David Chapman v. Safeway Ins. Co.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-0529 C/W 06-0530

DAVID CHAPMAN, ET AL.

VERSUS

SAFEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY OF LOUISIANA, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 03-C-0903 C/W 03-C-0904-D,
HONORABLE DONALD W. HEBERT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Chief Judge Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux and Judges Jimmie C.
Peters and J. David Painter.

AFFIRMED.

Louis M. Corne
1014 West University Avenue
Lafayette, LA 70506
(337) 264-1160
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS:
David Chapman, et al.

Jeffery Paul Robert
Law Firm of Grayson H. Brown
111 United Plaza, Suite 350
8545 United Plaza Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 924-9585
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, et al.

PETERS, J.

These consolidated cases arise from an automobile accident which occurred in

St. Landry Parish, Louisiana, on November 6, 2002. The plaintiffs in both cases

appeal the grant of a partial summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants,

Church of God in Christ, Inc., dismissing that defendant from the litigation. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment in all respects.

DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

The accident at issue in this litigation occurred on November 6, 2002, between

11:00 p.m. and midnight at the intersection of U.S. Highway 190 and Louisiana

Highway 95 in St. Landry Parish when a van driven by Johnathan L. Williams and

owned by Mr. Williams’ wife collided with a pickup truck. Among the passengers

in the van were Dustin Chapman, the minor son of David and Serena Chapman, and

Cavin Hanchett, the minor son of Mae Bell Hanchett. In February 2003, the

Chapmans and Ms. Hanchett filed separate suits against Mr. Williams and several

other defendants to recover the damages they and their children sustained as a result

of the accident. By an order dated May 21, 2003, the trial court consolidated these

two suits.

The pleadings in this litigation are substantial. However, disposition of the

issue now before us involves an analysis of the relationships between Mr. Williams,

the Church of God in Christ of Eunice, Inc. (Eunice church), and the Church of God

in Christ, Inc., located in Memphis, Tennessee (national church). At the time of the

accident, Mr. Williams was the pastor of the Eunice church, which, as the name

suggests, is an affiliate church located in Eunice, Louisiana. The plaintiffs named the

Eunice church as a defendant, asserting that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Williams

was an employee of the church and was in the course and scope of that employment

relationship. Thus, the plaintiffs asserted, the Eunice church was liable to them for

the damages they sustained as a result of Mr. Williams’ negligence based on the

principle of respondeat superior. Based on that same principle, the plaintiffs asserted

that Mr. Williams was also an employee of the national church and that it was also

vicariously liable for their damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the

national church and the Eunice church constituted a “single business enterprise,” or

that one was the alter ego of the other.

During the discovery process, the plaintiffs deposed Mr. Williams and Enoch

Perry, III, an elder and general counsel of the national church. Using this deposition

testimony, the national church filed a motion for summary judgment seeking

dismissal from the litigation. In that motion, the national church sought relief on two

grounds. First, it asserted that the two church corporations were separate and distinct

legal entities and that Mr. Williams was not its employee. Second, it asserted that Mr.

Williams was on a personal mission at the time of the accident and therefore it was

not vicariously liable regardless of whether an employment relationship existed.

After a February 6, 2006 hearing, the trial court granted the motion for

summary judgment and dismissed the national church as a party defendant in the

consolidated matters. The trial court also designated the partial judgment as a final

judgment subject to immediate appeal. The plaintiffs perfected this appeal, seeking

reversal of the judgment.1 In our opinion which follows, we will address only the

course and scope of employment ground because we find it to be dispositive of the

appeal.

1
As previously stated, the two suits were filed in the lower court and consolidated there. Our
opinion is rendered in Chapman v. Safeway Insurance Co. of Louisiana, 06-529 (La.App 3 Cir.
_/_/06), ___ So.2d ___. A separate judgment will be rendered this date in Hanchett v. Safeway
Insurance Co. of Louisiana, 06-530 (La.App. 3 Cir. _/_/06), ___ So.2d ___.

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE

The supreme court recently discussed the law pertaining to summary judgment

procedure and stated the following:

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Summary judgment is
warranted only if “there is no genuine issue as to material fact and [ ] the
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” La.Code Civ. Proc.
art. 966(C)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge’s
role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the
truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine
issue of triable fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving
party’s favor.

A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery,
affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the
legal dispute. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27
(La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751. A genuine issue is one as to which
reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach
only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary
judgment is appropriate. Id.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 966(C)(2) provides:

(2) The burden of proof remains with the movant.
However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof
at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion
for summary judgment, the movant’s burden on the motion
does not require him to negate all essential elements of the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point
out to the court that there is an absence of factual support
for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s
claim, motion, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party
fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that
he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at
trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Hines v. Garrett, 04-806, pp. 1-2 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765-66 (alteration in
original).

In the matter before us, the plaintiffs will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Therefore, the national church need only establish that there is an absence of factual

support for one or more elements essential to the plaintiffs’ claim.

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VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND COURSE AND SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT

Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320 provides in part: “Masters and employers

are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the

exercise of the functions in which they are employed.” This principle of law is

comprised in the term respondeat superior.

Vicarious liability is liability for the tortious act of another
person. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 333, at 905 (2001).
Vicarious liability is most often imposed on an employer for the torts of
its employee committed in the course and scope of employment. At
common law, the Latin phrase respondeat superior (“let the master
answer”) denotes this type of liability. Id.; Frank L. Maraist & Thomas
C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law, § 13-2, at 308-09 (1996). In
Louisiana, this concept is codified. See LSA-C.C. art. 2320; LSA-R.S.
9:3921.

Quebedeaux v. Dow Chem. Co., 01-2297, p. 4 (La. 6/21/02), 820 So.2d 542, 545 n.5.

In determining whether an employer is liable for the acts of an employee, the

factors to be considered are whether the tortious act was primarily employment

rooted, reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties, occurred

on the employer’s premises, and occurred during hours of employment. LeBrane v.

Lewis, 292 So.2d 216 (La.1974). Stated another way, the issue is whether the tortious

conduct of the employee so closely connected him or her in time, place, and causation

to his or her employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to

the employer’s business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal

considerations entirely extraneous to the employer’s interests. Id.

In Weatherford v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 93-841 (La.App. 1 Cir.

5/20/94). 637 So.2d 1208, aff’d on other grounds, 94-1793, 94-1927 (La. 2/20/95),

650 So.2d 763, the plaintiff filed suit on behalf of herself and her child, who was

injured when his bicycle was struck by the vehicle of a Catholic priest returning from

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counseling an ill person. The plaintiff argued that the Diocese of Baton Rouge, the

priest’s employer, was vicariously liable pursuant to La.Civ.Code art. 2320. The

Diocese argued that the priest went to the man’s home of his own volition on his day

off in his personal vehicle and that, given the priest’s character and nature, the priest

did something he would have done had he not been a priest. Because the trial court

had not reached the issue as framed on appeal, the first circuit conducted a de novo

review of the record and concluded that the priest was not acting in the course and

scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

In the present case, Mr. Williams’ deposition testimony established that when

the November 6, 2002 accident occurred, he was returning to Eunice in his wife’s

van after preaching a revival service in Church Point, Louisiana. Although the

Church Point church was also a Church of God in Christ church, it was otherwise

unrelated to the Eunice church, and Mr. Williams’ pastoral duties at the Eunice

church did not include participation in the revival service. According to Mr.

Williams, he received a telephone call at his home requesting that he preach the

Church Point revival and his participation was purely voluntary and for the benefit

of the Church Point congregation only. He explained that it was not unusual for him

to be involved in preaching activities outside of his role as the pastor of the Eunice

church and that these preaching activities were not limited to Church of God in

Christ Churches, but were interdenominational. In other words, Mr. Williams’

participation in revival services at other churches had less to do with his church

affiliation than with his ability as a speaker. As examples, he explained that in the

past he had conducted a revival at a Baptist church in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; had

participated in a “gospel youth explosion” in Rayne, Louisiana; and had participated

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in numerous other Christian activities involving singing, drama, and religious art,

which activities did not involve the Eunice church.

Concerning the presence of the two minor children injured in the accident, Mr.

Williams testified that he had transported them as well as other young members of

the Eunice church choir to the Church Point revival. According to Mr. Williams,

these choir members had volunteered to travel with him and sing at the revival. He

stressed the fact that their participation was for the benefit of the revival services,

and not the Eunice church. Because the service was on a Wednesday night, he did

not leave his pulpit vacant by involving himself in the revival.

Mr. Williams explained that he believed that, as a Christian, he had an

obligation or “calling” to preach the Word of God and minister to others. While

acknowledging that this obligation or calling was a qualification for being the pastor

of the Eunice church, it existed within him before becoming a pastor of that church

and would continue after he left that church and whether he pastored any other

church.

Mr. Perry testified by deposition that Mr. Williams, as pastor of the Eunice

church, had complete authority to make all decisions regarding the scheduling of

services in the local church. Mr. Perry also testified that preaching at other churches

is not part of Mr. Williams’ pastoral duties at the Eunice church.2

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs introduced

identical affidavits of Serena Chapman and Mae Bell Hanchett. In those affidavits,

each affiant asserted that “she would not allow her son to be out late at night on a

2
A copy of the Official Manual of the Church of God in Christ was identified by Mr. Perry
and attached to his deposition. Part V of the Manual distinguishes between a minister and a pastor.
It states that a local preacher is a minister who has been granted a license to preach, while a pastor
is the minister appointed over a congregation.

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school night unless it was a supervised church function” and that “[a]t no time did

[Mr. Williams] state that the trip was not a church sponsored trip.”

The plaintiffs’ basic argument is that one cannot separate the duties of the

pastor of a Christian church from his responsibilities as a Christian. That is to say,

he maintains his role as pastor twenty-four hours per day. While we agree that a

pastor is a pastor around the clock, we also note that it is a tenet of faith common to

Christians of all denominations that devotion and service to God are continuing

obligations, and, in this regard, the obligations owed by a pastor, a minister, a

preacher, and a layman are the same. It follows that the responsibilities of a pastor

have to be distinguished between purely pastoral duties and activities otherwise

associated with his Christian responsibilities.

In the matter now before us, the trial court basically concluded that Mr.

Williams was not engaged in pastoral duties at the time of the accident, and we

agree. The affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs simply repeat allegations of the

pleadings. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse

party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but his response must set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La.Code Civ.P. art.

967(B). If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

shall be rendered against him. Id. We find that the plaintiffs have not produced

factual support sufficient to establish they will be able to satisfy their evidentiary

burden of proof at trial that Williams’ conduct was within the course and scope of

his employment for purposes of vicarious liability. The partial summary judgment

was properly rendered dismissing the national church from the lawsuit.

DISPOSITION

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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We

assess all costs of the appeal to the plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED.

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