James Coleman v. Warden Thompson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-857

JAMES COLEMAN

VERSUS

WARDEN THOMPSON

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 218,987
HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and Glenn
B. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Laurel Irene White
Assistant Attorney General
Louisiana Department of Justice
Division of Risk Litigation
P. O. Box 1710
Alexandria, LA 71309
Telephone: (318) 487-5944
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellee - Warden Thompson

James Coleman
In Proper Person
2022 N. Lobdell Boulevard - #40
Baton Rouge, LA 70806

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

This case involves an inmate’s claim for compensatory damages of

$25,000.00 and punitive damages of $10,000.00 based upon a warden’s alleged

failure to timely release him to another facility where he could participate in a work

release program. The inmate, James Coleman, was released to the work release

program on December 28, 2004. His suit was dismissed against Warden Thompson

for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit in the district

court. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide whether the district court erred in dismissing an

inmate’s action against Warden Thompson.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Coleman filed suit against Warden Thompson of the Louisiana

Department of Corrections, J. Levy Dabadie Correctional Center (JLDCC), on

November 15, 2004. His suit was entitled “Tort Action for Damages under Act 42

U.S.C. § 1983.” However, the allegations were not based upon tort. Inmate Coleman

alleged that his due process and equal protection rights were violated by Warden

Thompson because Coleman was not timely granted a work release. Accordingly,

Coleman’s suit is in substance a challenge to the rules and conditions of his

confinement. For such complaints, an inmate is required to exhaust the

administrative remedy procedure which governs those complaints before filing suit

in district court. The defendant, Warden Thompson, through the Attorney General,

filed a Motion to Dismiss,1 asserting that Coleman did not exhaust his administrative

remedies.

The record indicates that Coleman was released to the Rapides Parish

Work Release program on December 28, 2004. The record does not contain any

information regarding Coleman’s crime or the length of his sentence. One of his

exhibits contains correspondence wherein Coleman references having been

incarcerated eleven and one half (11 ½) years, and his brief indicates incarceration

at several facilities. Warden Thompson’s brief states that Coleman had been

incarcerated at the JLDCC facility from July 10, 2000 until his work release on

December 28, 2004. The record further indicates that the eventual approval of work

release in August 2004 was based upon a “good time/parole” work release

application. The eligibility period for this type of work release appears to be six

months before the end of the prisoner’s sentence.

Coleman alleges that he was entitled to a screening for work release

twenty-four (24) months before the end of his sentence, and that he began requesting

the screening in November-December 2003. However, all of his exhibits, including

his outgoing letters and incoming responses, are dated in 2004.

The first exhibit in the file is a May 17, 2004 work release status form

indicating a denial, stating that Coleman was “screened too early,” and stating that

Coleman would be re-screened in October 2004. Coleman asserts that he was “[a]t

the 18 month period” at the time of this denial on May 17, 2004. Under the

governing administrative remedy procedure, discussed more fully below, Coleman

had ninety (90) days to write a letter to the warden, using statutorily required

language, in order to obtain administrative review of the denial.

1
While the desired outcome for the defendant in this case was a dismissal, his pre-trial
“Motion to Dismiss” would more properly have been captioned “Exception of Prematurity,” or
“Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,”and we will treat it accordingly.

2

The second exhibit is an undated note from the desk of the assistant

warden, Keith Deville, stating that Coleman would be brought up for screening in

August, 2004.

The third exhibit is the work release approval, dated August 18, 2004,

based upon the “good time/parole” application.

The fourth exhibit is the first correspondence in the record from

Coleman. It is a letter dated October 18, 2004 addressed to Richard Stalder, Director

of the Department of Safety and Corrections, asking for Stalder’s assistance in getting

Coleman a work release to the West Baton Rouge facility or, in the alternative, the

East Baton Rouge facility, and it contains complaints of being held back.

The fifth exhibit is a note from Coleman to Warden Thompson dated

October 26, 2004, requesting a “few moments” of the Warden’s time. It does not

state why the meeting is requested. This is the first correspondence addressed to

Warden Thompson. Coleman wrote Director Stalder again on November 15, 2004

stating that he had been approved since August but was told that he was on backlog.

Coleman complained that other inmates were being transferred. Coleman filed suit

in district court on the same date as the letter, November 15, 2004.

On November 29, 2004, Coleman wrote to the assistant warden again.

On November 30, 2004, the assistant warden responded that he had received

Coleman’s letter and would let him know when he would be leaving.

While not included in Coleman’s exhibits, the bound record contains one

other letter from Coleman to Warden Thompson written on December 1, 2004,

complaining about Christmas procedures and policy changes concerning work release

screening for multiple offenders. However, it does not address Coleman’s personal

plight in any manner, but rather is written from the perspective of Coleman as a dorm

representative asking for notices to post in the dormitory. The reference line in this
3

letter states, “RE: Memorandum / Policy Change Concerning Work Release

Screening.” Coleman’s exhibits further contain two acknowledgment letters from

Congressman Richard Baker stating that he had written Director Stalder on

Coleman’s behalf.

The suit filed by Coleman on November 15, 2004, seeks compensatory

damages in the amount of $25,000.00, ostensibly for the money he could have earned

if released to the work release program earlier, and also seeks punitive damages in the

amount of $10,000.00.

Warden Thompson sought a dismissal based upon Coleman’s failure to

first exhaust the administrative remedies available to him pursuant to the Corrections

Administrative Remedy Procedure Act (CARP) La.R.S. 15:1171, et seq.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Administrative Remedy

Coleman contends that the district court’s decision to dismiss his suit is

contrary to law and fact. However, our review of the applicable law and the facts and

the evidence, pursuant to the exhibits in the record, indicates that Coleman was

required to submit a proper written Request for Administrative Remedy regarding the

denial of his request to be placed in a work release program according to the statutory

procedures, and he did not do so. The record contains the affidavit of the paralegal

with the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Legal Services, Office of the

Secretary, Kimberley LeMaire. The affidavit states that in accordance with the

Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Adult Inmates, Coleman had 90 days from the

date of an incident to submit a request for administrative remedy, and that Coleman

4

did not comply, thereby failing to exhaust the administrative remedies available to

him.

More specifically, Coleman seeks redress from institutional policies and

the conditions of his confinement, which must first be adjudicated by way of the

Adult Administrative Remedy Procedure (AARP), La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. XI,

§ 325 (2005), which is incorporated and made a part of the Corrections

Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), La.R.S. 15:1171, et seq., before judicial

review is sought in the district court. This is the inmate’s sole remedy for non-tort

claims. See Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713 (La.R.S. 15:1171-

15:1179, Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure, unconstitutional to the

extent the statutes are applied to tort actions).

Warden Thompson asserts that all inmates are made aware of the

administrative remedy procedure at orientation where they have the opportunity to

ask questions and receive answers, and that the procedures are posted in writing in

accessible areas, pursuant to La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. XI, § 325(E)(2) (2005).

Warden Thompson further asserts that the AARP requires that the inmate’s request

for review of a denial for work release must be in writing and must contain the

phrase, “This is a Request for Administrative Remedy,” pursuant to La. Admin. Code

tit. 22, pt. XI, § 325(F)(2)(a) and (b) (2005).

Coleman admits that his correspondence did not contain the statutory

heading or language. He asserts, however, that a pleading is determined by its

substance, not its heading, that he nonetheless complied with the criteria, and that the

district court should be reversed. Our review of the record and the statutes setting

forth the procedures for obtaining administrative remedy indicates that the district

court was correct in dismissing Coleman’s suit, as the district court did not have

authority to hear the case due to Coleman’s failure to exhaust his administrative
5

remedies before filing suit. Nor did Coleman properly invoke the administrative

process after filing suit, such that it could in any manner be deemed pending. More

specifically, Coleman did not write any letter within ninety days after the written

denial for work release in May 2004; therefore, that review was forfeited. To the

extent that his complaint may be based also upon not being processed soon enough

after his approval for work release in August 2004, none of the letters following this

approval meet the criteria mandated by the applicable statutes.

Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP)

The Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP) provides,

in pertinent part, the following:

[La.R.S. 15:]1171. Authority

A. The Department of Public Safety and Corrections
and each sheriff may adopt an administrative remedy
procedure at each of their adult and juvenile institutions,
including private prison facilities.

B. The department or sheriff may also adopt, in
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act,
administrative remedy procedures for receiving, hearing,
and disposing of any and all complaints and grievances by
adult or juvenile offenders against the state, the governor,
the department or any officials or employees thereof, the
contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its
employees, shareholders, directors, officers, or agents, or
a sheriff, his deputies, or employees, which arise while an
offender is within the custody or under the supervision of
the department, a contractor operating a private prison
facility, or a sheriff. Such complaints and grievances
include but are not limited to any and all claims seeking
monetary, injunctive, declaratory, or any other form of
relief authorized by law and by way of illustration includes
actions pertaining to conditions of confinement, personal
injuries, medical malpractice, time computations, even
though urged as a writ of habeas corpus, or challenges to
rules, regulations, policies, or statutes. Such administrative
procedures, when promulgated, shall provide the exclusive
remedy available to the offender for complaints or
grievances governed thereby insofar as federal law allows.
All such procedures, including the adult and juvenile
6

offender disciplinary process, promulgated and effective
prior to June 30, 1989, shall be deemed to be the exclusive
remedy for complaints and grievances to which they apply
insofar as federal law allows. (Footnote omitted).

....

§ 1172. Administrative remedies; applicability; initiation

A. Upon adoption of the administrative remedy
procedure, in accordance with the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the implementation of the procedure
within the department or by the sheriff, this procedure shall
constitute the administrative remedies available to
offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action
they may claim to have against the state of Louisiana, the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections, or its
employees, the contractor operating a private prison facility
or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, or officers,
or a sheriff, or his employees or deputies. Any
administrative remedy procedure in effect on January 1,
2001, including the procedure published in LAC 22:I.325,
is deemed to be in compliance with the provisions of this
Section.

B. (1) An offender shall initiate his administrative
remedies for a delictual action for injury or damages within
ninety days from the day the injury or damage is sustained.

(2) The department is authorized to establish
deadlines for an offender to initiate administrative
remedies for any nondelictual claims.

(3) The department is authorized to establish
deadlines for the procedures and processes contained in the
administrative remedy procedure provided in LAC
22:I.325.

C. If an offender fails to timely initiate or pursue his
administrative remedies within the deadlines established in
Subsection B of this Section, his claim is abandoned, and
any subsequent suit asserting such a claim shall be
dismissed with prejudice. If at the time the petition is filed
the administrative remedy process is ongoing but has not
yet been completed, the suit shall be dismissed without
prejudice. (Emphasis added).

....

7

§ 1176. Records, confidentiality

Before any cause of action may be heard in any state or
federal court, administrative remedies must be exhausted
under the procedure authorized by this Part. . . .

§ 1177. Judicial review of administrative acts;
exception

A. Any offender who is aggrieved by an adverse
decision, excluding decisions relative to delictual actions
for injury or damages, by the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections or a contractor operating a private prison
facility rendered pursuant to any administrative remedy
procedures under this Part may, within thirty days after
receipt of the decision, seek judicial review of the decision
only in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court or, if the
offender is in the physical custody of the sheriff, in the
district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the
sheriff is located, in the manner hereinafter provided:

....

Adult Administrative Remedy Procedure (AARP)

The Louisiana Administrative Code at Title 22 (Corrections, Criminal

Justice and Law Enforcement), Part I (Corrections), Section 325, (Adult

Administrative Remedy Procedures), provides in pertinent part as follows:

A. Administrative Remedy Procedure

1. On September 18, 1985, the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections installed in all of its adult
institution a formal grievance mechanism for use by all
inmates committed to the custody of the Department. The
process bears the name Administrative Remedy Procedure
(ARP). Inmates are required to use the procedure before
they can proceed with a suit in Federal and State Courts.

2. Inmates are encouraged to continue to seek solutions to
their concerns through informal means, but in order to
insure their right to use the formal procedure, they should
make their request to the warden in writing within a 90 day
period after an incident has occurred. If, after filing in the
formal procedure an inmate receives a satisfactory response
through informal means, the inmate may request (in

8

writing) that the warden cancel his formal request for an
administrative remedy. (Emphasis added).

....

B. Purpose. Corrections Services has established the
Administrative Remedy Procedure through which an
inmate may seek formal review of a complaint which
relates to any aspect of his incarceration if less formal
methods have not resolved the matter. Such complaints
and grievances include, but are not limited to any and all
claims seeking monetary, injunctive, declaratory, or any
other form of relief authorized by law and by way of
illustration includes actions pertaining to conditions of
confinement, personal injuries, medical malpractice, time
computations, even though urged as a writ of habeas
corpus, or challenges to rules, regulations, policies, or
statutes. Through this procedure, inmates shall receive
reasonable responses and where appropriate, meaningful
remedies.

....

F. Procedure

2. Initiation of Process. Inmates should always try to
resolve their problems within the institution informally,
before initiating the formal process. This informal
resolution may be accomplished through discussions with
staff members, etc. If the inmate is unable to resolve his
problems or obtain relief in this fashion, he may initiate the
formal process.

a. The method by which this process is initiated is by a
letter from the inmate to the warden. For purposes of this
process, a letter is:

i. any form of written communication which contains this
phrase: “This is a request for administrative remedy;” or

ii. Form ARP-1 at those institutions that wish to furnish
forms for commencement of this process.

b. No request for administrative remedy shall be denied
acceptance into the Administrative Remedy Procedure
because it is or is not on a form; however, no letter as set
forth above shall be accepted into the process unless it
contains the phrase: “This is a request for administrative
remedy.” (Emphasis added).

9

As previously stated, inmate Coleman admitted that he did not include

the required phrase in the letters he wrote requesting assistance with his work release

transfer. In fact, the first correspondence in the record from Coleman to Warden

Thompson was a very brief note dated October 26, 2004, over 90 days after the denial

of the work release on May 17, 2004, and it did not mention the subject of work

release; it merely asked for “a few moments” of the warden’s time. While not

included in Coleman’s exhibits, the bound record contains one other letter from

Coleman to Warden Thompson written on December 1, 2004, complaining about

Christmas procedures and policy changes concerning work release screening for

multiple offenders. However, it does not address Coleman’s personal plight in any

manner, but rather is written from the perspective of Coleman as a dorm

representative asking for notices to post in the dormitory.

Moreover, the December 1 letter was written over 90 days after the

approval of a work release on August 18, 2004. Coleman was transferred for work

release twenty-eight (28) days after this letter was written. The note and letter

described herein are the only two pieces of correspondence written to Warden

Thompson, and it is clear that neither of them meets the criteria of the administrative

remedies procedures prescribed. In fact, none of the letters written to the assistant

warden, the director of the Department of Corrections, or the federal congressman

contained the language required to begin the administrative process. Accordingly,

the record is devoid of any administrative review or decision.

Swanson v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 01-1066

(La.App. 1 Cir. 6/21/02), 837 So.2d 634 held that the district court did not have

subject matter jurisdiction over an inmate’s complaint seeking an injunction to

prevent the Department of Public Safety and Corrections from tampering with his

medication, food supply, or urinalysis results. This is because there was no record
10

that the inmate had exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to the Corrections

Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), La.R.S. 15:1171(B) or La.R.S.

15:1184(A)(2). The court wrote:

No prisoner suit shall assert a claim under state law
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted. If a prisoner suit is filed in contravention of
this Paragraph, the court shall dismiss the suit without
prejudice. However, the prisoner shall be prohibited from
filing any subsequent suits in forma pauperis based on the
same claim or claims. (Emphasis added.)

Administrative remedies are available for prisoners
pursuant to the Corrections Administrative Remedy
Procedure law (CARP), La.R.S. 15:1171 et seq. Pursuant
to La.R.S. 15:1171B ‘all claims seeking . . . injunctive . . .
relief’ are covered by CARP and ‘[s]uch administrative
procedures, when promulgated, shall provide the exclusive
remedy available to the offender for complaints or
grievances governed thereby insofar as federal law allows.’
La.R.S. 15:1172B provides as follows:

No state court shall entertain an
offender’s grievance or complaint which falls
under the purview of the administrative
remedy procedure unless and until the
offender shall have exhausted the remedies as
provided in said procedure. If the offender
has failed timely to pursue administrative
remedies through this procedure, any petition
he files shall be dismissed.

Swanson, 837 So.2d at 635-36.

Likewise, in Robinson v. Parole & Probation Div., Dept. of Public Safety

& Corrections, 00-1574, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 819 So.2d 1031, 1032-33,

the appellate court articulated:

As in any case before this court, the first issue to be
considered is whether the case is properly before the court
and whether there is a basis for jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is
the legal power and authority of a court to hear and
determine an action or proceeding involving the legal
relations of the parties, and to grant the relief to which they
are entitled. La. C.C.P. art. 1; Metro Riverboat Associates,
Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Board, 99-0863
(La.App. 1 Cir. 12/20/00), 774 So.2d 1193, 1196 (on
11

rehearing en banc), writ granted, 2001-0185 (La. 6/1/01),
793 So.2d 188. It is the duty of a court to examine subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even when the issue is not
raised by the litigants. Id. at 1197. In this case, the
commissioner and the trial court did not have jurisdiction
over Mr. Robinson’s claim because he failed to exhaust
administrative remedies available to him under the
Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP),
La.R.S. 15:1171 et seq., prior to filing this application for
a writ of habeas corpus in the district court.

Pursuant to CARP, the Department of Public Safety
and Corrections (DPSC) adopted an administrative remedy
procedure for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and
all complaints and grievances by offenders against the
State which arise while an offender is within the custody or
under the supervision of the DPSC, even though the
grievance or complaint is urged as a writ of habeas corpus.
La.R.S. 15:1171(B). Such administrative procedures
provide the exclusive remedy available to offenders for the
purpose of preserving any cause of action claimed against
the DPSC. La.R.S. 15:1171(B); La.R.S. 15:1172(A); King
v. State, Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
98-2910 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 754 So.2d 1119, 1121.
Concomitantly, no state court shall entertain an offender’s
grievance or complaint which falls under the purview of
the administrative remedy procedure unless and until the
offender shall have exhausted the remedies as provided in
said procedure. La.R.S. 15:1172(B). If the offender has
failed to timely pursue administrative remedies through
this procedure, any petition he files shall be dismissed.
La.R.S. 15:1172(B).

As a parolee, Mr. Robinson remained within the
legal custody of the DPSC at the time he was allegedly
unreasonably detained in Arizona. La.R.S. 15:574.7(A);
State v. Bradley, 99-364 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/99), 746
So.2d 263, 266 (“Release on parole is a release from only
[DPSC’s] physical custody because [DPSC] still retains
legal custody over the parolee.”) Thus, Mr. Robinson’s
claim constitutes a complaint or grievance against the State
which arose while he was an offender within the custody of
the DPSC. (Footnote omitted).

Because the above described administrative
remedies provide the exclusive remedy available to an
offender for complaints or grievances, Mr. Robinson’s
application for a writ of habeas corpus should have been
processed through administrative channels before being
reviewed by the commissioner and trial court at the
Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Thus, the district court
12

did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Robinson’s claim and its
judgment is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3; State v. L.B., 95-2116
(La.App. 1 Cir. 5/30/96), 676 So.2d 179, 181; Boeing
Company v. Louisiana Department of Economic
Development, 94-0971 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/95), 657 So.2d
652, 659.

Robinson, 819 at 1032-33.

See also, Poulard v. Hanson, 36,290 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/14/02), 823 So.2d

1130, writ denied, 02-2730 (La. 1/24/03), 836 So.2d 45, where the inmate was

required to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge removal of his mattress,

sheets, and blanket as disciplinary measures, before bringing a civil action in trial

court.

As to the substance of his complaint, Coleman alleges that his

constitutional rights were violated through the “development and implementation of

institutional policy that is contrary to Louisiana Law 15:1111 and D.O.C. Regulation

# B-02-001, Appendix III, and for withholding him from work release participation.”

In his petition to the district court, Coleman cites La.R.S. 15:1111(B),

which states as follows:

§ 1111. Work release program

B. The department shall establish rules for the
administration of the work release program and shall
determine those inmates who may participate in the release
program. Any convict sentenced to imprisonment at hard
labor shall be eligible at any time during his sentence to
participate in the work release program, subject to the
provisions of this Part.

He also cites Department of Corrections Regulation B-02-001, and states

that it provides in Appendix III, subpart E (1) that, “[u]nless precluded by law, (see

section 2 below) inmates within 2 years of their discharge date or 6 months of their

parole eligibility date are eligible for work release.” However, Coleman did not

attach a copy of the regulation, nor did he indicate any of the referenced provisions

13

in section 2 that preclude eligibility. While we were not provided a copy of the

regulation, we were able to find references to the section cited in La. Admin. Code

tit. 22, pt. XI, § 311 (2005), which states in pertinent part as follows:

§ 311. Work Release

A. The board may recommend to the secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections that an
inmate be placed on work release at any time that the
inmate is within two years of discharge by diminution of
sentence, diminution of sentence/parole supervision, or full
term release date.

1. The inmate must not be serving a sentence for one of
the enumerated offenses specified in R.S. 15:1111 or
Department Regulation No. B-02-001 Assignment and
Transfer of Inmates. In this case, he would only be eligible
in the last six months of his term.

....

B. Inmates who are serving a sentence for an enumerated
offense as specified in R.S. 15:1111 or Department
Regulation No. B-02-001 “Assignment and Transfer of
Inmates,” are eligible for work release only during the last
six months of their term. . . .

(Emphasis added).

Accordingly, the recommendation for work release appears to be

permissive rather than mandatory, at least based on the limited materials that we have,

and without doubt the eligibility for work release turns on the inmate’s offense and

the length of his sentence. Therefore, we could not make a determination regarding

his eligibility for work release even if he had followed the administrative remedies

procedure, because we have not been provided the applicable regulation or any

information whatsoever regarding Coleman’s crime or the length of his sentence.

Coleman further argues three cases that support his position that he complied with the

statutory remedies procedure by writing letters. While the cited cases do not support

Coleman’s position, they are instructive and tend to support the opposition.

14

In Peterson v. Austin, 36,365 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/11/02), 836 So.2d 235,

writ denied, 03-0510 (La. 1/30/04), 865 So.2d 70, the inmate brought action against

a sergeant, alleging retaliation for the inmate’s filing of administrative grievances,

and against the correctional center nurse, alleging improper denial of a request to be

seen by a mental health professional. The district court dismissed the inmate’s suit

pursuant to the defendant’s exceptions of prematurity and lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the inmate’s

suit. It concluded that even though the suit had been styled as a “tort” action when

filed in the district court, the inmate was actually seeking a remedy with respect to his

conditions of confinement. That is accomplished through CARP, and which step the

inmate apparently skipped. The court stated as follows:

Although Peterson’s petition [in district court] was styled
as a complaint in tort, the nature of a pleading is
determined by its substance and not its caption. See La.
C.C. P. art. 865. . . .

Peterson, 836 So.2d at 237.

Therefore, the reference to the substance governing over the caption in

Peterson is a reference to a pleading filed in district court, not a letter filed in

compliance with the administrative remedies governing such actions. In the present

case, the statutes cited above govern the inmate’s remedy, not La.Code Civ.P. art. 865

which governs district court pleadings. The statutes governing administrative

remedies clearly require a properly captioned letter or a letter at least containing the

introductory phrase explaining the reason for the letter, “This is a request for

administrative remedy.” Moreover, in the present case, where Coleman captioned his

petition in district court as a tort action for damages, and he failed to follow the

procedures for first seeking an administrative remedy, his case is analogous to

Peterson with regard to the similar reason for dismissal, but not for the proposition

15

Coleman asserts. The Peterson court discussed the propriety of judicial review in the

district court after, but only after, exhausting the administrative remedy outlined

above. Peterson had not done that; nor has Coleman. The Peterson court concluded

as follows:

Peterson’s petition and the record reveal that he initially
intended to pursue administrative remedies only for issues
pertaining to his conditions of confinement and discipline.
The provisions of La.R.S. 15:1177(A), therefore, required
him to seek judicial review of any adverse administrative
remedy decision in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
within 30 days of receipt of the adverse decision. We
conclude, therefore, that if Peterson did exhaust his
administrative remedies, the proper venue for judicial
review of that decision was only in the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court. The trial court therefore correctly sustained
the defendant’s exceptions of prematurity and lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Peterson, 836 So.2d at 238.

Also cited by Coleman is Revere v. Reed, 95-1913 (La.App. 1 Cir.

5/10/96), 675 So.2d 292, where the inmate sought to obtain the names of the Grand

Jury members in his case. When the records were not provided, the inmate filed a

pleading in district court alleging that the district attorney had failed to comply with

the Public Records Act. The inmate’s pleading was entitled, “Petition for Compliance

with LSA RS 44:1 with Sanctions.” In a footnote, the appellate court stated that

despite its caption, the pleading was in substance an application for a writ of

mandamus since it contained an order for a rule to show cause. The court cited

La.Code Civ.P. art. 865 for the proposition that the substance of a pleading

determines the action sought, and the court’s analysis in the main text of the opinion

proceeded to discuss the viability of the claim in that regard. The Revere case had

nothing to do with the conditions of an inmate’s confinement and his statutory

Request for Administrative Remedy prior to filing a pleading in district court.

16

Inmate Coleman also cites Sims v. Wackenhut Health Services, Inc., 97-

1147 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 708 So.2d 1140, writ denied, 98-0747 (La. 5/01/98),

718 So.2d 417, for the proposition that his letters did not have to be in proper form.

In Sims, an inmate’s foot was amputated following a failed request for transfer to

another facility to obtain better medical treatment. The appellate court overturned the

trial court’s finding of abandonment. With regard to the inmate’s letter of request to

the warden, the appellate court found that the inmate had sufficiently pursued his

administrative remedies against the Department of Public Safety and Corrections

before seeking a legal remedy in the district court for the alleged inadequate medical

care. However, the Sims court did not discuss in any manner the content or captions

or introductory phrases in the letter written to the warden.

In the present case, as asserted by Warden Thompson, a letter to the

warden is the proper vehicle to obtain administrative remedy, but the letter must be

timely, and it must contain the statutory phrase, “[t]his is a request for administrative

remedy.” Accordingly, none of the cases cited by inmate Coleman support his

position that he exhausted his administrative remedies before filing his suit in district

court. Moreover, his pleading in district court, improperly entitled as a “tort” action,

was accepted by the district court and ruled upon based upon its substance, a

challenge to the rules of his confinement. His suit in district court was dismissed, not

because of the title of his pleading, but because he had failed to follow the procedures

outlined for exhausting his administrative remedy before seeking judicial review in

the district court. Those procedures did require particular statutory language, an

omission of which, as mandated by statute, would lead to dismissal of the inmate’s

claim.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, where inmate Coleman did not exhaust the administrative

remedies mandated by La.R.S. 15:1171, et seq., and La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. XI,

§ 325 (2005), the district court properly dismissed his suit with prejudice.

Appellant, James Coleman, is cast with all costs of these proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

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