Melissa Horacek v. Davelyn Watson

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-210

MELISSA HORACEK

VERSUS

DAVELYN WATSON, ET AL.

************

APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 212,514
HONORABLE F. RAE SWENT, DISTRICT JUDGE

************

JAMES T. GENOVESE
JUDGE

************

Court composed of John D. Saunders, Elizabeth A. Pickett, and James T. Genovese,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Robert G. Nida
Post Office Box 6118
Alexandria, Louisiana 71307-6118
(318) 445-6471
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Melissa Horacek

Thomas O. Wells
Post Office Box 13438
Alexandria, Louisiana 71315
(318) 445-4500
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Davelyn Watson, individually, and d/b/a Watson Properties, and
Carl Watson, individually, and d/b/a Watson Properties

GENOVESE, Judge.

In this suit for damages arising out of a home rental agreement between

Plaintiff and Defendants, Plaintiff appeals the district court’s judgment granting

Defendants’ exception of res judicata based upon a prior judgment of eviction

rendered in city court. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

FACTS

In October 2001, Plaintiff, Melissa Horacek (Horacek), executed a rental

agreement with Davelyn Watson for a home in Alexandria, Louisiana. On June 24,

2002, Davelyn Watson filed a rule to evict Horacek in Alexandria City Court. On

July 9, 2002, the city court judge rendered judgment in favor of Davelyn Watson and

against Melissa Horacek ordering Horacek to vacate the premises and to deliver

possession thereof to Davelyn Watson.

On March 21, 2003, Horacek filed the present action in the Ninth Judicial

District Court in Rapides Parish against Defendants, Davelyn Watson, individually,

and doing business as Watson Properties, and Carl Watson, individually, and doing

business as Watson Properties. Horacek alleges in her petition that in May of 2002

she notified Davelyn Watson of her intention to vacate the premises and that they

agreed to a pro-rated rental amount for the time her belongings would remain on the

rental property after vacating same. Horacek alleges that when she returned to the

property to obtain her belongings, she discovered that they had been removed from

the premises and discarded. Horacek contends that Defendants are the owners of the

rental property and that their wrongful seizure of her property constituted tortious

conduct, breach of contract, and violated Louisiana law regarding rental agreements

and evictions of tenants.

1

The answer of Davelyn Watson and Carl Watson (d/b/a Watson Properties)

averred that Carl Watson was the full owner of the rental property and that Davelyn

Watson had no ownership interest in the property as had been alleged. Additionally,

Defendants filed a reconventional demand against Horacek wherein they asserted that

Horacek had caused damage to the rental property and had abandoned same.

Defendants subsequently filed an exception of res judicata asserting that Horacek’s

present action was a compulsory reconventional demand which was required to have

been asserted by her in the suit for eviction filed in the Alexandria City Court.

The exception of res judicata was heard in the district court on August 15,

2005. After taking the matter under advisement, the district court judge granted the

exception of res judicata and dismissed Horacek’s claims with prejudice. It is from

this judgment that Horacek appeals. For the following reasons, we reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

ISSUE

The sole issue presented for our review is whether the district court erred in

granting the exception of res judicata.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Horacek asserts that the district court erred in concluding that her failure to

reconvene in the Alexandria City Court warranted the application of the doctrine of

res judicata. We agree.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 425(A) provides that “[a] party shall

assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the

subject matter of the litigation.” Additionally, by its use of the mandatory language

“shall,” La.Code Civ.P. art. 1061(B) requires a “defendant in the principal action” to

“assert in a reconventional demand all causes of action that he may have against the

2

plaintiff that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the

principal action.” In Walker v. Howell, 04-246, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/15/04), 896

So.2d 110, 112, this court held that “an exception of res judicata is the proper

procedural vehicle to enforce the . . . mandates [of La.Code Civ.P. art. 425 and

La.Code Civ.P. art. 1061] by barring claims that were or could have been litigated in

a previous lawsuit.”

Louisiana law applicable to res judicata is embodied in Louisiana Revised

Statutes 13:4231, which provides as follows:

§ 4231. Res judicata

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment
is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct
review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action
existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished
and merged in the judgment.

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are
extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes
of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any
issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential
to that judgment.

Defendants argued in the district court, and again on appeal, that the doctrine

of res judicata precludes the present action by Horacek due to her failure to assert her

claim via reconventional demand in the city court proceedings. Despite the

procedural constraints preventing such a reconventional demand, the district court

agreed with this assertion. The notice of rendition of oral judgment issued by the

district court reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

3

The Exception of Res Judicata is granted. [La.Code Civ.
P.] art. 1061(B) now provides all claims which arise out of
the same transaction shall be brought as a reconventional
demand. The fact that the initial action to evict was a
summary proceeding and the reconventional demand must
be brought in an ordinary proceeding does not change the
requirement that it indeed be brought. The proper course
of action would be to file the reconventional demand and
then have the issues severed by the court. Earhart v.
Brown, [97-522, (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/97), 702 So.2d
976.]

We disagree with the Earhart decision and find the district court’s reliance on same

to be misplaced.

The present claim for damages asserted by Horacek could not have been

litigated in the previous lawsuit filed in the Alexandria City Court for two reasons.

First, the action filed in the city court was for eviction. Such an action is a summary

proceeding instituted by a rule to show cause. La.Code Civ.P. art. 2592; La.Code

Civ.P. art. 4731. In contrast, the present suit for damages requires suit by ordinary

process. La.Code Civ.P. art. 851. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure requires

that “[t]he mode of procedure employed in the incidental action shall be the same as

that used in the principal action, except as otherwise provided by law.” La.Code Civ.

P. art. 1036(B). Accordingly, an attempt by Horacek to assert her present claim for

damages in the city court proceedings would have violated La.Code Civ.P. art.

1036(B).

Secondly, the present claim for damages could not have been litigated in the

Alexandria City Court due to a lack of jurisdiction. Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure Article 4843(K) grants the City Court of Alexandria jurisdiction over cases

“where the amount in dispute, or the value of the property involved, does not exceed

thirty-five thousand dollars.” Paragraph eighteen of Horacek’s petition asserts that

“her damages [are] greater than $50,000.00,” and paragraph nineteen states that she

4

“desires and is entitled to trial by jury as to all issues herein.”

Being a court of limited jurisdiction, the Alexandria City Court would have

been without jurisdiction to resolve the amount allegedly in dispute. Additionally,

La.Code Civ.P. art. 4871 states that “[t]here shall be no trial by jury in any case in a

. . . city court . . . .” Consequently, a trial by jury is prohibited in the Alexandria City

Court. Therefore, the present claim is not a claim that could have been litigated in the

original proceedings filed in the Alexandria City Court.

As noted above, Appellees argue that despite the procedural constraints

preventing Horacek from having the present action litigated in the Alexandria City

Court, the proper procedure would have been for Horacek to file her reconventional

demand in the city court, and then to have the court sever her claim for damages and

transfer same to the district court pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 4873. This is not

required by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

Appellees’ argument is likewise contrary to the intent of the doctrine of res

judicata. Comment (a) to La.R.S. 13:4231 states that the purpose of the doctrine of

res judicata “is to foster judicial efficiency and also to protect the defendant from

multiple lawsuits.” Similarly, comment (b) to La.R.S. 13:4231 states that “this

principle serves the interests of judicial economy. . . .” As this court recognized in

Metoyer v. Roy O. Martin, 03-1540, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/1/04), 895 So.2d 552,

564, on rehearing, writ denied, 05-1027 (La. 6/3/05), 903 So.2d 467 (quoting Lee v.

Twin Bros. Marine Corp., 03-2034, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 35,

37), “[t]he purpose of res judicata is to promote judicial efficiency and final

resolution of disputes by preventing needless relitigation.” The judicial efficiency of

the doctrine of res judicata is neither promoted nor accomplished by requiring

Plaintiff in this case to file her claim for damages against Defendants via

5

reconventional demand in the summary eviction proceedings in the Alexandria City

Court. Because the city court lacks jurisdiction over the amount in dispute and

cannot accommodate a trial by jury, it is nonsensical to require Plaintiff to file a

motion to sever the claims and a motion to transfer her claim to the district court.

That would be tantamount to judicial inefficiency as opposed to judicial efficiency.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court

granting the exception of res judicata and remand this matter to the district court for

further proceedings.

Having found that Horacek’s present claim is not barred by the doctrine of res

judicata, this court need not address Appellant’s alternative argument that the present

action lacks an “identity of parties” as required by Burguieres v. Pollingue, 02-1385

(La.2/25/03) 843 So.2d 1049. However, we do note that Carl Watson was not a party

to the eviction proceedings in the Alexandria City court and that the sole plaintiff in

that proceeding was Davelyn Watson.

DECREE

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court

granting Defendants’ exception of res judicata and dismissing Plaintiff’s suit with

prejudice. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

Costs of this appeal are assessed against Defendants, Davelyn Watson,

individually, and d/b/a Watson Properties, and Carl Watson, individually, and d/b/a

Watson Properties.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

6