CA-0005-0322 Nonprecedential Processed

First Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Ron Ceasar

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed November 2, 2005

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., April 20, 2005

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-322

FIRST FAMILY FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.

VERSUS

RON CEASAR

**************
APPEAL FROM THE
CITY COURT OF LAKE CHARLES
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, DOCKET NO. 99-3035
HONORABLE JOHN S. HOOD, CITY COURT JUDGE

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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
**************

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Ron Ceasar
In Proper Person
P.O. Box 715
Oberlin, Louisiana 70655

COOKS, Judge.

The Plaintiff, Ron Ceasar, appeals the trial court dismissal of his Motion to

Annul Judgment. Because we find the trial court ruling is an interlocutory, non-

appealable ruling, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 29, 1999, First Family Financial Services (First Family) obtained

a default judgment against Ron Ceasar in the amount of $3,520.87. The loan was

secured by a Dodge Colt automobile and a Compaq Persario computer. On February

16, 2000, in response to a judgment debtor rule, Mr. Ceasar filed a document entitled

“Answer.” In the Answer, he acknowledged the indebtedness to First Family.

However, he contends the debt has been satisfied because First Family has possession

of the automobile and the insurance proceeds on the stolen computer. Paragraph

One of the Answer provides, in relevant part:

This is a secured loan with First Family and the collateral items
are a computer and 1988 Dodge Colt. Plaintiff has no other rights.
Plaintiff already has the title to the car which was never retrieved from
the full payment of the defendant’s first loan. The computer was stolen
from defendant’s residence while moving on March 8, 1999 but was
insured by defendant, First Family and [it]does have a right to collect the
insurance proceeds from the theft. These are the only secured rights of
the plaintiff and defendant objects to any other assertion. The car in
question is located at 2215 Cline St., Lake Charles, Louisiana.

On November 12, 2003, Mr. Ceasar, in proper person, filed another document

entitled “Motion and Order for Nullity of Judgment.” In this pleading, Mr. Ceasar

asserts he was not properly served with the petition which forms the basis of the

default judgment. Additionally, Mr. Ceasar again asserts First Family has received

full payment on the debt. Mr. Ceaser submitted into the record a copy of a letter

which he sent to First Family marked “Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to

Forward.” Apparently, First Family is no longer in business and left no forwarding

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address.

Because Mr. Ceasar’s pleading was entitled a “Motion”for Nullity, on January

31, 2005, the city court judge set Mr. Ceasar’s motion for a hearing. First Family had

never been served with the documents and was not present in the courtroom. At the

conclusion of the hearing, which consisted of a dialogue between the judge and Mr.

Ceasar, the city court judge denied the motion. In Reasons for Judgment, the trial

court found:

This matter is not properly before the court in that the original
plaintiff in this case, First Family Financial Services, Inc., has not been
served with the petition to annul judgment which is the action before the
court today. The return of the deputy marshal of December 20, 2004
shows that the original plaintiff (defendant in the motion to annul) “have
closed or went out of service.” The petition to annul judgment was
returned unserved. The plaintiff in the motion to annul should have then
served the defendant through the Secretary of State under the Code of
Civil Procedure Article 1262.

The original defendant, Mr. Ron Ceasar, at the hearing on the
motion to annul never offered any testimony under oath to overcome the
presumption of correctness of the return in the original proceeding. Mr.
Ceasar did not subpoena the deputy marshal who made the original
service. The court had no basis on which to rule that, by clear and
convincing evidence, the defendant had overcome the presumption of
validity attached to the serving officer’s return of the citation showing
personal service.

The motion to annul must be denied until such time as service of
the “Petition to Annul” is properly made on “First Family Financial
Services, Inc.” or their successor.

A judgment and order for appeal was signed by the trial court. For the reasons

assigned below, we dismiss the appeal.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

An appeal may be taken from a final judgment or an interlocutory judgment that

causes irreparable injury. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2083. A final judgment is one that

decides the merits of an action in whole or in part. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841. The

trial court denied Mr. Ceasar’s Motion to Annul on the basis that no service of

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process had been obtained on First Family. This ruling neither decides the merits of

the case in whole or in part. Accordingly, the ruling is interlocutory. Deville v.

Calogero, 96-162 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/24/96), 673 So.2d 1175. See also Goodwin v.

Goodwin, 607 So.2d 8 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1992). Since we find the ruling of the trial

court causes no irreparable injury, no appeal lies from the ruling. Therefore, we

hereby dismiss the instant appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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