Lamson Petroleum Corporation v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-1038

LAMSON PETROLEUM CORPORATION

VERSUS

HALLWOOD PETROLEUM, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 932342
HONORABLE HAROLD J. BROUILLETTE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD
JUDGE

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Court composed of Billie Colombaro Woodard, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and John B.
Scofield,* Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Jefferson Joseph Moss, Jr. Richard Ferguson Price, Jr.
Moss & Bradley Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 2907 474 Metairie Road, Suite 203
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502-2907 Metairie, Louisiana 70005-4331
(337) 237-6280 (504) 834-5559
COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Doug Ashy James H. Echezabal
Ena Claire Ashy J.H. Echezabel, Inc.

*
Judge John B. Scofield participated in this decision by appointment of the
Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore.

Carl David Rosenblum Robin Daniel McGuire
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent,
Carrere, Denegre, L.L.P. Carrere, Denegre, L.L.P.
201 St. Charles Ave. 500 Dover Blvd., Suite 120
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(504) 582-8000 (337) 406-5610
COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
John E. Girard Buffalo Minerals, LLC
Gregory Satterfield Michael Brian Satterfield
Lawrence D. Bailey Gregory Satterfield
Scott R. Satterfield Barbara Ann Camp
Buffalo Minerals, LLC Lawrence D. Bailey
Ernest Gerald Mason Mary Joe Satterfield
Michael Brian Satterfield John E. Girard
Mary Joe Satterfield Lamson Petroleum
Barbara Ann Camp Corporation
Lamson Petroleum Scott R. Satterfield
Corporation Ernest Gerald Mason

Arthur Daniel Mouton Timothy Scott Cragin
Attorney at Law Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 52269 639 Loyola Avenue, 26th Floor
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505 New Orleans, Louisiana 70113
(337) 233-3697 (504) 576-6571
COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
John E. Girard Mary Joe Satterfield
Barbara Ann Camp Lamson Petroleum
Gregory Satterfield Corporation
Buffalo Minerals, LLC Scott R. Satterfield
Mary Joe Satterfield Buffalo Minerals, LLC
Michael Brian Satterfield Ernest Gerald Mason
Scott R. Satterfield Gregory Satterfield
Ernest Gerald Mason John E. Girard
Lawrence D. Bailey Barbara Ann Camp
Lamson Petroleum Lawrence D. Bailey
Corporation Michael Brian Satterfield

James Parkerson Roy Fred William Davis
Domengeaux & Wright Attorney at Law
Post Office Box 3668 701 Robley Drive, Suite 210
Lafayette, Louisiana 70502 Lafayette, Louisiana 70503
(337) 233-3033 (337) 981-0309
COUNSEL FOR COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
James Parkerson Roy Bethel Baptist Church,
Lafayette, Louisiana

2

Mark Harrison Tompkins
Ewell Elton Eagan, Jr. Attorney at Law
Gordon, Arata, M cCollam, Post Office Box 52526
Duplantis & Eagan, L.L.P. Lafayette, Louisiana 70505
201 St. Charles Ave., #4000 (337) 232-5300
New Orleans, Louisiana 70170 COUNSEL FOR
(504) 582-1111 DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
COUNSEL FOR Ena Claire Ashy
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: James H. Echezabal
Union Oil Company of Doug Ashy
California Triton Oil & Gas Corp.
Arthur C. LeBlanc, Jr. Petrocorp, Inc.
CPL & Associates Union Oil Company of
California
John Weir Grant J.H. Echezabel, Inc.
Attorney at Law
Post Office Drawer 52604 Marshall Fitzgerald Maestri
Lafayette, Louisiana 70505-2604 Attorney at Law
(337) 234-3777 Post Office Box 39200
COUNSEL FOR Lafayette, Louisiana 70593-9200
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE: COUNSEL FOR
Robert J. Boudreaux DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Mabel B. Lagneaux Union Oil Company of
Donald T. Boudreaux California
Wayne Boudreaux

3

WOODARD, Judge.

Lamson Petroleum appeals the trial court’s judgment concerning accounting.
It alleges that the court improperly admitted evidence and improperly relied on
evidence when rendering judgment. Because we find no error in the trial court’s
rulings, we affirm.

*****

This appeal arises out of the contested ownership of several tracts of land in the
Scott Field Area of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana.1 Hallwood Petroleum began
searching for oil in Scott Field in 1989. In the mid 1990's, Lamson Petroleum
(Lamson) researched the public records for the area and concluded that the lessors
who had leased certain roadbeds to Hallwood, may not have been the owners. It
began securing leases, retroactive to 1990, from those people it thought were the
owners of the roadbeds, it then filed petitory actions against Hallwood and their
lessors, asserting its right to proceeds of the production and ownership.
On June 6, 2001, the trial court ruled in Lamson’s favor on the majority of its
ownership claims. In its judgment the court, required that:

[w]ithin 60 days of the entry of this Judgment, the Defendants shall
make a full report and accounting of and pay to Lamson all proceeds
received by the Defendants or others on their behalf, from the sale of any
oil, gas or mineral production attributable to the undivided fifty percent
(50%) interest of Lamson and its lessors...

An accounting was not timely provided to Lamson, and it motioned for a
hearing under La.Code Civ.P. art 2504, seeking an order appointing and directing a
third person to perform the accounting. Lamson submitted its own accounting in
evidence at a February 25, 2003 hearing, which the court accepted as an accounting
against several defendants not involved in this appeal.

1
See Lamson Petroleum Corp. v. Hallwood Petroleum, Inc. 02-138 (La.App 3
Cir. 7/10/02), 823 So.2d 431, writ granted in part, 02-419 (La.10/25/02), 832 So.2d
975, affirmed on rehearing en banc, 02-138 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/31/02), 843 So.2d 424,
and cases cited therein.

1

Judgment was not yet final against the appellees in this case, Union Oil
Company of California, Petrocorp Incorporated, Triton Oil & Gas Corp., James H.
Echezabal, J.H. Echezabal, Inc., and Doug Ashy and Ena Claire Ashy (collectively
the Unocal defendants), until April 21, 2003. Thereafter, they failed to provide
Lamson with an accounting within 60 days.
Lamson filed another motion under La.Code Civ.P. art 2504, and the matter was
heard on August 26, 2003. At the hearing, Unocal introduced in evidence an
accounting presentation and a land surveyor, Gene Prather’s, testimony. Mr. Prather
referenced a survey plat he prepared, and his testimony centered on whether the
disputed portion of a roadway, Lamson used in its accounting, was in accord with the
June 6, 2001 judgment.
Counsel for the Unocal defendants also testified and explained the procedure
undertaken to create the accounting presentation. During testimony, counsel realized
his accounting numbers were off by approximately 12.5%, and, together with Lamson,
they adjusted the numbers to include the 12.5% error, and ultimately, to include other
allocated costs. Counsel for Unocal stipulated these numbers were correct and were
consistent with Lamson’a accounting as modified by Mr. Prather’s acreage
calculations. Then, Lamson provided the final numbers to the court but, inadvertently,
provided them without the 12.5% offset. On November 6, 2003, the court awarded
a judgment based on these incorrect numbers.
Unocal motioned for a new trial, alleging that trial court relied on incorrect
numbers when rendering judgment. The court held a hearing on this motion on
January 21, 2004, and counsel for Unocal alleged that his earlier numbers, including
those with the 12.5% offset and allocated costs, were incorrect. He submitted new
calculations which were much more favorable to Unocal. Counsel explained, in detail
to the court, the accounting changes he made to arrive at his new numbers. The court
granted the motion for new trial, in part, vacating the November 6, 2003 judgment and
awarding a new judgment, on February 11, 2004, based on the earlier calculations that
included the 12.5% offset that Unocal’s counsel stipulated were correct at the first
hearing. In doing so, it rejected the numbers Unocal submitted at the new trial hearing.
This appeal arises from certain evidentiary rulings the trial court made at the
August 26, 2003 hearing, as well as the subsequent judgments it issued. Specifically,
Lamson alleges that the trial court erred by: (1) allowing Unocal’s accounting into

2

evidence, (2) allowing the testimony of an expert designated as a non-testifying
expert, (3) relying on Unocal’s accounting, and (4) not relying on Lamson’s
accounting.

S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
A “trial court’s discretion concerning the admission of evidence is vast.” 2
Therefore, we will not overturn its decision to exclude or include evidence, absent a
clear showing that it abused its discretion.3 We review the trial court’s factual
conclusions under the manifest error standard; thus, we will not disturb its factual
determinations unless we conclude after reviewing the record that a reasonable factual
basis does not exist for the trial court's findings, and that the record establishes that
the trial court's findings are clearly wrong.4

T HE A DMISSION OF U NOCAL’S A CCOUNTING
First, Lamson alleges that the trial court improperly allowed Unocal’s late
accounting in evidence. As the trial court acknowledged, the accounting for the
Unocal defendants was due on June 20, 2003. At the hearing, Lamson objected to the
admission of the accounting because it was not timely. The trial court noted Lamson’s
objection and indicated that it would allow Lamson time to examine the accounting
and allow cross-examination at a later date. However, Lamson declined to do so,
stating that it would “like to get it over with today...because [it] didn’t want to delay
it any longer.”
Lamson maintains on appeal that the prejudicial effect on Lamson outweighed
the probative value of the accounting by its presentment on the morning of the
hearing. In support of its argument, it cites to our holding in Mai v. Blair.5 In Mai,
this court upheld the trial court’s finding that the admission of certain evidence on the

2
Adams v. Canal Indemnity Co., 99-1190, p.7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/00), 760
So.2d 1197, 1202, writs denied, 00-1636, 00-1637, 00-1640 (La. 9/22/00), 769 So.2d
1212.
3
Id.
4
Stobart v. State through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).
5
634 So.2d 1202 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993).

3

morning of trial would so severely prejudice the opposing party that any probative
value of the evidence was outweighed.6
However, in the instant case, the trial court gave Lamson the opportunity to
study the accounting and proceed with any questions at a later date. Lamson declined
this invitation. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing Unocal’s accounting in evidence.

T HE A DMISSION OF P RATHER’S T ESTIMONY
During the earlier trial resulting in the June 6, 2001 judgment, Mr. Prather was
designated as a non-testifying expert. Lamson maintains on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion by allowing Mr. Prather to testify that the boundary line Lamson
used, when producing its accounting, was incorrect. As the trial court noted in its
reasons for judgment:

[i]n permitting the testimony by Prather, it was the court’s determination
that the basis for the non-testifying status of Prather in the original trial
was not applicable to the present hearing. The court agreed, however, in
view of the complexity of the evidence, that after it was submitted by
defendant, the hearing could be continued to a later date in order to give
counsel for Lamson the opportunity to review it, including submitting it
Lamson’s surveyor and for cross-examination of Prather and
presentation of rebuttal evidence if considered necessary. However, it
was Lamson’s choice to cross-examine the witness that day and submit
the case for adjudication without consulting its surveyor or presenting
any further evidence.

Lamson points to several cases where the court excluded expert testimony
because the objecting party did not have notice that the expert would testify.
However, once again, Lamson chose not to take the time to review Mr. Prather’s
testimony or survey or to submit them to its own experts. We note that Lamson cross-
examined Prather at length, and the trial court concluded that “cross examination
failed to disclose any substantive error in either the methodology or in his
calculations.”
Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Mr. Prather’s testimony in evidence.

6
Id.

4

R EJECTION OF L AMSON’S A CCOUNTING
Lamson maintains that the trial court erred by not relying on its accounting.
However, we note that the trial court accepted Lamson’s accounting,“except as [the
accounting] is modified by the judgment amounts set forth below which modification
is made solely to conform the accounting of Lamson Petroleum to the acreage figures
set forth” by Mr. Prather’s survey. As the trial court mentioned in written reasons,
“[t]his court held that the Lamson accounting exceeded the fifteen foot limitation [of
the June 6, 2001 judgment] in certain areas,” and ordered a judgment based upon
Prather’s calculations. Thus, “at the conclusion of the new trial hearing, Lamson re-
submitted the judgment which had been submitted earlier . . . based upon Prather’s
calculations, but in all other respects, in accordance with Lamson’s accounting.”
Because we concluded that the trial court properly admitted the survey and
testimony about the survey in evidence, we do not conclude that it manifestly erred
when relying on the survey.

R ELIANCE O N U NOCAL’S A CCOUNTING
Lamson objects to the trial court’s reliance on Unocal’s accounting. Its
argument centers around Unocal’s allegation at the hearing for a new trial that all its
previous numbers were incorrect and, then, its submission of new, more favorable
numbers. Lamson contends that the trial court’s acceptance of numbers, which
Unocal alleged at the hearing for a new trial were incorrect, is manifestly erroneous.
At the hearing for a new trial, it heard testimony about how Unocal reached its
new accounting numbers. The trial court rejected Unocal’s new calculations, noting,
instead, that the numbers everyone agreed on at the hearing, “[i]f the surveying matter
is found in favor of the defendant” were the numbers which were supposed to be in
the judgment. Implicit in its ruling, accepting the previous accounting, is the rejection
of Unocal’s reasoning submitted at the new trial hearing—a factual determination
which we will not disturb.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s acceptance of Lamson’s
accounting, as modified by Mr. Prather’s acreage calculation, was correct.

*****

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CONCLUSION

Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting Mr. Prather’s testimony and Unocal’s accounting in evidence, and we
conclude that the trial court did not manifestly err by relying on the evidence, we
affirm. We assign the costs of this appeal to Lamson Petroleum.

AFFIRMED.

6