John H. Pucheu v. Maxine Guidry Pucheu

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-1372

JOHN H. PUCHEU

VERSUS

MAXINE GUIDRY PUCHEU

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 02–C-1721
HONORABLE DONALD W. HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, Jimmie C. Peters, Michael
G. Sullivan and James T. Genovese, Judges.

SAUNDERS, J., CONCURS.

DECUIR, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.

REVERSED.

Anne E. Watson
232 N. Liberty Street
Opelousas, Louisiana 70570
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
John H. Pucheu

J. Ogden Middleton, II
1412 Centre Court, Suite 403
Alexandria, Louisiana 71301
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Maxine Guidry Pucheu

GENOVESE, JUDGE.

This appeal presents the question of whether mental illness was sufficiently

proven so as to excuse the fault of the wife in the break up of the marriage for

purposes of final periodic support. The trial court found that the wife was excused

from fault and awarded $2,000.00 per month in final periodic support. For the

following reasons, we reverse.

FACTS

John Pucheu (“John”) and Maxine Guidry Pucheu (“Maxine”) were married on

December 9, 1988, separated January 9, 2000, and divorced on August 14, 2002.

Prior to their marriage, Maxine was employed by the Louisiana Legislature and John

was practicing law in Eunice, Louisiana. Upon marrying, Maxine left her job and

moved to the Pucheu family home in Eunice. Maxine had no prior children. John

had three children from a previous marriage. The couple had no children together,

but raised John’s three children, who are now adults.

Following a four-day trial on the issues of fault and final periodic support, the

trial court found that Maxine’s behavior during the marriage constituted fault which

led to the dissolution of the marriage. However, the trial court held that Maxine’s

fault was excused due to her pre-existing mental illness and awarded her final

periodic support in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. John appeals.

ISSUE

The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in finding that
Maxine Guidry Pucheu’s mental illness excused her from fault thereby
entitling her to final periodic support.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana Civil Code article 111 provides that a court “may award final

periodic support to a party free from fault prior to the filing of a proceeding to

terminate the marriage.”

In the present case, the trial court found that Maxine’s behavior during the

marriage constituted fault which led to the dissolution of the marriage. We agree with

the following factual findings of the trial court which are well supported by the

evidence in the record:

It is the factual finding of this Court that Mrs. Pucheu’s actions as
proven by Mr. Pucheu include, but are not limited to, her refusal to
participate in family activities, including all of the daily activities of
dining together and care of the minor children, failure to properly
communicate to her spouse and children, failure to perform household
chores, isolation of herself from other members of the immediate family,
cruel treatment, and outrages. When these instances of misconduct are
combined with each other it is this Court’s factual finding that they rose
to the level of fault and led to the ultimate dissolution of the marriage.

Even though the trial court found that Maxine was at fault in the break up of

the marriage, the trial court went on to state that the “behavior which constituted fault

in the dissolution of the marriage was involuntarily induced over an extended period

of time by her preexisting mental illness and excuses her of the same.” In reaching

this conclusion, the trial court relied upon Credeur v. Lalonde, 511 So.2d 65 (La.App.

3 Cir.), writ denied, 513 So.2d 822 (La.1987) which states as follows:

This Court further finds that the length of treatment and mental illness
documentation presented is more than sufficient to allow this Court to
form a reasonable factual basis of the reason for her conduct.
Furthermore, particular medical expert testimony is not required for each
instance of misconduct at each particular junction of her illness
including symptoms which arose to the level of misconduct that
constituted fault in the marriage’s dissolution when such a reasonable
factual basis for their cause exists.

However, this court finds that the trial court erred as a matter of law by

misinterpreting and misapplying Credeur and the prior jurisprudence on mental

illness as it relates to fault, or an excuse therefor, in the breakup of a marriage.

Relying on Credeur, the trial court reasoned that Maxine did not have to

establish by medical evidence that all of her acts constituting fault were caused by her

mental illness. This is a mistatement and misapplication of our holding in Credeur.

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In Credeur, unlike the matter before us, this court was faced with examining

only one assertion of fault based on abandonment. The evidentiary issue in Credeur

arose when a spouse had been diagnosed with a schizophrenic disorder in February

of 1984, and did not abandon the matrimonial domicile until August of 1984, some

five months later. This court simply stated that the reasons given by the spouse for

abandoning the matrimonial domicile were consistent with the diagnosed mental

illness disorder, i.e., fear that her husband and daughter were going to do her bodily

harm, and that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that there was a causal

connection. In contrast, with Maxine, the medical witnesses were not clear

concerning which actions were caused by her mental condition and which were not.

Dr. Krishna Yalamanchili, Maxine’s treating psychiatrist for over twenty years, was

unable to state with any degree of medical certainty or probability that Maxine’s

mental illness was the cause of all of her behavior constituting fault. Thus, we find

as a matter of law, the trial court applied the wrong standard to the facts in evidence,

and the error of law removes it from a manifest error analysis by this court.

When the court of appeal finds that a reversible error of law or manifest error

of material fact was made, it is obligated to conduct a de novo review of the entire

record and render a judgment on the merits wherever possible. Rosell v. ESCO, 549

So.2d 840 (La.1989); Campo v. Correa, 01-2707 (La. 6/21/02), 828 So.2d 502 (citing

Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So.2d 742.)

The record in this case reveals that Maxine had underlying emotional problems.

However, the factual and medical evidence established long periods between

documented medical treatment. Her first hospitalization occurred in 1982, six years

before her marriage to John. At this time, Maxine was diagnosed with anxiety

disorder and hysterical personality disorder. Despite her illness, she successfully

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worked at the Louisiana Legislature for eight years and continued to work there until

the marriage. The next hospitalization did not occur until 1996, eight years after the

marriage, when she was hospitalized for a personality disorder. Thereafter, she was

not hospitalized again until 2001, which was one year after the parties separated for

the last time. The diagnosis on this occasion was a major depressive disorder and

unspecified personality disorder.

The record reveals that Maxine engaged in a variety of behavior. In addition

to publicly criticizing her husband and refusing to participate with him in public

events, Maxine did not cook, clean house, iron, or maintain any marital sexual

relationship. She also exhibited bizarre behavior such as spending most of her time

locked in her bedroom with her dog, maintaining the bedroom in such a manner that

only the dog felt welcome, starting construction projects in the middle of the night,

playing the television intolerably loud so as to alienate everyone in the house,

engaging in screaming tantrums, cursing her husband, throwing objects, insisting that

he make more money to maintain her required lifestyle, and requiring him to run

errands for her during work hours. These were only some examples of her bizarre

behavior and activities.

Although there was sufficient proof in the record of mental illness to excuse

much of her bizarre and erratic behavior, there was likewise behavior constituting

independent fault not proven with any degree of medical certainty to be caused by her

specific mental condition. There were periods of remission where the fault

inexplicably continued. The mere proof of mental illness does not excuse all fault.

In the case at bar, there were numerous incidents and behavior constituting fault

which were not proven by a preponderance of the medial evidence to have been

caused or excused by the wife’s mental illness. A review of the jurisprudence on this

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issue supports this court’s conclusion, that for behavior constituting fault to be

excused for purposes of final periodic support, the spouse must establish that each act

constituting fault was caused by mental illness.

In Gilbert v. Hutchinson, 135 So.2d 283 (La.App. 3 Cir 1961), the issue was

“whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiff wife a separation from

bed and board, under the evidence, on the alleged ground of cruel treatment.” Id. at

284. Applying the law on separation as it existed at that time, this court noted “the

general rule that cruelties or indignities committed by one spouse are not cause for

a divorce or separation when such conduct is due to a physical or mental condition,

since the misconduct is considered excused to the extent that it was involuntarily

induced by such mental or physical condition.” Id. at 285(emphasis added). This

language was later relied upon in Courville v. Courville, 363 So.2d 954 (La.App. 3

Cir. 1978), writ denied, 365 So.2d 243 (La.1978). Again applying the law regarding

living separate and apart, this court, in Courville, wrote:

The trial court found that the wife’s actions toward her husband were
sufficient to constitute cruel treatment. However, the trial court also
held:

“Because of her mental condition at the time of the
separation, I find that Mrs. Courville cannot be found at
fault in causing the separation, as her condition is
considered excused under our law to the extent that it was
involuntarily induced by such mental condition”

Id. at 956 (emphasis added).

The distinction of the holdings of Gilbert and Courville from the trial court’s

interpretation of Credeur is the limiting language. Courville does not stand for the

proposition that proof of mental illness by a spouse seeking final periodic support

excuses, without limitation, that spouse from actions constituting fault. Rather, the

jurisprudence has recognized that mental illness of a spouse, if proven, excuses those

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actions which constitute fault in the break up of a marriage to the extent that each

act of fault was caused or involuntarily induced by the mental condition.

In the case of Maxine, the experts were significantly vague on what fault issues

were caused by her mental condition and those issues that were simply unpardonable

fault on her part. The trial judge reasoned that the medical evidence established that

some of her actions were excused because of her mental condition, but those which

were not so clearly identifiable would be included with her other behavior based on

the holding of Credeur. This court has conducted a de novo review of the record and

finds that none of the medical professionals testifying at trial stated that Maxine’s

mental problems caused her to do all of the things that she did. The experts simply

stated that some of her actions might be expected if she did not follow the

recommended treatment program.

The mental illness exception excusing fault was jurisprudentially established

to protect a spouse suffering from a condition that renders the spouse’s actions

impossible to control. Credeur is an example of such a situation given the wife’s

schizophrenic disorder. However, a mental condition, especially one that results in

intermittent flare-ups, with periodic remission, does not excuse all behavior

constituting fault. If so, an individual who marries someone with a mental condition

would be responsible for the support of that person no matter what actions are

undertaken by that person and regardless of whether the actions go beyond the realm

of the condition from which the person suffers. Such is not the intent of the mental

illness exception.

The trial court in this matter worked hard to reach a fair resolution of the issues

in a difficult case. This court agrees with the trial court that Maxine’s behavior

during the marriage constituted fault which led to the dissolution of the marriage. We

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also agree that Maxine suffers from a mental illness. However, having reviewed the

record in its entirety, we find that Maxine failed in her burden of proving that each

of her actions constituting fault were involuntarily induced by her mental condition

thereby excusing her fault by law. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial

court’s judgment excusing Maxine from fault due to her mental illness and awarding

her final periodic support. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Maxine Guidry

Pucheu.

REVERSED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

04-1372

JOHN H. PUCHEU

VERSUS

MAXINE GUIDRY PUCHEU

DECUIR, J., dissenting.

In reversing this fact intensive domestic dispute over the effects of mental

illness on the dissolution of the marriage, the majority abandons the manifest error

standard of review which governs this case. Accordingly, I dissent, finding the

majority substitutes its own opinion for that of the fact finder and misinterprets

jurisprudence pertinent to this case.

The majority characterizes the trial court’s reasoning as legal error and finds

the trial court’s reliance on Credeur v. Lalonde, 511 So.2d 65 (La.App.3 Cir.), writ

denied, 513 So.2d 822 (La.1987) is misplaced. Contrary to the majority’s holding,

however, I believe the trial court’s ruling was correct and well-supported by the

Credeur decision. The wife in Credeur sought to be excused from fault in

abandoning the matrimonial domicile based on a previous diagnosis of schizophrenia,

which the medical evidence showed was in remission three months prior to the

abandonment. Notwithstanding the fact that the wife’s medical condition on the date

of abandonment could not be proved, the court nevertheless found that her mental

illness excused her conduct. The court explained:

Although Dr. Dupree testified that he had no way of knowing
what defendant’s mental condition was as of that date, we note that
medical expert testimony is not necessary for a finding of mental
incapacity sufficient to excuse a spouse from fault. Gipson v. Gipson,
379 So.2d 1171 (La.App. 2 Cir.), writ denied, 383 So.2d 799 (La.1980).

(Emphasis added.) Id. at 67. The trial court in the instant case relied on proof of a

reasonable factual basis indicating a causal connection between Maxine’s behavior

and the dissolution of the marriage. Similarly, the Creduer court found a “reasonable

factual basis” to be sufficient proof:

Under these circumstances, there was a reasonable factual basis
upon which the trial court could have concluded that defendant was, on
August 27, 1984, suffering from a mental illness and that her mental
illness contributed to or was the cause of her abandonment. Absent
manifest error, findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal.
Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978).

Id.

In the recent case of Gremillion v. Gremillion, 39,588, p.17 (La.App. 2 Cir.

4/6/05), _____So.2d_____, the court reiterated the rule that findings of fact “on the

issue of fault will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous.” There, the wife’s

behavior was described as irritable, emotional, and argumentative following brain

surgery to remove a subdural hematoma. She had a history of bipolar disorder and

depression, and her symptoms were exacerbated by the surgery. The trial court

refused to attribute fault to her; rather, he found the husband’s failure to accompany

her when she was put out of her daughter’s house constituted mental cruelty and

constructive abandonment. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the second

circuit noted:

[T]o place legal blame or fault on Mrs. Gremillion, which in fact is a
legal judgment of moral responsibility for ending the marriage, would
be inappropriate. Indeed it is questionable whether an individual
suffering from mental illness can be blameworthy or at “fault” for the
dissolution of a marriage where it is the symptomatic behavior of the
mental disease that caused the dissolution. . . . This would be tantamount
to placing moral blame on an insane individual for acts attributable to
his insanity and over which he had no control.

Id., p. 18-19.

2

In my view, the trial court properly interpreted the Credeur case and its

reliance on that opinion was appropriate. Accordingly, I would adhere to the supreme

court’s most recent pronouncement on the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of

review in Driscoll v. Stucker, 04-0589 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 32, which I believe

governs this case:

In civil cases, the appropriate standard for appellate review of
factual determinations is the manifest error-clearly wrong standard,
which precludes the setting aside of a district court’s finding of fact
unless that finding is clearly wrong in light of the record reviewed in its
entirety. Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Assn, 2002-2660 (La.
6/27/03),851 So.2d 1006, 1023. Thus, a reviewing court may not merely
decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Id. The
reviewing court should affirm the district court where the district court
judgment is not clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Id., 851 So.2d
at 1023.

One of the basic tenets of the manifest error standard of review is
that “reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of
fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the court of
appeal is convinced that had it been the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently.” Parish Nat. Bank v. Ott, 2002-1562
(La. 2/25/03), 841 So.2d 749, 753. This principle is further explained
in Ott as follows:

This court has announced a two-part test for the
reversal of the factfinder’s determinations: (1) the appellate
court must find from the record that a reasonable factual
basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court, and
(2) the appellate court must further determine that the
record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong
(manifestly erroneous). The issue to be resolved by the
reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact is right or
wrong but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a
reasonable one.... The reviewing court must always keep
in mind that if the trial court’s findings are reasonable in
light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the appellate
court may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been
sitting as trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence
differently.

04-0589, at p. 10.

The facts in the record show that Maxine has regularly received psychiatric

care since at least 1982, which care has included three hospitalizations. Her treating

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psychiatrist for more than twenty years testified at trial, as did a psychologist who

treated Maxine for several years. John himself was actively involved in Maxine’s

psychiatric care, transporting her to Baton Rouge for appointments and discussing her

sessions and medications with the doctors. Through the years, Maxine was diagnosed

with both Axis I and Axis II mental illnesses as described in the DSM-IV: anxiety

disorder, hysterical personality disorder, depressive disorder, and an unspecified

personality disorder. Pursuant to Axis III and Axis IV, physical ailments such as

ulcers and chronic back pain were present and social and marital stressors were noted.

Additionally, Maxine received low scores on functioning assessment tests with regard

to Axis V. The trial court determined that Maxine’s medical history and mental

conditions form a reasonable factual basis to explain or excuse her conduct.

I believe a reasonable factual basis exists for the finding of the trial court and

see no manifest error in its judgment. The trial court’s conclusions are well supported

by the evidence. Maxine’s psychiatric history shows a longstanding disorder which

directly affected the marriage and ultimately caused its failure. Her disorder was

characterized by poor judgment, hysteria, depression, and social and marital stress.

The testimony presented by both sides depict Maxine as a very troubled and

emotional person. These symptoms culminated in and caused Maxine’s behavior and

ended her relationship with her husband. Medical evidence directly linking each act

of fault with Maxine’s diagnosis is unnecessary when the record so clearly depicts a

woman whose disorders took over the household.

The majority, however, holds Maxine to an impossible burden. That she, as a

mentally ill, depressed and anxious wife, with at times minimal functioning

capabilities, could provide psychological evidence regarding each and every act of

misbehavior, as described by her husband and over the course of a twelve-year

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marriage, is preposterous. Tellingly, the majority is unable to describe, and not even

once hint at, which behaviors might not be excusable and which are. How then could

Maxine? That, of course, is the province of the trial court and the rationale of

Credeur.

Because I find no manifest error in the conclusion that Maxine met her burden

of proving a causal connection between her mental illness and her fault in causing the

failure of the marriage, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court’s

judgment.

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