Theresa Hamilton v. City of Natchitoches

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-71

THERESA HAMILTON

VERSUS

CITY OF NATCHITOCHES, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. 74684, DIV. B
HONORABLE FRED C. SEXTON JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and J.
David Painter, Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Otis Edwin Dunahoe, Jr.
DUNAHOE LAW FIRM
P. O. Box 607
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0607
Telephone: (318) 352-1999
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellant - Theresa Hamilton

Edward M. Campbell
Special Assistant Attorney General
1721 Washington Street
Natchitoches, LA 71457
Telephone: (318) 560-3027
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - State of Louisiana, through DOTD

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

In this workers’ compensation case, Theresa Hamilton, a public school

teacher, was injured while she accompanied a class on a school-sponsored field trip.

The injury occurred on La. Hwy. 6 which is maintained by the State of Louisiana,

through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). Ms. Hamilton

filed a tort suit against the DOTD. The DOTD filed a motion for summary judgment

arguing that workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for Ms. Hamilton. The trial

court granted the motion for summary judgment. Ms. Hamilton appeals. Because

Natchitoches Parish School Board and DOTD are independent entities, La.R.S.

23:1034(E) is inapplicable. We, therefore, reverse and remand to allow Ms. Hamilton

to proceed with her action in tort.

I.

ISSUE

We will consider whether the trial court erred in granting a summary

judgment.

II.

FACTS

Theresa Hamilton, an employee of Natchitoches Parish School Board,

accompanied her class on a field trip. As she assisted her students across the street,

La. Hwy. 6, Mrs. Hamilton stepped off the curb and fell, breaking a bone in her foot.

She receives workers’ compensation benefits for her broken foot.

Mrs. Hamilton alleges that she fell due to a defective condition in the

pavement, and brought suit against the Louisiana Department of Transportation and

Development (DOTD). DOTD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that

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Ms. Hamilton is precluded from bringing suit against DOTD because of the

exclusivity provisions of the workers’ compensation laws governing suits by public

employees. The DOTD specifically asserts that La.R.S. 23:1032(A)(1), when

combined with La. R.S. 23:1034(E), precludes Ms. Hamilton from asserting any claim

except that of a workers’ compensation claims against her employee, Natchitoches

Parish School Board. The trial court granted the motion, and Ms. Hamilton appeals.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

A summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions,

interrogatory responses, and admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there

is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). This court reviews summary judgments

de novo applying the same criteria as the trial court to determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Bd. of Sup’rs, 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991).

After a review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s grant of a

summary judgment. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032A(1)(a) sets forth the

exclusiveness of the workers’ compensation remedy and states “[e]xcept for

intentional acts provided for in Subsection B, the rights and remedies herein granted

to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury . . . shall be exclusive of all

other rights, remedies, and claims for damages.” As an employee of Natchitoches

Parish School Board, Ms. Hamilton is a public employee and La.R.S. 23:1034(E)

reasserts the “exclusive, compulsory, and obligatory” remedy of workers’

compensation for public employees. However, it is not so with reference to third-

party wrongdoers whose fault caused the injury as La.R.S. 23:1101provides:

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When an injury or compensable sickness or disease for
which compensation is payable under this Chapter has
occurred under circumstances creating in some person (in
this Section referred to as “third person”) other than those
persons against whom the said employee’s rights and
remedies are limited in R.S. 23:1032, a legal liability to pay
damages in respect thereto, the aforesaid employee or his
dependents may claim compensation under this Chapter .
...

DOTD argues that they are not a “third person.” However, they do not

fall into any classification that La.R.S. 23:1032 specifically excludes as third persons.

Therefore, DOTD is not immune. DOTD also makes much of La.R.S. 23:1034(E),

which states:

For the purposes of this Section, the compensation
provided in Subsection A of this Section shall be the
exclusive remedy when an employee of the state or a
political subdivision incurs a compensable claim on the
premises of another political subdivision who is required
by law or cooperative endeavor agreement to provide the
employer with the premises or amenities of the workplace.
Neither the state nor any political subdivision, acting as an
employer, shall have a subrogation claim against any other
political subdivision for any compensable claim made by
an employee.

(Emphasis added). The language and construction of the statute does not lend itself

to the facts of this case. Thus, it is not dispositive. DOTD is not required, neither by

law nor cooperative agreement, to provide the Natchitoches School Board with

premises or amenities of the workplace. Simply put, DOTD has a duty to maintain

the public highways in a condition that is reasonably safe for all persons exercising

ordinary care and reasonable prudence. La.R.S. 48:21(A). This duty is not

specifically upheld for the Natchitoches School Board. Thus, La.R.S. 23:1034(E) is

not applicable.

Furthermore, in order to apply the workers’ compensation statutes

adequately our inquiry must also address whether Natchitoches School Board and

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DOTD are separate entities despite being political subdivisions of the State of

Louisiana. In this situation, “the determination that must be made in each particular

case is whether the entity can appropriately be regarded as an additional and separate

government unit for the particular purpose at issue.” Roberts v. Sewerage and Water

Bd. of New Orleans, 92-2048 p. 9 (La. 3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341, 346-7. We find that

they are separate entities.

The supreme court addressed a similar situation in Roberts v. Sewerage

and Water Bd. of New Orleans, and we find the court’s analysis analogous to the

present case and very persuasive. Roberts, 92-2048 (La. 3/21/94), 634 So.2d 341.

In Roberts, a police officer brought an action against the city sewerage and water

board (SWB) to recover for injury caused when his patrol car hit an open sewer hole.

The supreme court explained:

[W]hile the SWB and the City of New Orleans are closely
related, the fact that a political subdivision is closely
related to another does not necessarily prevent it from
being considered a “third person” for purposes of the
workers’ compensation act. Local government units such
as the SWB are generally treated as separate and distinct
public juridical persons or corporations for certain
purposes whether they are called that or not.

....

Applying a functional approach in the present case to the
pertinent legal precepts and the face of the pleadings, we
conclude that the SWB is an autonomous or self-governing
legal entity with respect to the management of its business
or function of providing water, sewerage and drainage
service to consumers in Orleans and other parishes. As
such, the SWB is legally independent of the City, state and
other governments in its source of revenues; the
employment, deployment, direction and control of its work
force; and the comprehensive management of its public
utility operations.

Id. at 10-11.

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Likewise, we look to the functions of the DOTD and parish school

boards to evaluate their relationships with the State. Parish school boards are

established by La.Const. art. 8 § 9. In general they have much discretion to determine

the number of schools; location of the schools; number of teachers employed;

teachers’ salaries; and adopt policies and procedures for the superintendent to uphold.

See La.R.S. 17:81. They are also recognized as “constituted bodies corporate with

power to sue.” La.R.S. 17:151. Although they must comply with State laws, parish

school boards are autonomous political creatures that are separate and distinct entities

providing the framework for education in their respective parishes. In contrast, the

DOTD is a department of the executive branch and charged with providing and

maintaining our public roadways. As such, the State of Louisiana is the real party at

interest.

DOTD suggests that this court follow the reasoning in Wright v. Moore,

280 So.2d 172 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1979). In Wright, a nurse employed by the

Department of Health and Human Resources who was injured during the course and

scope of her employment brought suit against the DOTD in connection with a

malfunctioning semaphore signal. The first circuit held that the plaintiff’s exclusive

remedy was for workers’ compensation. We find this case to be distinguishable. The

plaintiff was an employee of the State of Louisiana; she received her check from the

State of Louisiana; and, therefore, she was barred from suing her employer. In this

case, Ms. Hamilton was an employee of a parish school board, not the State of

Louisiana.

We further differentiate Talley v. State of Louisiana, 31,367 (La.App 2

Cir. 12/9/98), 722 So.2d 390, where plaintiff, an employee of the State, sued the

Department of Health and Hospitals and the court determined that workers’

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compensation was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. In Talley, the plaintiff was

directly employed by the Louisiana Department of Education as a paraprofessional.

Again, as noted in Wright, the State of Louisiana was the ultimate employer and

workers’ compensation statutes provided the exclusive remedy. Here, Ms. Hamilton

was employed by Natchitoches Parish School Board, not the State. By extension, the

DOTD and the Natchitoches Parish School Board are separate entities. Therefore,

Ms. Hamilton is not prevented from bringing a suit alleging a tort.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of a motion

for summary judgment. We remand for trial on the merits on the tort claim. All costs

of this appeal are assessed against defendant, Department of Transportation and

Development in the amount of $587.20.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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