Mary L. Morris v. State of la/atty Gen.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-518

MARY L. MORRIS

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA/ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 2005-1954
HONORABLE ROBERT L. WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Marc T. Amy, and Glenn B. Gremillion
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Terry James Manuel
Assistant District Attorney
Post Office Box 3206
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
H. Lynn Jones, II

Merietta Spencer Norton
Elections Sect. Sec. State
8549 United Plaza Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 922-0900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
W. Fox McKeithen

Tyrone Anthony Larkins, Jr.
Attorney at Law
8549 United Plaza Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 922-0900
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
W. Fox McKeithen

William P. Bryan, III, Esq.
Attorney General's Office
Post Office Box 94005
Baton Rouge, LA 70804
(225) 326-6000
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana, Attorney General’s Office

Mary L. Morris
In Proper Person
2345 See St.
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 436-5172
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Mary L. Morris

DECUIR, Judge.

The plaintiff-appellant appeals the judgment of the trial court which

dismissed her suit on the ground of prescription. For the reasons ascribed

herein, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the instant action.

On April 13, 2005, the plaintiff filed her Petition to Contest Election

Results challenging the election of April 2, 2005, for the position of District

A City Council for the City of Lake Charles. Named as defendants in this suit

were the State of Louisiana through Attorney General Charles Foti, and H.

Lynn Jones, II, Clerk of Court of Calcasieu Parish.

On April 15, 2005, W. Fox McKeithen, in his official capacity as

Secretary of State for the State of Louisiana, filed a Motion to Intervene. The

trial court denied this motion on April 19, 2005, writing, “PETITION FILED

BY PLAINTIFF, MARY L. MORRIS, WAS SUPPLEMENTED/AMENDED

TO INCLUDE SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THIS PRESENTED TO

COURT; AND, THIS DEFENDANT ACTUALLY PARTICIPATED IN

HEARING OF APRIL 18, 2005. THIS ORDER NOW MOOT.” This court

notes, though, that the record is absent any supplemental or amending petition.

The defendant, H. Lynn Jones, II, Clerk of Court of Calcasieu Parish,

filed the peremptory exceptions of no cause of action, prescription, and

peremption on April 18, 2005. The Secretary of State also filed exceptions of

prescription and no cause of action and argued that the plaintiff’s suit was

perempted.

Trial of the plaintiff’s action was set for April 18, 2005. At this hearing,

the trial court entertained arguments on the exceptions. After hearing the

arguments, the trial court granted the exceptions of prescription, deciding not

to reach a decision on the exceptions of no cause of action. The trial court
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signed a written judgment in open court granting the exceptions of prescription

and ordering the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action with prejudice at plaintiff’s

cost.

The plaintiff sought an appeal of the trial court’s judgment. Upon

receipt of the record in this matter, this court, sua sponte, remanded this matter

for the trial court to hold a hearing to enter onto the record the information

necessary for this court to make a determination as to the timeliness of this

appeal. The transcript from the hearing ordered by this court indicates that the

plaintiff presented her motion for appeal to the trial court within twenty-four

hours of the trial court’s signing of the judgment of dismissal; however, the

trial court states on the record that the order was not signed until after the

expiration of this time period.

Although La.R.S. 18:1409(D) requires the aggrieved party to obtain an

order of appeal and to give bond in an amount set by the trial court within

twenty-four hours of rendition of judgment, the trial court stated on the record

that any failure of the appeal in the instant case to comply with this statutory

provision was not imputable to the plaintiff. Therefore, we will proceed to

examine the merits of the plaintiff’s appeal in this case.

At issue in the instant case is the application of La.R.S. 18:1405(B).

This provision reads, “An action contesting any election involving election to

office shall be instituted on or before 4:30 p.m. of the ninth day after the date

of the election, and no such contest shall be declared moot because of the

performance or nonperformance of a ministerial function including but not

limited to matters relating to the printing of ballots for the general election.”

As previously stated by this court, the election the plaintiff challenges in the

matter sub judice was conducted on April 2, 2005. Therefore, any petition
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seeking to challenge this election had to be filed no later than 4:30 p.m., April

11, 2005. The plaintiff admits that her petition was not filed until April 13,

2005. Accordingly, the petition is untimely.

The plaintiff argued at the April 18, 2005 hearing and at oral argument

that the time limitation of § 1405(B) is unconstitutional and, therefore, should

not be applied to bar her action. The plaintiff cites La.R.S. 18:574(E), which

contains a different time period for the promulgation of the returns for

elections by the Secretary of State. Moreover, the plaintiff complains of the

vagueness and ambiguity of the language of the Louisiana Election Code.

Finally, the plaintiff sets forth a compendium of constitutional arguments.

We find no merit to the plaintiff’s arguments as to the constitutionality

of § 1405(B). The court in Fitzmorris v. Lambert, 382 So.2d 169 (La.App.1

Cir.), writ denied, 384 So.2d 793 (La. 1979), upheld the constitutionality of

this provision, even though § 1405(B) required the filing of an action

challenging an election within five days of the election under the wording of

the statute then applicable. Furthermore, there exists no conflict between the

time delays for the promulgation of election returns as forth in § 574 and the

time delays for challenging elections pursuant to § 1405.

The plaintiff also makes the argument that § 1405 is ambiguous as to

the date on which the delay for filing the action should begin to run. We find

no merit to this argument as the statute clearly states that the nine day delay

commences to run on the day following the conducting of the election.

Notwithstanding plaintiff’s contention that the language of the Election Code,

in general, is confusing, we find that the wording of § 1405(B) is clear and free

of any ambiguity or vagueness.

In conclusion, this court finds that the trial court’s ruling granting the
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exception of prescription is correct. In fact, the time period set forth in §

1405(B) has been held to be peremptive. Small v. Desselle, 520 So.2d 1167

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1987). Thus, upon the expiration of the nine day period for

challenging an election, the cause of action ceases to exist. Accordingly, we

find that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s suit with prejudice as

her claim ceased to exist prior to the filing of her petition. Costs of this appeal

are assessed against the plaintiff.

AFFIRMED.

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