Henry Gray v. State of Louisiana

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-617

HENRY GRAY

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CATAHOULA, NO. 23-375
HONORABLE LEO BOOTHE, PRESIDING
**********

SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Michael G. Sullivan, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Henry Gray - Pro Se
Riverbend Detention Center
9450 Highway 65 South
Lake Providence, LA 71254
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Henry Gray

John C. McNeese
William F. Bologna
Suite 2323
1515 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70112-3723
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:
Catahoula Correctional Center, et al.

COOKS, Judge.

On October 21, 2004, Henry Gray, at the time, an inmate in the Catahoula

Correctional Center, filed a pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” in district

court against the “State of Louisiana Catahoula Correction Center Warden Ronnie

Books & Capt. Little, Sgt. Atkins, Officer Ben Doe.” He later filed a “Motion to

Amendment Complaint” in the same court.

The Catahoula Correctional Center and any employees, deemed named, then

filed a dilatory exception, alleging the petition was “ambiguous, vague and

insufficiently clear to permit defendants to join the issue.” Defendants also filed an

exception, asserting Plaintiff “failed to provide a short, clear and concise statement

of the causes of action allegedly arising out of the material facts” as required by

La.Code Civ.P. art 891. Further, Defendants filed an exception of prematurity

maintaining that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing

suit. Finally, Defendants filed two motions: The first requesting that Plaintiff’s

claims be screened by the district court pursuant to La.R.S. 15:1184(B) and that any

claims deemed to be frivolous, malicious or which fail to state a cause of action be

dismissed; and the second, asking that the court strike from Plaintiff’s amended

petition “the ad damnum as well as the demand for mental pain and suffering and for

punitive damages as unavailable under Louisiana law.”

The trial court then issued an order directing that Plaintiff Gray be produced

for a hearing on March 24, 2005. The hearing was held at which time Plaintiff

testified and Defendants’ arguments were heard. The trial court granted Defendants’

exceptions and motions and struck Plaintiff’s pleadings without prejudice, reserving

his right to re-file. Plaintiff requested an appeal, which was ordered by the trial court.

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ANALYSIS

I. Exception of Prematurity.

Defendants argued the district court did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims because he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies mandated under the

Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), La. R.S. 15:1171-1179 and

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), La.R.S. 15:1181-1191, prior to filing his

petition in the district court.

CARP, enacted in 1985 in response to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized

Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1980), authorizes the Department of

Corrections (DOC) or the sheriff to adopt an administrative remedy procedure for

receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all complaints and grievances by

offenders against the state, the department, or its employees that arise while an

offender is within the custody or under the supervision of the department. La.R.S.

15:1171(B). Any complaint or grievance “with respect to the conditions of

confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons

confined in prison” is subject to the provisions of CARP. La.R.S. 15:1184 (A)(1)(a).

A petitioner is required to “initiate his administrative remedies for a delictual action

for injury or damages within ninety days from the day the injury or damage is

sustained.” La.R.S. 15:1172(B)(1). The DOC is also authorized to establish

deadlines for non-delictual claims and the procedures and processes contained in the

administrative remedy procedure. La.R.S. 15:1172(B)(2-3). If the offender fails to

timely initiate or pursue his administrative remedies within the deadlines established,

the claim is abandoned and any subsequent suit shall be dismissed with prejudice.

La.R.S. 15:1172(C).

Significantly, if a claim falls within the scope of CARP, review of an adverse

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administrative decision is “without a jury and shall be confined to the record. The

review shall be limited to the issues presented in the petition for review and the

administrative remedy request filed at the agency level.” La.R.S. 15:1177(A)(5).

When it was originally enacted, La.R.S. 15:1177 provided that the district court acts

as an appellate court and review, even for tort claims, was limited to the manifest

error standard. La.R.S. 15:1177.

In Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, the supreme court

declared the provisions of La.R.S. 15:1171-79 violated Article V, Section 16(A) of

the Louisiana Constitution to the extent that they are applied to an offender’s tort

actions. The Pope court reasoned that CARP’s unconstitutionality resulted from the

manner in which the district court was limited to a deferential judicial review of the

administrative decision, rather than a de novo review of the tort action. By restricting

judicial review, the administrative procedure, in effect, allowed the Department of

Public Safety and Corrections to adjudicate its own liability in tort actions, and the

district courts were required to give “manifest error” deference to those adjudications.

Thus, it served to “divest the district courts of the original jurisdiction fixed by the

Constitution in those civil matters, such as tort actions, in which the Constitution does

not otherwise provide for original jurisdiction in other tribunals.” Pope, 729 So.2d

at 720.

Subsequent to the Pope decision, the legislature amended CARP to specifically

exclude tort claims from the limited judicial review procedures. As amended, La.R.S.

15:1177(A) provides:

A. Any offender who is aggrieved by an adverse decision, excluding
decisions relative to delictual actions for injury or damages, by the
[Department] . . . may, within thirty days after receipt of the decisions,
seek judicial review of the decision . . . .

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Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1177(C ), was also amended and provides, in relevant

part:

C. This Section shall not apply to delictual actions for injury or
damages, however styled or captioned. Delictual actions for injury or
damages shall be filed separately as original civil actions.

(Emphasis added.)

However, the Pope court acknowledged the legislature “is free to enact

procedures for initial submission of tort claims by prison inmates to an administrative

agency for review, for example, of frivolous claims, as long as the action of the

administrative agency does not constitute the exercise of original jurisdiction.” Id.,

at 720. In response, in 2002, the legislature amended La.R.S. 15:1172 to provide an

administrative procedure for review of tort claims, reserving the right of an offender

to then file a petition in district court for a de novo hearing. Thus, the legislature

corrected the constitutional objections to CARP.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1172 provides, in relevant part:

(B)(1) An offender shall initiate his administrative remedies for
a delictual action for injury or damages within ninety days from the day
the injury or damage is sustained.

. . . .

(C) If an offender fails to timely initiate or pursue his
administrative remedies within the deadlines established in Subsection
B of this Section, his claim is abandoned, and any subsequent suit
asserting such a claim shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The provisions of the PLRA were enacted to curtail baseless or nuisance suits

by prisoners. Pope, 792 So.2d 713. As defined in the act, a “prisoner suit” is “any

civil proceeding with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions

by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison, but does not

include post conviction relief or habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or

duration of confinement in prison.” La.R.S. 15:1181. The provisions of this act

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“shall also apply to all prisoner suits in state court asserting claims arising under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 or other federal laws.” La.R.S. 15:1191. Under PLRA, an offender

must first exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing in the district court.

Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:1184(A)(2), provides:

No prisoner suit shall assert a claim under state law until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. If a prisoner suit
is filed in contravention of this Paragraph, the court shall dismiss the
suit without prejudice.

Further, a district court, as in CARP, is allowed to screen and dismiss

complaints which it deems are frivolous, malicious or fail to state a cause of action.

La.R.S. 15:1184(B).

In Cheron v. LCS Correctional Services, Inc., 04-0703 (La.1/19/05), 891 So.2d

1250, the issue arose as to whether Cheron was required to exhaust his administrative

remedies prior to asserting his tort claim. Cheron’s claim arose after the decision in

Pope, (which declared CARP unconstitutional as applied to tort claims), but prior to

amendments to CARP and PLRA (contained in Act 89) which provided a procedure

for the filing and disposing of tort claims. The Department argued, at the time

Cheron’s claim arose, La.R.S. 15:1184 was in effect and required a prisoner to

exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing a separate suit. The supreme

court held at the time Cheron’s claim arose the Department did not have any available

administrative procedures in place for the processing of tort claims and Cheron was

not required to utilize an unconstitutional administrative process. The supreme court

stated:

As this court indicated in Pope, it is permissible for the legislature
to create an administrative remedy with reference to delictual matters.
Indeed, the passage of Act 89 provided such a remedy. However, the
remedy so established cannot be applied retroactively to deprive a party
of a vested right. Further, it is inappropriate to jurisprudentially create
a grace period where none is legislatively provided.

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Id. at 1260.

Now, “[u]nder the post-Pope statutory scheme, all complaints and grievances,

including traditional tort claims seeking monetary relief, are subject to administrative

procedures.” Wood v. Martin, 37,856 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 1057,

1060; La.R.S. 1172(B). However, whether a claim is ultimately subject to a full de

novo review in the district court under the court’s original jurisdiction, is still

dependent on the characterization of the claim. The first circuit in Madison v. Ward,

00-2842 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/3/02), 825 So.2d 1245, sitting en banc, found claims

involving a liberty interest or asserting deprivation of a constitutionally protected

right is a traditional civil matter over which the district court retains original

jurisdiction. The Madison court stated as follows:

Thus, given Pope’s ruling that the district court cannot be
divested of original jurisdiction to hear tort suits, Lightfoot [v. Stalder,
00-1120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/01), 808 So.2d 710]’s implication that
claims involving a vested property right or a liberty interest should not
be subject to CARP, and the most recent statement of legislative will
found in Act 89, we conclude that the district court retains original
jurisdiction, and this court has appellate jurisdiction, in tort suits and
other “civil matters,” including claims involving unconstitutional
deprivations of vested property rights, liberty interests, and other
properly alleged violations of constitutionally protected rights.

Id. at 1254.

Included in this category would be disciplinary actions where the punishment

involves the deprivation of property (a vested property right). Id. Further, in Carter

v. Cain, 01-2841, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/27/02), 828 So.2d 1226, 1228, the court

noted as to an inmate’s “claim of denial of access to the courts, . . . the district court

has original jurisdiction over these types of claims, under Pope v. State, 99-2559, 792

So.2d at 720 and Madison v. Ward, 825 So.2d at 1254.” See also Ngo v. Estes, 04-

186 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/29/04), 882 So.2d 1262.

In the present case, the State contends Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative

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remedies prior to filing suit. A party raising an exception of prematurity has the

burden of showing that an administrative remedy is available and the petitioner has

failed to submit the claim for review prior to filing suit. Cheron v. LCS Corrs. Servs.,

Inc., 02-1049 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 872 So.2d 1094, aff’d, 04-0703 (La.1/19/05),

891 So.2d 1250. In Ngo v. Estes, 882 So.2d 1262, 1264, this court discussed the first

circuit case of Daily v. Travis, 02-2051 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/23/04), 872 So.2d 1104,

writ granted, 04-744 (La. 5/14/04), 872 So.2d 527, as follows:

[T]he first circuit concluded that CARP’s former administrative
regulations could not be enforced without encountering the problems
with judicial review that Pope found to be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the first circuit refused to dismiss the inmates’ suits in both
cases as premature because the Department of Public Safety &
Corrections was unable to show that a valid administrative remedy
existed. As the first circuit explained in Cheron, 872 So.2d at 1103
(citation omitted) (emphasis added):

The party that raises the objection of prematurity has the
burden of showing that an administrative remedy is
available, by reason of which the judicial action is
premature. Once the existence of an administrative remedy
is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
the specified administrative remedies or procedures have
been exhausted or that the present situation is one of the
exceptional situations where the plaintiff is entitled to
judicial relief because any administrative remedy is
irreparably inadequate.

We find, as the first circuit did in Dailey, that plaintiff’s suit cannot be dismissed as

premature because there is no showing that an adequate administrative remedy was

available under the exceptional circumstances presented herein.

Plaintiff was arrested on February 7, 2003. He was housed in Madison Parish

until September 24, 2004, when he was transferred to Catahoula Correctional Center.

According to Plaintiff, upon arrival at Catahoula, all his mail and stamps were

confiscated, his law books were taken, other personal property including clothing, a

bible and prescription medication were removed from his possession without him

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being given a property slip, and he was denied all access to the law library and any

assistance from “library workers.” He also asserted, after his personal property was

taken, he was placed in disciplinary lockdown for three days without a hearing and

put into a cell with two other inmates. The cell had only two beds, requiring him to

sleep on the floor.

In response to the alleged treatment, Plaintiff attempted to seek redress under

CARP. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections installed in all of its

institutions, pursuant to CARP, a formal grievance mechanism for use by all inmates

committed to the custody of the Department. This process is referred to as the

Administrative Remedy Procedure.1 Inmates are required to file a request to the

1
Attached to Mr. Gray’s brief is a copy of the Administrative Remedy Procedure, which
provides as follows:

On September 18, 1985, the Department of Public Safety and Corrections installed in all of its
institutions, pursuant to CARP, a formal grievance mechanism for use by all inmates committed
to the custody of the Department. The new process bears the name Administrative Remedy
Procedure. The procedure has been approved by the U.S. District court for the Middle District of
Louisiana and by the Louisiana Legislature (La.R.S. 15:1171 et. seq.). Inmates are required to
use the procedure before they can proceed with a suit in Federal and State Courts.

Inmates are encouraged to continue to seek solutions to their concerns through informal means,
but in order to insure their right to use the formal procedure, they must make their request to the
Warden in writing within a 30 day period after an incident has occurred. If, after filing in the
formal procedure an inmate receives a satisfactory response through informal means, the inmate
may request (in writing) that the Warden cancel his formal request for an administrative remedy.

All inmates may request information about or assistance in using this procedure from their
classification officer or from a counsel substitute who services their living area.

The printed forms used in the process contain precise instructions for inmate participants. All
instructions should be read and followed carefully.

Original letters of request to the Wardens should be as brief as possible. Inmates should present
as many facts as possible to answer all questions (who, what, when, where, how) concerning the
incident.

Form ARP-1 is used by inmates to continue to additional Steps in the process. Sufficient space
was allowed on the form for inmates to give a reason for requesting review at another level.
There is no need to try to rewrite the original letter or request in this limited space. The original
letter of request is available to all reviewers at each Step of the process. Inmates must merely
give a reason for their dissatisfaction with the previous response.

If an inmate does need additional space for citing reasons for continuing in the process, he may
use another page of paper. The inmate must make sufficient copies of this additional page to
attach to Form ARP-1 if and when he decides to go to the next Step in the process (he should

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warden in writing within a thirty day period after an incident has occurred. Inmates

may request information about or assistance in using the Administrative Remedy

Procedure from their classification officer or from a counsel substitute who services

their living area. On October 1, 2002, the record indicates, Plaintiff signed and

submitted an Inmate Request Form which set forth:

Requesting (ARP) (Administrative Remedy Procedures) Form adopted
in compliance with Federal “Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act” (42 U.S.C. 1997c) Title 28. Chapter I, part 40 of the Code of
Federal Regulation; And Louisiana Corrections Administrative
Procedure Act (La.R.S. 15:1171, et seq.). That on the 24 day of
September, Captain Little confiscated (3) Law Books, from me the
Requestor. (1) Lawyer Federal Appeal, (2) & (3) Louisiana Code of
Criminal Procedures, 1 & 2, For Court Filing reasons. They where hard
backs. I’ll adgree [sic], to taking the backs of books. (Cases pending in
two courts) District & Appeal court. Need and must have the Books!!!

The form was approved by the assistant warden on October 4, 2004. On October 5,

2004, Plaintiff filed an “ARP. X. Lost Property Claim. La.R.S. 15:866.2, and Racial

Discrimination, and Harassment by and through Catahoula Administration.” He

received no response to this filing, and believing he “[w]asn’t going to get legal

assistant, or his law books back. And needed to file motions, in court. Plaintiff had

no . . . alternative, but to file in [district] court, for reasons stated and deadlines in

other courts.”2 Thus, on October 21, 2004, Mr. Gray filed his “Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus” in district court. He alleged his treatment by Catahoula personnel

send the original to the Warden, make a copy for his file, and a copy to be attached to Form
ARP-1 should he decide to go to the Third Step).

Once an inmate is accepted into the procedure, he must use the manila envelope that is furnished
to him with his First Step response to continue in the procedure. The requested information on
the envelope should be filled in before forms are inserted since the forms are self-carboning.

The flaps on the envelope may be tucked into the envelope for mailing, or the inmate may choose
to tape or staple the envelope closed.
2
Mr. Gray listed a district court suit he filed, docket number 100311, Civil Docket A;
another suit filed in district court which had not yet at the time of filing been assigned a docket
number; and a case in the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, docket number 2004-KW-
1869. Mr. Gray noted he was unable to pursue these cases due to the holding of his mail by
Catahoula personnel.

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amounted to harassment, discrimination and the violation of his constitutional rights.

His petition also detailed his numerous attempts to comply with the Administrative

Remedy Procedure

Two days after filing his “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” Plaintiff was

transferred to Claiborne Parish Detention Center. He then mailed a “Second Step

Form ARP-3” to Richard Stalder, the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety

and Corrections, concerning his treatment at Catahoula. Stalder then mailed the

Second Step form to the Assistant Warden at Claiborne, John Goodwin. According

to Plaintiff, he was called to the assistant warden’s office. Plaintiff states Goodwin

refused to comply with Stalder’s orders and would not help Plaintiff complete the

necessary steps to pursue his claim. The day after Plaintiff’s hearing on his “Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus” in district court, Plaintiff was transferred to the Richland

Detention Center in Richland Parish. According to Plaintiff, after filing two more

ARP claims while at Richland, he was moved to Riverbend Detention Center in East

Carroll Parish, where he remained incarcerated at the time of this appeal.

Mr. Gray contends he has been frustrated in his attempts to pursue his

administrative remedies by continual transfers to different correctional centers.

Additionally, he has been denied access to the prison library, his law books and mail

has been taken from him, thus, denying him the ability to effectively pursue cases he

has pending at the trial and appellate levels. Although the Administrative Remedy

Procedure specifically provides that “[a]ll inmates may request information about or

assistance in using this procedure from their classification officer or from a counsel

substitute who services their living area,” Plaintiff maintains he has been provided

no assistance from anyone in his attempts to pursue his administrative remedies.

A review of Plaintiff’s pleadings indicate he has never had the opportunity to

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adjudicate the merits of his claim for return of his personal effects, including his law

books. Prison officials did not follow through with a review of several of his

complaints within the system, deciding instead to transfer him to different facilities.

Moreover, the trial court dismissed his complaint for failure to pursue administrative

remedies without reaching the question of whether prison officials prevented him

from pursuing those remedies. Mr. Gray’s complaints have been consistent, as is

evident from his dialogue with the trial court:

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gray, what’s your position?

MR. GRAY: After they took my law books I was complaining
about, they locked me down – when I moved to
Catahoula, I was locked down, first of all, the first
day I went there I was locked down. They took my
law books. I wasn’t able to go to the law library. I
had other cases pending in the First Circuit Court of
Appeal and district court and from that time to now,
I’m still hung up on two cases. I had one in the
Supreme court I had, and got help on that one that I
had filed, but I had a deadline when I was at
Catahoula and I wasn’t able to make some of the
deadlines on the cases I had in court because I
wasn’t able to go to the law library.
They took some of the law books I had came from
Madison Parish and some I had when I got to
Madison Parish, they came from Baton Rouge.

....

THE COURT: All right. It doesn’t say anything about
administrative remedies in here. I just read your
amended complaint.

MR. GRAY: It’s an exhibit on there, in the complaint, the
administrative remedy, the form I had to fill out and
the process you had to go through at Catahoula, you
have to fill out a request form to get administrative
remedy form. By the time I had done that three or
four times, filling out a request form, I was
transferred from the facility to stop the litigation.

....

THE COURT: Well, what do you want out of the Catahoula – you

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were here for 15 days, you want money or
something.

MR. GRAY: They took my clothes and my property, my boots, all
the stuff that Madison Parish had passes us out.
What I was saying the indigent supply that the
prison gave us when I came here, they took all that.
They took my stamps, my soap, I was fouled up. I
couldn’t write, I couldn’t get my papers to work in
Court and just whatever.

THE COURT: Sounds to me like that’s a civil suit. I’m going to
strike everything you’ve filed. And you can start
over and do it right this time.

MR. GRAY: If I can get to the proper books and get to the law
library, I can do it. I lost all of my property while I
was there.

....

THE COURT: Mr. Gray, I recommend you start over if you intend
– I don’t recommend anything, but if you want to
file action in this Court, do it right.

MR. GRAY: Like I say, they took my civil law books and
everything.

The trial court never reached the merits of Mr. Gray’s complaint, instead opting

to dismiss his petition. The State now contends Mr. Gray must pursue his grievance

through administrative channels prior to obtaining judicial review of his claim. We

find the State has failed to prove Mr. Gray had a viable way to file for administrative

relief. In fact, the crux of Mr. Gray’s complaint is that time and time again, he has

filed administrative complaints, but has been unable to see them to a resolution due

to the actions of prison officials. The State cannot, now, assert Mr. Gray did not do

that which it prevented him from doing. Neither can the State circumvent the court’s

authority to review such a complaint by claiming the court has no jurisdiction to hear

the claim. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court granting the State’s

exception of prematurity.

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II. Exceptions of Vagueness and Ambiguity of the Petition and Failure to
Conform to the Requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 891.

At all times below and before this court, Plaintiff has acted as his own counsel.

We acknowledge that Plaintiff’s petition, as well as his brief to this court, are difficult

to understand. However, the jurisprudence has consistently held pro se plaintiffs

should be allowed more latitude than plaintiffs represented by counsel because they

lack formal training in the law and its rules of procedure. Bankston v. Alexandria

Neurosurgical Clinic, 94-693 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 659 So.2d 507. “A layman

who represents himself cannot be held to the same standards of skill and judgment

which must be attributed to an attorney, Connolly v. Connolly, 316 So.2d 167, 168

(La.App. 4th Cir.1975), although he assumes responsibility for his own inadequacy

and lack of knowledge of both procedural and substantive law. Rochon v.

Consolidated Constr. Co., 452 So.2d 404 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984).” Rader v. Dep’t of

Health and Hosps., Office of Public Health, Eng’g Servs., 94-0763, p. 3 (La.App. 1

Cir. 3/3/95), 652 So.2d 644, 646.

Compounding the difficulties presented by Plaintiff’s layman status was the

detention center’s alleged refusal to allow him to use the inmate law library and the

taking of his personal property, in particular his law books. We also surmise from his

submission before this Court that Plaintiff is complaining he was never provided with

the proper forms or assistance to initiate any administrative remedies for multiple

alleged infractions of his rights and he does not possess the independent “know-how”

to protect his rights without access to the prison library or assistance of appointed

counsel.

In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct 1491, 1498 (1977), the United

States Supreme Court held “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the

courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of

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meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or

adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” The Supreme Court further

elaborated in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996) that

while “Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library,” it did

require “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of

fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” To establish a Bounds violation the

inmate must suffer “actual injury” or “actual harm” resulting from the alleged

shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program.” Id. A review of Plaintiff’s

pleadings show he has sufficiently alleged “actual injury” or “actual harm” from his

denial of access to the law library.

We have reviewed the pleadings and find we are able to derive the causes of

action asserted by Plaintiff. While Plaintiff may have failed to set forth “a short, clear

and concise statement of the causes of action allegedly arising out of the material

facts” as Defendants allege, we do not agree with them that “the facts alleged are

ambiguous, vague and insufficiently clear to permit defendants to join the issue.” The

exception of vagueness or ambiguity of the petition does not entitle defendants to

demand exactitude and detail of pleadings beyond those necessary to place them on

notice of the causes of action alleged. Snoddy v. City of Marksville, 97-327 (La.App.

3 Cir. 10/8/97), 702 So.2d 890. It is sufficient if Plaintiff’s petition fairly informs

Defendants of the nature of the cause of action and includes sufficient substantive

particulars to enable them to prepare their defense. Id. We find Plaintiff’s petition,

while not reflecting the same standards of skill and judgment which would be

expected of an attorney, were sufficient to alert Defendants of the causes of action

alleged. Therefore, the trial court’s grants of the exceptions of vagueness and

ambiguity of the petition and failure to conform to the requirements of La.Code

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Civ.P. art. 891 are reversed.

III. Motion to Screen.

Defendants filed a Motion to Screen requesting that Plaintiff’s claims be

screened by the trial court pursuant to La.R.S. 15:1184(B) and any claims deemed

frivolous, malicious or which fail to state a cause of action be dismissed. La.R.S.

15:1184(B) provides in pertinent part:

The court, on its own motion or on the motion of a party, shall dismiss
any prisoner suit if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a cause of action, seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

We can safely say Plaintiff’s allegations, e.g., the taking of his personal property and

denial of access to the courts, are not frivolous, do not fail to state a cause of action

or meet any other of the criteria for dismissal set forth in R.S. 15:1184(B). Therefore,

the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s petition pursuant to La.R.S. 15:1184(B).

IV. Motion to Strike.

Plaintiff in his “Motion to Amendment Complaint” sought “$1,000 a day for

his mental pain and physical pain and suffering,” as well as punitive damages of

$2,000.00 and compensatory damages of $5,000.00. Defendants filed a Motion to

Strike under La.Code Civ.P. art. 964, asking the district court to strike from the

petition the demand for specific monetary amounts contending this portion of

Plaintiff’s prayer violates the restrictions found in La.Code Civ.P. art. 893.

Defendants also moved to strike Plaintiff’s demand asserting mental anguish damages

are not recoverable absent proof of physical injury as provided in La.R.S. 15:1184(E)

and punitive damages are unavailable under Louisiana law. La.Code Civ.P. art.

893(A) provides that no specific monetary amount of damages shall be included in

the allegations or prayer for relief of any original, amended, or incidental demand and

that the prayer should be “for such damages as are reasonable.” Accordingly, we
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grant the motion to strike only to the extent necessary to delete references to specific

monetary amounts, with the reservation that Plaintiff’s prayer shall be read to include

a demand “for such damages as are reasonable.” Further, because the record indicates

the trial court did not reach the issue relating to Plaintiff’s right to pursue mental

anguish damages and punitive damages as a result of the alleged conduct, we remand

the issue for further hearing and ruling.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court granting

Defendants’ Exceptions of Prematurity as it applied to Plaintiff’s claims of

deprivation of constitutional rights is reversed. We also reverse the trial court’s grant

of the exceptions of Vagueness and Ambiguity of the Petition, Failure to Conform to

the Requirements of La.Code Civ.P. art. 891, and dismissal based on La.R.S.

15:1184B. We reverse that portion of the judgment granting the Motion to Strike,

except to strike any references to specific monetary amounts in the petition, with the

reservation that Plaintiff’s prayer shall be read to include a demand “for such

damages as are reasonable.” Further, we remand for a hearing and ruling on the issue

of Plaintiff’s right to pursue mental anguish damages and punitive damages as a result

of the alleged conduct. In addition, we hereby order that Plaintiff be afforded access

to the inmate law library where he is currently incarcerated and/or be provided legal

assistance. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Costs of this appeal are assessed against Defendants-Appellees.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

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