Irving Ceasar v. Sheriff Sid Hebert

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-374

IRVING CEASAR, ET AL.

VERSUS

SHERIFF SID HEBERT, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 100030-A
HONORABLE GERARD B. WATTIGNY, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John D. Saunders, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Mark M. Gonzalez
Scheuermann and Jones
909 Poydras Street, Suite 2556
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 525-4361
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Jerry Corsey

Morris M. Haik, Jr.
209 French Street
New Iberia, LA 70562
(337) 560-4357
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Iberia Parish Government

Joseph L. Ferguson
420 S. Iberia Street
Post Office Box 9804
New Iberia, LA 70560-9804
(337) 365-6789
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Sheriff Sid Hebert
Glynn Reaux

Noland J. Hammond
Post Office Box 1841
Alexandria, LA 71309
(318) 443-7191
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES:
Irving Ceasar
Ronald Foster

AMY, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals the decision of the trial court granting the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to recover

payment under the uninsured motorist provision of the defendants’ insurance policy

for damages he sustained in a motor vehicle accident. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record indicates that on February 26, 2002, the plaintiff, Jerry Corsey, an

inmate at the Iberia Parish Jail, voluntarily participated in a litter abatement program.

He and three other inmates were passengers in a vehicle driven by Deputy Glynn

Reaux, Iberia Parish Sheriff’s Department, when it collided with another vehicle. The

inmates filed a suit for damages, naming as defendants Deputy Reaux, Sheriff Sid

Hebert, the Iberia Parish Government and its insurer, Commonwealth Insurance

Company. Deputy Reaux and Sheriff Hebert filed motions for summary judgment,

alleging that they were immune from tort liability under La.R.S. 15:708.1 The Parish

filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs were not under its

authority and control, and therefore, it owed no duty of care to them. In its motion

for summary judgment, Commonwealth contended that they were only liable if the

1
Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:708(A)(1)(b) provides:

A prisoner, who participates in a litter abatement or collection program
pursuant to this Paragraph, shall have no cause of action for damages against the
sheriff conducting the program or supervising his participation therein, nor against
any employee or agent of such sheriff, for any injury or loss suffered by him during
or arising out of his participation in the program, if such injury or loss is a direct
result of the lack of supervision or act or omission of the sheriff or his employee or
agent, unless the injury or loss was caused by the intentional or grossly negligent act
or omission of the sheriff or his employee or agent. The sheriff shall not be liable for
any injury caused by the prisoner, unless the gross negligence or intentional act of the
sheriff or his employee or agent was a substantial factor in causing the injury. No
provision hereof shall negate the requirement to provide a prisoner with necessary
medical treatment as statutorily required.

insured was legally obligated to pay. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the

motions and also dismissed Deputy Reaux and Sheriff Hebert from the case.2

Corsey now appeals the granting of summary judgments in favor of the Parish

and Commonwealth. He has designated the following as error:

The trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action
against Commonwealth Insurance Company, since Plaint[iff] was an
insured, injured in the vehicle insured by Commonwealth, and no other
insurance was available to him and no evidence was presented at the
summary judgment hearing to counter these claims.

Discussion

Standard of Review & Summary Judgment

An appellate court reviews motions for summary judgments de novo and

employs the same criteria as the trial court in deciding whether summary judgment

is appropriate. Lafleur v. Aftco Enterprises, Inc., 05-127 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/06), 927

So.2d 1200. “A motion for summary judgment will be granted ‘if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B).” Id.

at 1202.

The mover bears the initial burden of proof to show that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. However, if the mover will not
bear the burden of proof at trial, he need not negate all essential
elements of the adverse party’s claim, but he must point out that there
is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the
claim. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2). Once the mover has met his
initial burden of proof, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to
satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. Id.

2
In a previous appeal, Corsey challenged the judgments in favor of the Sheriff and his
Deputy. Since these issues have been adjudicated in Ceasar v. Hebert, 05-1195 (La.App. 3 Cir.
4/5/06), 926 So.2d 139, we do not address them here.

2

“Interpretation of an insurance contract is usually a legal question
that can be properly resolved in the framework of a motion for summary
judgment.” Robinson v. Heard, 01-1697, p. 4 (La.2/26/02), 809 So.2d
943, 945.

Id. Furthermore, in Mouton v. Thomas, 05-926, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/1/06), 924

So.2d 394, 396 (citations omitted), this court held that a “[s]ummary judgment

declaring no coverage under an insurance policy may only be rendered when there is

no reasonable interpretation of the policy which would provide coverage under the

undisputed facts of the case.”

Uninsured Motorist Coverage

Corsey argues that as a passenger of the vehicle involved in the accident, he

was a “user” of the vehicle and, thus , an “insured” under Commonwealth’s insurance

policy. He contends that because of “a lack of a remedy available to [him,] (the

negligent defendant and his principal, the sheriff, are both immune) it is all the more

important to approach this case with an eye toward determining, where there might

be insurance coverage[.]” Corsey argues that, as an insured, he should be able to

recover damages under the policy’s uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) provision.

Therefore, he contends that his claims against Commonwealth remain “and the case

should be remanded to allow them to be tried.”

Although Corsey contends that he is an “insured” under Commonwealth’s

policy, as his argument here focuses on the uninsured motorist coverage, we turn

directly to consideration of that argument. After review, we find no merit in his

assertion that the policy afforded him with coverage under the UM provision. We

first note that the policy’s UM provision indicates that coverage shall be afforded “in

accordance with the laws of the State I [sic] which the accident occurs.” Accordingly,

3

we turn to La.R.S. 22:6803, entitled “Uninsured Motorist Coverage,” which provides

that:
(1)(a)(i) No automobile liability insurance covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any
motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and required to be
registered in this state or as provided in this Section unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits of
bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under provisions filed with
and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease, including death resulting therefrom . . . .

In Breaux v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 369 So.2d 1335 (La.1979),

the supreme court considered whether an insurance policy provided UM coverage to

the passenger in a vehicle when the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of

the host driver of that vehicle. In denying UM coverage in light of the UM coverage

provision, the supreme court explained:

In our view, the intent and effect of this provision [La.R.S.
22:1406(D)(1)(a)] is plain. A person insured under the uninsured
motorist provision of a particular policy delivered or issued for delivery
in this state with respect to a motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state must establish that he is legally entitled to recover
damages [f]rom the owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicles in order to obtain coverage thereunder. As to coverage
under the uninsured motorist provisions of a particular policy, the
statute thus contemplates two distinct motor vehicles: the motor vehicle
with respect to which uninsured motorist coverage is issued and the
“uninsured or underinsured” motor vehicle.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, even if insured, a determination we need not reach, Corsey is required

to prove that a vehicle, other than the one for which UM coverage was issued, was

uninsured or underinsured. See Breaux, 369 So.2d 1335. See also Nall v. State Farm

3
At the time of the accident, the uninsured motorist provision was designated as La.R.S.
22:1406(D)(1)(a).

4

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 So.2d 216 (La.1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Patton, 95-

732 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/4/95), 665 So.2d 1312; Lang v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 00-

1634 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/01), 783 So.2d 587.4 Here, Corsey was a passenger in the

vehicle for which UM coverage was issued. In light of Breaux and its progeny, which

emphasize that the UM statutory scheme requires two distinct motor vehicles for UM

recovery, Corsey’s claim under the UM provision fails. It is clear from the

jurisprudence that the vehicle on which the UM coverage is issued and the uninsured

or underinsured vehicle, must be separate vehicles. He cannot claim that the covered

vehicle was uninsured or underinsured. This is true regardless of the fact that the trial

court determined that the liability portion of the policy does not provide coverage in

this instance due to the immunity afforded by La.R.S. 15:708(A)(1)(b).

This assignment lacks merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendants, Iberia Parish Government and Commonwealth

Insurance Company, is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the

plaintiff, Jerry Corsey.

AFFIRMED.

4
We note that La.R.S. 22:680(1)(f) also contemplates two distinct motor vehicles for
purposes of UM coverage:

Uninsured motorist coverage shall include coverage for bodily injury arising out of
a motor vehicle accident caused by an automobile which has no physical contact with
the injured party or with a vehicle which the injured party or with a vehicle which the
injured party is occupying at the time of the accident, provided that the injured party
bears the burden of proving, by an independent and disinterested witness, that the
injury was the result of the actions of the driver of another vehicle whose identity is
unknown or who is uninsured or underinsured. (Emphasis added).

5