Joann Prudhomme v. Sammy Prudhomme

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-516

JOANN PRUDHOMME

VERSUS

SAMMY PRUDHOMME

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 64978-A
HONORABLE J. LARRY VIDRINE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Marc T. Amy, and Billy Howard Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

H. Douglas Hunter
Guglielmo, Lopez, Tuttle, Hunter & Jarrell
Post Office Drawer 1329
Opelousas, LA 70571-1329
(337) 948-8201
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Sammy Prudhomme

Kathy F. Meyers
Post Office Drawer 450
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-5596
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Joanna Prudhomme

AMY, Judge.

The defendant was found in contempt of court for not paying $9,190.50 in

support arrearage. The defendant made an initial payment of $3,500.00. He argues

that he and the plaintiff subsequently entered into a settlement agreement whereby he

would pay $3,000.00 to the plaintiff and deliver a riding lawnmower to her. This

agreement, which was to extinguish the arrearage, was ruled invalid by the trial court.

On subsequent motion, the defendant was again found in contempt of court, and the

trial court ordered that he pay the remaining arrearage. The defendant appeals this

latter judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record indicates that the plaintiff, Joanna Christy Weeks Prudhomme, and

the defendant, Sammy Curtis Prudhomme, were married in September 1981. Ms.

Prudhomme filed for divorce in May 2003; in her petition, she requested spousal

support as well as child support for the parties’ three minor children. The judgment

of divorce was signed on January 16, 2004, and an income assignment order was

issued April 8, 2004, whereby $1,476.00 per month for child support was to be

deducted from Mr. Prudhomme’s wages.

On June 23, 2004, Ms. Prudhomme filed a rule for contempt of court for failure

to pay child support and spousal support. In its judgment dated December 30, 2004,

the trial court found that “Sammy Curtis Prudhomme is delinquent and in arrears in

the amount of . . . $9,190.50[,] and that said delinquent amount is hereby made

executory immediately, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial

demand.” The trial court ordered Mr. Prudhomme to serve ninety days in parish jail,

which was to be suspended if the arrearage was paid within ninety days of the

judgment. He was also ordered to pay $1,000.00 in attorney fees.

On January 7, 2005, Mr. Prudhomme filed a motion for new trial, which the

trial court denied. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Prudhomme tendered $3,500.00 to Ms.

Prudhomme. As the entire arrearage was not paid, Ms. Prudhomme filed another rule

for contempt on April 12, 2005, which was later continued without date. Two weeks

later, Mr. Prudhomme filed a motion and order for suspensive and/or devolutive

appeal.

According to Mr. Prudhomme, on May 16, 2005, he and Ms. Prudhomme

allegedly entered into an agreement whereby the parties “came to a mut[u]al

agreement regarding all arre[a]rages and all community settlements[.]” According

to the agreement, Mr. Prudhomme was to pay Ms. Prudhomme $3,000.00 and deliver

a riding lawnmower to her. Mr. Prudhomme maintained that he fulfilled his

obligations under the agreement and that because of this, he did not deem it necessary

to pay the costs for his appeal.

Arguing that no settlement had been reached, Ms. Prudhomme filed a motion

and order to dismiss Mr. Prudhomme’s appeal of the December 30, 2004 judgment

for failure to pay court costs. Mr. Prudhomme opposed the motion, arguing that Ms.

Prudhomme signed the settlement agreement, he fulfilled his obligations, and he

relied on this agreement to his detriment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted

the motion to dismiss.

Ms. Prudhomme subsequently requested that her rule for contempt, which was

previously filed on April 12, 2005, be reset. Mr. Prudhomme responded by filing an

exception of prematurity and an answer. At the hearing on the rule for contempt, Mr.

Prudhomme proffered testimony regarding a $3,000.00 payment allegedly made

2

pursuant to the terms of a purported settlement agreement.1 At that time, Mr.

Prudhomme explained that he had paid $3,500.00 toward the arrearage. He testified

that Ms. Prudhomme told him that the $1,000.00 in attorney fees was paid from this

amount.

Ms. Prudhomme acknowledged in her proffered testimony that she received

and negotiated the $3,000.00 check from Mr. Prudhomme; however, she indicated

that the terms of the settlement agreement were not fulfilled because Mr. Prudhomme

did not return the riding lawnmower “as we discussed.” Furthermore, according to

Ms. Prudhomme’s proffered testimony, she informed Mr. Prudhomme that her

attorney had already taken the $1,000.00 in attorney fees out of the $3,500.00 that he

had given to her. She testified that she explained to Mr. Prudhomme that “he owed

her [Ms. Prudhomme’s attorney] the money back because she owed me.”

At the contempt hearing, Ms. Prudhomme testified that despite some payments

made to her, Mr. Prudhomme owed $3,142.50 in arrearage, excluding the $1,000.00

in attorney fees.

In its January 31, 2006 judgment, the trial court ordered Mr. Prudhomme to pay

arrearage in the amount of $3,142.50 and $1,000.00 in attorney fees from the previous

judgment as well as an additional $500.00 in attorney fees for the costs of those

proceedings. The trial court sentenced Mr. Prudhomme to sixty days in jail. It is

from this judgment that Mr. Prudhomme appeals, asserting two assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding that the settlement agreement
entered into between the parties on May 16, 2005 is invalid.

1
Although this testimony was proffered, we include it in our discussion of the case because
of the nature of Appellant’s arguments.

3

2. The trial court erred in the January 31, 2006 judgment in
calculating the amount remaining to be paid by Sammy Curtis
Prudhomme under the judgment of December 30, 2004.

Discussion

Settlement Agreement

Mr. Prudhomme argues that the settlement agreement that he and Ms.

Prudhomme entered into on May 16, 2005, was valid and that the terms of the

agreement were met. He specifically points out that Ms. Prudhomme negotiated the

$3,000.00 check, the memo line of which contained the notation: “Final Payment per

Agreement of 5/16/05.” Mr. Prudhomme contends that this payment, along with the

delivery of the riding lawnmower, released him of his obligation to pay the remaining

arrearage. He argues that Ms. Prudhomme’s negotiation of the check indicates that

she intended this matter to be settled and this constitutes a compromise of their

dispute. Accordingly, he asserts that he did not deem it necessary to pay the costs of

his appeal.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 3071 provides in pertinent part:

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or
more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust
their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on,
and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by
the danger of losing.

This contract must be either reduced into writing or recited in
open court and capable of being transcribed from the record of the
proceeding. This agreement recited in open court confers upon each of
them the right of judicially enforcing its performance, although its
substance may thereafter be written in a more convenient form.

In Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government, 04-1459, pp. 24-

25 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 55, the supreme court stated:

A compromise agreement, like other contracts, is the law between the
parties, and must be interpreted according to the parties’ true intent.

4

Boyette v. Riverwood Int'l, 27,980 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/96), 669 So.2d
730, 733, writ granted in part, on other grounds, and denied in part,
96-1418 (La.10/4/96), 679 So.2d 1366. The party who attempts to rely
on the existence of a compromise agreement bears the burden of proof
to show that the requirements for a valid compromise are present,
including that the parties intended to settle. Id.

“The parties’ intent in executing a compromise is normally discerned from the four

corners of the document; extrinsic evidence is normally inadmissible to explain,

expand or contradict the terms of the instrument.” Randall v. Martin, 03-1311, p. 5

(La.App. 5 Cir. 2/23/04), 868 So.2d 913, 916.

The settlement letter stated as follows:

I Joanna Christy Weeks Prudhomme and Sammy Curtis
Prudhomme on 5/16/05 came to a mutal [sic] agreement regarding all
arrerages [sic] and all community settlements as stated below.

- $3000.00 cash with $1500.00 being paid upon settment [sic]
of judgement [sic] with $200.00 a month paid thereafter until
remaing [sic] balance is paid in full.

- 1 riding lawnmower to be returned to Joanna Christy Weeks
Prudhomme upon judgement [sic].

Signed this day on 5/16/05
/s/ Joanna Christy Weeks Prudhomme
/s/ Sammy Curtis Prudhomme

Witness[es]
/s/ Paula Prudhomme
/s/ Ferren Prudhomme

Here, the trial court found the settlement agreement invalid because Mr.

Prudhomme “did not comply and carry out his end of the bargain.” The trial court

dismissed Mr. Prudhomme’s appeal because “[i]n addition to not complying with the

agreement[,] he did not pay the costs.” The trial court’s decision will not be

overturned absent manifest error. Randall, 868 So.2d 913.

5

In part, Mr. Prudhomme is relying on the settlement letter as a defense to

payment of $9,190.50, the amount the trial court determined he owed in arrearage.

In order to prevail, Mr. Prudhomme must show that the settlement agreement

complied with La.Civ.Code art. 3071 and that he and Ms. Prudhomme intended to

settle their claims. Suire, 907 So.2d at 55.

The settlement letter stated that Mr. and Ms. Prudhomme “came to a mutal [sic]

agreement regarding all arrerages [sic] and all community settlements[.]” According

to the terms of the agreement, Mr. Prudhomme was to pay Ms. Prudhomme $3,000.00

in cash with $1,500.00 being paid upon settlement of judgment and the remainder

paid in $200.00 monthly installments. In addition, he was to return a riding

lawnmower to Ms. Prudhomme upon judgment.

The record supports a finding that the terms “upon settlement of judgment” and

“upon judgment” are indicative of a conditional obligation. “A conditional obligation

is one dependent on an uncertain event. If the obligation may not be enforced until

the uncertain event occurs, the condition is suspensive.” La.Civ.Code art. 1767.

Because it is unclear from the settlement agreement what the phrase “upon settlement

of judgment” means, the court may look to extrinsic evidence to explain the terms of

the agreement and to find the parties’ intent as it relates to settling their claims.

Randall, 868 So.2d 913; La.Civ.Code art. 2046. The record, however, does not

contain any such evidence. For ease of discussion, however, we note that at the

hearing for contempt of court, Mr. Prudhomme’s attorney acknowledged that the

terms of the settlement agreement were subject to a condition. He stated:

Mr. Prudhomme agreed to pay this money and deliver the lawn mower
when the Judgment was signed, we still don’t have a Judgment so under
this enforceable agreement Mr. Prudhomme didn’t even have to pay the
$3,000.00 yet because it was conditioned upon her signing the Judgment

6

which is a Satisfaction of Judgment saying that your Judgment on the
arrearage has been satisfied, so that’s the resolutory [sic] condition, her
signing the Judgment, she never would but he went ahead and complied
with the agreement anyway. . . . [W]e’ve sent the Satisfaction of
Judgment way back last summer to them and they refused to sign it.

In response, Ms. Prudhomme’s attorney explained:

Judge, last summer when that Satisfaction of Judgment was sent
to us that was sent prior to the hearing that we had, we wouldn’t sign it
because (inaudible) Mr. Prudhomme to do all of the things that the Court
had previously ordered him to do, we had had a hearing, you found him
in arrears and in an excess of $9,000.00, plus some other costs. Without
anything else, I get a letter in the mail with an, a so-called Consent
Judgment attached from Mr. Hunter saying, if you sign this Mr.
Prudhomme will pay half of what the Judge ordered and everything will
go away, so of course we didn’t sign it because . . . she wants all of the
money that you ordered[.]

These statements seem to illustrate that the parties’ interpretation of “upon

judgment” meant “satisfaction of judgment” or “consent judgment.” Therefore, Mr.

Prudhomme apparently agreed to pay Ms. Prudhomme $3,000.00 and return the

lawnmower to her when a satisfaction of judgment was signed by both parties. As

there is no indication that the parties agreed upon a time period in which the judgment

was to be signed, the terms of the agreement can be viewed as needing to be fulfilled

within a reasonable time. See La.Civ.Code art. 1773.2

The record indicates that on July 19, 2005, Mr. Prudhomme tendered a check

in the amount of $3,000.00 to Ms. Prudhomme. As of this date, no satisfaction of

2
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1773 provides in pertinent part:

If the condition is that an event shall occur within a fixed time
and that time elapses without the occurrence of the event, the
condition is considered to have failed.

If no time has been fixed for the occurrence of the event, the
condition may be fulfilled within a reasonable time.

Whether or not a time has been fixed, the condition is
considered to have failed once it is certain that the event will not
occur.

7

judgment had been signed. This failure of the suspensive condition, i.e., the signed

satisfaction of judgment, is fatal to the enforcement of the agreement. La.Civ.Code

art. 1773. Furthermore, according to Ms. Prudhomme, Mr. Prudhomme did not return

the lawnmower until January 9, 2006, approximately eight months after the settlement

agreement was signed, an arguably unreasonable period of time. Thus, the trial court

was not manifestly erroneous in finding that the settlement agreement was invalid.

This assignment is without merit.

Amounts Owed

As an alternative argument, Mr. Prudhomme contends that the “trial court erred

in the January 31, 2006 judgment in calculating the amount remaining to be paid by

[Mr.] Prudhomme under the judgment of December 30, 2004.” In the December 30,

2004 judgment, the trial court ordered Mr. Prudhomme to pay Ms. Prudhomme

$9,190.50 as it related to arrearage and $1,000.00 in attorney fees. He contends that

should “this Honorable Court find that no binding settlement agreement exists, this

remittance [of $3,000.00 per the settlement agreement] left a balance on the

December 30, 2004 judgment of $3,690.50[.]” According to Mr. Prudhomme, he

arrived at this figure by subtracting this $3,000.00 remittance as well as a previous

payment of $3,500.00. Mr. Prudhomme alleges that $1,000.00 in attorney fees was

paid from the $3,500.00 payment and that he, therefore, does not owe these fees.

In its January 31, 2006 judgment, the trial court found Mr. Prudhomme in

“contempt of court for failing to comply with the Judgment and Reasons for

Judgment dated October 27, 2005 [sic], finding him in arrears on child support and

liable for attorney’s fees and court costs.” He was ordered to pay $3,142.50 in

arrearage. In addition to paying the $1,000.00 in attorney fees, Mr. Prudhomme was

8

ordered to pay an additional $500.00 in attorney fees as well as court costs. Further,

he was sentenced to sixty days in parish jail.

At the first hearing for contempt of court, the trial court determined that Mr.

Prudhomme owed $9,190.50 in arrearage. He was also ordered to pay $1,000.00 in

attorney fees. According to Mr. and Ms. Prudhomme’s proffered testimony, Mr.

Prudhomme initially submitted $3,500.00 to Ms. Prudhomme. The parties further

testified that Mr. Prudhomme subsequently tendered a $3,000.00 check to Ms.

Prudhomme, which she negotiated. A copy of the check was entered into evidence.

Although Ms. Prudhomme stated in her proffered testimony that she negotiated

the $3,000.00 check, she alleged that the terms of the settlement agreement were not

complied with, i.e., the riding lawnmower was returned “very late.”

Ms. Prudhomme’s testimony at the contempt hearing indicates that the

$3,000.00 check and the $3,500.00 that Mr. Prudhomme previously submitted have

been applied toward the arrearage. During the contempt hearing, Ms. Prudhomme

was asked if she knew how much Mr. Prudhomme was in arrears other than the

$1,000.00 in attorney fees, to which she responded: “It’s about $3,142.50, I believe.”

The trial court ordered that Mr. Prudhomme pay Ms. Prudhomme $3,142.50 in

arrearage. As there is no documentation or evidence in the record to support this

figure, it appears that the trial court relied solely on the testimony offered by Ms.

Prudhomme. We note that during the contempt hearing, Mr. Prudhomme entered into

evidence a copy of a $3,000.00 check and a copy of a letter indicating the mailing of

a $3,5000.00 check to Ms. Prudhomme. However, Mr. Prudhomme did not offer that

evidence as a means of disputing Ms. Prudhomme’s calculation of the remaining

arrearage. According to Mr. Prudhomme, that evidence was to show that he made an

9

initial payment of $3,500.00 and that pursuant to the settlement agreement, the

remaining arrearage was extinguished when he tendered a $3,000.00 check. He did

not offer testimony concerning the amount owing in arrearage in the event that the

settlement agreement was found to be invalid.

In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Chrysler Corp., 01-1641, p. 35 (La.App.

3 Cir. 7/31/02), 834 So.2d 1026, 1048, this court stated that “[i]t is within the

province of the trier of fact to weigh credibility and to accept or reject the testimony

of any witnesses.” Furthermore, the trial court’s finding of fact will not be overturned

in the absence of manifest error. Gerace v. Gerace, 05-1300 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/5/06),

927 So.2d 622.

Given the unique circumstances of this case, we find no error in the trial court’s

determination that Ms. Prudhomme’s testimony was credible as it related to the

amount of arrearage owed. Nor do we find error in the trial court’s ordering Mr.

Prudhomme to pay the amount Ms. Prudhomme concluded was owed, namely

$3,142.50.

With regard to the $1,000.00 in attorney fees, we find that the trial court was

not manifestly erroneous in ordering that Mr. Prudhomme pay them. Even if the

attorney fees were credited against the $3,500.00 payment to Ms. Prudhomme, as Mr.

Prudhomme alleges, the fact would remain that Ms. Prudhomme did not receive that

$1,000.00 toward the arrearage. Therefore, Mr. Prudhomme is responsible for the

$1,000.00 attorney fee.3

This assignment is without merit.

3
Because Mr. Prudhomme has not contested the $500.00 in attorney fees or court costs
awarded in the January 31, 2006 judgment, we do not address them.

10

DECREE

For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of

this proceeding are assessed against the defendant, Sammy Curtis Prudhomme.

AFFIRMED.

11