if it did not maintain its
standards for its teachers.
Mrs. Case met with Mrs. LaCross about these allegations. She admitted that
she had been out drinking and confirmed the essential elements of Mrs. Scurlock’s
report. Following their meeting, Mrs. Case concluded that Mrs. LaCross clearly lied
on her employment application and violated the ministry’s standard of personal
holiness. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Case called Mrs. LaCross and informed her that
Cornerstone’s board of directors had terminated her employment with Cornerstone.
Mrs. LaCross filed suit against Cornerstone to recover $36,000.00 in wages
($18,000.00 per year), damages for mental anguish, and attorney fees resulting from
Cornerstone’s alleged breach of its contract. The trial court held that Cornerstone
terminated Mrs. LaCross without just cause and awarded her $5,000.00 in attorney
fees, $10,000.00 for her mental anguish, and $36,000.00 in wages.
Thus, we must determine whether Cornerstone’s termination of Mrs. LaCross
constitutes a breach of its contract with her, entitling her to damages.

*****

E RROR
“Error vitiates consent [to a contract] only when it concerns a cause without
which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or
should have been known to the other party.” 1 When one party is in error and, thus, the
error is unilateral, there is no meeting of the minds.2 A unilateral error may invalidate
a contract when an error exists as to a fact that was a cause for making the contract
and when the party who induced the error knew or should have known that it was the
cause.3 (Emphasis added.)
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1950 provides:

1
La.Civ.Code art. 1949.
2
Scoggin v. Bagley, 368 So.2d 763 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1979).
3
Nugent v. Stanley, 336 So.2d 1058 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976).

2

Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the
contract, or the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality
of that thing, or the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law,
or any other circumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good
faith have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.

(Emphasis added.) In addition, comment (d) to La.Civ.Code art. 1950, specifically,
states that a party may obtain relief if s/he intended to contract with a certain person
or a person of a certain quality or character and the other party lacked the intended
quality or character. Furthermore, “[e]ven when an obligation has multiple causes,
error that bears on any one of them is sufficient to make the obligation invalid.”
In the application, Cornerstone asked Mrs. LaCross the following question:
“Do you use alcoholic beverages? Yes or No. If yes, to what extent?” to which she
answered by simply circling “No.”
However, during the trial, she admitted that she did drink:

Q. Do you drink regularly?

A. I drink occasionally.

....

Q. There’s a question [in the application] that says: “Do you
use alcoholic beverages?” Do you see that?

A. I do.

Q. And you responded: “No.”

A. Exactly.

(Emphasis added.)
Within the last paragraph of the application, which Mrs. LaCross signed and
submitted to Cornerstone, it clearly states:

To the best of my knowledge, the foregoing statements are complete and
correct and no fact has been withheld that would adversely affect a
decision to employ. (Falsification may be the cause for dismissal.)

3

Given Mrs. LaCross’ admission that she does drink and her failure to
acknowledge that fact in her application when the application clearly stated that any
falsification would be grounds for dismissal, Cornerstone contends that it was under
no obligation to honor the employment contract that it subsequently offered to her.
Specifically, it asserts that the uncontested facts establish that she lacked certain
qualities and characteristics that the school sought, which she misled it into believing
she had; therefore, an error concerning a cause exists and renders the contract void ab
initio because, without her misrepresentations, Cornerstone may have never offered
her the subject employment contract. We agree.
The fourth circuit has upheld the dismissal of a contract on these grounds even
when there was no provision on the application which explicitly provided that
falsification would be a ground for dismissal. In Ostrolenk v. Louise S. McGehee
School4 and Bischoff v. Brothers of the Sacred Heart,5 it held that when the applicant
misstates or fails to state facts, on the application, in an attempt to mislead the school
administration, the contract of employment is invalid from its inception.
Like the plaintiffs in Ostrulenk and Bischoff, Mrs. LaCross induced school
officials into believing that she possessed principles she really lacked. Moreover,
Mrs. LaCross compounded her situation. Namely, there is a provision within her
application which explicitly provides that falsification of the application is a ground
for dismissal. However, not only did she lie about her consumption of alcohol, a
material fact that induced an error, but, additionally, her signature, indicating that her
answers and statements on the application were complete and correct when at least
one was not, in and of itself, induced error.
The fact is that Cornerstone felt strongly that its employees possess certain
principles, one of which concerned consumption of alcohol. But more importantly,
it sought honest employees. It had a right to select its employees according to these
standards and to dismiss them for failing to meet them.

4
402 So.2d 237 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 404 So.2d 1259 (La.1981).
5
416 So.2d 348 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1982).

4

Was the Defense of Error Properly Raised?
Mrs. LaCross’s counsel believes Cornerstone waived its right to raise the
affirmative defense of error when it failed to assert this defense in the pleadings.
Certain defenses must be affirmatively plead to give the plaintiff fair and adequate
notice of the nature of the defense.6
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1005 provides:

The answer shall set forth affirmatively arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
division, duress, error or mistake, estoppel, extinguishment of the
obligation in any manner, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality,
injury by fellow servant, transaction or compromise, and any other
matter constituting an affirmative defense. If a party has mistakenly
designated an affirmative defense as an incidental demand, or an
incidental demand as an affirmative defense, and if justice so requires,
the court, on such terms as it may prescribe, shall treat the pleading as if
there had been a proper designation.

(Emphasis added.)
Cornerstone argues that it did affirmatively plead the defense of error in
paragraph eleven (11) of its “Answer to Petition for Damages,” even though it was not
designated as an affirmative defense:

The allegations of paragraph 11 of plaintiff’s Petition for Damages are
denied, save and except that prior to the start of the 2002 school year,
Cornerstone, through its duly authorized representatives, learned that
petitioner was not candid in her application for employment, and that
lack of candor applied to certain important elements, including the use
of alcohol, and other activities which indicated to Cornerstone that
plaintiff did not, in fact, possess the desire and/or qualities to “make
personal holiness before the Lord a first concern and spiritual fellowship
with God’s people a priority,” as the contract, among other things,
clearly indicated a teacher would do.

6
Hanks v. Wilson, 633 So.2d 1345 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/11/94).

5

This allegation sufficiently sets forth facts from which a legal conclusion of error is
found.7 Therefore, it meets the requirement for affirmative defenses provided in
La.Code Civ.P. art. 1005. Namely, through the operation of the last sentence in
Article 1005, in the interest of justice, we deem Cornerstone’s affirmative defense of
error properly pled.8

CONCLUSION

For the reasons assigned above, we reverse the trial court’s determination that
Cornerstone Christian Academy of Lafayette, Inc. terminated the subject employment
contract without just cause and, thus, dismiss Stephanie LaCross’ suit. We assess all
costs, including those incurred at the trial level, to her.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

7
See Norris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 293 So.2d 918 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974).
8
See Id.

6