Mary Smith Patton v. David Self and William Hadlock

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

06-1029

MARY SMITH PATTON

VERSUS

DAVID SELF AND WILLIAM HADLOCK

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APPEAL FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, DOCKET NO. 55,424
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, DISTRICT JUDGE
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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Oswald A. Decuir, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Anselm N. Nwokorie
Brian G. Smith
Tikisha Y. Smith
Smith & Nwokorie
120 West Madison Aveneue
P.O. Box 1182
Bastrop, LA 71220
(318) 283-2500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Mary Smith Patton

Ronald J. Fiorenza
H. Bradford Calvit
Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel
934 Third Street, Suite 800
P.O. Drawer 1791
Alexandria, LA 71309-1791
(318) 445-3631
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
David Self and William Hadlock

COOKS, Judge.

The Defendants, David Self and William Hadlock, appeal the trial court’s

judgment which found the rights of Plaintiff, Mary Smith Patton, were violated

during the arrest of Plaintiff for traffic infractions. The trial court awarded Plaintiff

$20,000.00 for the violation of her civil liberties and any other damages suffered. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 29, 2001 at approximately 2:30 a.m., the Plaintiff, Mary Smith

Patton, was driving her pick-up truck west on San Antonio Avenue in Many,

Louisiana. Officers David Self and William Hadlock of the Many Police Department

stated they observed Plaintiff driving off the right edge of the roadway and then

crossing the centerline. Officer Hadlock had been alerted that a sedan-type

automobile was being driven in an improper manner, and was dispatched to that

immediate area when he saw Plaintiff’s alleged traffic infractions. Officer Self was

driving east on San Antonio Avenue to meet with Officer Hadlock when he observed

Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Officer Self made a U-turn in the parking lot where Officer Hadlock’s police

unit was sitting and began following Plaintiff’s mid-sized red pick-up truck, with

Officer Hadlock following behind. The Officers observed Plaintiff make a right at

the intersection of Church Street and San Antonio Avenue1, continue down San

Antonio Avenue and cross the center line again. At that point, Officer Self activated

his lights to signal to Plaintiff to pull over. Plaintiff slowed and pulled over onto the

right parking lane and curb of San Antonio Avenue immediately before Sorelle Street.

1
San Antonio Avenue makes a 90-degree right turn at its intersection with
Church Street. At this intersection, one may continue forward onto Church Street or
turn right continuing down San Antonio Avenue.
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She then slowly turned off of San Antonio Avenue onto Sorelle Street and stopped

her vehicle when it became parallel with the curb of Sorelle Street.

Both officers then approached the vehicle and instructed Plaintiff to exit the

truck. Both officers stated that as they approached the vehicle they detected the odor

of alcohol coming from the cabin of the truck. They also stated Plaintiff had slurred

speech and bloodshot eyes. Plaintiff remained in the vehicle and repeatedly asked

through her rolled down window why she had been stopped. The officers continued

to verbally instruct the Plaintiff to exit the vehicle. Plaintiff rolled her window back

up to a gap of about three inches, locked the doors and remained inside. The officers

became more aggressive in their demands for Plaintiff to exit the vehicle. Officer

Self then shouted at Plaintiff to “look at me!” When Plaintiff looked toward him,

Officer Self quickly sprayed pepper spray through the gap in the window.

Eventually, Plaintiff unlocked the door and was quickly grabbed by the officers. She

continued to ask the officers why she was being stopped, but did verbally assert that

she would exit the vehicle. Before being allowed to exit, Plaintiff was physically

removed by the officers and forced to the ground, face down, and arrested for driving

while intoxicated, failure to drive on the right side of the road, resisting an officer,

and for running a red light.2 No field sobriety test was executed and Plaintiff refused

to submit to a breathalyzer test at the Many Police Department.

The stop and arrest was recorded by video camera mounted on the dashboard

of Officer Self’s vehicle. However, the alleged traffic violations giving rise to the

stop were not on video tape. Plaintiff did not admit to the alleged traffic violations

2
At her criminal trial, Plaintiff was found guilty only of violating La.R.S.
32:71, Driving on Right Side of Road, based on the officers’ testimony. She was
found not guilty of the charges of Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated (La.R.S.
14:98), Resisting an Officer (La.R.S. 14:108), and Obedience To and Required
Traffic-Control Devices (La.R.S. 32:231).
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and chose to go to court to oppose them.

A few days prior to her criminal trial on the traffic violations, Plaintiff

complained to the district attorney over the actions of the defendants during the

arrest. No action was taken.

On January 23, 2002, the various traffic offenses were tried and heard in the

district court. The district court judge found plaintiff guilty of crossing the center

line, but found her not guilty of the other offenses. As there was no video of the

alleged driving infraction, the conviction was based on the testimony of the arresting

officers.

The following day, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety, Office of State

Police, began investigating plaintiff’s allegations of police misconduct. A report was

issued finding the complaint was unfounded and that the officers were left with “no

option other than physical force to effect the arrest.”

On September 20, 2002, Plaintiff filed a suit for damages suffered as a result

of the actions of Officers Self and Hadlock, who were named as defendants. Plaintiff

argued that “during the arrest process, petitioner was sprayed with a chemical,

forcibly removed from her vehicle and thrown to the ground.” All of these actions,

Plaintiff contended, were “unwarranted and excessive.” The petition alleged Plaintiff

suffered “personal injuries including to her neck, back, hip, thigh, knee and eye.”

The suit went to trial on May 4, 2006. The trial court gave extensive, written

reasons for finding in favor of Plaintiff. It held that the Defendants did not have

probable cause to stop Plaintiff, and then used excessive force to effectuate the arrest.

After determining that there was no probable cause to stop Plaintiff, the trial court

addressed the excessive force claim:

These findings render baseless, and heighten to a more egregious
degree, the excessive use of force by the Defendants as spraying

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Plaintiff with pepper spray, pulling her out of the vehicle against her
will and throwing her to the ground to be handcuffed. Curiously, the
other officers in the video did not seem to share the same measure of
concern over the Plaintiff. In the Court’s opinion, spraying her with
pepper spray while she was locked in a truck was void of logic. To do
so to a suspect under these conditions does not pop locks on the vehicle
doors or morph car windows into rice paper. Plaintiff posed no physical
threat whatsoever to the officers necessitating deployment of pepper
spray and by doing so did they abuse their police power given to them
to protect the City of Many while its residents slept. The pepper spray
also doomed their opportunity to conduct a field sobriety test before the
impartial eye of the camera giving their allegations of intoxication a
chance at credibility. After Plaintiff unlocked the door and was still
blinded and at the height of the burning effects of the spray upon her
eyes, nose and throat, she resisted further because, in this Court’s view,
she was disoriented under the circumstances and unable to maneuver
herself out of the truck. The Defendants, while trying to pull her from
the vehicle, continued their directives to exit, to which she responded,
“OK, I need a minute. . .” Plaintiff consented by this point, but the
officers, likely influenced by anger, chose to throw the Plaintiff to the
ground, face down, absent any sign of threat to officer safety.
Defendants claim she began “reaching to her right. . .” when locked
inside the vehicle, but this Court finds this allegation untruthful so as to
account for their use of force. Viewed in this light, the brutality
displayed was excessive and motivated by notions other than officer
safety.

A judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff finding the Defendants liable in solido

for all damages arising from the “unlawful traffic stop and arrest.” The trial court set

Plaintiff’s damages “at the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS (US

$20,000.00), together with legal interest from date of judicial demand and for all costs

incurred.” Defendants have appealed the judgment.

ANALYSIS

Defendants first contend the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in determining

that the arrest complained of by plaintiff was without probable cause. Defendants

argue that because plaintiff was convicted on one of the charges it “unequivocally

establishes that the arrest was lawful and that [plaintiff] cannot establish the lack of

probable cause for the arrest.” The record does indicate that plaintiff was convicted

of violating La.R.S. 32:71, Driving on Right Side of Road, based on the officers’

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testimony.

We note Plaintiff’s petition did not claim or allege false arrest; but, instead was

based on defendants’ use of excessive force. Although the trial court did find the stop

of Plaintiff was made without probable cause and, thus, the arrest unlawful, he did

indicate that even if the arrest were lawful, excessive force was used by the officers

to effectuate the arrest. The trial court stated:

Academically, had this Court found that this traffic stop was lawful, it
would remain deeply disturbing to believe that mere misdemeanor traffic
offenses, offenses malum prohibitum, even those as serious as driving
while intoxicated, could result in such unprovoked acts of police
aggression. It troubles this Court, nay, any Court, to see officers
forcibly dragging citizens, under cover of night, out of their vehicles
during a traffic stop because they cross a center or fog line or ride up on
the shoulder of the road.

The law is clear that “even if an officer has probable cause, the use of excessive

force in effecting the arrest becomes an actionable claim for damages.” Zerbe v.

Town of Carencro, 04-422, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/04), 884 So.2d 1224, 1228,

citing Penn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 02-893 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/2/03),

843 So.2d 1157. “Excessive force transforms ordinarily protected use of force into

an actionable battery, rendering the defendant officer and his employer liable for

damages.” Penn v. St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office, 843 So.2d at 1161.

Therefore, even if accepting Defendants’ argument that the conviction on the one

charge of crossing the centerline precludes any question as to whether probable cause

existed, and correspondingly whether there was a false arrest, Plaintiff was not

prevented from bringing her suit for excessive force.3

A determination of excessive or unnecessary force is a finding of fact which

3
Defendants also argued the trial judge erred when he visited the scene of the
alleged traffic infractions. This assignment of error solely pertained to the false arrest
issue. As we find no need to address that issue, this assignment of error is rendered
moot.
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may not be disturbed unless: (1) the record evidence does not furnish a sufficient

basis for the finding; or (2) that finding is clearly wrong. See Arceneaux v.

Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978); Saucier v. Players Lake Charles, LLC,

99-1196 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/22/99), 751 So.2d 312. In Kyle v. City of New Orleans,

353 So.2d 969 (La.1977), the supreme court set forth several factors to consider in

making a determination of whether the force used by a police officer to effect an

arrest was reasonable under the circumstances. The factors include: (1) the known

character of the arrestee; (2) the risks and dangers faced by the officer; (3) the nature

of the offense or behavior involved; (4) the chance of escape if the particular means

are not employed; (5) the existence of alternative methods of arrest or subduing the

arrestee; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers as compared to

that of the arrestee; and (7) the exigencies of the moment.

Under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, we must determine

if the trial court’s determination that Officers Self and Hadlock used unreasonable or

excessive force is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. In this determination we

need not rely merely on the testimony of the witnesses, but have the advantage of a

videotape of the events in question.

After a careful review of the entire record, we find the trial court did not err in

finding Officers Self and Hadlock did not act reasonably under the circumstances.

We direct our attention to the first Kyle factor. Defendants argue Plaintiff was

“driving erratically, apparently under the influence of alcohol, and had refused to

comply with repeated verbal instructions.” Initially, we note the video showed no

erratic driving by Plaintiff, but instead indicates she pulled off to the side of the road

when the emergency lights of the officers’ vehicles were activated. We also note,

Officer Hadlock originally stated that Plaintiff crossed the centerline and ran a red

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light on a stretch of road that was included on the videotape. However, the video

showed no crossing of any centerline by Plaintiff, and revealed Plaintiff went through

a yellow light as she was being followed by Officer Self’s vehicle, which had its

emergency lights activated. As the trial court indicated, Officer Hadlock later

changed his testimony, saying Plaintiff crossed the centerline earlier than he

previously stated. Officer Self attempted to rectify this contradiction by testifying the

actual centerline infraction occurred in the brief moment when the video camera lost

sight of the Plaintiff’s vehicle. The trial court found these clarifications to have little

merit, and believed they were a “desperate and a veiled attempt to align their words

with the unbiased gaze of the camera’s lens.”

The testimony at trial also established that approximately five months prior to

the incident, a male friend of Plaintiff filed a civilian complaint with the Many Police

Department alleging nearly identical claims against Officer Hadlock. In that case,

Plaintiff was a passenger in that vehicle and served as witness to the civilian

complaint. When questioned about that earlier civilian complaint, Hadlock admitted

that Officer Self, on the night in question in the instant case, reminded him who

Plaintiff was when he recognized her as the driver of the truck.

Plaintiff acknowledged that after being pulled over she repeatedly refused the

officers’ commands to exit the vehicle. She stated she did so because she was scared

of Officer Hadlock based upon the earlier complaint, and further stated she was aware

of his reputation for aggressive behavior and had heard “even worse things” about

Officer Self.

There is nothing in the record to establish that the officers had any known

reason to believe Plaintiff was dangerous. The only previous knowledge Defendants

had of Plaintiff was through her participation as a witness in the earlier civilian

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complaint filed against Officer Hadlock.

The second Kyle factor is the risks and dangers faced by the officers.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff initially stopped her vehicle, but then backed her truck

up. They contend they were reasonable to believe that the truck was potentially a

dangerous weapon. The trial court found Plaintiff “posed no physical threat

whatsoever to the officers necessitating deployment of pepper spray” and the use of

“pepper spray also doomed their opportunity to conduct a field sobriety test before

the impartial eye of the camera giving their allegations of intoxication a chance at

credibility.” The trial court also noted that the other officers in the video, who arrived

after the initial stop, but before Plaintiff was removed from the vehicle, “did not seem

to share the same measure of concern over the Plaintiff.”

We note that although Defendants claim they were concerned that Plaintiff’s

vehicle was potentially a dangerous weapon because she might back up in it, we find

this concern was allayed when Defendants were standing next to the driver’s side

door. Further, the trial court also found, after being pepper sprayed, Plaintiff, in

response to the continued directives from the officers to exit her vehicle, responded,

“OK, I need a minute. . .” We also note the Plaintiff also stated “I’m fixing to step

out” as she was being grabbed from her vehicle by the officers. As the trial court

noted, Plaintiff was not given time to exit the vehicle, but was forcibly removed from

her vehicle and taken to the ground. The video conforms the trial court’s account of

these events.

The third Kyle factor concerns the nature of the offenses involved. In this case,

the officers charged Plaintiff with multiple traffic violations, including an alleged

DWI. There was no indication that any weapons were involved, and it was

reasonable to assume that the officers’ apprehensions should have been allayed when

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they were able to approach the vehicle without incident.

The next Kyle factor is the arrestee’s chance of escape if particular means are

not employed. The Defendants contended because Plaintiff was behind the wheel,

the chance of escape was a legitimate concern. However, by the time the pepper

spray was used, and Plaintiff was forcibly removed from her vehicle, other police had

arrived at the scene and the Plaintiff’s vehicle was blocked by the police units.

The fifth Kyle factor is the existence of alternative methods. Defendants

contend since Plaintiff had locked her doors, the only alternative was to use pepper

spray or bust the window. The trial court noted the officers could have attempted to

pop the lock on the vehicle. We further would note the officers did not attempt to

reason with Plaintiff in a less confrontational manner or simply wait a few more

minutes.

The sixth Kyle factor is the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers

as compared to that of the arrestee. There were initially two police officers (the

defendants), and eventually more. Plaintiff was female, alone and unarmed.

The last Kyle factor concerns the exigencies of the moment. Officers Self and

Hadlock argue as long as Plaintiff was behind the wheel, she was essentially in

possession of a dangerous weapon, and thus the situation was far from stable. Even

accepting this argument as marginally providing justification for the officers’ decision

to use pepper spray, their actions in forcibly removing Plaintiff from the vehicle and

throwing her to the ground after she verbally expressed intent to comply with the

officers’ command “in a minute” was unreasonable.

Under the circumstances shown here, the force used by Officers Self and

Hadlock was excessive. The Plaintiff, although not complying with the officer’s

commands to exit the vehicle, presented little danger of harm or escape. We also note

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the officers did not answer Plaintiff’s question as to why she was pulled over.

Although she was in her vehicle, Plaintiff had no real means of escape, as the vehicle

was blocked in and other officers soon arrived on the scene. While reasonable minds

may differ as to whether the officers’ use of pepper spray was warranted, we fully

agree with the trial court that following use of the pepper spray, Plaintiff, who

verbally indicated she would then comply and exit the vehicle, was not given a

reasonable time to do so. Rather than give Plaintiff the opportunity to compose

herself, the officers forcibly grabbed her from the vehicle and threw her to the

ground, placed a knee in her back and handcuffed her. The trial court also made a

credibility determination in rejecting the account of the defendants that Plaintiff

reached to her right after the pepper spray was applied. We find the record supports

the trial court finding that “the brutality displayed was excessive and motivated by

notions other than officer safety.” Therefore, after reviewing the record and

applicable law, we find the factfinder’s conclusion, which involved credibility

determinations by the trial judge, that the force used by the officers was excessive

under the circumstances, was a reasonable one.

Defendants also contend the damages awarded by the trial court were

excessive. To overturn the trial court’s award there must be a showing that the trier

of fact abused the great discretion accorded it in awarding damages. Simply put, the

award must be so high or low in proportion to the injuries such that it “shocks the

conscience.” Young v. Fitzpatrick, 03-1038 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/4/04), 865 So.2d 969;

Ross v. City of New Orleans, 00-1879 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/01), 808 So.2d 751;

Moore v. Healthcare Elmwood, Inc., 582 So.2d 871 (La.App. 5 Cir.1991). In

deciding whether an award is excessive, appellate courts must consider the individual

circumstances of the subject case to determine if the trier of fact abused its much

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discretion in setting the award. Only after determining that the award was improper

may the appellate court consider awards in previous, similar cases. Kaufman v.

Adrian’s Tree Service, Inc., 00-2381 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/31/01), 800 So.2d 1102;

Garcia v. Louisiana Dep’t. of Transp. and Development, 00-0930 (La.App. 4 Cir.

5/16/01), 787 So.2d 1142.

Defendants argue Plaintiff had numerous physical problems which predated the

incident. The record conformed Plaintiff did have prior physical problems, but also

indicated she was not seeing a physician during the period prior to the accident.

Plaintiff also testified that the injuries she suffered from the accident exacerbated her

prior medical problems. The trial court was presented with this evidence at trial, and

concluded that Plaintiff did suffer compensable injuries such that an award of

$20,000.00 was appropriate. After a thorough review of the record, we cannot say

the trial court abused its great discretion in its award of damages.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs

of this appeal are assessed against Defendants-Appellants.

AFFIRMED.

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