Dewayne S. Eaves v. Spirit Homes, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-49

DEWAYNE S. EAVES, ET AL.

VERSUS

SPIRIT HOMES, INC., ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 199,051
HONORABLE HARRY FRED RANDOW, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and
Michael G. Sullivan, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Fred Andrew Pharis
PHARIS & PHARIS
831 DeSoto Street
Alexandria, LA 71301
Telephone: (318) 445-8266
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiffs/Appellees - Dewayne S. Eaves and Shirley Stroud

Russell L. Potter
Stafford, Stewart, & Potter
P. O. Box 1711
Alexandria, LA 71309
Telephone: (318) 487-4910
COUNSEL FOR:
Third Party Defendants/Appellees - Leslie Roshong d/b/a Arrow
Mobile Home Movers

Dana A. Bolton
P. O. Box 85480
Baton Rouge, LA 70884
Telephone: (225) 295-0502
COUNSEL FOR:
Third Party Appellants - Quality Mobile Homes, Inc. and Gregory
D. Lord

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

DeWayne S. Eaves and Shirley Faye Stroud (Eaves), brought an action

for redhibition against the manufacturer, Spirit Homes, Inc., and the sellers, Quality

Mobile Homes, Inc. and its owner, Dr. Gregory D. Lord (Quality or Dr. Lord),

alleging numerous defects in their newly-purchased mobile home. Dr. Lord, as owner

and liquidator of Quality Mobile Homes, Inc., filed a third-party demand against the

installers and movers of the mobile home, Leslie Roshong d/b/a Arrow Mobile Home

Movers (Arrow), after learning that Arrow had wrecked the home during delivery.

An arbitrator found that there were no redhibitory defects at the time of sale; rather,

the damages occurred solely as a result of the negligence of Arrow in delivering and

installing the mobile home. Pursuant to the findings of the arbitrator, the trial judge

rendered judgment against Dr. Lord in the amount of $2,500.00 plus legal interest and

costs.

Dr. Lord subsequently paid Eaves a total of $5,248.79 and sought

indemnity for that amount from Arrow. Dr. Lord also sought reimbursement of his

attorney fees and court costs of $33,902.75 and of his lost income of $6,475.00, as

well as his portion of the arbitration fees. Arrow reimbursed Dr. Lord the amount of

the original judgment plus legal interest and costs totaling $5,248.79, that Dr. Lord

was required to pay to Eaves. However, Arrow asserted in a motion for summary

judgment that it was not liable for Dr. Lord’s own expenses and costs in the litigation.

The trial judge denied Arrow’s motion for summary judgment as to the arbitration

fees but granted a partial summary judgment finding that Arrow was not liable for Dr.

Lord’s lost income or his attorney fees and court costs in defending the suit or in

bringing the third party demand. It is from this partial summary judgment that Dr.

Lord appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

ISSUE

We must decide whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary

judgment exculpating the mover/installer, Arrow, for the attorney fees and lost

income of the seller, Dr. Lord.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July 1999, Eaves purchased a new mobile home, or manufactured

home, for his mother and himself from Quality Homes, Inc., financing a portion of

the purchase price via an installment contract with Quality. The cost of the home

with tax was $31,175.00, and the finance charge over the life of the loan was

$40,429.00. Eaves’ mother, Shirley Faye Stroud, provided the downpayment for the

manufactured home and made the installment payments. However, she was not a

party to the contracts. The contract of sale included an express warranty and also the

delivery and set-up of the home. Quality enlisted the services of Arrow to move and

install the home onto the lot of Eaves. However, Quality did not enter into a written

contract with Arrow for the delivery of the home, and there was no contract between

them for indemnification and attorney fees should the home become damaged during

delivery. Arrow was apparently forced off the road while delivering the home to

Eaves’ lot, and the home sustained damage in transit.

Subsequent to delivery, Eaves and his mother identified numerous

defects in the home, including but not limited to dents, bowed walls, offset moldings,

nails coming loose, and floors and doors that were not level. Attempted repairs did

not resolve the problems. On February 11, 2000, Eaves filed a redhibition suit,

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demanding that the sale and installment contracts be cancelled and rescinded. The

petition alleged hidden manufacturing defects that existed at the time of sale.

Quality filed an exception of prematurity alleging that Eaves had

executed an arbitration agreement and then failed to submit the matter to binding

arbitration. Eaves fought the arbitration and various exceptions by the defendants for

several years, filing four supplemental petitions. During that time, Dr. Lord

liquidated Quality and assumed the debts of the corporation. He also learned through

discovery that Arrow had wrecked the home during delivery, causing damage to the

home.

Dr. Lord filed a third-party demand against Arrow. Eaves then filed a

Fifth Supplemental and Amending Petition adding Arrow as a defendant. However,

when the matter was ultimately submitted to binding arbitration, Eaves’ claims

against Arrow were not submitted, since Arrow was not a party to the contract

providing for arbitration.

The arbitrator found that Eaves was the sole purchaser of the

manufactured home and that he failed to prove redhibitory defects at the time of sale.

The arbitrator further found that the home was damaged during delivery by the sole

negligence of Arrow, that the seller, Dr. Lord, was responsible to Eaves for Arrow’s

negligence, and that the remaining damage could be repaired for not over $2,500.00.

The trial court adopted the ruling of the arbitrator, and Dr. Lord subsequently paid

Eaves $5,248.79 for the judgment and for Eaves’ legal costs. Arrow reimbursed Dr.

Lord this amount for Eaves’ damages.

Dr. Lord sought further reimbursement and indemnification from Arrow

for his lost income of $6,475.00, due to his having to attend a deposition and a four-

day arbitration, and for his attorney fees of $33,902.75. Arrow filed a Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment asserting that it was liable for only the $2,500.00
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judgment awarded to Eaves and against Dr. Lord, and that Dr. Lord could not recover

his own attorney fees and other costs absent a contractual agreement or a statutory

entitlement. The trial court granted summary judgment in part to Arrow as to Dr.

Lord’s claims for attorney fees and lost income. The trial court’s judgment denied

summary judgment to Arrow as to the claims of Dr. Lord for the arbitration fees,

expert fees, and judicial interest awarded against Dr. Lord in the arbitration

proceedings. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment to Arrow on the issue of Dr. Lord’s lost income and attorney fees.

III.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Appellate courts review grants of summary judgment de novo, using the

same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment

is appropriate, that is, whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether

the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ocean Energy, Inc. v.

Plaquemines Parish Gov’t., 04-66 (La. 7/6/04), 880 So.2d 1.

The Seller’s Rights and Obligations

Dr. Lord contends that as the innocent but statutorily responsible dealer

or seller, he is entitled to be reimbursed his lost income and his own attorney fees

expended in defending against claims resulting from the wrongful acts of Arrow. Dr.

Lord argues that Eaves claimed $11,000.00 in repairs to the home and that it was Dr.

Lord’s attorneys who successfully reduced that figure to $2,500.00. Dr. Lord

therefore asserts that he is entitled to indemnification from Arrow for all of his

expenses of the litigation. However, Dr. Lord did not have a written contract with

Arrow that provided for indemnification and attorney fees.
4

As a general rule, Louisiana law does not provide for the recovery of

attorney fees in the absence of a specific statutory provision allowing such recovery

or a contractual agreement by the parties to pay attorney fees. Kinsinger v. Taco Tico,

Inc., 03-622 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/12/03), 861 So.2d 669; Richey v. Moore, 36,785

(La.App. 2 Cir. 3/7/03), 840 So.2d 1265, writ denied, 03-987 (La. 5/30/03), 845

So.2d 1054. See also, Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Meyers, 385 So.2d 245

(La.1980); LeBlanc v. State Farm Ins. Co., 04-1522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/26/04), 878

So.2d 715, writ not considered by, 04-1642 (La. 10/08/04), 883 So.2d 1023. In the

present case, it is undisputed that Dr. Lord merely enlisted the services of Arrow to

move and install the mobile home by oral agreement, and that there was no written

contract between them. Accordingly, there is no contractual agreement by the parties

to pay attorney fees.

The statutes governing the manufacture, sale, and installation of

manufactured homes are found at La.R.S. 51: 911.21, et. seq., known as the "Uniform

Standards Code for Manufactured Housing.” For the protection of the buyer, those

statutes currently provide product warranty and licensing requirements for

manufacturers, retailers (dealers and sellers), and installers of manufactured homes.

However, the statutes underwent revisions pursuant to Acts 2001, No. 718, § 2. In

1999, when Eaves purchased the subject manufactured home from Dr. Lord and

received delivery and installation of the home from Arrow, the statutes did not require

a warranty by the installer.1

1
Following revisions in 2001, La.R.S. 51:911.25 currently provides as follows:

A. Each new manufactured home, sold as such shall be covered by warranties that shall
protect only the first retail purchaser of the manufactured home, for a period of one year from the
date of the purchase, in accordance with the terms of the warranty:

(1) The manufacturer shall warrant, in writing, that the manufactured home was in
compliance with the Code and the requirements of this Part at the time of manufacture.

5

For purposes of this litigation, the pertinent statutes in the Uniform

Standards Code for Manufactured Housing (hereinafter referred to as, “ Manufactured

Housing Code”) are La.R.S. 51:911.24.1 and 51:911.25.

Except for the substitution of “dealer(s)” with “retailer(s),” La.R.S.

51:911.24.1 maintains the same language as it did in 1999, and provides in pertinent

part as follows:

C. Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise,
sales, or other contractual agreement, each manufacturer
shall indemnify and hold harmless its retailers against any
judgment for damages, including but not limited to court
costs and reasonable attorney fees of the retailer, arising
out of complaints, claims, or lawsuits including but not
limited to strict liability, negligence, misrepresentation,
express or implied warranty, or rescission of sale to the
extent that the judgment arises out of alleged defective or
negligent manufacture, assembly, or design of
manufactured homes, parts, or accessories or other
functions of the manufacturer, which are beyond the
control of the retailer.

Accordingly, the Manufactured Housing Code did and does provide for

the seller or retailer, such as Dr. Lord, to receive indemnification or reimbursement

of his own attorney fees from the manufacturer under certain circumstances.

However, this statute does not provide for indemnification including attorney fees

Further, the manufacturer shall warrant that the manufactured home was manufactured free
from any defects in materials or workmanship as outlined in the Code.

(2) The installer shall warrant that the manufactured home was installed according to the
Minimum Standards for Installation of Manufactured Homes (R.S. 51:912.21 et seq.).

(3) The manufacturer, retailer, or installer shall not be liable for any defect in the
manufactured home which is the result of improper setup, moving, or defects in work or materials
done or furnished by persons other than the manufacturer, retailer, or installer.

B. Manufactured homes sold as used manufactured homes shall not be covered by a warranty
unless provided for in writing outlining the terms and conditions of the warranty.

C. The warranty required by this Part shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any
other warranties, rights, and privileges which the buyer may have under any other law or instrument.
The buyer may not waive his rights under this Part and any such waiver is hereby prohibited as
contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

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from an installer. In 1999, the only statute in the Manufactured Housing Code that

addressed the acts of the installer was La.R.S. 51:911.25 which provided in pertinent

part as follows:

A. Each new manufactured home . . . shall be
covered by warranties of the manufacturer . . . .

B. Each such manufactured home sold by a dealer
licensed by this state shall be covered by written warranties
which shall be furnished by the manufacturer and the
dealer, which shall obligate them to warrant as a minimum,
the following:

(1) Compliance with standards. The
manufacturer shall warrant that the
manufactured home complied with the Code
and the requirements of this Part . . . .

(2) Defects. The manufacturer shall warrant
that the manufactured home was
manufactured free from any defects . . . and
was delivered to the dealer in such condition.
Neither the manufacturer nor the dealer shall
be liable under the warranty for any defect in
the manufactured home which is the result of
improper setup, moving, or defects in work or
materials done or furnished by persons other
than the manufacturer or dealer, unless such
setup, moving, work, or materials were done
or furnished by a person under contract with,
or connected by agency with such
manufacturer or dealer. (emphasis added)

....

Accordingly, under La.R.S. 51:911.25(B)(2), Dr. Lord is liable for the

improper moving and set-up by Arrow because, while there was no written agreement

between Dr. Lord and Arrow, there was a verbal contract and an agency relationship

wherein Arrow was hired by Dr. Lord to move and install the home onto the property

of Eaves. Arrow did not contract with Eaves to move and install the home; Arrow

contracted with, and was the agent of, Dr. Lord. While La.R.S. 51:911.25(A)(2)

currently provides that the installer must warrant to the buyer that the manufactured

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home was “installed according to the Minimum Standards for Installation of

Manufactured Homes (R.S. 51:912.21 et seq.),” there was no such responsibility

imposed upon the installer in 1999.

Rather, the statutes appeared to impose a kind of vicarious liability onto

the seller who contracts with an installer to move and set up a mobile home in much

the same manner as the seller would be liable if his own employee had moved and

installed the home. This obligation of the seller who does, after all, profit from the

sale, is in keeping with our Civil Code which also provides for the seller’s obligations

of delivery and warranty: “The seller is bound to deliver the thing sold and to

warrant to the buyer ownership and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden

defects in, that thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold is fit for its intended

use.” La.Civ.Code art. 2475.

While there is and was a provision in 1999 in the Manufactured Housing

Code that required a manufacturer to indemnify a seller for the seller’s own losses,

La.R.S. 51:911.24.1(C), there was no provision requiring Arrow as the installer to

indemnify Dr. Lord as the seller or dealer for any damages caused by Arrow.

Moreover, while the more recent 2001 revisions require the installer to give a

warranty of proper installation to the buyer, the revisions still do not contain a

provision directly requiring the installer to indemnify the seller. We are not called

upon to decide what effect the new requirement for installer warranty might have on

a seller’s request for reimbursement from the installer. Accordingly, we will leave

that for another day. In the present case, Dr. Lord has not asserted any statute that

would allow him to recover his own attorney fees and expenses.

Dr. Lord argues that he is entitled to be indemnified for, or reimbursed,

his legal fees and lost income because pursuant to Green v. TACA Int’l Airlines, 304

So.2d 357 (La.1974), indemnity “shifts the entire loss from a tort-feasor only
8

technically or constructively at fault to one primarily responsible for the act that

caused the damage.” Id. at 359 (emphasis added). However, in the Green case, the

“entire loss” referenced therein was an award to the airline of “full indemnity for its

liability to plaintiffs.” Id. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the “entire loss” referred

to the plaintiff’s losses in damages and attorney fees, not the statutorily liable

defendant’s losses in defending the suit.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Nassif v. Sunrise Homes, Inc., 98-3193

(La. 6/29/99), 739 So.2d 183, cited the Green case and made it abundantly clear that

the reference to “entire loss” means the plaintiff’s loss. The court stated that “[a]s

a general rule, attorney fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or

contract.” Id. at 185. However, the court distinguished between a defendant’s action

for his own attorney fees and an action for indemnity, finding that an action for

implied indemnity included attorney fees, but only the attorney fees that the defendant

third-party plaintiff was bound to pay the original plaintiff. More specifically, the

court stated:

Because Coast [defendant/third party plaintiff] is seeking
indemnity for the attorney fees it was compelled to pay
Nassif [plaintiff], rather than reimbursement for its own
attorney fees, we must begin by examining the basic law of
indemnity, and the distinction between an action for
indemnity and an action for attorney fees.

Indemnity in its most basic sense means
reimbursement, and may lie when one party discharges a
liability which another rightfully should have assumed.
Black’s Law Dictionary 769 (6th ed. 1990); 42 C.J.S.
Indemnity § 2 (1991). It is based on the principle that
everyone is responsible for his own wrongdoing, and if
another person has been compelled to pay a judgment
which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer, then the
loss should be shifted to the party whose negligence or
tortious act caused the loss. 42 C.J.S. Indemnity at § 32.
The obligation to indemnify may be express, as in a
contractual provision, or may be implied in law, even in the
absence of an indemnity agreement. Id. at § 29. An
implied contract of indemnity arises only where the
9

liability of the person seeking indemnification is solely
constructive or derivative and only against one who,
because of his act, has caused such constructive liability to
be imposed. Bewley Furniture Co., Inc. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 285 So.2d 216, 219 (La.1973).

Id. at 185.

The Nassif court went on to explain the theoretical basis of indemnity

as the general obligation to repair the damage caused by one’s fault pursuant to

La.Civ.Code art. 2315, and the moral maxim that one person should not enrich

himself at the expense of another. The Nassif court then differentiated between an

action for indemnity and an action for attorney fees and stated as follows:

Applying similar concepts, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, in United Gen. Ins. Co. v. Crane Carrier Co.,
695 P.2d 1334 (Okla.1984), distinguished between an
action for attorney fees and an action for indemnity. In that
case, the court stated:

We therefore hold that where the jury returns
its verdict in favor of the defendant
third-party plaintiff against the third-party
defendant for the full amount of the judgment
awarded against the defendant third-party
plaintiff, the defendant third-party plaintiff is
not entitled to recover from the third-party
defendant the attorney’s fees expended in
litigating the third-party action for the reason
that the indemnitee cannot recover attorney
fees . . . in the absence of an express contract
for such indemnification.

Nassif, 739 So.2d at 186 (quoting United Gen. Ins. Co. v. Crane Carrier Co., 695

P.2d at 1339) (emphasis added). The Nassif court agreed with the assessment in the

Oklahoma case and held that the defendant third-party plaintiff in Nassif was entitled

to recover from the third-party defendant the attorney fees that the plaintiffs

recovered from the defendant under the general rules of indemnity. Accordingly, the

court stated:

[A]n action for indemnity is a separate substantive cause of
action, independent of the underlying wrong, and distinct
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from an action for attorney fees. . . . [T]he equitable
principle of restitution applies in an action for indemnity to
allow a defendant who is only technically or constructively
liable for a plaintiff’s loss to recover from the party
actually at fault the attorney fees it was compelled to pay
the plaintiff, even in the absence of a statute or contract of
indemnification. This measure of relief is in accordance
with the long standing principle that “[i]ndemnity shifts the
entire loss from a tortfeasor only technically or
constructively at fault to one primarily responsible for the
act that caused the damage.” Green v. TACA Int’l Airlines,
304 So.2d 357, 359 (La.1974) (emphasis added).

Id. at 186-87.

Based upon the foregoing, where there was no written contract for

indemnity or for attorney fees between Dr. Lord and Arrow, Dr. Lord is entitled to

indemnity from Arrow under a theory of implied indemnity which covers only the

damages and attorney fees of the original plaintiffs, Eaves, that Dr. Lord was

obligated to pay in the main demand. Accordingly, Arrow has reimbursed Dr. Lord

the amount of the $2,500.00 judgment in favor of Eaves plus legal costs and interest

in a total amount of $5,248.79, and that is all that Dr. Lord is entitled to under the

theory of implied indemnity. As for Dr. Lord’s claim to attorney fees as special

damages which he prayed for in his petitions, there clearly is no contract for attorney

fees between Dr. Lord and Arrow, and Dr. Lord cites no statute providing for his

reimbursement of his own attorney fees.

Dr. Lord cites Daigle v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 580 So.2d 722

(La.App. 3 Cir. 1991), and La.Civ.Code art. 2545 for the proposition that the innocent

seller is entitled to reimbursement of its own attorney fees and losses associated with

defending the suit. In Daigle, where the seller was found innocent but nonetheless

had to prepare for and attend trial, the court ordered the bad faith automobile

manufacturer to reimburse attorney fees to the good faith seller for the seller’s

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defense against the main demand of the purchaser, for the seller’s third party demand

against the manufacturer, and for the seller’s appeal.

However, Daigle is not analogous to the current litigation because the

faulty party being sued for attorney fees in the current litigation is the installer, not

the manufacturer. Following a fourth circuit case, the majority in Daigle appears to

have erroneously based its award of attorney fees on La.Civ.Code art. 25452 which

provided at the time, and still provides, that a bad faith seller is liable to the buyer for

the buyer’s attorney fees. However, the issue in Daigle involved a good faith seller

and reimbursement of attorney fees to that good faith seller. In any event, the

concurring opinion in Daigle cites La.Civ.Code art. 2531, which at all times pertinent

hereto, has provided a remedy against the manufacturer for the loss sustained by the

good-faith seller. More specifically, the second paragraph of La.Civ.Code art. 2531

provides as follows:

A seller who is held liable for a redhibitory defect
has an action against the manufacturer of the defective
thing, if the defect existed at the time the thing was
delivered by the manufacturer to the seller, for any loss the
seller sustained because of the redhibition. Any
contractual provision that attempts to limit, diminish or
prevent such recovery by a seller against the manufacturer
shall have no effect.

2
Prior to the 1993 revision, La.Civ.Code art. 2545 was entitled, “Liability of seller for
concealment of vice,” and provided that, “[t]he seller, who knows the vice of the thing he sells and
omits to declare it, besides the restitution of price and repayment of the expenses, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages. (Amended by Acts 1968, No. 84,
§ 1.).” Smith v. H.J. Landreneau Bldg. Contractor, Inc., 426 So.2d 1360, 1362 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1983).

Under the 1993 revision, La.Civ.Code art. 2545 is entitled, “Liability of seller who knows
of the defect; presumption of knowledge,” and provides that “[a] seller who knows that the thing
he sells has a defect but omits to declare it, or a seller who declares that the thing has a quality that
he knows it does not have, is liable to the buyer for the return of the price with interest from the time
it was paid, for the reimbursement of the reasonable expenses occasioned by the sale and those
incurred for the preservation of the thing, and also for damages and reasonable attorney fees. If the
use made of the thing, or the fruits it might have yielded, were of some value to the buyer, such a
seller may be allowed credit for such use or fruits. A seller is deemed to know that the thing he sells
has a redhibitory defect when he is a manufacturer of that thing.”

12

Accordingly, both La.Civ.Code art. 2531 and La.R.S. 51:911.24.1(C),

which text was stated earlier in this decision, provide for reimbursement from the

manufacturer to the seller of the seller’s losses in defending against the claims of the

buyer under certain circumstances. However, neither the Civil Code article nor the

revised statutes imposes a requirement on the installer to reimburse the seller for the

seller’s losses in defending against the claims of the buyer. Article 2531 is further

inapplicable in the present case because no redhibitory defects were found.

Dr. Lord also cites Holden v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 416 So.2d

335 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writs denied, 421 So.2d 248, 421 So.2d 249 (La.1982), which

was relied upon by the Daigle court. However, as in Daigle, the issue in Holden was

the manufacturer’s, not the installer’s, reimbursement to the good faith dealer of the

dealer’s attorney fees. Accordingly, Holden is also distinguishable from the instant

case.

As to Dr. Lord’s claim for his lost income in the amount of $6,475.00,

due to his having to attend a deposition and a four-day arbitration, Arrow cites Evans

v. Century Ready Mix Corp., 446 So.2d 860 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984). There, the court

found that lost income due to trial preparation was not an item of damages reasonably

contemplated in a sale of the concrete product at issue. More specifically, the Evans

court found that lost earnings “is but a remote and indirect consequence of the breach

of contract and does not fall within the ambit of the reasonable contemplation of the

parties as provided in La.Civ.Code art. 1934,” relative to offer and acceptance. Id.

at 862. Under the present set of circumstances, we agree with this assessment.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

which granted partial summary judgment to Arrow on the issues of Dr. Lord’s

attorney fees and lost income. Costs of this appeal are assessed against Dr. Lord.

AFFIRMED.

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