Sunrise Properties, Inc. v. Long's Preferred Products, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

05-1303

SUNRISE PROPERTIES, INC.

VERSUS

LONG’S PREFERRED PRODUCTS, INC.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 05-C-0223-D
HONORABLE DONALD W. HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, and Billy Howard Ezell,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Reginald J. Ringuet
William H. Collier
Ringuet, Daniels & Collier
P. O. Box 52647
Lafayette, LA 70505
(337) 232-0002
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Sunrise Properties, Inc.

Richard E. Lee
Attorney at Law
810 Main Street
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 448-1391
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Long’s Preferred Products, Inc.

DECUIR, Judge.

Lessee appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of lessor ordering

payment of unpaid rentals, interest and attorney fees.

FACTS

In April 2000, Long’s Preferred Products, Inc. entered into a lease agreement

with Sunrise Properties, Inc. for a building in Grand Coteau, Louisiana. The lease

provided for a term of three years, and a monthly rental of $3,166.67. The lease

further provided that if Long’s remained on the premises after the expiration of the

term, the tenancy would be month to month at double the monthly rental.

Long’s remained through the end of the lease term. Effective April 1, 2003,

Long’s employee, Otis Young, signed a lease amendment providing for a one-year

extension of the lease at the same rent. The lease amendment also provided for

automatic renewal for one year unless either party gave written notice sixty days

before expiration of the extended term. Long’s remained on the premises through the

end of the extended term on March 31, 2004 and after the automatic extension until

June of 2004. Long’s refused to pay rentals for the remainder of the automatically

extended term.

Sunrise filed suit seeking unpaid rentals for the period July 1, 2004 through

March 31, 2005. In its answer, Long’s repudiated the lease amendment on the

grounds that Otis Young was not authorized to act on behalf of the corporation.

Sunrise then amended its petition to enforce the provisions of the original lease which

provided for double rental on a month-to-month basis. Sunrise sought unpaid rentals

of $3,166.67 for the fifteen months Long’s remained on the premises after the

expiration of the original lease. Sunrise also filed a motion for summary judgment

which was granted by the trial court. Long’s lodged this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Long’s contends on appeal the trial court erred in granting Sunrise’s motion for

summary judgment. Specifically, Long’s argues that the court erred in finding that

there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute when Long’s filed an affidavit

from Otis Young asserting that he had entered into a verbal lease agreement to extend

the lease on a month-to-month basis at $3,166.67.

Appellate courts review grants of summary judgment de novo, using the same

criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is

appropriate, i.e., whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ocean Energy, Inc. v. Plaquemines

Parish Gov’t, 04-0066 (La. 7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1.

We find no merit to this assignment. In its answer, Long’s repudiates the

written lease amendment based on Young’s lack of authority to act for the

corporation. Long’s then has the temerity to allege to this court that the summary

judgment should not have been granted because of an alleged verbal contract to

extend the lease entered into by Young. In other words, Long’s argues that Young

did not have authority to enter the written lease amendment but did have authority to

enter a verbal lease amendment. We cannot give credence to such an argument. The

trial court’s grant of summary judgment was proper.

Long’s next contends that Sunrise is equitably estopped from collecting unpaid

rentals because it accepted the reduced rent under the lease amendment that Long’s

repudiated. Estoppel, which has been described in the jurisprudence as a rarely

applied equitable doctrine of “last resort,” is not favored in Louisiana law. Morris

v. Friedman, 94-2808, p. 9 (La. 11/27/95), 663 So.2d 19, 25. One who seeks to avail

himself of the doctrine must establish his right to do so with unusual clearness. Kibbe

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v. Lege, 604 So.2d 1366, 1370 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writs denied, 606 So.2d 540, 541

(La.1992). In the present case, not only does Long’s fail to clearly establish its right,

but is arguably equitably estopped from raising the issue by its conduct in availing

itself of the benefits of the lease amendment and then repudiating it. This assignment

has no merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs

of these proceedings are taxed to appellant, Long’s Preferred Products, Inc.

AFFIRMED.

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