Alice F. Andries v. David Andries

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-88

ALICE F. ANDRIES

VERSUS

DAVID ANDRIES

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 221,265
HONORABLE F. RAE DONALDSON SWENT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, and Marc T. Amy, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Henry H. Lemoine, Jr.
607 Main Street
Pineville, LA 71360
(318) 473-4220
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
David Andries

Lauren Gay Coleman
Coleman & Henderson, LLC
910 Foisy Avenue
Alexandria, LA 71301
(318) 449-9857
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Alice F. Andries

AMY, Judge.

David Andries appeals the judgment partitioning the community property of

his former marriage to Alice Andries. The appeal, however, appears before this court

on an incomplete record as it lacks the transcript from the trial court proceedings.

The pleadings demonstrate that Mr. and Ms. Andries were married in 1957 and that

Mr. Andries filed for divorce on July 21, 2000. The trial court granted the divorce

in August 2001. Thereafter, in June 2003, Ms. Andries filed a petition for partition

of community property. The matter came before the district court for trial in March

2006. After the rendering of written reasons for ruling, the trial court signed the

judgment of partition on November 16, 2006.

Mr. Andries appeals the partition of judgment, assigning the following as error:

1. The trial court erred in establishing a value of the Hancock Bank
CD which was cashed and disbursed in 2000 between the parties
prior to the filing of the Petition for Divorce, therefore it was not
in existence at the time the Petition for Divorce was filed nor at
the time of the trial of this matter.

2. The trial court erred in not placing a value on the 1990 Dodge
Truck and a Lincoln that were last in the possession of Alice
Andries, and who had sole use and possession of said
automobiles, and did not take the necessary steps for the
preservation of said automobiles.

3. The trial court erred in not even acknowledging the motor home
that was a community asset and was last in the sole use and
possession of Alice Andries.

4. The trial court erred in not allowing all reimbursement payments
made by David Andries on community obligations that he paid
after the Petition for Divorce was filed, said obligations being
paid with his separate funds.

5. The trial court erred in accepting Alice Andries’ claim that she
would be entitled to a reimbursement for one-half of an income
tax refund.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

Discussion

State of the Record

Review of Mr. Andries’ assignments of error is hampered by the absence of a

trial transcript. Both Mr. Andries’ brief and the trial court’s reasons for ruling note

that the proceeding was not recorded. Counsel for Mr. Andries writes that: “When

this matter went to trial on March 7, 2006, this writer had no reason to believe that

the Trial Court would not record the testimony of the proceedings, as evidenced in

the Reasons for Judgment.”

There is no indication what action, if any, was taken to transcribe the hearing

according to La.Code Civ.P. arts. 2130 and 2131, which provide:

Art. 2130. Record on appeal; statement of facts

A party may require the clerk to cause the testimony to be taken
down in writing and this transcript shall serve as the statement of facts
of the case. The parties may agree to a narrative of the facts in
accordance with the provisions of Article 2131.

Art. 2131. Same; narrative of facts

If the testimony of the witnesses has not been taken down in
writing the appellant must request the other parties to join with him in
a written and signed narrative of the facts, and in cases of disagreement
as to this narrative or of refusal to join in it, at any time prior to the
lodging of the record in the appellate court, the judge shall make a
written narrative of the facts, which shall be conclusive.

Despite his burden to do so as the appellant, there is no indication that Mr. Andries

caused to be provided either a transcript or narrative of facts. See Steinhoff v.

Steinhoff, 03-24 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 843 So.2d 1290; Creech v. Creech, 29,499

(La.App. 2 Cir. 5/7/97), 694 So.2d 589. See also Saacks v. Saacks, 96-736, p. 5

(La.App. 5 Cir. 1/28/97), 688 So.2d 673, 675 (wherein the fifth circuit observed that:

“Appellant is in the position of having the burden to demonstrate error in the

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judgment of the trial court. For that reason the burden is on appellant to comply with

La. C.C.P. art. 2131 and to have a complete record before the court of appeal.” )

Thus, while the parties’ exhibits1 have been submitted to this court, they are

before us absent the context of the testimony that accompanied their introduction into

evidence. The trial court, however, rendered written reasons for ruling, which

demonstrate its reasoning as to its determinations. To the extent that Mr. Andries’

assignments of error require reference to evidence and testimony that could have been

discoverable from the transcript, this omission is imputable to him. See Steinhoff, 843

So.2d 1293. In Creech, 694 So.2d 589, the second circuit, remarked that, in instances

where the record lacks a transcript and factual issues are involved, the trial court’s

judgment is presumed to be correct and supported by competent evidence. Thus,

review is limited to determining whether the pertinent law was correctly applied to

the facts. Therefore, we review Mr. Andries’ appeal in light of these considerations.

1
In addition to numbered exhibits provided at trial, the trial court’s reasons for ruling
reference the following:

The marking of exhibits in this case has created some confusion, especially
since the matter was not recorded. David Andries testified at length from a trial
notebook prepared by his attorney and he used the numbering system in the
notebook. The parties also introduced a few exhibits not in the notebook, which
were handed to the clerk. Since the trial notebook had not been introduced at that
time, the exhibits were identified as 1, etc. The trial notebook was not introduced
until the end of trial, when the court asked the attorney how it was to be numbered.
The attorney asked it be numbered D-1 in globo. In fact, the notebook has multiple
exhibits numbered as “1,” etc. Apparently, the clerk did not hear the exchange
between the court and the attorney, because the minute entry does not show the
introduction of the notebook. The court is certain, however, that it was.

The court is also certain, however, that the notebook contains much more than
David’s actual testimony. There are explanatory statements that may have been more
than he said and far more details are provided about bills. That is, the typed portions
of the notebook are not regarded as part of the exhibits and the court has considered
only the exhibits, themselves.

A version of this trial notebook has been filed as an exhibit with the record and, in light of the trial
court’s statement, has been considered on review.

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Certificate of Deposit

The trial court recognized that the parties possessed “a CD in the amount of

$40,957.37, on June 25, 2000” and, based upon a June 2000 statement of the account

submitted by Ms. Andries, awarded each one-half ownership of the certificate. Mr.

Andries asserts that the trial court erred in valuing the certificate of deposit at

$40,957.37. Rather, he contends that it should have been valued at the time of the

trial as is required by La.R.S. 9:2801.2 Mr. Andries further contends that the

certificate was “cashed some time after June 25, 2000 and prior to July 21, 2000,

which was the date the community was terminated, and the funds were either used to

pay on community obligations and/or disbursed between the parties.”

Notwithstanding any testimony which is absent from the record and any related

credibility determinations made by trial court, the reasons for ruling specifically

indicate the trial court’s awareness of La.R.S. 9:2801. However, the trial court

observed that the parties’ evidence precluded the statute’s application, stating:

The court also notes that the parties did not present all property
values as of the trial date as is required by LSA-R.S. 9:2801, et seq.
Neither party objected or offered trial-current evidence. The court has
accepted the value presented and will calculate the distribution
accordingly.

In light of this statement, and since the only evidence available for review is that

offered by Ms. Andries, we find no error in the trial court’s determination.

Vehicles

Mr. Andries next asserts that the trial court erred in failing to place a value on

a 1990 Dodge Truck and Lincoln that were in Ms. Andries’ possession. He contends

2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2801 (A)(4)(a) provides that: “The court shall value the assets
as of the time of trial on the merits, determine the liabilities, and adjudicate the claims of the
parties.”

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that she had full use and possession of the automobiles, but that she failed to properly

preserve their value.

In this regard, the trial court stated:

There was much testimony about cars. David has a 1997 Ford F
150, which he showed has [sic] having a 2005 blue book listing of
$11,675.00. He is awarded ownership of this vehicle. Alice had a
Dodge truck and someone had a Lincoln, but the testimony at trial
showed the Dodge had been wrecked, had the tags pulled and was not
operable and the Lincoln had not been driven since 1995. The court
finds these vehicle [sic] do not have any value and do not even exist for
the purposes of assigning ownership in this partition.

If the factors that Mr. Andries’ advances were presented to the trial court, there is no

indication of them in the materials available for review. Thus, the record reveals no

error in this regard. As such, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Motor Home

Mr. Andries’ third assignment of error concerns the couple’s motor home,

which, according to the trial court’s ruling, was repossessed in September 2001. Ms.

Andries’ exhibit number 1 indicates that a deficiency of $28,739.05 remained after

repossession.3 Other than this fact, and copies of checks written as payment through

September 2001, the record contains only the following comment by the trial court

in its assessment of the motor home and Mr. Andries’ claimed reimbursements for

payments made toward the home:

3
In discussing the couple’s debts, the trial court explained:

The evidence from the parties shows the former community was solvent on
the date of termination, July 21, 2000. Complications have arisen, however, because
the parties made interim payments, paid off remaining balances and sold property
prior to the suit for partition. Thus, there were other assets that existed and were used
to pay off the debts. Further, the parties have not communicated with each other and,
therefore, what should have been simple has become very difficult. The parties
allowed a motor home to be repossessed, instead of trying to sell the vehicle. In any
event, this suit is really a partition of the remaining assets held by David, as other
assets were used to pay off all debts.

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7. Bank of the West (#8656) - This debt was for the Motor Home,
where Alice lived until she set up the Kendall Lane property. David is
awarded reimbursement for one-half of $22,274.73 or $11,137.36, for
payments he made from August 2000 to September 2001, when it was
repossessed. The testimony of the parties does not persuade the court
that Alice should be solely responsible for the Motor Home bill.

In this assignment of error, Mr. Andries asserts that the motor home was in Ms.

Andries’ possession and, therefore, that she should have been held solely liable for

the debt. He also contends that the trial court should have valued the motor home as

“if it still existed at the time of trial” and then provided him with a proper amount of

“credit” for this community asset.

This assignment lacks merit. The trial court’s reasons clearly indicate that it

considered the parties’ evidence and testimony on this issue, awarding

reimbursements for his contribution to the property. Nothing in the record reveals

error in its determination.

Reimbursement

In a two-sentence assignment of error, Mr. Andries contends that he provided

invoices and cancelled checks “proving” community debts and, therefore, he is

entitled to credit “for one-half of all payments that he made as outlined and presented

in the exhibits.”

On the issue of reimbursements, the trial court found:

At the time of trial, all of the debts were paid. There was a date
in time where the parties reached some kind of agreement to pay off
creditors, but this agreement did not result in any satisfaction for the
parties. [Mr. Andries] continues to hold the majority of assets and seeks
reimbursements for any payment he ever made, without proof it was
payment on a community obligation or acknowledging half of the
payment he made was for his own part of the community debt. [Ms.
Andries], on the other hand, does not claim to have made any payment
on community debts, herself, but has made little or no explanation for
any debt or accounts.

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....

[Mr. Andries] has made multiple claims for reimbursement for
payments made post-termination. These payments are set forth in the
trial notebook; however, the court was not presented with any arguments
or law regarding what was done.

The trial court considered each of the items for which reimbursement was claimed,

finding evidence supporting a reimbursement to Mr. Andries in the amount of

$21,167.09. The trial court’s recognition that the cancelled checks and invoices lack

context is equally true on appeal as there is no accompanying transcript.

This assignment lacks merit.

Tax Refund

Finally, Mr. Andries contends that the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Andries

“one-half of an income tax refund from 2000, simply based on her testimony and no

evidence. Mr. Andries, on the other hand, had all of the evidence in the world and

the Trial Court still refused David Andries’ testimony that the parties had already

divided the proceeds.”

Again, any testimony regarding the income tax refund is absent from the

record. Further, the trial court’s reasons for ruling indicate that credibility

determinations were involved regarding the tax refund. The trial court explained:

[Ms. Andries] seeks reimbursement of one half of an income tax refund
of $13,170.00. She endorsed the check and says he cashed it. [Mr.
Andries] claims he cashed the check and gave her half. The court
accepts [Ms. Andries’] version of events. Everything else in this case
demonstrates [Mr. Andries’] desire and intent to withhold paying [Ms.
Andries] anything. The court does not believe he gave her the one half
and she is owed reimbursement of one half or $6,585.00.

This assignment lacks merit.

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DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs

of this proceeding are assigned to the appellant, David Andries.

AFFIRMED.

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