Richard Romero v. Grey Wolf Drilling Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-498

RICHARD ROMERO

VERSUS

GREY WOLF DRILLING COMPANY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 76324-G
HONORABLE DURWOOD WAYNE CONQUE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell, and
J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

L. Clayton Burgess
Post Office Drawer 5250
Lafayette, LA 70502-5250
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Richard Romero

Jennie P. Pellegrin
One Petroleum Center, Suite 200
1001 West Pinhook Road
Lafayette, LA 70503
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Grey Wolf Drilling Company

PAINTER, Judge

Plaintiff, Richard Romero, filed the instant action in negligence against Grey

Wolf Drilling Company (“Grey Wolf”). Grey Wolf moved for summary judgment

based on assertions that Grey Wolf owed no duty to Plaintiff under the facts of this

case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Grey Wolf and Romero

now appeals, alleging that the evidence submitted by Grey Wolf in support of its

motion for summary judgment was insufficient. For the following reasons, the

summary judgment is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 25, 2000, Plaintiff injured his right ankle when a joint of drill pipe rolled

onto it. Plaintiff had climbed onto the pipe rack to position a piece of pipe that had

been removed from the well by a laydown machine operated by his co-worker, Ricky

Alleman. According to Plaintiff’s own description, on this particular occasion, he put

boards down across the pipe rack so a new layer could be started and he then signaled

Alleman to let the pipe joint come to him. He stepped over the pipe joint with one

foot but did not step quickly enough to avoid injury to his other ankle.

At that time, Plaintiff was employed as a lead laydown operator by Offshore

Energy Services, Inc. (“OES”) and was working at Grey Wolf’s rig 611 drilling

location. Austral Oil & Gas (“Austral”) was the well operator and had a contract with

OES for the laydown services. No Grey Wolf employee participated in the laydown

operations.

Plaintiff filed suit against Grey Wolf, alleging that Grey Wolf was “short-handed

in laying down drill pipe” and negligent in “keeping and maintaining inadequate

crews which caused unreasonably safe [sic] and dangerous conditions to other people

in the area” and in “creating an unsafe condition at the job site.”

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Grey Wolf moved for summary judgment on the ground that it owed no duty to

Romero in this situation. In support of its motion, Grey Wolf submitted the affidavit

of the Operations Manager for OES, Glenn Hohensee. According to Hohensee,

neither Grey Wolf nor any of its employees furnished the equipment necessary to

perform the laydown operations. Hohensee’s affidavit also stated that there was no

contract between Grey Wolf and Plaintiff’s employer, OES, relative to the work

performed by Plaintiff on the day of the accident and that Grey Wolf was not

contractually bound to furnish roustabouts or other employees to either roll pipe or

to help employees roll pipe. Further, according to Hohensee’s affidavit, Grey Wolf

had no input in the control or direction of the work that Plaintiff performed at its rig

611 or in the supervision of OES employees. Grey Wolf also submitted the affidavit

of Plaintiff’s co-worker, Ricky Alleman, who stated that neither he nor Plaintiff told

anyone at the drilling location that they needed assistance to roll the joints of pipe as

they were released from the laydown machine. Alleman also stated that Plaintiff

never told him that he needed assistance in placing the joints of pipe.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Grey Wolf granting the motion for

summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals, alleging that Grey Wolf did not have the proper

evidence to carry their burden of proof on summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

This court reviews summary judgments de novo, under the same criteria which

govern the district court’s consideration of the appropriateness of summary judgment.

Wright v. Coastal Fabrication, L.L.C., 04-1408 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899 So.2d

131 (citing Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342

(La.1991)). Thus, we must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact

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exist and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code

Civ.P. arts. 966(B) and (C).

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 966(C)(2) sets forth the applicable

burden of proof:

The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will
not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on
the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does
not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim,
action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence
of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's
claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce
factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his
evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

In this case, the inquiry on de novo review centers on whether Grey Wolf owed

a duty of care to Romero. In ruling for Defendant on its motion for summary

judgment, the trial court stated as follows:

. . . I find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Grey Wolf had
no duty to provide assistance in the laydown operation, specifically the roll
down of the pipe’s operation. The fact that help was gratuitously given on
other occasions when manpower was available, does not establish a duty. I
don’t think I get to the question of whether or not there was any negligence.
I will simply say that there is no dispute, no material issue of fact regarding
the dispute about the duty. I think it’s clear from the facts of the case that
there was no duty on the part of Grey Wolf , and that they are entitled as a
matter of law to Summary Judgment in this case.

In brief, Plaintiff summarizes his complaint as follows: “Presumably, had Grey

Wolf provided hands to assist with the laydown operations, Mr. Romero would not

have had to get on the top of the pipe rack and therefore, would not have gotten

injured.” In its motion for summary judgment, Grey Wolf disputed Plaintiff’s

allegation that Grey Wolf had a duty to perform or to help perform the laydown

operation in which Plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury. Louisiana Code

of Civil Procedure Article 966(C)(2) does not require Grey Wolf to negate all

essential elements of Romero’s claim, but “rather to point out to the court that there

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is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to plaintiffs’

claim.” Carrier v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 00-1335, p. 4 (La. 1/17/01), 776 So.2d

439, 441. In support of the motion, Grey Wolf submitted the affidavits of Hohensee

and Alleman, as described above, and the depositions of Plaintiff and Art Gunnells,

the safety manager for OES. We agree with the trial court that the evidence submitted

by Grey Wolf establishes that Grey Wolf had no duty to provide assistance in the

laydown operation and that there is no genuine issue of material fact in that regard.

Once Grey Wolf satisfied its burden, the burden shifted to Plaintiff to provide any

factual support sufficient to establish that he would be able to satisfy his evidentiary

burden of proof at trial. Plaintiff attempted to rely on his own deposition and the

deposition of Gunnells in arguing that Grey Wolf did owe a duty to Plaintiff. This

attempt is simply insufficient to establish that Plaintiff would be able to carry his

evidentiary burden at trial.

This court has recently noted that:

Under Louisiana law, when a plaintiff alleges negligence on the part of a
defendant, the court undertakes a duty-risk analysis, which consists of the
following four-prong inquiry:

(1) Was the conduct in question a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm to the plaintiff, i.e., was it a cause-in-fact of the harm which
occurred?

(2) Did the defendant owe a duty to the plaintiff?

(3) Was the duty breached?

(4) Was the risk, and harm caused, within the scope of protection
afforded by the duty breached?

Wright v. Coastal Fabrication, L.L.C., 04-1408, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/6/05), 899

So.2d 131, 134-135 (citing Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120 (La.1987) and Roberts v.

Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La.1991)).

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A review of the evidence establishes that Grey Wolf did not assume any

responsibility for any facet of the laydown operations performed by Plaintiff. It did

not own any of the equipment used by Plaintiff. It did not supervise, and had no duty

to supervise, the laydown operations. Plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred

in finding that Grey Wolf did not owe him a duty of care fails to note that even if

Grey Wolf owed a duty, there is nothing in the record to show that Grey Wolf

breached any duty owed to Plaintiff under any recognized theory of recovery. See

Wright, 899 So.2d 131.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in granting Grey

Wolf’s motion for summary judgment. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment

dismissing all claims of Romero against Grey Wolf with prejudice is affirmed. Costs

of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Romero.

AFFIRMED.

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